
Copy 1 



Light and Truth 

AFTER 

The World Tragedy 

A POLITICAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF 

THE EUROPEAN WAR of 1914-1919 



By 
J. ANTHONY STARKE 



ADVANCE PUBLISHING CO. 

44 EAST 23rd STREET NEW YORK 



Light and Truth 

AFTER 

The World Tragedy 

- A POLITICAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF 

THE EUROPEAN WAR of 1914-1919 



By 
j/ANTHONY STARKE 

Author of these Political Pamphlets 
THE TRUE SITUATION (1896) Gold Standard vs. Free Silver 

NATIONAL EVOLUTION (1908) Electoral, Immigration and 

Office-Tenure Reform 

SHALL THIS REPUBLIC LIVE? (1912) The Three-cornered Party 

Contest and the Author's 
General Reform Program 

New York, August 1st, 1921 
ADVANCE PUBLISHING CO. 

44 EAST 23rd STREET NEW YORK 

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will be promptly filled 

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Copyright, 1921 
By J. ANTHONY STARKE, New York 

All Rights Reserved 

German and Spanish Translations in Preparation 
by the Author 



NOV -3 1921 

©C1A629230 



LIST OF CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION 7 

A. ANTE-WAR POLITICAL CONDITION 
OF EUROPE. 

I. 1639-1793 15 

II. 1793-1815 19 

III. 1815-1870 24 

IV. THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-1871 27 

V. THE PROBLEM OF ALSACE-LORRAINE 31 

VI OTHER POLITICAL EVENTS CONTRIBU- 

TORY TO THE WAR CONDITIONS 

OF 1914 (1854-1914) 35 

A. The Russo-Turkish and Balkan Questions 36 
B The Unification and Development of 

Italy 42 

C- Germany's Phenomenal R'se to World 

p ower — Her Oriental Expansion Policy 44 

D. Austria's Political Character and 

Destiny 55 

E. The Ensuing Combinations of the Pow- 

ers — The Triple Alliance — Germany, 
Austria, Italy. The Triple Entente — 
England, France, Russia 61 

VII MORAL DELINQUENCY AND SPIRITUAL 

INERTIA AS ESSENTIAL FACTORS 

OF THE WAR ^ 



B. OUTBREAK AND COURSE OF THE 
WAR. 

VIII. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR— The Great 

Conspiracy — The British Propaganda. 79 
IX. THE FOOD BLOCKADE — Its After-War Effects 98 
X. ITALY, GREECE AND ROUMANIA IN THE 

WAR — Those Irredentas 103 

XL AMERICA IN THE WAR 110 

A. American Neutrality — Sentimental In- 

fluences. — International Rights on the 
High Seas — The U-Boat Warfare — 
Sinking of the Lusitania — The Psycho- 
logical Moment Neglected 110 

B. The American Anti-German Propaganda 

— The German Anti-American Propa- 
ganda — Our Disinterested Motives — 
Political Effects of the War Upon 

America 126 

XII. THE INVASION OF BELGIUM AND THE 
ENEMY COUNTRIES — The Belgian 
Atrocities — The Devastation Charge 

Against Germany 151 

XIII. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND HER 

ALLIES 160 

A. Strain upon Germany — Democracy's 

Opportunity — The Wilson Gospel — 
Military Puzzles Explained — America 
Turns the Tide to Victory — The 
Aftermath 160 

B. The Armistice. Abdication of Kaiser 

Wilhelm II. — The Reaction of Des- 
pair — A New Germany Revealed — 
The Modern Drift — A New Philosophy 
of Life Needed — The German State. . 185 

C. Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria in the 

War — Self-Determination of Nations 
— Poland — Opportunities for Retalia- 
tion ' 211 



XIV. PEACE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.. 224 

A. The Peace and League of Falsehood — 

The Future Armies, and Disarma- 
ment — The War a Fiasco — Ireland's 
Title to Independence — America's 
Disappointment and Awakening 224 

B. War and Civilization — Misleading Illu- 

sions — A "Natural View" of Life as 
the Remedy — The True Historical and 
Ethical View of War 236 

XV. THE SUMMIT — The Nineteenth Century — 
Progress or Decay — The Philosophy 
of "Rationalism" vs. Supernatural Re- 
ligions — Its Practical Application. . . . 247 

XVI. AFTER-PEACE CONCLUSIONS— The League 
of Nations and America — Modification 
of the Treaty — Revelations from Paris 
— President Wilson's Position — Ger- 
man and other War Publications — 
Present Situation in Europe — England 
and France Show their Hand at Last 
— Final Summary of the Moral Aspect 
of the War — The Russian Drama. . . . 267 



NOTE. The main occurrences of the war being still vividly 
in the public mind, a consecutive reading of this book 
is not strictly necessary. With this point in view, the 
separate articles were each made as complete as pos- 
sible. This plan accounts for the occasional repetition 
of statements which may be found. 



taken place since peace was signed enable us to clearly recog- 
nize and analyze the true realities which precipitated the war, 
their historical background and all the attendant economic and 
social factors which combined brought on the terrible complica- 
tion. In the light of such examination we begin to realize to 
what a distorted state of emotion and astonishing perversion 
of reasoning powers the entire world, almost, had been brought 
during the war by the nefarious methods which inaugurated 
and accompanied the upheaval. Truth was dethroned by black 
deceit; all normal feeling and judgment became stifled; un- 
reasoning passion was given free run! Our examination will 
also disclose those disturbing social and ethical tendencies which 
were active in Europe for years and contributed their share 
to the conflict and its strange ending. 

In its turn, the war has given to these non-political questions 
an increased importance which will make them, perhaps, its 
greatest resulting problems. In this way we will endeavor 
to establish the correct relationship between the war and all 
the facts of political and social life and the individual man. 
No other, narrower, examination of this world catastrophe can 
have any value of true information and furnish us with real 
guiding lessons for the future. In order to reach this com- 
bined view on the political and social side of the problem 
and a well-balanced estimate of the conflict as a whole, it 
will be necessary to present the war to a large extent from 
the point of view of Germany and her allied powers in order 
to check our present preponderating impressions with the other 
side of the case. We have been given the Entente represen- 
tation of the war so exclusively, almost, that it becomes nec- 
essary for us also to know the German view and relations 
of the war in all its factors if we are to arrive at a correct 
judgment on the struggle and our own part in it. 

We must, 'therefore, aim to be impartial, hide nothing and 
spare no one, whether it be on our side or on that of 
the enemy. Great deeds of valor, ability, devotion and sacri- 
fice have been done by all the nations engaged in the war! 
From the merely physical and intellectual point of view the 
war is for all concerned a testimonial of merit! All the same, 
when we include also the moral and ethical factors and grasp 



the commotion as a whole the war is for all its actors and the 
world at large a picture of horror, shame and remorse ; the 
bright individual spots are extinguished by the revolting moral 
outrage of this unwarranted and monstrous fratricide! It 
compels us to denounce the political motives and methods which 
led to and reigned during the war and reign to-day in the 
most scathing terms which language can find. The war was 
a nauseating mass of falsehood and low sordid cunning — an 
ethical fraud — and a maze of incomprehensible aberration! 
This Gordian knot of foul conceits, calumnies and lies must 
be cut asunder by fearless strokes of dissecting criticism till 
the truth shall stand revealed and the guilty be ^xposed! In 
this iniquitous war gigantic, relentless and often barbarous 
physical forces and methods were projected into the arena and 
sustained by equally unnatural, corrupt moral impulses. There 
was an absence, on all sides, of grand purposes, of honest and 
true enmities, of real enthusiasm for a just cause or noble 
ideal; instead there were the low designs of material ambitions, 
lust of power for its own sake, all covered by a web of false 
pretenses. This war lacked even the brutal nobility of openly 
avowed conquest or of a fanatical religious or general senti- 
mental object; it was, from beginning to end, the war of 
meanest motives of all history — the war of cold," cruel political 
and material calculation — the negation of all our moral and 
religious pretensions — -a crushing accusation against all man- 
kind! It is absolutely necessary that this base character of 
the war be revealed to all peoples at this time — now — not in 
twenty years hence — if we wish to prevent an early similar 
or even more awful atrocity. The hideous character of the 
war is particularly illustrated by the cynical cunning with 
which its perversity was sought to be hidden to the great 
majority of men in all countries by an organized system of 
hypocritical pretense, on the part of the Entente powers, of 
being engaged in a conflict for liberty, justice, human rights 
and civilization against a barbarous people and autocratic 
Kaiser who had risen to destroy these! What a nightmare of 
an idea! — mendacious and unbelievable on its very statement. 
With us in America, alas! this cruel deceit became transformed 
into an exalted but false illusion and inspiration which led 



us into war and in its course cost us over a hundred-thousand 
lives, heavy material sacrifices and deep suffering, and has 
brought us mostly burdens and disappointment. 

This book is not a history of the war in the ordinary sense. 
The reader is assumed to be acquainted with the general course 
of events, diplomatic and military. Reference to these is 
made only as appears necessary to illustrate the author's point 
of view and elucidate his deductions. The general trend of 
these has been indicated in the preceding statements and may 
be formulated more specifically, as to the political issues of 
the war, as follows: 

1. To show that the official advanced war motives of 
America against Germany were founded on imperfect 
information , and skilfully aroused prejudices, and that 
they were colored and sustained by an idealism which, 
while genuine as far as the large body of the people was 
concerned, had been artificially inspired by an interested 
clique which wanted war for a variety of reasons, of 
which some were as sordid as those of the European En- 
tente powers. 

2. To repel with all possible emphasis the charge that 
Germany had plotted and started the war for motives 
of political aggrandizement and a general policy of 
"world conquest," and to roll back this infamous charge 
of her sole responsibility upon its authors and restore the 
name of Germany, as to this important issue, to the 
estimation in which it was held before the war. 

3. To disprove the charge of "systematic and official cruelty" 
and "wanton destructiveness" in the conduct of the war 
by the Central powers beyond the general war practice 
of other nations in an enemy country, and to expose and 
denounce the unprincipled exaggeration with which this 
charge has been exploited for sentimental purposes in 
the allied countries, particularly in America. 

4. To protest against the annihilating terms of peace im- 
posed upon Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, but 
particularly upon Germany, and to arouse a sentiment for 
their immediate revision on lines of what is politically 

10 



just under the conditions of Section 2 and reasonably pos- 
sible of fulfillment. The admission of the joint responsi- 
bility by all the powers involved must become the basis 
of the peace revision. Also to insist that in regard to 
economic questions and territorial adjustments a settle- 
ment be made in agreement with natural geographical 
and true racial boundaries and approved by a free plebis- 
cite of the populations affected. 

5. To bring about gradually through the realization of the 
fact that the world was enslaved by a mistaken concep- 
tion of the origin and nature of the war, the conviction 
that a great wrong has been done to Germany and her 
allies, and that, in reparation of this wrong, not only 
should the Treaty of Versailles be revised, as stated in 
Section 4, but these stricken countries be rehabilitated 
as speedily as possible and their present acute distress 
relieved. 

6. In America to stimulate by word and example a soften- 
ing of the aspersity and prejudices which were aroused by 
the war against our fellow-citizens of German birth or 
descent, and who were compelled to suffer much un- 
deserved abuse and heavy material losses. In these 
respects the war recollection should be buried as speedily 
as possible. It would be thoroughly wrong, un-American 
and most regrettable if the former relations of mutual 
esteem and confidence were not promptly restored with 
our German-American and other late "enemy" fellow- 
citizens, in business as well as socially. 

We see from the preceding that the just determination of 
these political questions is not a matter of mere interested 
argument as to "who is right and who is wrong" for its own 
sake but a necessary procedure for helping the world out of 
the evil consequences of the war. We cannot expect to arrive 
at this result until a just peace is determined on the basis of 
truth; until this is done all settlements made will prove mere 
makeshifts. We may, naturally, wish to squirm out of our 
own responsibilities in the premises, and also to assist our 
friends to do the same, but it will not avail! As a final dispo- 

11 



sition of the war issues and results, the Treaty of Versailles 
is an international calumny and must be wiped out, cost what 
may in hurt feelings of national pride and violation of opinions 
and sentiments with which we have deceived ourselves! There 
can be no real peace, no world regeneration, no new prosperity 
and new comity among the nations until this treaty is rewritten 
on the basis of war facts now established beyond all doubt. 
The day for acknowledgment has come! 

The importance of the social and ethical questions related 
to and focused by the war conditions is now fully recognized; 
they have become the absorbing intellectual problem of the 
world, from philosophers and doctrinary preachers to statesmen 
and the educated of all nations. The author's views on these 
questions are presented in scattered instalments in connection 
with the text subjects of articles XII B, XIII B, XIV and XV. 
In regard to socialism of every kind and degree, its further 
spread on the lines and aims now followed is deprecated, the 
movement being, in the opinion of the writer, defective in 
several important respects in its fundamental theory and im- 
practical in application on a large scale through not taking 
sufficient account of the general laws of nature and the limita- 
tions of human nature and individual character. Socialism will 
require to purify and strengthen its system in the direction 
stated in the text to enable it to place its promise to mankind 
upon a firmer footing. Above all, socialism and all the other 
present surging movements of life reform, political reform 
and industrial reorganization should be divorced, as to their 
ethical foundation and purpose, from supernatural beliefs and 
be founded upon a natural system of life philosophy, called 
"rationalism" by the author, and set forth in the book at the 
various points mentioned. The opinion is expressed that super- 
natural religion and related schools of thought should not be 
made the source and guide of our code of practical life ethics 
for the individual and society. The author makes the attempt, 
in all earnestness, to show that the false morality which pro- 
ceeds from these phantastic beliefs, and which produced a fatal 
inertia of spiritual outlook as applied to political relations, was 
in reality the ultimate cause of the war. By their power of 
distorting man's conception of his own nature they promote, 

12 



instead of restrain and suppress, the low selfish impulses of 
our animal character. Religion, as we understand it in its 
practical aim, has not succeeded to enthrone the virtues which 
it counsels and has not brought the real brotherhood of man — 
not after several thousand years of work. Such progress as 
has been made towards these ideals is due almost entirely to 
the advance of man's natural intelligence — which carried the 
advance in religious thought with it — and must now carry us 
out of it. The fault is not in the purpose but in the mistaken 
fundamental idea and in the method of teaching. It is these 
which are responsible for the lamentable, barren results shown 
to-day in the moral and social chaos which pervades the world. 
The reader should thoroughly understand that the author's 
ideas are not the result of any narrow antagonism to religion 
as such but of a deep conviction that our everyday morality 
needs a less illusory foundation, one more convincing and, 
therefore, more authoritative and in better agreement with 
the quality of 20th century intellect. 

The war has been a terrible destroyer, not only of human 
lives and material possessions but of beliefs, hopes, illusions 
and false ideals of every kind, in regard to man's nature and 
the problem of existence. Surely, our life philosophy must 
be reconstructed! The childish myths about a "soul" apart 
from the body, of a "conscious life" after death, of the belief - 
in "divine providence," in "eternal justice" and in a "pre- 
determined destiny" as to our position and course in life and 
the occurrences in the world in general must be dismissed as 
a nebulous inheritance from the infancy of man and incom- 
patible with this age. Nothing, certainly, has been more 
thoroughly demonstrated by the war than the utter untenability 
and emptiness of these beliefs! These propositions will, no 
doubt, seem very extreme to many but they are not out of 
proportion to the existing world malady, neither is there any- 
thing new in them; doubt about the supernatural is as old as 
mankind itself. What we have stated is impartially deduced 
from the facts of life and is held as incontrovertible in ever 
widening circles ; now the war and the ghastly exhibition it has 
made of man has given to these views a glaring vividness and 
convincing basis of truth. We seem to have walked in a 

13 



wrong direction; the illusory and supercilious character of 
our thought and feeling — the whole false pretense of our life 
and living — stand to-day exposed and must be remodeled if 
civilized society is not to succumb! 

In the article entitled "The Summit" the conclusions out- 
lined above are pursued further, and the attempt is made to 
focus not only the war and our immediate life interests but 
the position of our civilization as a whole in the light of larger 
history and of the great cosmic laws to which human existence 
is subordinated. In this view civilization is seen to come and 
go in- ascending and retreating waves of achievement, now 
carried by this people or part of the world and now by an- 
other. It is also revealed that stagnation and retreat are 
mainly caused by the failure of the moral philosophy (religion, 
if you prefer) of a particular t'me, and in a lesser degree by 
the exhaustion of the physical and mental powers, by external 
subjection or other material agencies. Applying this deduction 
to our own time, we are brought to the conclusion that such a 
failure and retreat of civilization is vividly indicated by the 
actuality of the war's occurrence and the general conditions 
of our day. These, and certain parallel physical symptoms 
which are plainly in evidence, are a warning to us that the 
civilized western world may have reached the crest of such 
$. wave of historical development. Shall we fall and fail utterly 
or, after a period of stagnation and travail, rise again to new 
heights of achievement? 



14 



A. ANTE-WAR POLITICAL CONDITION 
OF EUROPE 

I. 1639-1793 

These six Introductory Articles were written to furnish 
the reader with the historical outline indispensably necessary 
to enable him to comprehend the political and general situation 
in Europe as it existed at the time just previous to the war. 
Without these facts fully understood, he would not be able 
to gauge correctly the political, racial and economic factors 
which entered into the motives and objects of the war on the 
part of the several nations involved. The American reader 
needs this information particularly because foreign history and 
geography are not taught to any great extent in our public 
schools, such study being reserved for the higher colleges. We 
also lack in our public life the animated intercourse which 
exists in Europe between men for discussing history and 
pending political questions and which gives even to the Eu- 
ropean of ordinary education a fair grasp of past and current 
events. When we join to this deficiency the circumstance that 
the average American is too far removed in his interests to 
feel a very keen concern in the political affairs of Europe, 
except during some great event like the war just closed, it 
becomes evident that we may easily fall victims to false infor- 
mation spread before us in times of agitation or actual hostili- 
ties by those interested to suppress the truth, and who may 
wish to work upon our national pride, racial sympathies or 
humanitarian impulses for their own selfish purposes. 

The greatest event still intimately connected with the 
political history of Europe as the shaping influence of modern 
conditions is the French Revolution of 1789-1795. In its 
tempestuous course the revolution aroused the opposition of 

15 



the other European states, trembling for the established social 
and political order of the world, and this brought on the 
"wars of the French Republic." These, in turn, produced 
General Napoleon and the defeat of the external enemies of 
France, yet ultimately led to the fall of the French Republic. 
The military savior turned dictator and the republic was suc- 
ceeded by the empire and Napoleon as emperor, in his astound- 
ing career of military and political triumphs. These ended 
in his own defeat and eclipse at Waterloo, followed by the 
Congress of Vienna and the final, second, peace of Paris in 
1815. The settlement there made in regard to the boundaries 
and sovereignties of the different countries involved in the 
long struggle — France, Austria, independently and also as 
nominal head of the German Empire, Russia, England, Holland, 
Scandinavia, Spain, Sardinia, and Prussia and a number of 
smaller independent German States forming the Germany of 
that day — is the foundation and starting point of modem po- 
litical Europe. 

It is not necessai'y for the purpose of this book to dwell 
in much detail upon the events of the wars of the French 
Revolution, of those preceding it and of the Napoleonic era. 
The reader who desires to inform himself thereon may study 
up on the story of these stirring times from any of the standard 
books of history. But it is necessary for our future argument 
on the war just closed to recite at least the salient facts of 
Germany's unfortunate position and acute sufferings in these 
many wars at the hands of France. This recital will trace 
the origin of the deep-seated resentment which the Germans 
feel towards the French in consequence of these aggressions 
and depredations. We must go back to the time of Louis the 
XIV of France and Frederick the Great of Prussia, in fact still 
further back to Louis the XIII and his famous cardinal-minister, 
Richelieu, to find the record that sections of Alsace, a part of 
Germany since the Middle Ages, were first seized by the French, 
in the year 1639, in the course of the complications which arose 
out of the thirty-years' war of the Reformation (Luther and 
Protestantism — 1618-1648). About ten years later, in the 
peace of Westphalia (1648), which terminated that historic 
religious conflict, these first gains of France in Alsace were 

16 



confirmed to her and reluctantly conceded by prostrate Ger- 
many, exhausted by the long war. 

Early in the reign of Louis the XIV, concurrent with the 
time of the Great Elector of Brandenburg (founder of the 
Prussian dynasty) , the second incursion of France into the 
upper Alsace and into the Palatinate, and beyond the Rhine 
into the Frankish countries, took place, conducted by the 
feared general Turenne. He devastated these sections in a 
barbarous manner, burning and pillaging as he went, and ex- 
tending his raids all along the rivers Saar and Moselle, in 
Lorraine (1674-1678). In the peace of Nymwegen (1679) new 
districts of Alsace were claimed by the French and also the 
first tentative hold obtained over parts of Lorraine. These 
successes, made relatively easy by the weakness and lack of 
unity of the small German princes who ruled over these coun- 
tries, emboldened Louis the XIV to make additional demands. 
He proceeded to issue his famous "decrees," — a sort of com- 
pulsory declaration of political adherence — and had them pro- 
mulgated by the bribed and overawed "Reunion Councils" 
which he had set up. In pursuance of these steps he boldly 
seized a series of additional towns, villages and country dis- 
tricts of Alsace. In the very midst of ostensible peace he 
had his general fall upon the free German city of Strassburg 
with a strong force, disarm the defenders and compel them, 
upon their knees and under pain of instant death, to swear 
allegiance to France (1680). All these robberies of German 
lands had to be conceded — under protest — by the disconcerted 
and divided German and Austrian rulers of these parts, unable 
to defend themselves against their powerful enemy, and were 
assigned to the French in the peace of 1684. 

But still greater trials were in store for Alsace and Loi*raine 
and the unfortunate Rhine countries which formed the buffer 
states between France, on the one side, and Austria and 
Prussia beyond. A fourth invasion, dictated wholly by mon- 
archical ambitions and entirely devoid of provocation on the 
part of Alsace or Germany, occurred in the so-called "Orleans 
War" for the succession to the rule of the Palatinate (1690- 
1697), in which dispute Louis the XIV was determined again 
to have his ambition prevail. The German empire, Austria, 

17 



the Netherlands, Spain and Savoya were involved in this con- 
tention. In order to prevent these enemies invading French 
territory, the French war minister, Louvois, ordered the sys- 
tematic and merciless devastation of the Rhine countries and 
Alsace. The work was done so well that it required fifty years 
for the afflicted districts to recover from the ruin wrought by 
the relentless French general Melac, who had charge of the 
operations. The famous fortress-castle of Heidelberg on 
the right side of the Rhine, a structure of immense strength 
and ramified extent, was undermined and almost entirely 
blown up. To this day the shattered round-tower of the castle 
is a mute witness to these outrages. The bridge acros the 
river Neckar, at Heidelberg, was also blown up and the greater 
part of the town laid in ashes. Many other isolated strong- 
holds were similarly destroyed. The cities of Worms and 
Speier, in the Palatinate, shared the fate of Heidelberg; the 
inhabitants were driven out, and the houses and the venerable 
old cathedrals burned and all but destroyed. In the town 
of Mannheim the citizens themselves were compelled to raze 
the fortification walls under pain of death. In the country 
districts, fields and vineyards were uprooted, barns and stocks 
of produce burned, cattle mutilated — all by orders of the 
wanton French government and its generals, drunk with power! 
The countries arrayed against France were unable to stem 
the tide against the mighty French monarch with his well- 
equipped armies, skilful commanders, abundant supplies; and 
in the peace of Ryswick (1697) all previously acquired parts 
of Alsace-Lorraine and the Palatinate, and many new conquests 
made in this latest raid, including several important towns 
and districts on the right bank of the Rhine were confirmed 
to France as the prize of overwhelming main force overriding 
right and tradition and the nationality of the populations af- 
fected. 

This settlement of force lasted undisturbed for nearly a 
hundred years. The Alsatians became Frenchmen outwardly,' 
but retained their Teutonic national character, language and 
customs as before. In 1793, however, new disturbances began 
in Alsace-Lorraine when, at the beginning of the wars of the 
French revolution, as already related, German and Austrian 



coalition troops crossed the Rhine to put down the revolution 
and its reign of blood horrors. In the course of this invasion 
of France and its progress toward Paris, the Germans held 
these their old native lands again for about a year. But the 
able French generals of the revolution soon turned the scales 
against the Germans and Austrians and broke their hold in 
Alsace completely. In the disastrous peace of Basel (1795) 
France won back all and more than she had ever held before 
of Alsace and Lorraine. The whole west bank of the Rhine, 
including Holland, had to be abandoned to her and Germany 
was compelled to accept the Rhine as "the natural frontier" 
between the two countries. It was, once again, a victory of 
might over right; nothing could withstand the fierce spirit of 
the French in the years of the revolution! Soon thereafter, 
however, the cities of Heidelberg and Mannheim, which had 
been ceded in the above peace to France, were retaken by 
Austrian troops after a violent period of siege and destruction, 
and rejoined to Germany. All this perpetual warring and 
taking of lands and cities had, from the beginning (in 1639), 
been a mere game of superior power and covetous conquest on 
the part of France, in which the inhabitants of the affected 
districts had no voice and could but submit and suffer. The 
acceptance of this degrading peace of Basel, of 1795, illustrates 
well how a defeated enemy may be compelled by force of 
political circumstances to submit to onerous terms of armistice 
and peace, although not entirely crushed. Austria and Prussia 
were not exhausted, but were confronted by greater troubles 
brooding in Poland at this time and to meet which it was 
necessary for them to conserve their strength by a temporary 
peace with France. 



II. 1793-1815 

Nothing further occurred to affect the political status of 
Alsace-Lorraine till 1870. But it is necessary for our general 
argument to present a similar rapid sketch of the further 
military visitations to which the Rhine countries and entire 
Germany were subjected at the hands of their imperious and 
unceasing enemy, France. In the years from 1793 to 1799, 

19 



during the wars of the French Republic and following the peace 
of Basel (as already related), all southern Germany, from the 
Rhine to the heart of Bavaria and even into the Tyrol and 
Upper Austria, was intermittently overrun by the French, 
accompanied by battles, siege, fire and pillage. Anyone 
acquainted with these countries knows that to this day there 
is scarcely a town or city within them that has not got "its 
legends and its ruins" to point to as reminders of the passage 
of the "French scourge" of those days! 

With the year 1800 and the seizure of complete power by 
Napoleon as First Consul of the Republic, the Napoleonic era 
began. From its commencement, in the military sense, by a 
new raid into Bavaria by the French general Moreau, which 
culminated in the battle of Hohenlinden (1801), and thence 
through the entire Napoleonic gamut — invasion of Hanover 
(1801) — second invasion of South Germany, capitulation of 
the fortress of Ulm and battle of Austerlitz (1805) — formation 
of the compulsory "Rhinebund" and dissolution of the German 
empire, the frightful battle of Jena, surrender of the principal 
fortresses of Prussia and entry into Berlin, all in 1806 — 
the "bloodiest" of all battles, that of Eylau on the borders of 
Poland (1807) — surrender of the Silesian fortresses and battle 
of Friedland, also in 1807 — Napoleon's triumphal conclave in 
the city of Erfurt (1808) — territorial spoliation of Sweden 
(1809) — the battles of Aspern and Wagram, also in 1809 — 
the campaign against Russia, battle of Borodino and the 
memorable "retreat from Moskau" in flames (1812) — (five 
hundred thousand went, eight thousand came back) — the com- 
bats of "the liberation," ending with the world-battle of 
Leipzig, the dissolution of the forcible and hated "Rhinebund" 
and of the Napoleonic creation of the kingdom of Westphalia 
(1813) — entry into Paris by the triumphant coalition allies 
(1814) — Elba, the Congress of Vienna, and finally, WATER- 
LOO (1815) — Germany, to its remotest parts, was the battle- 
field in these tremendous conflicts, Germany had to sustain 
and quarter the French armies and give them through-passage 
into Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Russia! 

Let the reader study the full account in any textbook of 
history and fully picture all this in his mind and grasp the 

20 



magnitude of the trials heaped upon the German people for a 
continuous period of twenty years by the ambitions of this 
overbearing neighbor-nation, France, and the unscrupulous 
schemes of a military adventurer, Napoleon the First, and 
consider that all this had occurred without any provocation 
whatever having been given by them! Even those who will 
not read the detailed history of the Napoleonic wars can form 
an idea from the above rapid recital of events — a succession 
of wars and battles which in number, magnitude and intensity 
had never before been crowded together into the space of 
fifteen years — what this must have meant for Germany, who 
had to bear the phys'cal brunt of it all, quite independent of 
the political humiliation and spoliation which she had to suffer. 
It left her crushed and exhausted from every angle. 

In the second peace of Paris (November, 1815) France, at 
last defeated by the coalition against her, was retrenched to 
her borders of 1790, which included Alsace and parts of Lor- 
raine, but without the additional territories which had been 
ceded to her in the peace of Basel of 1795. Considering 
all the historical facts, this magnanimous settlement was one 
of the most remarkable political concessions of all times! Here 
was plainly the opportunity for Prussia, in her hour of triumph, 
to take revenge for the many wrongs and sufferings inflicted 
upon her and all Germany, especially the southern parts 
thereof, by France, and to make the claim for the return of the 
provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany as independent 
German principalities and members of the greater empire. 
England, Austria and Russia were willing to entertain this 
proposition — but Prussia repelled the temptation! She hesi- 
tated to sow the seeds of a new war over the possession of 
these countries. Napoleon, the firebrand and usurper, who had 
victimized France almost as much as he had all the other 
countries of Europe, being gone, Prussia did not desire that 
France should be too deeply humiliated and torn. Regrettable, 
fateful generosity! — but in spite of wars there existed at that 
time a close intellectual sympathy between Germany and 
France in philosophy, arts and letters which justly claimed its 
expression by this lenient political peace. 

It is not necessary to establish in detail all the political 

21 



interests connected with this perpetual strife between France 
and Germany, from 1639 to 1815, and to determine the exact 
responsibility in each case. France was brutally aggressive, 
without question; but some blame also attaches to the lack 
of unity, vaccillation of policy and bartering covetousness of 
the German kings and princes. These were much left to follow 
their own separate interests, in the absence of a strong political 
direction on the part of the nominal German empire and 
Kaiser. The authority of both was more titular than real and 
concertedly effective. Austria, which held the imperial power, 
and whose ruler was also, therefore, the emperor of all Ger- 
many, was through her territorial and dynastic relations with 
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands — and even with France — not in 
a position to carry on an effective and strictly German imperial 
policy apart from her own interests. The indisputable fact 
remains that from the reign of Louis XIII to the end of the 
revolution, from 1639 to 1797, the French were always the 
aggressors in these wars and that their object was the forcible 
acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine, and general dictation 
over the German countries immediately east thereof. This is 
the verdict of impartial history. But under Napoleon I this 
traditional "objective" of France was quickly widened out to 
obtaining political domination over entire Germany and secur- 
ing actual "administrative occupation" of large areas on the 
right bank of the Rhine, notably of the entire provinces of 
Westphalia and Hanover. 

From the above it should be apparent to the reader that 
for a period of 175 years, from 1639 to 1815, Germany suf- 
fered with but little intermission a continuous campaign of 
attack and destruction from her turbulent and haughty neigh- 
bor, France. These violations were dictated solely by lust 
for increased power and wealth; there was an entire absence 
of active provocation on the part of the German princes of 
these districts or by the powers of the empire or the inhabitants 
of the territories in question. No claim of race identity or 
close relationship even, or of political preferences of the people 
of Alsace and Lorraine, the Bavarian Palatinate or the western 
Rhine provinces were ever advanced by France as a justifica- 
tion of her policy of aggression. All these peoples were origi- 

22 



nally pure German in stock, language and customs; they 
remained so in overwhelming proportion even up to 1870. 
The ethnological proof of this is incontrovertible; one needs 
but to read the family names, those of the towns and cities, 
rivers, mountains and woods of Alsace and Lori-aine to be 
convinced! 

Will the people of the United States, after reading these 
plain and true statements, begin to understand the deep resent- 
ment felt by the Germans against the French, their implacable 
enemy and despoiler for three centuries? The story we have 
given is the one which the German boy and girl hears from 
the lips of father and mother when they are gathered around 
the fireside and are old enough to understand! France has no 
such story of unprovoked wrong from the Germans to tell its 
children — not even to-day! It is this story which sinks into 
the young blood and heart of German children, from the Rhine 
to the Baltic, and lurks and boils; this story which we must 
understand — be willing to understand — to comprehend the 
German frame of mind and point of view in regard to France 
in general and Alsace-Lorraine in particular. And at this 
very hour a new story of unheard-of rapacity and national 
strangulation of Germany by France is being added to the old ! 
The above recital explains the action of Germany in 1871, 
of rejoining these provinces to the new empire; it also explains 
the attitude and temper of her people in the great war just 
ended and which, in the light of their experiences, was but a 
deliberate attempt to throw them down once more, to rob them 
again of Alsace-Lorraine, to destroy the successful State which 
they had built up in scarce more than forty years, that it may 
no longer be a thorn in the side of their jealous enemies! It 
is well to keep all this in mind to allow us to correctly appraise 
the French claims at the "peace table" not only for the return 
of Alsace and Lorraine, but for the annexation of the entire 
German left bank of the Rhine! How shockingly these "out- 
rageous claims" clashed with the pretended idealism for liberty, 
justice, humanity and nationality which was so adroitly put 
forward as the war motive of the Entente allies! 

Has America forgotten with what execration the English- 
man was regarded in this country for the one hundred years 

23 



or more following the war of the American revolution? Yet 
the history of our contention against England bears no com- 
parison in the degree of aggravation and injury to that of 
Germany against France! Except that the superficiality of 
our knowledge of the history of Europe excuses us somewhat, 
we should be truly ashamed of the unmerited villification dealt 
out to Germany by America in the Alsace-Lorraine argument 
with its cry of "the crime of 1871" and the persistent mis- 
representation of this question during the war and to this day! 



III. 1815-1870 

From 1815 to 1870 no military actions took place between 
France and Germany. It was a period of reaction from the 
political ideas of the French Revolution and of internal political 
commotions followed by monarchical restorations in almost 
every country of Europe. Between 1840 and 1850 a new 
period of agitation for democratic institutions set in, not 
only in France but in Germany and other countries. In the 
course of these convulsions France became a republic for the 
second time, under the presidency of Louis Napoleon, nephew 
of the Great Napoleon, who soon imitated his uncle by making 
himself emperor of the French (1852), and reigned as such 
till 1870. In all other directions, also, Napoleon III aimed 
to revive the glories of the former French empire in pomp, 
political dictation, wars of conquest, in general vainglorious- 
ness and opulence of life, and he succeeded very well. France 
was once more at her height, Paris again the mistress of 
elegance, the pinnacle of ostentatious civilization. The great 
International World's Fair at Paris, in 1867, was the triumph 
of Napoleon's reign, the scene of political fraternization among 
all the peoples and of their homage at the feet of France. To 
some simple minds it seemed as if the millennium had come ! 

In Germany, during this period, a wonderful spirit of 
national revival had arisen, a striving for concentration, union 
of effort and progress, political and material. After the re- 
publican movements of 1848, in different parts of the country, 
and the reaction which followed in favor of firmly governed 
monarchial states on the pattern of Prussia, the several in- 

24 



dependent kingdoms and principalities vied with each other 
to bring all their administrative institutions, the universities, 
colleges and art academies, public school instruction, the 
physical training of the young and the military service to 
the highest development. All intellectual pursuits — literature, 
art and music — flourished. Prussia gradually took the national 
leadership; her predominating size of territory and rapid 
material progress, the ability of her kings and statesmen, her 
magnificent military organization on the basis of universal 
conscription service pointed her out as the leader to bring 
about a new united German fatherland — the dream of the 
several peoples of the disjointed German nation, from poets 
and scholars to princes and peasants ever since the terrible 
Napoleon I had set his heavy foot upon them. Austria 
seemed disqualified for the task of active national leadership 
because of her largely slavic composition and Italian interests, 
if for no other reason. 

External political events marched rapidly apace towards 
new and favorable constellations. In 1864 Prussia and Austria 
were jointly drawn into a war with Denmark about the 
succession to the partly Danish and partly German provinces 
of Schleswig and Holstein. After a tortuous course of diplo- 
matic negotiations, followed by hostilities, Denmark lost the 
fight at both ends and agreed to the surrender of these pro- 
vinces to the victors. This conflict ended with an acrimonious 
dispute between Austria and Prussia about the division of 
occupation and administration of the two provinces. This 
laid the foundation for the war of 1866, although both Schles- 
wig and Holste.'n were ultimately conceded to Prussia by 
Austria and incorporated into her dominions. The double 
success of Prussia in this war, in which her new military 
organization had demonstrated its superiority in actual war- 
fare for the first 'time, and her diplomacy, under the leadership 
of Bismarck, had won the victory over Austria, established her 
predominant position in Germany beyond question. Soon her 
plans for the reconstruction of the North-German union or 
"Bund" upon a more effective basis, eliminating Austria, led 
to serious internal constitutional agitations in Germany itself, 
during 1864-66, and, together with the Schleswig issue, finally 

25 



to the war between Prussia and Austria and to the fratricidal 
strife between the different smaller German States and Prussia, 
in 1866, many of which still vacillated in their "leanings" 
between Prussia and the hereditary Austrian authority. The 
dangers and uncertainties of these times of external conflict 
and internal fermentation towards a new national life weighed 
heavily upon the German patriotic heart; all that had been 
hoped for, striven for, bled for in the war with Denmark 
seemed to hang in the balance! Unfortunately the far-seeing 
and practical ideas of the king of Prussia, William I, of 
Bismarck, of von Moltke, for bringing about a strong and 
united Germany were not fully comprehended ; events came 
too rapidly for the stolid mind of the mass of the people; 
their irresistible consequences would have to be pounded into 
the heads of princes and people alike with cannon shots and 
saber cuts! 

The military campaign of the war of 1866 between Prussia 
and Austria developed rapidly. In the famous battle of 
Koeniggraetz, or Sadowa, in Bohemia, the Austrians suffered 
a crushing defeat at the hands of Prussia. Her star now 
flamed in the zenith! The victory resulted in the immediate 
and complete elimination, thenceforth, of Austria from German 
national political affairs. Those North-German and South- 
German States which had risen against Prussia's uncompre- 
hended plans were now quickly defeated, in their turn, by 
Prussia. The states of Hannover, Nassau and Kurhessia were 
annexed and incorporated into her dominions and their rulers 
dethroned, under liberal compensations. The kingdom of 
Saxony and most of the central Saxon principalities now en- 
tered into the perfected political union, or "Bund," with Prussia 
and came under her complete leadership. The South-German 
states of Baden, Wurttemberg, Bavaria and Hessia retained 
their constitutional independence but entered into a close mili- 
tary convenion with Prussia in order to create a uniform army- 
system for the whole country. These political arrangements 
provided the general foundation and paved the way for the 
one and united German Empire which came five years later. 
As a fact, the unification of the military service and revenue 
customs, establishment of a federal judicial system and con- 

26 



certed internal legislative action had resulted, practically, in a 
"united new Germany" even at that time, 1866-1870. (The 
contemporaneous war, in 1866, between Austria and Italy 
font, the latter's final deliverance from foreign rulers and her 
c<auplete unification is described in a later article on Italy.) 
on 

IV. THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, 1870-71 

Our review has now reached the great years of 1870-71. 
Many volumes have been written on the political events and 
diplomatic moves which culminated in this momentous war, 
which was in many respects the most wonderful military event 
of all history. It would carry us too far to trace all these 
factors and describe the course of the war in much detail. The 
rise of the German federation, under Prussia's leadership, and 
the military strength of Prussia has been related in the preced- 
ing article. This was one of the factors; another was the new 
spirit for German unity. Whether France purposely provoked 
the war of 1870 or whether Prussia did, or whether the occa- 
sion was, perhaps, equally welcome to both sides bears no 
important relation to the argument we are interested in most. 
After all information available is sifted down, these salient 
facts appear: That Napoleon III was deeply chagrined by the 
failure and tragic ending of the French expedition to Mexico 
to set up Prince Maximilian, of Austria, as emperor of Mexico, 
in 1864, and that he was ready to embrace any opportunity to 
restore the injured prestige of France; that he viewed with 
apprehension the rising power of Prussia and the prospective 
early erection of a unified and strong Germany which might 
challenge the pre-eminent position of France on the continent; 
that he was fully aware of the activities of his many internal 
enemies — royalists and republicans — whom nothing could con- 
ciliate, no surveilance, control or repression intimidate, and 
who were bent upon his fall; that he knew himself to be, like 
his great uncle, an usurper of the imperial power by force and 
intrigue alone and artificial endorsement, devoid of real devo- 
tion by the people; that alone great deeds of glory by battle or 
diplomacy for French honor and renown could long hold 
the glamour of his reign. His opponent, the astute Bismarck, 

27 



gauged the position of Napoleon accurately and felt that a 
war with France, under all the circumstances, was only a 
question of time and opportunity. He made his preparations, 
military and diplomatic, accordingly, to be ready when *he 
hour of fate should strike. :o; 

A matter for serious dispute between France and Pruseia 
soon arose — the succession to the Spanish throne — but the 
ostensible point of contention was merely the hinge upon 
which the deeper political motives at work were balanced and 
revolved, until they finally led to the declaration of war by 
France upon Prussia, in July, 1870. It must be conceded that 
Napoleon, a man of very high intelligence and good natural 
instincts, was driven upon this fatal course by an ambitious 
entourage, headed by the Empress Eugenie, and by other 
circumstances beyond his control; moreover, in diplomatic skill 
he was like putty in the master hand of Bismarck! In his 
scheming, Napoleon made one fundamental miscalculation: 
He relied upon the ignoble and unpatriotic record of South 
German princes of former times in their covetous submission 
to the Bourbon kings and to Napoleon the Great, he believed 
that he could detach tHe South German states of Baden, 
Wurttemberg, Bavaria and the Hessias, which had not yet 
fully entered into the German "Bund" (see preceding article) 
from Prussia by adequate promises of compensation. In this 
reckoning Napoleon plainly underestimated the new German 
spirit and purposes for a united fatherland. In his moves to 
realize his object he soon proved himself no match for the 
forensic and persuasive diplomacy of Bismarck. Napoleon's 
plans and hopes in this respect, and also in respect to England, 
Austria, Russia and Italy in his quest for allies, were fore- 
doomed to failure! When hostilities broke out, France stood 
alone and was confronted by a militarily united Germany, 
commanding forces which in numbers exceeded and in equip- 
ment and leadership far outclassed her own. Events also 
proved quickly that the regime of favoritism and corruption 
which had eaten into French court and official life in the later 
years under Napoleon III had left behind a demoralized army, 
inefficient generals and empty arsenals. 

28 



The result is known: The defeat of France was rapid and 
complete. Napoleon and General MacMahon were hopelessly 
beaten at Sedan and surrendered with 380,000 men and 2000 
cannon; General Bazaine was crushed in the series of frightful 
battles around Metz (Gravelotte, Saint Prieux, Pont-a-Mous- 
son) and pressed into the fortress, and later compelled to 
surrender with 180,000 men; Paris was besieged and starved 
into submission after heroic resistance. Previous to these 
events at Sedan and Metz the fortress of Strassburg, and 
many minor ones, had fallen or were ready to surrender. In 
the Southwest — along the Swiss border — as well as in the 
West, about Orleans, the German armies met with stout resist- 
ance, but were ultimately victorious. French troops fought 
valiantly on all fields — as always — and the Provisional Repub- 
lican government, under the genius and fire of the great com- 
moner, Gambetta, made heroic efforts to arrest the final dis- 
aster, but without avail. The military collapse of France was 
early followed by political revolution, civil war and the terrible 
days of the "Commune," marked by the burning of Paris and a 
reign of terror akin to that of the great revolution of 1789. 
At Sedan, and with what followed, Napoleon lost his throne 
and soon died in exile. In January, 1871, six months only 
after the outbreak of hostilities, the German Empire was pro- 
claimed and established in Versailles itself, with the king 
of Prussia, William I, as William I, emperor. In the final 
peace a war indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs ($1,000,- 
000,000) was laid upon France by the victors, and a portion 
of the country occupied temporarily as security for payment 
of the indemnity. The territorial exaction was that the whole 
of the province of Alsace and the German part of Lorraine 
were re-annexed to Germany, partly as an act of political 
restitution and partly as a measure of military protection. 

The world was consumed with astonishment and admiration 
at the cyclonic rapidity and titanic grandeur of these military 
and political events! Germany had leapt with one bound to 
the front rank of nations and in a short time became the 
dominating political power on the continent. In eulogy of 
the ability and force demonstrated by Germany in this war 
we are bound to add: Compared with the energy and concen- 

29 



tration of action, the rapid succession of grand and decisive 
battles, the successful sieges of Paris, Metz, Strassburg, etc., 
the whole lightning-like splendor of the war of 1870, the war 
of 1914-18 was a tame exhibition in the sluggishness of its 
immense masses of men, the desultory monotony of the trench 
fighting, the total failure of attaining even one really brilliant 
and decisive military action on a large scale by either side! 
The staggering loss of life in the great war was partly due to 
intensity of actions, but mostly to the great numbers of soldiers 
in the field, the destructiveness of the modern explosives and 
machine guns and the increased size and range of modern 
artillery. In genius of leadership, the war of 1870 far out- 
shines the one just closed, but in individual valor of troops on 
both sides the two wars compare very favorably. 

Defeated France, happily, was not all a loser in the war of 
1870-71. The fortunate consequence of her disaster was — 
after the passage of a few years of turbulence and uncertainty 
— the failure of all monarchical and Napoleonistic plots at 
restoration and the definite establishment of free government 
under the present republic. 



The War Indemnity of 1871. It is interesting, at this time, 
to compare the money indemnity exacted by Germany from 
France in 1871 — five billions of francs in gold — with the 
money indemnity demanded by the leading Entente Allies from 
Germany, now settled at approximately 134 billions of marks 
in gold, equivalent to about 167 }£ billions of francs in gold! 
(Fr. 167,500,000,000, or $34,000,000,000 gold, approximately). 
In 1871 there was, also, great destruction in France, and many 
excesses — atrocities — had occurred, but one heard little about 
these, either during the war or thereafter. The French took 
all that as the unavoidable accompaniment of war by a military 
force in an enemy country; the British sentimental propaganda 
had not then been invented! We will admit, certainly, that 
the wealth of nations has greatly risen in the period between 
the two wars, also that the scale of the, later war was much 
larger as to men, ships, guns, engineering and new devices. 

30 



Yet one fails entirely to comprehend the figures demanded from 
Germany, except on the assumption that something more than 
bona fide war damages is included in and intended by these 
demands ! 



V. THE PROBLEM OF ALSACE-LORRAINE 

Our prime interest in the preceding sketch of the war of 
1870-71 centers in the question of Alsace-Lorraine which has 
figured so largely as a leading motive in the late war and was 
one of the great problems of the peace conference. The his- 
toric background of this question is given in Articles I and II. 
As stated, Germany re-annexed these provinces in 1871 prima- 
rily as a restitution of lands Germanic in national character, 
language and traditions, but equally as a step necessary from 
considerations of military security. It was necessary to 
protect the Rhine by a strip of land on its west bank, a river 
generally being the most vulnerable boundary between two 
hostile countries, no matter how well it may be protected by 
fortifications. This precaution arose from the certainty felt 
by the German leaders, even in 1871, that France would seek 
revenge for her unparalleled defeat sooner or later, whether 
Alsace-Lorraine were taken from her or not. Still more it 
arose from the voice of history, the story of persistent French 
attack and invasion in the past, which we have related in pre- 
ceding articles. To do otherwise would have been blindness 
and weakness combined on the part of Germany in the cir- 
cumstances. Thomas Carlyle, the renowned English philoso- 
pher, critic and historian, wrote as follows on this subject: 
''No people has had such a bad neighbor as Germany has 
possessed during the last four hundred years in France. Ger- 
many would have been mad had she not thought of erecting 
such a frontier wall between herself and such a neighbor when 
opportunity offered." These are indelible words from an ab- 
solutely impartial thinker. England conceded the perfect justice 
of the re-annexation, and made no protest against it in spite 
of her warm friendship for France. That the re-annexation 
was not only proper politically, but also an act of wisdom is 
proven by the fact that it assisted largely to secure the long 

31 



period of peace between Germany and France which followed 
— forty-three years — a fact well worth remembering to-day. 

In order to maintain a close connection with all that has 
been stated on this matter in the preceding Articles, we will 
at once pursue this subject of Alsace-Lorraine to the finish. 
Nothing of great moment had occurred to affect this question 
in the interval of peace, from 1871 to 1914. The Germans 
instituted the complete re-Germanization of the annexed pro- 
vinces and spent immense sums in reconstruction of the cities, 
in promotion of enterprise and industry, in railroads, canals, 
and bridges, in betterments of every kind. These efforts to 
benefit the country and win the population were not unac- 
companied with some friction, due to the rigidity of German 
official methods, but there was at no time any evidence of 
real discontent on a large scale with the new political asso- 
ciation. Such hostile incidents as did happen were, naturally, 
greatly exaggerated in Finance and other countries antagonistic 
to Germany's rise. The recalcitrant and irreconcilable French 
elements in Alsace-Lorraine were encouraged to complain and 
revolt against the annexation by their sympathizers in France, 
but all this did not avail much as the substantial benefits of 
German rule became apparent to the people. 

In France, also, the solidity, wisdom and benefit of German 
rule was being recognized. There were even those "cooler 
heads" in France who believed that this national wound would 
ultimately heal if it were not being continually torn open 
afresh at every slight German provocation of France by that 
small band of irreconcilables led by Foreign-affairs Minister 
Delcasse, and later by the future President Poincare. This 
agitation was seconded by articles in French papers inspired 
by England and Russia, whose interests were opposed to the 
sincere efforts of Germany and a minority of enlightened 
Frenchmen to bring about a genuine rapprochement between 
the two countries. From about 1908 on, this hostile agitation 
gained great impetus through the secret entente which had 
been effected between England, France and Russia by Edward 
VII (in pursuance of deep-laid and long-visioned English ob- 
jects), and towards the year 1914 had carried almost the whole 
French nation with it in a delirious desire for revenge. 

32 



President Wilson, and others, adopting a term coined by 
the French soon after the war of 1870, have called this re- 
annexation "the crime of 1871." This inflaming term is a 
pointed example of that vicious practice of exaggerated lan- 
guage which has characterized the late war and caused so 
much misunderstanding! How and whei-ein was there a crime 
in this natural and legitimate act of re-annexation? The 
war of 1870 had been honestly fought by Germany; the terms 
of peace wei*e agreed to and ratified by the French Congress; 
it was in all respects a "reasonable peace" which Germany had 
exacted, but a just amount of indemnity and reparation and 
guaranties of security could not be dispensed with. It may 
have been "unwise" of Germany to re-annex the provinces and 
thus sow the seeds of later troubles, but the Germans believed 
differently, and were probably correct in their estimate of the 
stability of peace with France whether Alsace-Lorraine were 
taken or not. There was every historical and ethnological 
reason for France to accept the situation loyally and cultivate 
the amicable relations so sincerely desired by Germany, in- 
stead of keeping up a fateful friction by the cry of revenge! 
It should be thoroughly understood by the American reader 
that it was not territory originally French which was taken in 
1871 but districts which were, racially, German and had, in 
spite of a hundred and seventy-five (175) years of French 
rule, remained overwhelmingly German in character! How 
otherwise than with dismay and resentment could Germany 
view this perpetual agitation by France for a new conflict 
the purpose of which was to rob her again of these two valu- 
able provinces of essentially German population, which she 
had regained in a costly war and upon which she had spent 
prodigious efforts and billions of money to bring up to a high 
level of development and prosperity? 

That which will be a crime is the intended (now accomp- 
lished) restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, in the light 
of the historic facts presented in these articles and in the 
face of the principle "of nationality and self-determination" 
so eloquently urged as the "guide-to-be" in the territorial 
adjustments of the Peace Congress. This author believes that 
the only just and durable solution of this problem would be 

33 



the autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine as a free state, and its union 
as such with the new German Federated Republic, if — as the 

writer believes — the people will so declare by a plebiscite. 
The people themselves should be invited to decide this question 
of preferential allegiance and should for their own content- 
ment and that of the world in general declare in a free and 
full plebiscite in which direction — and in what proportion — 
their political sympathies lie! Only in such a settlement will 
all the factors of this problem find their logical and just 
satisfaction. To those Americans and others who lean to the 
French side in this contention it is desirable to submit some 
important "practical considerations" — studiously kept from 
their view but of wide bearing on the subject — in order to 
strip from this argument the "halo of artificial sentiment" so 
adroitly wound about it. 

It should be known that the protestations of the French of 
their great love for the Alsacians and Lorrainers have a very 
materialistic sub-stratum: The coal and iron fields of Longwy 
and Briey are as valuable in the eyes of the French as in 
those of the Germans; the sturdy Germanic vitality of these 
people has been as a tonic to the French nation in its effete 
depopulizing social habits and has furnished them great work- 
ers, thinkers, soldiers, field-marshals, business men and finan- 
ciers; the productivity of Alsace-Lorraine in agricultural and 
dairy lines, fruit, poultry, cattle, etc., is an important asset 
even for so richly blessed a country as France. It must, in 
addition, be particularly appreciated by the American reader 
that the Alsace-Lorraine of to-day is not that of 1871. It 
has been magnified tenfold in all its activities, wealth and 
culture by the beneficence of forty years of German steward- 
ship of ability and honesty! 

When the French rode into Strassburg, Muehlhausen, Col- 
mar, Metz, etc., at the end of the late war, they rode into 
splendid, stately, clean cities which spoke of order, system, 
sanitation, prosperity and civic pride. Great industrial estab- 
lishments were found throughout the country; agriculture, 
farm buildings, cattle stocks were at the top of development; 
the smallest places were found possessed of waterworks, elec- 
tric-light plants and other installations for modern comfort 

34 



and convenience; everywhere the French met evidences of 
progress, prosperity and popular contentment. Surely such 
a country was a desirable one to re-annex by France irre- 
spective of any pretensions of sentiment! When the Germans 
rode into the same cities in 1871 they found them reeking 
with rats, mice, black roaches and similar vermin that thrives 
on dirt and negligence. The evidence of second-empire sloth, 
official laxity and public vice were everywhere. The trans- 
formation is significant: It cannot all be ascribed to .the 
general progress of the times; it was not necessary for the 
Germans to do all these things; they are the result of the 
working of a principle! Strassburg, to-day, is. transfigured 
from a cramped-up, dirty, middle-age fortress town to one 
of the finest of the many fine German cities. The Alsatian 
% and Lorraine people have been raised 100 per cent in efficiency, 
physical and moral character, general and technical educa- 
tion, happiness and well-being. Is it not reasonable to assume 
that a people so benefitted should be proud of its new posi- 
tion and glad to remain united with its German tyrants? There 
are many among them living to-day who, in 1870, were any- 
where from 16 to 36 years of age and who have been wit- 
nesses of the transformation. The Germans were never afraid 
of a popular vote in Alsace-Lorraine, provided it would be 
taken under proper safeguards to eliminate unfair pressure 
by the French army of occupation. Just now the French, 
naturally, flatter their new wards and exert themselves to 
win their favor; but in course of a little time Paris will 
again indulge itself in the witticisms and thinly veiled asper- 
sions against the Alsatians which were so frequently heard 
before the war of 1870. France, better than anyone else, 
knows that she can never convert this population of German 
race, traits and physiognomy into real French people — and the 
inborn antipathies will find sarcastical vent as of yore! 

VI. OTHER POLITICAL EVENTS CONTRIBU- 

TARY TO THE WAR CONDITIONS OF 1914. 

(1854-1914) 

Additional to the preceding subjects we must take cogni- 
zance of several other important political events and conditions 

35 



in Europe, long prior to 1914, which became active factors in 
the making of the great war. We will describe them under 
the following divisions: A. The Russo-Turkish and Balkan 
Question; B. The Unification and Development of Italy; C. Ger- 
many's Phenomenal Rise to World Power. Her Oriental Ex- 
pansion Policy; D. Austria's Political Character and Destiny; 
E. The Ensuing Combinations of the Powers. All these events 
and moves on the European chessboard are so intricate and 
extensive that it will not be possible to state more than the 
outline facts of each group, but that much we believe to be 
absolutely necessary to enable the American reader to form 
a correct conception of the exceedingly complicated and ex- 
plosive situation which existed in Europe towards the fateful 
year 1914. 

A. THE RUSSO-TURKISH AND BALKAN QUESTION * 

This problem enjoys the merit of having always been 
inspired by the same motives and objects and conducted by 
the same means — intentional militant provocation, insidious 
diplomatic intrigue. Since the time of Peter the Great it 
has been the unmistakable purpose of Russia to obtain sea- 
shore control and freedom of shipping from the Black Sea 
and the Aegean Sea to the Mediterranean. A glance at the 
map is sufficient to explain this. Russia's northern coast is 
icebound ; even the sheltered port of Archangel is open only 
for a part of the year. Her Baltic coast is more free in this 
respect, but the passage through the Danish straits is tortuous 
and consumes much time before the open North Sea is reached. 
It is subject to the hostile interference of Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway. As for the Siberian seacoast, it is too 
far removed from the most important part of Russia, the 
western section, to make its full value available even at the 
present time ; but before the construction of the Trans-Caspian 
railway, from Moskau to Vladivostok, it was so far removed 
as to be useful only for the fishing industry and local shipping. 
Thus Russia, an immense empire with a population of close 
to 150 millions, is largely landlocked. Her rapid and un- 
restricted intercourse with the countries bounding on the Medi- 
terranean, with England, with the Orient through he Suez 

36 



Canal is hemmed. These conditions, naturally, were and are 
unfavorable for the legitimate development of Russia's industry 
and commerce. 

This geographical disability, and the consequent political 
designs to which it gave rise, linked with Russia's position 
as the head of the Greek-catholic church and the natural pro- 
tector of all Greek-catholic countries and districts along the 
Mediterranean borders, and of such populations within the 
Turkish dominions, led to frequent demands upon Turkey for 
redress of grievances, and, at times, to sharp protests over 
troubles of violence arising out of this general situation. 
Under the great Czar Nicholas (between 1850 and 1854) serious 
friction of this nature had arisen between the Greek catholics 
and the Roman catholics in regard to the jurisdiction over the 
Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. This dispute brought on a 
clash of the "spheres of interest" between Russia and France, 
as the latter had assumed to occupy the same protective posi- 
tion in regard to Roman catholics in the Orient and near- 
Orient as Russia held in regard to the Greek catholics. This 
led to a state of embitterment between the two countries, 
between the Czar Nicholas and Napoleon III. Also, this 
situation could not help undermining the political authority of 
Turkey over the catholic christians of both confessions within 
her own borders. Instead of yielding to proposals of com- 
promise, Nicholas, a masterful man, remained unbending in 
his claims and increased his demands for control over the 
Sultan. Russia, moreover, declared herself the champion of 
the Slavic nationalities within European Turkey at that time 
(Bulgars, Serbs, Bosnians, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, etc.) who 
were beginning agitation for their political emancipation. 

This attitude soon made it clear to the other powers that 
Russia's object was much more that of her territorial ex- 
tension and seashore rights than of her benevolent interest 
in the Greek catholics and the Slavs. In consequence of this 
delicate and dangerous political empasse, England and France 
championed the sovereignty of Turkey and demanded the re- 
cession of Russia from her defiant attitude for control over 
Turkey. These representations failed of any result, and the 
war of the Crimea broke out (1854-55). In this war France, 

37 



England and Turkey, joined later by Sardinia, were arrayed 
against Russia. For its short duration, it proved one of the 
most costly, in human life, of the older types of war. The 
armies were exposed to unspeakable sufferings from climatic 
hardships and disease, as during the campaign the dread 
Asiatic cholera broke out in the ranks. The most famous action 
of the war was the siege and fall of the Russian fortress of 
Sebastopol, on the Crimean peninsula in the Black Sea, in 
September, 1855. Famed, also, is "the charge of the Six 
Hundred" of the British Light Brigade, at Balaclava, nobly 
immortalized in Tennyson's stirring poem. In the midst of 
these events Emperor Nicholas died suddenly. His successor, 
Alexander II, being more peacefully inclined than his father, 
and realizing the superior power of the enemy coalition, soon 
brought the bloody conflict to an end by making acceptable 
concessions. Military honors were about evenly divided be- 
tween *-he belligerents. 

The peace concluded in the Congress of Paris, 1856, 
guaranteed the political integrity of Turkey as she was before 
the war; it trimmed down the pretensions of Russia as the 
sole protector of the christian slavic Balkan inhabitants and, 
instead, conferred this function upon the victorious signatory 
countries, extending it also to the christian peoples of Asiatic 
Turkey. This settlement laid the foundation of at least one 
side of that ever-burning Balkan question. From that time 
on, numerous atrocious massacres and persecutions of Chris- 
tians, and consequent insurrections arising out of these religi- 
ous and racial animosities, have taken place in the Balkan 
countries and in the christian sections of Asiatic Turkey, not- 
ably in Armenia, and have deeply stirred European feeling 
against the Turk. In consequence, a second war occurred 
between Turkey and Russia on the same issues, 1877-78. This 
was followed by a politico-religious war between the allied 
Balkan States and Turkey, and, later, by a political war 
among the Balkan States themselves, and ending finally by one 
between the Balkan States and Greece. This succession of 
wars, together with the four-years' war just concluded, have 
made of that south-eastern corner of the map of Europe a 
veritable 'cockpit! Yet, in 1914, the Balkan question was 

38 



still far from being settled; to the religious and racial strife 
against the Turk there was now joined the keen contention 
for individual nationality among these peoples. Within a 
comparatively small territory there are thrown together in 
that area some seven or eight nationalities, and semi-nationali- 
ties: Greece, Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and Albania, to which we must add Hungary, 
Croatia, Slavonia, Turkey and Italy to make this political 
crazy-quilt complete. The Balkan and adjoining slavic na- 
tionalities are largely intermixed along their real and imaginary 
boundary lines, and the whole area is permeated by Greeks, 
Turks, Italians and numerous Jews, also some Austrians and 
Germans. Each country claims parts of the others on ethno- 
logical and historical grounds; each has proud traditions of 
former independence; they all claim the glories of ancient 
Greece and Rome as their heritage. In reality they are a 
collection of "wreckage peoples," evolved from the transition 
periods of ancient civilizations, mixed with nomadic settlers 
from the east and, hence, of most indefinite lineage. In 
character they are turbulent, hot-blooded, ignorant, vengeful, 
treacherous and cruel and, therefore, of the worst possible 
political reputation. They have been the trouble-makers in 
Europe for 75 years; if, figuratively speaking, the whole of 
them could be made to disappear in the Mediterranean Sea, 
it would be a benefit for the peace of the world! 

England is directly responsible for this exasperating and 
baffling state of affairs. By nourishing in these peoples, 
under the impulse of Gladstone's humanitarian eloquence, an 
inordinate sense of importance quite beyond their deserts and 
the nationalistic possibilities of the situation as it stood at 
that time, she directly encouraged their restlessness and vi- 
olence, increased the racial jealousies between them and inter- 
fered with the natural evolution of these related countries to 
a strong and united slavic state under Austrian guidance — the 
fertile scheme of the murdered prince Francis Ferdinand! 

The Balkan question is important to our argument in that 
it furnished one of the causes of the great war. The peace 
of Paris (1856) by no means succeeded to make Russia give 
up her ambitions along the southern waters; this ambition is 

39 



her natural, her necessary national policy. She now turned 
further east, to Asia, to find a way. By the gradual conquest 
of Turkestan and the Caucasus district, by the instigation of 
a revolt in Afghanistan against England in India, and by the 
occupation of parts of Persia she sought a position of political 
influence in these countries to enable her to reach her object 
at least partly at the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. But 
these steps were blocked by England in the defeat of the 
Afghan insurrection, 1880. In the Balkans, having been check- 
mated by the great powers in her direct line of action, she 
resorted to intrigue and cabal to further her designs and used 
these states as "a club" towards her most direct antagonists, 
Austria and England, as the Balkan states carried an in- 
herent and constant threat to the peace of Europe. Russia 
now urged with increasing insistence her "slavic-race protec- 
torate" argument, her racial and dynastic relationship with 
Serbia in particular, and by both these agencies worked 
through the Balkan states for the achievement of her own 
political purposes: The elimination of Turkey from Europe; 
possession of or dictation over Constantinople; acquisition of 
Aegean and Adriatic sea ports; complete freedom of navigation 
through the Bosporus and Dardanelles for her commercial ships 
and navy. For the realization of this program in Europe, 
Russia would probably have been willing to renounce definitely 
any further designs to reach the Persian gulf and Arabian 
Sea. This aspect of the matter is important as it carried 
within itself the possibility of that later rapprochement with 
England which atually took place and was such an important 
factor for the war of 1914. The connection is plain: England 
could afford to look with much less concern upon Russia 
obtaining her southern-sea outlet policy in European than in 
Asiatic waters because of the lesser danger therefrom to 
India. For, holding the Suez Canal and Gibraltar, she had it 
in her power, with her superior fleet, to block any sea aggres- 
sion from the Mediterranean from any or all the countries 
bounding thereon. 

All the same, these schemes of Russia were opposed to 
the interests of England on general political principles as 
well as on account of India, and were opposed to the in- 

40 



terests of Austria because of the latter's long historical and 
necessary economic association with the Balkan states and 
Adriatic countries, and because of her established position . 
on the east coast of the Adriatic, from Trieste to Antivari. 
This was Austria's only sea coast, and her commercial and 
naval ports were located there; she could not entertain their 
possession being questioned from any quarter. And, in more 
recent years, a new antagonist to Russia's Balkan policy arose 
— Germany — by her plans, also from economic necessity, to 
extend her supply sources and markets eastward through 
Austria, the Balkans, the Black Sea and Turkey into Mesopo- 
tamia, to Bagdad and the Persian gulf in order to reach the 
Orient by a quicker and safer route than that by the sea past 
England, France, Spain, Gibraltar, the Mediterranean, past 
Malta and through the Suez Canal! This grand and bold 
German scheme necessarily carried with it the making of 
confidential and financial conventions with the countries 
through which this line of communication — the Berlin-Bagdad 
railroad — was to pass, to guarantee the physical necessities 
and safety of the line. Russia's fear of Germany in this 
enterprise was not so much due per se to the latter's plans 
of commercial extension than to the interference she was sure 
would flow from the accompanying alliances with her own 
policy of securing freedom of shipping ports and political 
position along the Aegean and Adriatic. It must be acknowl- 
edged that Russia was honest enough to disclaim any suspicion 
that Germany's proposition carried with it any deeper political 
plot of permanent annexations, or that silly bugaboo of 
"world dominion" ascribed to her by the Entente enemy. Yet, 
these great plans of Germany not only threatened to thwart 
Russia but were also a formidable challenge to England; they 
would strengthen Germany's commercial position, extend her 
sphere of political influence and bring her dangerously near to 
Persia and to India itself. Thus this near-oriental compli- 
cation with its irreconcilable interests was the most important 
factor — the Russo-English factor — that brought on the war of 
1914. Its acute development will be discussed in detail in the 
succeeding articles. 

41 



B. THE UNIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF ITALY 

This historical event engages our interest more in its 
accomplishment than in the processes of its evolution, but the 
latter are one of the most fascinating studies of modern his- 
tory. Italy as "a country" has, like Germany, been more a 
political term than national identity. There were independent 
kingdoms and principalities of great number, and many of them 
dominated by foreign ruling dynasties. Of such, Austria had 
held a strong hold in central and upper Italy for several 
hundred years. The struggle for Italian unity is comparatively 
a recent event, 1858-1866, disregarding the earlier movements. 
After the war between France and Austria, 1858-60, in which 
Napoleon III had championed the cause of Italian unity and 
independence from foreign yoke, and which defeated and dis- 
solved several of the Bourbon and Austrian kingdoms and 
smaller principalities, there followed a series of revolutions in 
lower Italy for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Naples 
(founded by Napoleon I). This movement was led by the 
famous patriot Garibaldi. Soon thereafter a number of minor 
dynastic conflicts occurred in Lombardy, undertaken by the 
strong and patriotic king of Sardinia, Victor Emanuel, for 
the final clean-up of these small sovereignties, native as well 
as foreign. These conflicts and revolutions, which extended 
from the Sicilies to northern Italy, resulted in a few years' 
struggle in a united country, but not as a republic, as so 
many had hoped, but as a kingdom under Victor Emanuel of 
Sardinia, a man who had not only proved his ability and 
leadership in this struggle for nationality, but had won the 
confidence and regard of the entire people. The province 
of Venice and the Papal State, the latter under strong French, 
Spanish and Austrian protection, alone were left out of the 
fold. Seldom before in the history of mankind have the 
united and inspiring efforts of but a few able, high-minded 
and patriotic men succeeded to fire a people to such a pitch 
of national enthusiasm — Cavour, Garibaldi, Mazzini and Victor 
Emanuel — and attained in so short a period so complete and 
magnificent a political success for their ideals. To emperor 
Napoleon III, his liberal mind, political intelligence and well- 

42 



meaning interest United Italy also owes an eternal debt of 
gratitude. 

In 186G, when the war clouds began to rise between Prussia 
and Austria for the final trial of strength for German leader- 
ship, king Victor Emanuel, morally supported by Napoleon III, 
saw the opportunity — and did not hesitate to seize it — for 
definitely expelling the remaining hated rule of Austria from 
the province of Venice, the last of the true Italian provinces 
still in foreign possession. (The Papal State was always 
regarded in a light not purely political and was, also, an 
absolutely native state within Italy.) Austria was, however, 
in spite of her pressing difficulties with Prussia, unwilling to 
cede Venice without a struggle, to satisfy her prestige at 
least, and thus war resulted between the two countries. After 
a few engagements between the opposing armies, running paral- 
lel with Austria's disastrous campaign in Bohemia against 
Prussia, and likewise unfavorable, she was compelled to yield. 
As a result, Venice had to be ceded, and was united with Italy. 
Thus the watchword of the Italian wars of the liberation 
"Free to the Adria," was at last made a reality. 

This happy unification of Italy ran about parallel in point 
of time with that of Germany which had, practically, begun in 
the same year, 1866, with the reconstructed North-German 
"Bund." In the course of their subsequent development, 
after 1871, many reciprocal political and economic interests 
and cultural sympathies sprang up between these two coun- 
tries. Germany, by its new political position, greater size 
and industrial activity the leader, invited Italy to join her — 
with Austria — to form the historic "Dreibund," or Triple Al- 
liance, one of Bismarck's great diplomatic designs and 
triumphs. Nothing speaks more for his skill and broad- 
minded outlook than this success to conciliate Austria with 
Germany and also with Italy only a few years after 
wars of the most bitter enmity had been fought between them. 
In return for the security which this political alliance guaran- 
teed to Germany, Bismarck was able to extend Germany's 
fostering and protecting hand over Italy in the years of 
her development to a first-class power. More than once the 
gathering clouds of jealousy and enmity that rose from other 

43 



countries, particularly France and England, and foreboded 
danger to Italy's adventures of foreign acquisition in Tunis, 
Tripoli and Abyssinia were thus held aloof and dissipated by 
Germany's powerful arm. In the industrial and economic sense, 
also, this same combination of helpful and stimulating effects 
which flowed from the Triple Alliance can be said to have 
been "the making of modern Italy," the upbuilding of her 
material progress. 

This propitious relationship was violently torn asunder by 
Italy's perfidious course of selfishness in aligning herself with 
the Entente allies in the war and against Germany in the face 
of her binding treaty obligations. While Italy's action was 
not a direct contributary cause of the war, it had an important 
effect on its course and final outcome. One can venture the 
statement without much uncertainty that, with Italy remaining 
neutral, Germany and her allies would have won the war. The 
details of Italy's faithlessness and ingratitude for the benefits 
received from Germany's friendship and protection form one 
of the most drepressing chapters of the war. This topic will 
be further pursued in its proper connection in a later article. 

C. GERMANY'S PHENOMENAL RISE TO WORLD POWER 

Her Oriental Expansion Policy 

The rise of the German Empire after the war of 1870-71 
was like that of a phoenix; at her height, in the years just 
preceding 1914, Germany was the cynosure of all eyes! This 
astounding success was due to the wise and solid foundation 
from which the German State had been developed — unification 
not merely physical and external but organic and internal. In 
nothing else has the versatile genius of her great statesman — 
Otto von Bismarck — shown more brilliantly than in this work 
of organizing the country for attaining a solid future. The 
dominating ability of his external diplomatic policy was even 
surpassed by the penetrating intelligence of his internal policy: 
In the' amalgamation of the many differing elements of ad- 
ministration and public life of what had formerly been some 
thirty or more separate German States into one harmonious 
whole; in the conversion of the thirty different standards of 

44 



money, weights and measures, judicial procedure, police laws, 
post-office service, railroads and other public transportation 
factors, etc., into one national standard in each class. With 
all this went the complete unification of the military service, 
financial and banking laws, public and higher education. Hav- 
ing the common language, the addition of this standardizing 
and unifying of all the elements of public administration, in- 
tercourse and business agencies made the people and the 
country a homogeneous whole. The task of accommodation 
required on the part of the people to take up all these changes 
was a tremendous one, but the intelligence and patience of 
the Germans were equal to the demand! 

In the economic field Bismarck's policy was built upon the 
basis of a stimulating protective tariff and favorable com- 
mercial treaties; by fostering and protecting ship-building, 
mining, forestry and agriculture by state subsidies; by creating 
facilities for obtaining working capital through establishing 
of banks and co-operative loan societies; by a well-balanced 
system of taxation, etc., all of which combined started the 
wheels of industry a-humming in Germany at undreamed-of 
speed. Two agencies were the special fertilizers of this pro- 
gram: The first, the five billions of francs of French war- 
indemnity gold which poured into the country in a steady 
stream like a blessing from heaven; the second, the establish- 
ment of a chain of the most highly organized commercial, in- 
dustrial and higher technical schools spread throughout the 
country, and also of such for agriculture, mining and forestry, 
thus harnessing every phase of science, investigation and prac- 
tical experience to the chariot of industry. Under this com- 
bination opportunity, the golden, was laid at the feet of the 
German people in boundless profusion and was seized by them 
with an energy, intelligence, systematic application and solidity 
of business methods which achieved a success to astonish the 
world ! 

In its train immense manufacturing establishments arose 
in all parts of the country; steamships and sailing vessels, 
counting thousands of the finest ships afloat, plied from the 
North Sea and Baltic ports to every part of the world; a net 
of railroad lines of the highest class of construction and equip- 

45 



ment was spread over the empire ; macadamized highways 
linked together the cities and towns, and canal systems between 
the rivers made cheap transportation to tide water possible. 
As a result production, exports and imports increased from 
year to year to prodigious figures comparable only to those of 
England or the United States. All energies were strained to 
the utmost and brought prosperity to all and untold national 
wealth. 

The entire internal life of the nation shared in this progress. 
Magnificent cities arose, adorned by grand public buildings, 
monuments, parks and boulevards; the medium-sized and 
smaller towns shared proportionately in this wave of improve- 
ment and enjoyed, down to the smallest villages, the triumphs 
of modern science as applied in sanitary drainage, waterworks, 
electric lighting systems, telegraph and telephone service, 
public-health regulations and hospitals, fire departments, etc. 
The educational system of Germany and her universities, famed 
since the Middle Ages, were brought to that highest degree of 
theoretical and practical instruction which made them the pin- 
nacles of learning and the Mecca to which students came by 
the tens of thousands annually from every part of the globe. 
German research in history, archeology, natural sciences, bi- 
ology, chemistry, electricity, abstract and applied philosophy 
achieved a position of world renown and musters the names 
of many of the most famous men in these studies. In litera- 
ture, music and the drama, art and architecture works of 
great force and originality were produced that excited universal 
admiration. And not least was the practical sociological de- 
velopment which took place in the new Germany. The physical 
and moral well-being of the working population was safe- 
guarded by wise and just laws which recognized its importance 
to the State, and the standard of living of the entire people 
was raised from one of severe frugality to one of greater 
variety and plenty. 

This sociological side of the modern State received in no 
other country — monarchy or republic — such wide recognition 
and effect as in Germany; nor were these progressive measures 
of social justice entirely the result of socialistic agitation, but 
largely the voluntary acts of an enlightened administration and 

46 



public opinion. The institutions for the sick, the needy, 
the criminal, the imbecile and entirely demented were raised 
to the highest grade of efficient and economical service. By 
the introduction of wise factory and labor-protective laws, 
of the workmen's compensation act, compulsory life insurance 
of the employee by the employer and a system of old-age 
pensioning of the workers that great scourge of humanity, 
breeder of sickness, vice and crime — POVERTY — was practi- 
cally abolished in Germany! All-in-all and everything was done 
with the well-known German qualities of thoroughness, atten- 
tion to detail, honesty and faithfulness to duty! 

It fairly baffles the imagination to form a complete mental 
picture of this highly educated German people throbbing and 
seething with life-activities of every kind — 65 millions 
crowded together in a territory only a little larger than the 
State of Texas — when we consider their many-sided and in- 
tensely social, emotional and sentimental character; their deep 
interest in all the arts and sciences; in music, literature and 
advanced philosophy, all deployed and enjoyed in the self- 
consciousness of complete political and material success! Such 
a mental picture would be that of the much named, little un- 
derstood and foolishly derided "German Kultur"! And this is 
the country which had to be destroyed by envious greed and 
stupid hatreds born of pride and lust of power; this the country 
which is accused to have plotted the destruction of civilization ! 

Politically, the growth of Germany's position and influence 
was developed by her ruler and statesmen apace with her 
internal and commercial progress. Her political position was 
to be not merely a part of the great work but, in fact, its 
basis, its necessary basis of peace. Only upon a basis of 
secure and long-continued peace could Germany grow and 
prosper to her ligitimate national greatness. But within that 
seething caldron — Europe — it was possible only by the crea- 
tion of a strong army and navy, ready to strike at a day's 
notice — and a resolute foreign policy to indicate that this 
force would be used without hesitation when necessary to 
guard her security — to attain the desired condition, the con- 
tinued peace of Europe! The military readiness of Germany 
was, thus, a blessing to all nations; it was not at all a matter 

47 



of free choice by Germany but imposed upon her by her vul- 
nerable geographical position in the center of Europe, sur- 
rounded by hereditary foes. A country so located cannot begin 
to prepare for war when war from without is actually upon 
her, and one or more enemies are ready to invade her terri- 
tory from land or sea, or both. Thus this Germany, in all 
its desire for and necessity of peace, was secretly ever trem- 
bling beneath its success and outward serenity in the certain 
expectation of war, sooner or later, of war of revenge, envy 
and hate; she knew at all times that her enemies were but 
waiting for their opportunity! Yet, any such war in which 
Germany might have at any time become involved could, on 
her part, only have been a defensive war. The self-evident 
truth of this statement is proven by the forty-three years of 
uninterrupted European peace, 1871-1914, during which time 
difficult political situations had arisen on several occasions 
which brought war perilously near, but the outbreak of which 
was prevented, each time, by Germany's resolute attitude and 
military preparedness, based on her determined policy to pre- 
serve the peace in her own interest and in that of all Europe! 

This great and splendid German Empire was in very large 
measure the work of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who followed upon 
the foundation builders — Bismarck and the aged emperor Wil- 
helm I — and the galaxy of able and devoted men who worked 
with them. He succeeded his father, the ill-starred and beloved 
Frederick III, who at the death of William I was in the 
grip of a fatal illness and died after but a few months of 
reign. The success of William II was not due to any striking 
qualities of statesmanship akin to genius, but to his broad 
general purpose and liberal progressive attitude on all questions 
concerning the welfare and reunion of the country and its 
people; to his confident, joyous, exuberant enthusiasm for 
the empire! When the present wave of abuse will have dis- 
appeared, history will undoubtedly give him much credit; ra- 
tional Germany does it ungrudgingly even to-day. In judging 
Wilhelm II it may be overlooked that in a monarchy of the 
semi-autocratic constitution of Germany the head, king or 
emperor, is the source from which must flow a large share 
of the initiative and directing inspiration, and which may — 

48 



as such — prove either the life-giving impetus or the death- 
dealing blight for the national destiny. Emperor William 
proved himself, in this sense, a true leader of his State and 
Country, and in all situations a man of very high intelligence 
and political insight, of firmness of purpose and noble patriotic 
ambition. And he fully realized, up to the very outbreak of 
the war, the spiritual and material object of his reign : To 
achieve by a policy of uninterrupted peace and ready strong 
defense the upbuilding of the German nation to a foremost 
position in the world! A man of high moral character and 
true Prussian unbending righteousness, of profound religious 
feeling, possessed of fine judgment and enthusiastic instincts 
for the arts and sciences and all the beautifying and stimu- 
lating influences of life Kaiser Wilhelm — leaving aside a few 
minor vagaries and weaknesses of character — was a man and 
emperor of whom the German nation has reason to be proud, 
to whom the German nation should be deeply grateful even 
in the hour of his fall! The unmerited abuse, the infamy of 
every species which has been heaped upon his head by the 
enemy nations and many neutrals and — saddest of all — by the 
blind and vulgar of his own people are an arraignment of 
the fairness, moral decency and sense of justice of our time. 
He is accused of heinous, impossible crimes; but impartial 
history will say that his crime consisted merely in his audacity 
to stand up in defiance, backed by his people, against the En- 
tente plot to subdue and humiliate and, if necessary, crush and 
break up the German empire! 

The fame of Germany's internal institutions, like that of 
her manufactures and business methods, went abroad every- 
where and, in return, attracted visitors to the country from 
all parts. And while that which they saw elicited unstinted 
praise, these evidences of the working of a truly "mutualized 
State" — mutualized between the citizen and his government, 
between his obligations and the returns received in practical 
benefits — these evidences of an elevated national consciousness 
nevertheless excited envy and jealousy in many. Here was 
a country in which public administration was not only capable 
and economical but also strictly honest; the taxpayer's dollar 
went further than anywhere else ; the whole "reciprocal con- 

49 



ception of "the State" as an entity was on a higher plane. 
Americans, particularly, who went to Germany in thousands 
"to see" were disagreeably touched in their political prejudices 
to find that so ideal a State, so efficient an administration 
had been attained under a monarchy, a semi-autocracy in fact, 
while at home in their own country, under democratic insti- 
tutions and the aegis of "liberty" they beheld everywhere 
the curse of incapacity, extravagance, graft and open bribery 
undermining the public service, all of which — while fully 
recognized and aired in the public press — is condoned by a 
humdrum, self satisfied political attitude by and on behalf of 
the citizen. The French Republic, likewise, in the looseness 
and corruption of its internal administration, had its ire aroused 
by the precision, smoothness and completeness of the German 
public service. Political scholars who had asserted the superi- 
ority of democratic institutions over monarchical ones saw in 
Germany an irksome contradiction of their arguments, in many 
respects. All the same, many of the practical administrative 
methods and humanitarian socialistic innovations of Germany 
for the greater efficiency, protection and contentment of the 
great body of the people were diligently copied in England, 
America and other countries. 



(~\F the details of the formation of Germany's famous 
^^ political association — the Triple Alliance — in support of 
the empire's consolidation and development, we shall" speak 
later. This alliance, and its later extensions, was the founda- 
tion of her Oriental Expansion Policy which was one of the 
foremost causes of the war. The industrial and shipping 
competition of Germany was felt and resented more keenly by 
England than any other country. Germany's leading produc- 
tions interfered less with the trade of France, Belgium and 
the United States than with that of Great Britain and, as 
to shipping, the bulk of the freight and passenger service of 
the world was in the hands of Germany and England. This 
threat to the supremacy of the latter in manufacturing, com- 
merce and shipping, or at least the serious encroachment upon 
these, challenged England to the depths of her national pride. 

50 



Never before had she countenanced a rival, nor would she do 
so now! She had defeated the rivalry of Spain, of Holland 
and of France, one by one, and would likewise crush the 
rivalry of Germany, cost what may! This was the feeling in 
England — as attested by the utterances in the press, in books, 
in parliamentary debates — even before the Berlin-Bagdad Rail- 
road Scheme was launched by Germany; but when that project 
came into the open and, in spite of England's and France's 
stubborn opposition during a tortuous course of negotiation, 
left no further doubt of its being executed, together with all 
the attendant changes of "political balance" in the near-Orient, 
the die was cast! 

The general idea of the Berlin-Bagdad railroad was simple 
enough. The increasing industrial production of Germany 
made the question of raw materials, new markets and security 
from interference acute. The near East and further Orient — 
Mesopotamia, Persia, India, China, Japan, the Dutch and 
British possessions and the east coast of Africa, where Ger- 
many had an important colony — offered sources of supply and 
markets as well. If a railroad line could be arranged through 
Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey and Mesopotamia to Bagdad and 
the Persian gulf, with a water-link through the Black Sea 
and one down the Tigris river, together with all the necessary 
economic and nscal conventions with the countries along the 
route, the problem would be solved! 

This plan promised not only to meet the direct economic 
need from which it sprang but would have opened to Germany 
a shorter and safer route to the Orient than that from the 
Baltic and North Sea through the English Channel, the' Straits 
of Gibraltar, the Mediterranean and Suez Canal — or that, around 
the Continent of Africa — with all the possibilities of sudden 
interruption by the ever-present danger of a European war. 
In brilliancy and boldness of conception this Berlin-Bagdad 
railroad plan far exceeded the Cape-to-Cairo plan of Cecil 
Rhodes, the British South-African Premier, or the Panama- 
Canal Scheme. In revolutionary consequences to commerce 
and the political and industrial alignment of the world there 
is no comparison possible with any other similar enterprise 
excepting that of the Suez Canal. The map and a little 

51 



imagination will show the reader what all this would have 
meant for Germany and against England, and in a lesser degree 
also against Russia, France, America and every country having 
Oriental commercial interests. It was easy, also, to foresee that 
this scheme would lead to political influence of Germany in 
Persia. The railroad, once opened to Bagdad, would soon 
be extended to the open Arabian Sea and by its connections 
through Asia Minor would reach the Mediterranean ports of 
Smyrna, Beirut, Jaffa, and future ports to be established on 
the Arabian side of the Red Sea! A train from any of these 
ports could have reached Vienna, Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg 
before the fastest ship would have passed Gibraltar. 

This Berlin-Bagdad route and its branches would have 
increased Germany's commercial opportunities ten-fold in a 
few years' time; from the Arabian Gulf and the Persian Sea 
shipping lines would have been established to every point of 
Asia, Africa and the rich islands of the Indian Ocean, to 
Australia and New Zealand. A truly gigantic superman con- 
ception and ambition ! Such a consummation in the hands of 
an unscrupulous power desiring world-power and dominion 
would have been capable of upsetting the political balance and 
all the geographies; it would have to be stifled, killed! Was 
Germany such a power? The answer to this question it was 
scarcely necessary to determine accurately; it? was only nec- 
essary, under the influence of jealousy, to spread the suspicion 
thereof — and that and the positive commercial advantages laid 
into her hands by that scheme were sufficient to unite all 
the natural antagonists of this proposition — some of them 
already filled with other grievances — to a combination for 
thwarting these ambitious plans of this presumptuous new- 
comer among the nations! 

Looking at this matter dispassionately we may well ask 
this question : "Wherein was the moral or political wrong in 
Germany's plans in as much as her enterprise was m'erely 
commercial and economic and did not emanate from any 
design of conquest and annexation? Have not other nations 
carried out similar schemes of commercial extension or im- 
proved transit facilities: Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Cape-to- 
Cairo railroad plan, and others, all of which carried with them 

52 



political measures and re-arrangements? Why is that which 
is approved and accepted when done by England, France or 
America wrong when done by Germany? Why should a 
nation so fit not aspire to its fullest development, to an 
equal position and facilities with the others? She had of- 
fered financial participation in the Bagdad scheme to all the 
world; she had agreed to allow England to establish her own 
port on the Arabian Sea and use of the railroad on equal 
terms, a candid offer which was frustrated only by England's 
evident design to obtain control of the road for herself by 
insisting upon political rights for France and Russia as well. 
(See Lord Haldane's Memoirs.) Germany had even agreed 
to concede to England exclusive shipping rights upon the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers and the establishment of irriga- 
tion works. 

The plain truth behind all the political charges and man- 
oeuvres of England, Fi'ance and Russia in connection with 
Germany's undertaking is that they — and particularly England 
— were envious of the material gain and incidental political 
prestige which would flow to her from it, and were determined 
to break it up — somehow, as opportunity would present — 
rather than share in the enterprise under Germany's control! 
Theirs was a simple rule-or-ruin policy! 

Thus what Germany had achieved and wanted to continue 
in legitimate ways opened the evil eye of jealousy and greed 
in other nations! Malicious insinuations as to her real pur- 
poses and policy, once she should be big enough to throw 
off the mask of peaceful objects, were invented and spread 
about. This false pretense of apprehension as to the future 
received, unfortunately for Germany, some countenance from 
the imprudent utterances of a small band of impulsive so- 
called pan-German or all-German writers and speakers who 
talked in a boastful and presumptive way about "Germany's 
greatness," the "Imperial power," "the invincible army," of 
"wanting a place in the sun," of "extending German culture 
over the World," and made other similar aggressive-sounding 
declarations which all were more in the nature of super- 
patriotic ebulitions by a small minority than the expression 
of a definite national purpose. These vaporings were never 

53 



the voice of the Kaiser, the Government or the serious part 
of the German people, and were denounced in all responsible 
circles. Nevertheless, they were skilfully exploited by the 
enemy, and during the war made much of by the propaganda 
and magnified beyond recognition. Similarly the occasional 
outbreaks of patriotic fervor by the Emperor or the Govern- 
ment — unnecessary attitudes of provocation, shaking of the 
mailed fist and a certain brusqueness of language — a tempera- 
mental failing of the' Germans more in the nature of noise 
than real menace — were elaborated and published everywhere 
as evidences of Germany's designs of domination and world 
conquest! Nothing even remotely setting forth proof or even 
reasonable probability of any such designs has ever been pro- 
duced — for good and sufficient reasons! 

But with all this false pretense of alarm, these manufac- 
tured motives, these slanderous insinuations on the part of 
the enemy countries, the real nature and intent of the policy 
of England, France and Russia was never for a moment obscure 
or left in doubt. The solid facts underlying their design were 
too plainly in view to be disguised except for the most ignorant. 
The effect upon Germany was exasperating and depressing 
at the same time, as well as eloquently informing. It brought 
the realization to the rulers and the people that they were 
not to be left to enjoy the fruits of their efforts and that their 
further normal progress on the lines of the past and of the 
proposed near-east extension project were to be blocked — by 
diplomacy if possible, by force if necessary! 



Lord Haldane's Memoirs. As minister of war of Great 
Britain, Lord Haldane had conversations with the Kaiser at 
Berlin, in 1906, and at Windsor Castle, in 1907, relative to 
the Kaiser's desire to find a common ground on which England 
could corroborate with Germany in a peaceable execution of 
Germany's Bagdad plans. There was good prospect of these 
negotiations ending successfully, till England, througli her 
foreign minister, Earl Grey, raised the question of the political 
rights of France and Russia to participate in the contemplated 
arrangements. This immediately aroused the suspicions of 
Germany and indicated to her, even at that time, the existence 
of the Triple Entente "in embryo" as a coming active combina- 

54 



tion against the Triple Alliance and its specific near-east 
policy. Why did England not conclude this "Separate Under- 
standing" with Germany? It is plain; she was even then plan- 
ning to bring in these two countries, with their distinct in- 
dividual animosities and ambitions against Germany, to work 
up a bellicose situation on the continent and a threat to Ger- 
many — conveniently hinged on the real and artificial opposition 
to the Berlin -Bagdad railroad scheme — from which she — 
England — would profit by the thwarting of Germany's near- 
oriental scheme and the substitution of her' own ambition in 
the same premises. As Germany became more and more con- 
vinced that the inclusion of France and Russia into the nego- 
tiations with England would produce dangerous complications 
against her, she declined to proceed with England along these 
lines and ended the solicitations. They were resumed later, 
however, and practically concluded to a favorable finish by 
the early spring of 1914. (See also the later explanatory 
paragraph "The Asia-Minor Question.") 



D. AUSTRIA'S POLITICAL CHARACTER AND DESTINY 

The beginning of Austria's modern history has been in- 
dicated in the description of the war with Prussia, in 1866, 
in consequence of which she was pushed outside the German 
Confederation, and by her contemporaneous war with Italy 
by which Venice was separated from her rule. By these 
events Austria was left composed of the following parts of 
originally and preponderatingly German population: Upper 
and Lower Austria, the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia and Moravia. 
In the North the province of Bohemia was inhabited to a pre- 
ponderating percentage by Czechs (a branch of the Slavic 
family of nations) ; the semi-independent kingdom of Hungary 
was partly Magyar (Slavic) and partly German; the southern 
provinces of Croatia and Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Dalmatia) were preponderatingly Slavic, with a small ad- 
mixture of Italians along the seacoast; Galicia, north of 
Hungary, was of mixed stock, about one-half Slavic and one- 
half Polish. In the southeastern part of Galicia, the Buckovina, 
and in Transylvania the native Slavic and Hungarian popu- 
lations, respectively, had admixtures of Roumanians and 
Ruthenians. (All these peoples are "fragmentary wreckage" 
fiom by-gone civilizations or from Nomadic tribes, like the 

55 



Huns, similar to those of the Balkan States proper and of 
Albania and Greece, as we have defined it in a previous 
Article.) These several non-Germanic sections of Austria 
had, however, a very large proportion of German population 
who were the ruling class in government and business. Many 
almost entirely German cities and districts were scattered 
throughout this heterogeneous empire, as indicated by their 
names as given on any good map of Austria-Hungary. Mixed 
in with this strangely conglomerate population there were 
several millions of Jews, distributed throughout the country 
but prevalent particularly in the eastern parts. Of religious 
creeds and sects there were about as many as there were 
languages and dialects, but the catholic faith predominated 
largely. 

The kingdom of Hungary had, after a nationalistic revo- 
lution and war for independence, under Kossuth, been ac- 
corded a separate Constitution and parliament and limited 
internal self-government. All the other states, or rather 
provinces, were governed directly from Vienna by the na- 
tional imperial government and parliament, the Reichsrath. 
The official government language, and of public instruction, 
was German, but no restrictions were imposed upon the use 
of the Slavic languages in speech, publications, political debate 
or religious worship. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzego- 
vina were formerly independent Balkan principalities, but 
had, in consequence of continual agitations and disorders, been 
made semi-autonomous states by the Peace of Berlin, 1878 
(after the Russo-Turkish war), and placed under the ad- 
ministration of Austria under a secret understanding that 
after the lapse of a reasonable number of years of gradual 
amalgamation she might, if found necessary, take complete 
possession of these countries. This plan was carried out by 
Austria in 1909, as the autonomous arrangement had not 
brought the hoped-for contentment of the population. The 
signatory powers of the Peace of Berlin acquiesced reluc- 
tantly in the "accomplished fact," instituted by Austria by 
the military occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, being dis- 
inclined to face the risk of precipitating a dispute and 
renewal of war over the question. Austria agreed to certain 



political guarantees and qualifications, and Germany supported 
her policy firmly as being a move for orderly conditions and 
progress under a state of peace. 

Such, in rapid outline, was the political constitution of 
Austria-Hungary in the decade preceding 1914. We have 
thought it desirable to state them because of their important 
connection with the beginning and also with the ending of 
the great war. It must be evident to the reader that a 
country composed of so many different nationalities and 
with so many different languages and traditions was not an 
easy one to govern successfully and lead in the ways of 
peace, progress and prosperity, and so as to realize some sort 
of a united sovereignty, a national identity. There were 
perpetual rivalries between the different nationalistic "Parties" 
of Austria in the Reichsrath, and continued aspirations for 
independence by the Hungarians and the Czechs of Bohemia. 
Austria was, in a large measure, held together by a genuine, 
almost reverential loyalty for the ancient dynasty of the 
Hapsburgs and particularly for the old emperor, Francis Joseph. 
This influence, reinforced by a firm military police administra- 
tion and joined to a liberal attitude towards the different 
racial and tribal customs and languages enabled Austria to 
succeed fairly well as an imperial government. Yet it was a 
current prediction in the political world that this conglomerate 
and polyglot empire would break up into its separate parts 
at the death of Francis Joseph. 

By entering the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy, 
the political position of Austria-Hungary was strengthened 
greatly, internally and externally, and by her trade and 
financial relations with Germany the country prospered ex- 
ceedingly. Industry, commerce and wealth grew rapidly. Her 
military organization and navy were brought to considerable 
strength and efficiency under Germany's influence. As to 
the difficult matter of the racial diversity in the monarchy, 
the historic policy of Austria up to about 1908 had ever, 
except as to Hungary, been one of "benevolent absorption," 
of amalgamation with the dominant race, the German people 
of Austria proper. She did not countenance a permanent 
continuation and fostering of Slavic culture and separatism; 

57 



she looked upon these sturdy but undeveloped races (except 
for a small minority) mostly as excellent physical and cultural 
"fertilizing stock" but never as being entitled to become a 
leading influence in the empire's affairs, except as to individuals 
of ability in important positions. German methods and cul- 
ture were to be the directing forces of the country; and for 
this reason those all-German cities and districts had been 
placed throughout the provinces as outposts of amalgamation 
and leavening dough among the Slavic people. 

When the semi-autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
abolished, 1909, Austria at first encountered much difficulty 
in the pacification of certain political elements which stood 
under hostile foreign influence. Bosnia particularly was 
closely related in race and traditions to Serbia, adjoining. 
But Serbia was Russia's secret seat of action ; it was easy 
from there to foment demonstrations of racial kinship, of 
political union, of independence from Austria; but these agi- 
tations were not for their own intrinsic sake but for much 
larger purposes, primarily for keeping up the general tur- 
bulence, to prevent Bosnia settling down and following the 
lines of development and adaptation mapped out for her. 
The main purpose was to keep friction alive between Austria 
and the Balkan States and Russia, and to maintain the latter's 
influence in these countries till the propitious hour for in- 
augurating the larger aims and policy should strike! For the 
termination of this intolerable state of cabal and intrigue, 
Austria began to plan a policy of "union of interests" towards 
Serbia whose ultimate result should be the elimination of 
the latter as an hostile State continually agitating on her 
borders and interfering with her rule in Bosnia. This was 
the situation and "policy" up to 1910. 

At this time a man of distinguished character and political 
ability came to the front — Archduke Francis Ferdinand of 
Austria — nephew of the emperor and heir to the throne. He 
had written books and delivered addresses of importance in 
which he still further advanced the new ideas for the solution 
of the problem of the Slavic peoples of Austria, Serbia and 
adjoining Balkan districts. Seeing the difficulties of the old 
policy of "benevolent assimilation" m its uphill work against 

58 



the tenacity of national, or rather tribal, characteristics and 
aspirations, and their jealousies and enmities as long as they 
were in political opposition to each other, he advocated making 
of the several slavic peoples a united and autonomous country, 
similar to Hungary, thereby giving them racial recognition and 
virtual independence in their domestic affairs, yet tying them 
to Austria with the stronger bonds of a loyalty based on 
practical freedom than on the old principle of submissive 
amalgamation. Above all it was advanced that such an auto- 
nomous and united Slavic State would exclude the continuation 
of the insidiously patronizing "interest" of Russia and all her 
self-seeking machinations. The comparative question was sub- 
mitted to the consideration of Austrian statesmen and the 
leaders of all the various peoples: "Why should it not be 
possible to unite these separate Slavic peoples, who were not 
radically different races at all but only different branches 
or groups of the same general stock, into a united whole?" 
The differences between them were not greater than those which 
had formerly existed, or were still existing, between the dif- 
ferent race-groups of Germans: Bavarians, Wurttembergers, 
Badeners, Prussians, Hanoverians, Hessians, Saxons. 

And also, considered in a larger view, was there not at 
bottom something incongruous and contrary to the modern 
spirit of business organization in these "separatist" and "na- 
tionalistic" political tendencies in Austria? Everywhere we 
find concentration of related factors to united effort — combi- 
nation in short — to be the keynote of modern political success 
as well as of business success. Was not the German empire, 
the British empire, Italy, the United States of America evi- 
dence of the value of this principle? Was it not better to be 
an active and appreciated part of a successful whole than an 
unknown nonentity of independence, incapable to achieve any- 
thing noteworthy? Was it not a fact that the agencies of 
modern political action and existence, as of business life, 
are so manifold and extensive in scope that a small inde- 
pendent state has no chance whatever to accomplish anything 
in competition with the larger powers, to cut any figure in 
the life of the world? These "practical considerations" as to 
independent political success are such as should not only 

59 



have been preached in Austria but written in letters of flame 
on the walls of the peace-conference room at Paris! These 
ideas seem to have been overlooked during the late war when 
impulsive sentimentalists raised visions of "liberty and inde- 
pendence" in every handful of people whose mustachios hung 
a little different from those of their neighbors! This "self- 
determination of nations" idea — meaning so-called political 
freedom and independence from others — will turn out, as 
applied to Austria, a fatal delusion that will make for war 
and not for peace. There is more required to make a nation, 
one able to stand up and live, than the semblance of an 
ethnographical pedigree! To the one people which has every 
factor of nationality and independence — physical, racial, ethno- 
graphical — Ireland — this principle is to be denied! 

These views of Prince Ferdinand and the associates who 
thought with him attracted wide attention because of their 
drift and because they were expressed by the future ruler 
of Austria. They were received with distrust by the people 
of the states concerned through general ignorance and lack 
of sufficient political insight to absorb so broad a conception — 
much in the same way as Bismarck's first North-German con- 
federation was distrusted by the South-German states. Fer- 
dinand's propositions were, in fact, by many regarded as a 
hidden scheme for complete annexation to Austria of the 
Slavic southeastern peoples, a view derived from Austria's 
political spirit in these respects up to 1910. These fears 
were busily spread among the people by agents of outside 
hostile powers. To Russia, the chief agitator in this work, 
the advent of this man and his policy meant the opening of 
a new perspective full of apprehensions. Russia had watched 
with glee all the signs of an early dissolution of the Austrian 
monarchy; she, also, had a scheme of combination of the 
Slavic Austrian and Balkan states, when the breakup should 
come, but it was to be under her domination and for the 
realization of her national ambitions on the Aegean and 
Adriatic coasts. If this Prince Ferdinand's idea should take 
root and he should soon become emperor of Austria, that 
state's expected dissolution might, instead of becoming the 
long-awaited opportunity for Russia, be transformed into a 

60 



reorganization to new life of the Austrian empire. That, to- 
gether with Germany's powerful support, from her new eastern 
interests, would mean the permanent defeat of Russia's asph'a- 
tions — her flag would never float from Constantinople's min- 
arets ! ! 



E. THE ENSUING COMBINATIONS OF THE POWERS 

The Triple Alliance — Germany, Austria, Italy 
The Triple Entente — England, France, Russia 

The various motives from which Germany had become the 
object of the intense jealousy, envy and hate of the three 
other leading nations of Europe — England, France and Russia 
— should now be clear to the American reader. In order to 
safeguard her power and secure the peace she needed for 
her development, Bismarck had formed the Triple Alliance, 
previously mentioned, a strong central-European wedge, — 
Germany, Austria, Italy. The offensive and defensive compact 
between Germany and Austria was general and mutually bind- 
ing in all emergencies. It included intimate trade and fiscal 
arrangements, also agreements for the remodeling of the mili- 
tary system of Austria in some important respects on the 
Prussian plan. The agreement with Italy was somewhat more 
limited and conditional, especially as between Austria and 
Italy; but it was also at least a defensive alliance in case of 
attack of Germany or Austria by more than one power, and 
an offensive alliance, as regarded Italy, in any circumstances; 
and, as with the other two powers, it carried important re- 
ciprocal trade and fiscal provisions, preponderatingly in favor 
of Italy. Italy received immeasurably more than she gave 
during the many years of this arrangement; she basked and 
grew in the protection and stimulation that came to her from 
the Triple Alliance. When the test came, in 1914, instead 
of remaining staunch, she listened to the seducer and briber 
and stabbed her partners in the back in true blackhand style. 
The Triple Alliance was a secret pact, and its exact terms 
were known only to few, but the general trend of the agree- 

61 



ments was public knowledge. It is generally believed that a 
similar secret defensive "understanding" — if not full alliance 
— was concluded at about the same time (1895) with the 
kingdom of Roumania. 

As the years rolled on and the German near-east aims 
began to develop, negotiations were taken up by her with 
the countries whose assent and facilities were required for 
the Berlin-Bagdad railroad plans — Turkey and Bulgaria 
directly, Roumania and Greece indirectly — and intimate con- 
ventions were concluded to secure their authorization, co- 
operation and the rights-of-way and fiscal measures necessary 
for the undertaking. The exchange consisted of liberal money 
considerations, valuable trade concessions, floating of national 
loans for internal improvements, and included, also, political 
alliance and offensive and defensive military obligations on 
a mutual basis. When we join these new eastern arrange- 
ments which Germany negotiated to those of the Triple Alli- 
ance already existing, we can see what a formidable combina- 
tion it made! For and by Germany and her associates it 
was a combination for and of peace; but in the view of 
the three enemy powers it was a challenge to war for the 
reason that the commercial objects sought and the increased 
political influence gained by Germany were regarded as ag- 
gressively competitive to their own material interests and 
political spheres of influence. And, equally, the wonderful 
brilliancy and promising grand success of the scheme had 
excited their deep nationalistic envy and resentment! It was 
intolerable to them to see Germany gain all these material 
advantages and this additional prestige and power, no matter 
what explanations and guaranties she might vouchsafe. To 
them it had, therefore, become necessary to oppose this Triple 
Alliance and eastern combination with a counter alliance and 
plot — the Triple Entente and the design to thwart Germany's 
plans at any cost — after it should have become apparent that 
she could not be diverted from her purposes. 

It is credibly reported that King Edward VII, who was 
not only a most gracious bon-vivant but a very sagacious dip- 
lomat and king, seeing the dangerous drift of things, made a 
final effort early in his reign at a personal meeting between 

62 



himself and Emperor William of Germany, said to have taken 
place in Buckingham palace gardens, to influence the latter 
to modify the German aims and policy in the near East, her 
naval program of construction, etc., in appeasement of Eng- 
land's opposition and apprehensions, national prejudices and 
assumed prerogatives in connection. The interview was with- 
out result and the two monarchs parted in anger. This clean- 
cut mutual avowal of the opposing purposes of England and 
Germany became the starting point for the formation of the 
Triple-Entente — England, France, Russia — to check the Triple 
Alliance. But previous to this final consolidation of opposition 
to Germany, important political events had taken place. In 
1890, soon after the retirement of Bismarck, the former good 
relations between Germany and Russia had become loosened, 
and the existing "mutual protective convention" between the 
two countries was not renewed. Immediately a close approach- 
ment between France and Russia was solicited by France and 
received enthusiastic response from Russia, resulting in an 
intimate political alliance which, even in the nineties, con- 
stituted a two-power coalition danger against Germany. Eng- 
land still kept quietly in the background, suspicious of Russia, 
and because of the irritation then existing in France against 
England on account of Fashoda (1898). But soon a new 
political atmosphere arose. Queen Victoria had died and 
was succeeded, in 1901, by Edward VII, and about at the 
same time the irritating African Colonial questions arose, par- 
ticularly that of Morocco, which were managed with exceed- 
ing skill and tact by Delcasse in the interest of inaugurating 
a close approachment with England for the purpose of isolating 
Germany. 

The determined protest of the latter and her insistence 
on a mutual and joint settlement of these ascending colonial 
questions and on the recognition, by the other powers, of 
Germany's legitimate interests in Africa led to the Algeciras 
conference and to the victory of Germany on these points. 
But this success, or concession, only served to draw England 
closer to France and to open the door for the gradual recon- 
ciliation between England and Russia and the formation of 
the complete Triple Alliance. From all sides the opposing 

63 



interests, the joint interests as well as the separate interests, 
of the three powers against Germany and the Triple Alliance 
had become consolidated and clarified for a definite policy 
and plan of action. England's interest lay chiefly in the 
curtailing of Germany's commercial competition, of her naval 
growth and of her Turkey-Persia scheme; in France the per- 
petual irritation between the two countries on account of 
the Morocco question, which had spread over a period of ten 
years, culminated in the violent outbreak of the Delcasse 
Alsace-Lorraine fever of revenge and raised plans for the 
crushing of Germany; in Russia, which had seen her Constantin- 
ople ambitions, to which Turkey and Austria were the natural 
obstacles, permanently jeopardized by Germany's political and 
military support of these countries, new visions arose of ulti- 
mate success. 

She, Russia, was furthermore, bound to France by the 
financial debt she had contracted, to the amount of some 
twenty billions of Francs, for assistance in floating national 
loans, for railroad construction, including strategical railroads 
throughout Poland and the building of a line of fortresses 
along Poland's eastern frontier, all in preparation for war, 
also for industrial plants, etc., France thus virtually had 
become a partner in Russia's own southern policy; and in order 
to thoroughly disarm Russia's traditional opposition to England, 
and vice-versa in regard to these objects, it was agreed 
between the three powers that, in case of success in the war 
to come, Russia was to be free to take Constantinople, the 
navigation of the Dardanelles was to be open to the world, 
and all other measures necessary were to be taken to secure 
to Russia the coveted southern-seas outlet. To this general 
ground plan of opposition to Germany there were now added 
diplomatic efforts to undermine the relations between Germany 
and her allies by esti'anging Austria, by drawing away Italy, 
by shaking the faith of the others. In Austria, especially, the 
various nationalities were encouraged to strike out for in- 
dependence and "republican freedom" so as to accelerate the 
breakup of the old monarchy and rob Germany of her chief 
ally. As early as 1913 a French book was circulated in 
Bohemia, Hungary and other disaffected parts of Austria con- 
taining a map of the central empires showing "how they would 

64 



be after the next war" and representing Austria dismembered 
into separate sections and Germany shorn of Alsace-Lorraine! 

From the above recital we see that Russia quickly became 
the most active and most dangerous member of the Entente 
because, from her geographical position and the nature of her 
objects, she would prove the most readily provocative and 
aggressive. It was in the East, without question, where the 
conflagration would begin! In addition to what we have said, 
there were other considerations which had great weight with 
Russia in becoming an active member of the Entente. She 
had come out of the war with Japan defeated, her military 
and naval reputation discredited. It was necessary to re- 
habilitate these for the Czar's regime to be able to retain its 
hold upon the country; for, internally, Russia had arrived at 
a condition of supreme discontent by the toiling masses — to 
the point of revolution. The government of oppression, cor- 
ruption and licentiousness was exasperating to the people, the 
revelations of life at Court and in the higher circles of Russian 
society were humiliating to their sense of decency and relig- 
ious feeling. But above all, the country had for years been 
saturated with socialistic and anarchistic doctrines of reform, 
of liberty, equality and "natural rights" for the plain man. 
The ruling classes well knew the country to be seething with 
the revolutionary spirit (at least in the large centers) and 
ready to start an outbreak at the first provocation. It was 
imperative to forestall this: A successful war of conquest, in 
combination with the Triple Entente, for attaining Russia's 
southern policy, and directed against Turkey or the obstreper- 
ous Balkan States, or directly against Austria and Germany, 
would reestablish Russia's military prestige, be popular with 
the people and lull them back to loyalty to the Czar 
and dynasty and away from their dangerous democratic and 
socialistic dreams. Hence, the policy of irritation against 
Austria was at work all the time and intensified; the diabolical 
intrigues carried on in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro could 
not do other than lead to some terrible plot of violence before 
long which would precipitate a war! Who, then, can fail to see 
that it was not Germany who was the plotter for the war but the 
Triple Entente in the intensity and complexity of its three- 
cornered designs against her and her allies! 

65 



Additional strength accrued to the Entente by the secret 
accession to it of Japan through her alliance with England. 
Japan had emerged from her war with Russia, and the previous 
one with China, with great distinction and success; she had 
come to the front rank as the dictating mistress of China and 
the Orient. England, with her wide-open eye, hastened to 
make an offensive and defensive treaty with Japan, after her 
successful wars, before any other power should have the fore- 
sight and opportunity to do so. The idea was simple and 
reciprocal. The revolution in China and, in consequence, the 
jeopardized "vested interests" of the leading commercial na- 
tions in that country, had brought the whole European 
Concert into the Chinese internal conflict and had set up 
that "open-door policy" to prevent the powers being drawn 
into a war among themselves over their respective political 
and trade rights in China. But Japan, ambitious to control 
China altogether in order to bind her to herself as a source 
of raw materials and food stuffs and a ready great market 
for her manufactures, seeing that she could not possibly rule 
alone in this matter without a contest at arms, shrewdly allied 
herself with England, as the strongest of her competitors in 
this game, in a policy of gradually forcing out the other 
nations! 

Hence, Japan was quite ready to secretly pledge her sup- 
port to England in any European complications which might 
arise, as this would open up an opportunity of ousting from 
Asiatic influence and Asiatic possessions such of the European 
nations (enemies of England) as might become involved in 
such a complication — and might be defeated in consequence. 
Furthermore, Japan unquestionably realized that an alliance 
with England would be a valuable support to her against the 
United States of America in the latter's policy of racial dis- 
crimination and exclusion of her people, which policy had 
already produced a serious state of friction between the two 
countries. As for England, her alliance with Japan was a 
master stroke of political foresight; it cleared the Asiatic 
situation by creating a definite political status, backed by 
strong forces, in place of a chaotic "free-for-all" scramble 
full of danger. It secured Japan as an ally in Europe; finally, 

66 



nothing could have so neatly taken the edge off America'* 
policy against Japan as the knowledge of this alliance in 
Washington; it could have no other effect than to protect 
Japan against America and thus secure amicable relations all 
around and particularly in England's interest! Her professed 
friendship for the United States had, for the time, laid the 
spectre of the Japanese danger. 

This favorable Anglo-Japanese alliance was at the oppor- 
tune time deftly employed by England in her European war 
policy to find an additional support for the Triple Entente 
in the United States of America. There was this wonderful 
and aspiring young giant of the western hemisphere — the 
United States — big, alert, generous, whole-souled, and pos- 
sessed of boundless resources in food and materials and men! 
And, while it was realized that our country could not be so 
readily drawn into a definite entangling alliance with a Eu- 
ropean power at that time, England, even then, began her 
subtle plans of molding public opinion here in favor of her 
policies, to arouse jealousy of Germany commercially, and 
prejudice politically; to misrepresent to this people — an easy 
task — what was happening in European political developments 
and thus to lay the foundation for future help and common 
action. With this preparation made by careful propaganda, 
assisted by officious adulation, flattery, social ties, it needed — 
when the time of action had come — but the careful handling 
of episodes and details, as they might present themselves, to 
win this country for the Entente. 

What the purpose of the Triple Entente was, individually 
and collectively, we know beyond doubt, but what its plan 
of execution was, we can but surmise. With two such gigantic 
combinations facing each other, with the ever-changing political 
chessboard of Europe before them subject to sudden disturb- 
ances, it is most presumable that there was no definite plan, 
that no very definite plan could have been made. There 
can only have been the general plan to shape policy, mold 
events, design intrigues — and watch for the opportunity and 
seize it when it should present itself with a promise of success. 
The manner of action, in detail, would have to depend on 
the circumstances of the ostensible casus belli. Herein lay 

67 



the great risk, the hidden danger, the perplexing uncertainty 
of the calculation ! For, that a war such as actually happened, 
a world-war of unprecedented proportions and brutality, was 
designedly foreseen or foreplanned we cannot, we dai'e not 
assume! It would be too monstrous, too diabolical for human 
beings to evolve and countenance such a design ! Mankind 
would have to creep under the crust of the earth and forever 
disappear in shame and remorse if it were capable of evolving 
and harboring such a conception! Let us take refuge in the 
historical fact that nations often drift on gropingly under 
the spell of evil desires and without clearly knowing their 
way and end, much like individuals. 

And yet! so thoroughly depraved did the human conscience 
become in this war that the Germans were openly and without 
scruples chai'ged by the Entente allies with this very crime 
of having purposely provoked this war from motives of world 
conquest, and that upon this monstrous charge the peace terms 
of diabolical cynicism were based which are crushing Europe 
to atoms! The author believes it rather to be reasonable to 
assume that the Entente, instead of planning deliberately to 
let loose this awful war, counted to prevail over their adver- 
sary by the sheer weight of their preponderating strength and 
the agency of skilful diplomacy, or, at the worst, by a con- 
tinental war of limited proportions, the combined effect of 
such action to bring about the defeat and political humiliation 
of Germany and the abandonment of her program of ambition! 
How this calculation was upset, and the position England 
occupied in connection therewith, will be l'elated in the fol- 
lowing article. 

How strong the German Triple Alliance would prove in 
the crucible of war no one was able to predict, nor was there 
anything certain about the durability and extent of the alli- 
ance with Turkey and Bulgaria or the friendly pledges of the 
kings of Greece and Roumania. The military assistance which 
Turkey and Bulgaria would be able to render to Germany 
was not to be despised, and its certainty or uncertainty was a 
matter of moment. The three doubtful countries — Italy, Greece 
and Roumania — were well known to be ambitious for possess- 
ing sundry neighboring territories. Under cover of their 

68 



"irredenta agitations" they were planning to reach out for 
valuable lands and peoples, ports, fortresses and other strategic 
factors. Might they, perhaps, be induced by guaranties in 
these directions to violate their honor and break their definite 
agreements and implied promises with Germany and the Triple 
Alliance? These disquieting questions would only be answered 
under the stress and temptations of actual war! 

Before proceeding to the detailed summary of the "war 
conditions" in the spring of 1914, it becomes interesting and 
useful to state certain facts, political relations and opinions 
which were not heard or thought of as war motives at its 
outbreak but were fabricated into such some months later 
only, after and because the war had developed contrary to 
calculations. They are : 

1. England was not opposed to Germany because of her form 
of semi-autocratic government or because of the personality 
of the Kaiser; she is a monarchy also, although of a more 
liberal character; King Edward VII was the Kaiser's uncle, 
the Kaiser's mother was the Princess Royal of England, 
daughter of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert; every 
branch of the English Royal family is intimately related 
with the German reigning houses and nobility, especially 
of Hannover, Brunswick and Hessia. 

2. France, although a republic, had no animosity towards 
Germany because of her monarchical form of government 
or because of the Kaiser personally, and neither of these 
conditions were in any way linked with the question of 
"revanche" and Alsace-Lorraine. Culturally there existed 
the most intimate and sympathetic intercourse between 
France, Germany and Austria before the war, more so 
than with any other countries. 

3. Russia was more autocratic in political form than Germany 
and governed by a Czar; Italy, Greece, Roumania and 
Serbia were kingdoms, also, and therefore none of these 
had any objections to Germany and Austria because of 
being empires with a Kaiser for a nominal ruler, nor did 
this prevent England, France and the United States to 
work with them in war alliance. 

69 



4. All these countries were on a basis of so-called "militarism," 
i.e., had standing armies and compulsory military con- 
scription. None of them ever objected to Germany's mili- 
tarism on principle, at most only to its numbers and effi- 
ciency. The political conditions in Europe had made stand- 
ing armies and service by conscription "a necessity" for 
over a century, especially for Germany and Austria. 

5. The peace footing of the French army, in 1914, was larger 
than that of the German army, not only relatively but 
absolutely by nearly 100,000 men of all arms, although 
the population of Germany exceeded that of France by 
nearly twenty millions. These additional French soldiers 
were drafted from her African and Asiatic colonies. 

6. Kaiser Wilhelm was, in the last decade of his reign, the 
most prominent political personage in Europe, perhaps in 
the world, acclaimed as a wise and just ruler and a man 
of great intelligence and ability and of the highest charac- 
ter, liberal in thought, progressive, intensely occupied with 
every need and legitimate aspiration of the German people, 
and working only for their welfare and for peace and 
contentment among all the nations. He was worthy, con- 
scientious, honest, no plotter; but, unfortunately he was 
not possessed of the superlative political genius required 
to guide the German ship of State safely through the 
"Cillis and Charibdis" of European politics and the great 
crisis of the war. He neither made nor wanted the war. 
No man in history has ever been more coarsely and shock- 
ingly slandered and abused than the German emperor, 
especially in America — in America afflicted with deplorable 
ignorance of European history and conditions — be it said 
to our great shame! The fact that Germany has, since, 
deposed the Kaiser and established a republic has, of itself, 
no connection with either the rule or the character of 
William II. 

7. Not until some months after the outbreak of the war, and 
in some respects not until the entry of America, were the 
subjects of autocracy, democracy, liberty, humanity, kais- 
erism, militarism, Junker tyranny, self-determination of 
nations, etc., advanced anywhere as directly connected with 

70 



the motives and objects of the war. All of these have 
been subjects of international discussion for years, but 
had absolutely no direct bearing on the causes of the war; 
as "war motives" they were the artificial product of a 
deceiving, conniving, slanderous and corrupting war propa- 
ganda inaugurated by England and blindly outdone by 
America ! 

The author has made the above grouping with the par- 
ticular purpose of impressing the American reader with the 
totally erroneous ground of seven-tenths of the motives upon 
which the war is popularly assumed to rest and upon which 
we finally went to war with Germany; also with the realization 
of the political ignorance, gullibility, blind passion and bad 
taste which we exhibited to the world. It seems desirable that 
these impressions in regard to ourselves be made ahead of the 
material and drift of the following articles of this book. The 
opinion here expressed of our unsound war atmosphere and 
attitude is that held not only by the intelligent part of the 
world outside of America but by the best informed, most 
sane, just-minded and truly patriotic of our own people. 



The Asia Minor Question. In view of its important bearing 
on the war it may be well to add more specific details on 
some points. The country in question is Turkish territory, 
and stretches from the Agean Sea to the Arabian gulf. Persia 
is its eastern border, and along that is situated the ancient 
district of Mesopotamia, watered by the great rivers Euphrates 
and Tigris. They join some fifty to sixty miles north of the 
end of the Arabian gulf, and discharge into that through 
several branches, similarly to the Danube, Nile, etc. This 
country is famous since Biblical times for its general fertility, 
and is also rich in petroleum wells. For this reason it had for 
some years even before 1900 attracted the attention of Eng- 
land and France, and later of Germany, for railroad projects, 
river steamboat traffic and water-irrigation schemes to develop 
its natural riches and bring them to Europe. All these schemes, 
naturally, had to be planned under "concessions" from Turkey 
and compensatory fiscal arrangements with that power. The 
rights obtained in this way and the projects launched by the 
above nations, including also Russia and Italy in a lesser 
degree, badly criss-crossed each other. 

71 



To Germany the great point of attraction lay less in the 
local economic opportunities than in the possibilities of secur- 
ing by a great railroad scheme — the Berlin-Bagdad railroad — 
quick and secure communication with the Orient, Asia, etc., 
and with her own African colonies. She nursed her plans very 
carefully and secretly, secured liberal concessions from Turkey 
and made liberal financial arrangements in return; and when 
the project could not longer be hidden and its real purpose 
became apparent, was already in a position of controlling 
advantage as compared with England and France. From that 
moment there was open opposition from those countries to 
her plans. (See also a preceding explanatory paragraph en- 
titled: Lord Haldane's Memoirs.) She tried to placate them 
in every way and made many concessions of rights in 
order to attain at least her main purpose — as stated above, 
under absolutely secure political conditions. The negotiations 
with France proceeded favorahly and reached an amicable 
understanding towards 1912. Even with England, her most 
stubborn opponent, a point was finally reached where a peace- 
ful agreement seemed possible. 

Germany had agreed to give to both England and France 
important participation in the capitalization of the German 
company and seats in its directorate; she agreed that Bagdad, 
on the Tigris river, should be the end of the German railroad, 
and thus relinquished her original plans and rights to continue 
the railroad to the deep-water port of Basra, on the lower 
Tigris, close to the head of the gulf; she conceded the naviga- 
tion rights on the Tigris from Basra to Bagdad to the British, 
also navigation rights on the Euphrates river, irrigation water- 
works rights, etc. ; she agreed to build the port works, 
docks, etc., at Basra and Bagdad with her own capital, 
as owner, but conceded to England a 40 per cent privi- 
lege of participation in the investments. Finally, there 
was a general agreement that all the interested countries 
should have equal rights and rates of shipment on all the 
Asia-Minor railroads and the Berlin-Bagdad line and on all 
the river transportation lines. 

On these terms England, at last, agreed to offer no further 
opposition to the construction of the railroad by Germany 
and to the batter's preponderating rights of ownership and 
direction of the enterprise. It seemed thus as if the laborious 
and difficult negotiations of many years (in which Germany 
had shown persistent good will under most galling aggra- 
vation) were to be crowned with success. But this favorable 
prospect had scarcely opened when the ominous shot at Sera- 
jevo rang out and threw the gloom of doubt over all these 
propositions. 



72 



Succeeding Developments. It is peculiarly illustrative of 
England's intense jealousy of her commercial and shipping 
supremacy in the world that she should have thx*own all this 
opposition in Germany's path — which, she knew very well, had 
no side issues of political influence or territorial aggression, 
while she herself — England — was in possession of numerous 
similar trade routes and special privileges in every part of 
the world, the most of them acquired by foi*ceful conquest 
or arbitrary political measures and not by peaceful diplomacy 
and equitable agreements as in the case of Germany in her 
Asia-Minor project. In view of all the facts, a serious doubt 
arises as to whether England's final apparent acquiescence in 
the German Berlin-Bagdad scheme was sincere and actuated 
by genuine desire to secure world peace by removal of the 
acute friction over that question? As to Germany, her sin- 
cerity cannot be doubted ; her objects were clear and plainly 
stated; the detailed history of the Berlin-Bagdad railroad nego- 
tiations as given by Carl Helfferich, ex-German imperial vice- 
chancellor, in the first volume of his famous work "Der Welt- 
krieg" (The World War), and whose character for honesty 
and veracity cannot be impugned, proves the assertion. But 
as to England and France the case is different! Even while 
England was officiously pretending to give Germany the right 
of way in her enterprise, Earl Grey was busy with his letters 
to M. Cambon, French Foreign Minister, on the provisional 
military convention pledges between England and France, and 
soon thereafter entered, together with France, into definite 
marine-policy agreements with Russia, for the case of a Euro- 
pean war. 

These negotiations were carried on in the early spring of 
1914 — and were, therefore, eloquent of coming events! In 
order to deceive Germany as to the real, strength of these 
Triple-Entente military and naval understandings, no real con- 
ventions were concluded; the agreements were verbal, in 
secret notes and memoranda — the word was to be represented 
by the spirit. It appears from this that, no matter with what 
pretended sincerity England's negotiations with Germany as 
to peace in Asia Minor had been carried on, her greater 
political object — the crippling of Germany's further gi'owth — 
which she had cautiously nursed since the Algeciras confer- 
ence, was not to be relinquished! Germany was deceived for 
a short time ; but from the day of the visit of King Edward VII 
to President Poincare of France, in Paris, on April 21st, 1914 
(accompanied by Earl Grey) , the real situation became 
quickly revealed — the cards were on the table — and the French, 
Belgian and Russian press could no longer restrain its open 
exultation and demand for an early war with Germany. 

It was thus for her own purposes entirely that England 
encouraged an early military embroilment between France and 

73 



Russia, on one side, and Germany and Austria, on the other, 
to bring to a settlement the many questions of political an- 
tagonism, jealousy, hate and revenge pending between them ; 
she counted that Germany would emerge humiliated out of 
such a conflict and ready to submit to England's dictation 
when the latter would declare her solidarity with these powers. 
This policy of England resulted less from the designs of 
the British statesmen of the hour, or from any specific political 
or economic necessities, than from her traditional policy of 
centuries which had made England great and which greatness 
and supremacy were to be maintained! Her power was now 
to be turned against Germany, as her present greatest political, 
industrial, naval and shipping competitor. The astute Bis- 
marck expressed the situation tersely, as early as 1887, when 
he said, in a speech in the Reichstag: "The only way for us 
to guarantee good relations with England would be to restrict 
our economic and national development, and that, of course, 
we cannot do." 



The Kaiser's League of Nations. To many readers the 
preceding articles may furnish ground for the belief that 
Germany was the main obstacle to the introduction of freer 
political methods and relations into world politics because of 
being the most pronounced "militarist" power and because of 
having refused to join in the Hague arbitration and reduction- 
of-armament proposals. To disprove such conclusions, we 
must understand that the Morocco disputes and the near- 
Oriental question thoroughly convinced Germany that the 
Triple Entente meant war sooner or later, and that all these 
Hague proposals were insincere and nothing less than traps 
set to beguile her. They wanted to "down" Germany well 
enough but would have preferred to accomplish this without 
the uncertain means of an appeal to arms. The great Bismarck 
said, soon after the war of 1870-71, that "Germany would 
have to fight for what she had achieved within one or two 
generations, as the envy of her neighbors would never allow 
her to enjoy the fruits of her victory and her new prosperity 
without challenge." 

We have shown in our articles that Germany's necessity 
and aim was peace and that it was because of that aim that 
she had to be armed to the teeth. A corroboration of the 
Kaiser's constant peace policy has recently come to light 
through the memoirs of Count Witte, the prominent Russian 
statesman. It appears that in 1905, while on a visit to the Czar, 
the Kaiser proposed a "League of Nations" offensive and defens- 
ive, between the Triple Alliance and Russia and France to secure 
peace on the Continent, and that France was to be prevailed 
upon by Russia to join in this league. This entire proposition 
was arranged secretly between the Kaiser and Czar and at 

74 



first even kept from the knowledge of the Russian Prime 
Minister of the day, Count Lamsdorff, presumably to facilitate 
confidential pourparlers being begun with France. When the 
two Russian statesmen named above became aware of these 
private plans of the two monarchs, they announced at once 
that "this proposition was an affront to France and would 
upset the aggressive policy of the Franco-Russian alliance" — 
already formed at that time — against Germany's African and 
near-Oriental policy, and for nearer-home reasons. This prop- 
osition then quickly died of inanition due to the lack of 
energetic power on the part of Czar Nicholas and the deter- 
mined opposition of the pro-French war party at his Court. 
From all the circumstances of the situation it is evident that 
Russia was to be the moving spirit in this plan because of her 
intimate relation with France ; she failing, Germany could go 
no further. Emperor William was deeply disappointed by the 
fiasco of his well-intentioned demarche. 



VII. MORAL DELINQUENCY AND SPIRITUAL 

INERTIA AS ESSENTIAL FACTORS OF 

THE WAR 

In the Introduction the author indicates the breakup of 
the moral and ethical systems of our times, due to their 
irrational foundation, as essential causes of the war. These 
views are elaborated in the articles mentioned, and it would 
not be amiss to read them in connection with the present 
article. To these causes we must add one closely related to 
them and no less important: It is the unfortunate spiritual 
inertia in which mankind has been held within its stupendous 
technical and material progress and which prevented a political 
organization of the world in harmony therewith, and the timely 
removal of causes of war. We refer here to the brilliant 
ideas of Dr. Alfred E. Fried, a holder of the Nobel peace prize, 
as expressed in his magazine articles on the war and the 
League of Nations. Among the voluminous literary material 
which the author has read in his studies on the war, nothing 
more able, broad and fundamentally true has been presented, 
especially as applicable to the possibility of a successful 
League of Nations in the present conditions of the world. The 

75 



author's own views singularly cover, include and indorse those 
of Dr. Fried, although presented in a different form. It is 
highly desirable that the philosophical foundations of the 
war be submitted to the reader at this stage of this book's 
argument in order that he may become imbued with a clear 
impression that below historical and political developments, 
as given in the succeeding chapters, there are deeper causes* — 
the ethical and spiritual conditions of the great tragedy. 

In the article "The Summit" the author has drawn a picture 
of the phenomenal progress of mankind in scientific, technical 
— purely material — directions during the nineteenth century 
and up to the outbreak of the war. In the course of this 
progress — particularly in the means of inter-communication 
for business, research, pleasure — the world has figuratively 
become smaller, as pointed out by Fried and by the author 
in his "National Evolution," published in 1908; peoples and 
countries have been drawn closely together, intercourse has 
been extended, differences have been leveled and prejudices 
softened, dark continents and semi-savage races have been 
brought into the fold of civilization. As a result, a con- 
tiguity of interest and aspiration began to embrace the entire 
world; the events and trend in each individual country im- 
mediately became the common knowledge and property of 
all others, the world was approaching the status of an inter- 
national community. But such a condition plainly demanded 
a corresponding widening of sentiment and method in the 
regulation of political matters — an internationalized type of 
political view, diplomacy and action. 

While this was recognized by leaders of thought and a senti- 
ment in this direction was developing and the first tentative 
steps were actually being taken (Hague Peace conferences and 
Tribunal, the Kaiser's League of Nations of 1905, International 
rules on the High seas, belligerency regulations, etc.), not 
sufficient progress and harmony of purpose had been attained 
by 1914 to make it possible to resolve the elements of a threat- 
ening world conflagration into a judicial argument at the 
Hague Peace Palace. Philosophy, which in the wider sense in- 
cludes religion, had remained stagnant; man continued in this 
respect, in the confining swaddling clothes of his infancy, which 

76 



left his spiritual horizon far behind his material plane. The 
political leaders of the time had one foot upon the bridge of 
progress but the other was restrained by the evil memories 
and practices of the past; in other words: Spiritual progress 
had lagged behind, had been outrun by the different factors 
of material progress, had not been able to change its feeling 
and perspective and obtain intellectual control over the new 
conditions in the world. In final analysis this must be recog- 
nized as one of the most important indirect causes of the 
war through its failure to substitute counsel for force. The 
new conditions of intercourse, assimilation, and material ad- 
vance of every kind had come too rapidly for man himself to 
comprehend fully the process of change which was overtaking 
him and to devise the ajustments required by it. 

This dangerous conflict between material achievement 
and lack of philosophical outlook was bound, sooner or later, 
to bring the world to a crash. For, the new conditions while 
increasing contact and domains of mutual interest between 
all the nations of the world, leveling inequalities and pre- 
judices, also increased opposition of interests and general fric- 
tion, leading to jealousy and envy between them. Conflicting 
spheres of interests of the different nations crossed each other 
in every corner of the world, and instead of leading the 
statesmen to the road of "intelligent understandings," the 
old policies of secret diplomacy, combinations and appeal to 
force were left to deal with the questions. Instead of "regu- 
lation" becoming the means of adjustment, force, imperialism 
and militarism retained their sway. Thus, instead of man's 
material advance leading to his continued progress and ever 
greater happiness, all was pulled down by the very breadth 
and depth of his achievements in scientific and general progress 
when these became applied to the gruesome tasks of war! 

The war has now fully taught us that the new "intimacy" 
of all parts of the world, the internationally of sentiment and 
feeling which exists in many directions, demands a new order 
of political philosophy and world organization for regulating 
the intercourse among the nations. This conviction has found 
expression in the "League of Nations." But those very con- 
ditions of intimacy and unity which existed before the war 

77 



and made the ground so favoi'able for the forming of such a 
league and new system of arriving at political adjustments 
have been destroyed by the war and are now missing. In- 
stead of free intercourse, confidence, friendship, we now have 
repression, distrust, hate and wilful crippling of the defeated 
nations. The borders are closed, travel is impeded, famine 
and political ferment hold hundreds of millions by the throat, 
business is depressed to the minimum of absolute necessity, 
enterprise is dead, every country is bankrupt and its money 
almost without value. (The author is speaking of Central 
Europe, particularly.) Hunger, dismay and hopelessness have 
paralyzed all energies and cast a pall over Continental Europe. 
How can such conditions be favorable for the erection of a 
successful League of Nations at this time? The very elements 
required— broad international sympathy and unity of interest 
and outlook — are missing. We now realize with pain and 
remorse what it was that we possessed before the war, what 
we failed to see and do, the great opportunity we lost! As Dr. 
Fried says: "The structure of a real league of nations can- 
not be erected ere these lost foundations are regained." We 
must first win back the pre-war conditions of -international 
freedom, opportunity and prosperity, and the spiritual buoy- 
ancy which comes of peace before we can hope to apply to 
politics the new thought of counsel, compromise and co- 
operation in place of sinister selfishness and' the use of 
material force! 

We have called the defect under consideration "spiritual 
inertia," but what, at bottom, was its nature? The great 
achievements of our age certainly do not indicate any in- 
tellectual disability or decay in man; never did intelligence, 
the power of thought, ingenuity, imagination shine forth 
brighter than in the nineteenth century. Why, then, did this 
"intellectual strength" not assert itself in the domain of 
political philosophy? Why did vision remain unclear? What 
was it that put "the spirit" in chains? Here we have to leave 
Dr. Fried and take up the author's more objective and fun- 
damental explanation of the whole phenomenon. Where, we 
ask, is the distinct line between spirit, morals and ethics? 
The author asserts that human nature is one and undivided 

78 



and cannot be precisely separated into its constituent factors. 
There is but one system or function of thought, and it in- 
cludes feeling, spirit, morals and ethics; and the conclusion 
is inevitable that this "spiritual inertia" which held the world 
in bondage was but the applied expression of the philosophical 
inertia and delinquency of our day, as analyzed in the parts 
of this book mentioned. It was the lack of strong moral 
convictions, of full confidence in the basis of our moral and 
ethical system that delivered man over to the rule of coarse 
selfishness, greed for power and possessions, jealousy and envy 
of the brother-man and brother-nation ; that filled his mind 
with the oppression of these dark impulses to the exclusion 
of a free and liberal perception of the new world conditions 
and of the new political atmosphere required for their peace- 
able solution ! Thus, whichever way we argue the point, we 
are brought to the author's declai'ation that a new philosophy 
of life is needed in the world freed from the cobwebs brought 
over from the infancy of man in order to bring real truth, 
candor, seriousness and sympathy into men's character, their 
motives and actions in all the avenues of human demonstration. 



B. OUTBREAK AND COURSE OF THE WAR 
VIII. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR 

The Great Conspiracy. The British Propaganda 

As stated in the "Introduction" this book is not a history 
of the events of the war in the usual sense but an examination, 
rather, of the inner forces — political, social, moral — that made 
the war. Our object is to free the colossal occurrence from 
the atmosphere of ignorance, deceit and calumny in which it 
has been enveloped and to reveal the great wrongs of motive, 
errors of calculation and judgment which precipitated the 
war and maintained it during four long years of terror. 

With the view to focus the individual and joint responsi- 
bility of the powers for the war we will briefly restate the 
objects of each thus: 

79 



1. Germany had no schemes of vengeance or conquest 

against any of the opposing powers, and there were no acute 
political disputes arising from active aggression or direct 
threat pending with any one of them in the spring of 1914. 
The Morocco question had pi'actically been disposed of through 
the final agreements with France made in 1911-12, except that 
a state of mutual irritation was left behind. This question 
unfortunately had, in its long course of friction, greatly 
stimulated the French agitation for revenge for 1870 and for 
regaining Alsace and Lorraine. The efftect of this open 
determination of an influential section in France to bring 
these questions to a military decision at the first favorable 
opportunity was, naturally, very disquieting and exasperating 
to Germany and caused deep political apprehension in that 
country. As to other "war" subjects, Germany had determined 
on the immediate execution of her eastern commercial ex- 
pansion policy and the Bagdad railroad single-handed, prac- 
tically, as participation by other nations, mainly England and 
France, did not appear possible without surrendering her 
supreme rights in the undertaking. She was also carrying 
out a gradual increase of her naval strength in proportion to 
the increase of her mercantile shipping and colonial possessions 
and in line with England's policy in this respect. For the 
success of her internal and external policy Germany needed 
evidently nothing so much as peace; she was fully aware of 
the growing enmity of England and the United States because 
of jealousy of her steadily expanding trade and shipping, but 
she claimed the right to look upon the world as an open 
market and free-for-all field of competition in which merit 
and price of wares and efficiency of service should be the 
only privileges of competition. 

2. France, always enmious to Germany in her subconscious 
self, had been defeated in her plan (with England) to humiliate 
Germany in the Morocco question — by ignoring her rights as 
a member of the Madrid Colonial conference — and had, in- 
stead, been compelled by Germany to come into the Algericas 
conference and, later, settle the Morocco and related colonial 
disputes by agreements with her, recognizing Germany's rights 
and sphere of interest in Africa. This result had left a sharp 

80 



sting of resentment in the breast of France, which found its 
vent in the renewed and virulent revenge and Alsace-Lorraine 
agitation under Delcasse's lead, purposely calculated to irritate 
Germany to some open act of hostile rejoinder leading to war. 
Knowing England's fear of Germany's growth, and Russia's 
precarious internal situation and Constantinople ambitions, 
France found it easy to approach them both with suggestions 
for a combination. This insidious work culminated in the 
Triple Entente to block Germany's plans, bring on her sub- 
mission — defeat in war, if necessary — and compel the resti- 
tution of Alsace-Lorraine. 

3. Russia was determined, from the variety of motives 
previously explained, to provoke war with Turkey, the Balkan 
States, Austria and even Germany — one or more or all of 
them — to set the ball a-rolling to win Constantinople and 
the freedom of the southern seas, already pledged to her by 
England and France as the prize for entering the Entente. 

4. Austria was resolved to put down the plotting of Russia 
and Serbia against her rule in Bosnia and Dalmatia, and the 
plotting of Russia in Serbia and Montenegro against her tra- 
ditional political consolidation policy towards these countries. 

5. England was determined to check Germany's further 
encroachment upon her industrial, commercial-shipping and 
naval supremacy and to definitely prevent the execution of 
her eastern-extension program unless she could obtain a con- 
trolling hand therein. Such was the relative situation. 

We see from this summary that the three Entente nations 
and Austria were the bellicose factors; they each had definite 
"grievances and objects" involving aggression. Germany, on 
the contrary, had none such; there were no plans of territorial 
aggression against either France, Belgium or Holland, nor 
against any eastern country; if there had been anything of 
this kind in secret preparation it would surely have come to 
light by this time through the war "revelations" in the different 
countries. The irritation of Germany against France was a 
"reflex" irritation; the protective position she had to assume 
towards Austria was obligatory under the Triple-Alliance treaty 
and a matter of honor with her, but it was "indirect" as far 
as she herself was concerned. The above statement is funda- 

81 



mental for the correct understanding of the war development; 
it is incontrovertible; it leaves it impossible for anyone to 
continue to believe the infamous manufactured propaganda 
charge "that Germany purposely plotted the war from motives 
of conquest." It was the result of the determined aggressive 
Entente designs against the stubborn defensive Alliance designs! 
The responsibility is well divided between them and must be 
shared by all of the five original war powers; if anything — 
Germany was the least responsible of all!! It defies all 
understanding that the people of the United States, so able 
and intelligent in business matters, could not see through this 
entanglement and fell an easy victim to English wiles and 
French ebullitions and plunged pell mell into this hotbed of 
hate and intrigue — European politics! 

The nations of the Triple Entente — France, England and 
Russia — knew very well that neither of them could fight for 
their objects single-handed against the Triple-Alliance — 
Germany, Austria, Italy — with any chance of success, hence 
the combination; and the motive of this combination rested 
in first line upon their respective particular objects and in- 
terests, in lesser degree upon their common jealousy of 
Germany's political and industrial position and in the least 
degree of all upon natural sympathy for each other. As be- 
tween England and Russia, there was no natural sympathy at 
all — quite the contrary; as between England and France there 
had been a sympathetic understanding about their colonial 
policies since the beginning of the Morocco contention, but 
even in this the common tie was a material one — the exclusion 
of Germany from further colonial extension in Africa and the 
checking of any plans on her part for acquiring new colonies 
in other parts of the world. England would never have gone 
to war with Germany merely for the sentimental object of 
helping France win back Alsace-Lorraine, and surely not to 
help Russia win Constantinople, and the same reasoning applies 
to the other two powers in regard to each other. 

We see from the above that the separate self-interests 
of the three powers were beyond doubt the main impelling 
force of the Entente ; the other factors were of greatly inferior 
moment. Had America ever comprehended this — that sordid 

82 



selfish aims — jealousy, greed, and vainglorious revenge — 
were at the bottom of the combination against Germany, she 
would never have reached the point of entering the war, she 
would have remained strictly neutral and would have taken 
her unavoidable shipping losses and restrictions philosophically 
like the other neutrals did — as inevitable incidents of war — 
and would have prevented all avoidable losses by proper ship- 
ping regulations. We have already said that the war came 
as the joint result of the entire situation, and that no war 
of the fierce character and unprecedented extent of the past 
conflict was consciously planned by the Entente. The cal- 
culation was that whenever by any acute political provocation 
a dangerous crisis should arise which would furnish a plausible 
pretext for aggressive threats against the Triple Alliance or 
any individual member thereof, the Entente combination should 
quickly reveal itself as of such strength and determination 
that Germany would not dare take up the sword in defence, 
that she would be overawed and compelled to submit to her 
political humiliation and the retrenchment of her ambitions to 
save herself from annihilation. Failing this immediate out- 
come by political pressure, the most that was contemplated 
and expected was a limited war with the same final effect. 
THIS ENTIRE CALCULATION MISCARRIED! 

On the afternoon of June 28th, 1914, Europe was thrown 
into consternation by the catastrophe at Serajevo, Bosnia. 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria, and his morganatic 
wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, while on an official visit and 
representing the Emperor of Austria, were assassinated while 
riding in a carriage through the streets of that city. The 
terrible event had come without an inkling of the plot having 
penetrated to the authorities or the public ear. Suddenly, 
without warning, the electric spark had been flashed into the 
European powder magazine. The public was stunned, fearful 
of the dread consequences which were sure to follow. 
Immediately there occurred that rapid exchange of diplomatic 
"notes" between the powers, accusations, explanations, frantic 
efforts to preserve the peace, during which the world lived in 
suspense. All was in vain; it ended in little more than a month 
with the outbreak of the war. A few days' investigation had 

83 



established the fact that, although the deed had been committed 
in Bosnia, the murder was, on its surface appearance, a 
Serbian plot, the work of a wide-spread Serbian secret con- 
spiracy! Austria, the injured and attacked country, demanded 
at once not only the admission of guilt from Serbia but full 
information about the conspiracy, also the adequate punish- 
ment of the assassins and all concerned in the devilish act, 
and such guaranties and control over Serbian affairs as would 
almost have annulled that country's sovereign independence. 

The Serbian government met these demands as fully as it 
could possibly do without abdicating its sovereignty. But 
Austria, in her exasperation, was unbending; the moment 
and opportunity had now arrived, in a manner quite unex- 
pected, for eradicating once for all that hotbed of native and 
foreign intrigue which had been gnawing at her flanks for 
twenty years, and of instituting that regime of closer asso- 
ciation and control of which we have previously spoken. She 
demanded the right herself to examine all the secret police 
records on the plot, and in future to exercise control over the 
Serbian police department; she insisted on the severe physical 
punishment of Serbia by military occupation and practical 
subjection of the country for a stipulated duration. This 
was the famous "Ultimatum" to Serbia, most ominous demand 
of political coercion of modern history. All attempts at com- 
promise failed; Germany's pleas with her ally for moderation 
were unavailing until later, when the favorable time for its 
exercise had passed. Austria finally ended the tension by 
declaring war on Serbia and preparing to invade that country, 
July 28th, 1914, one month after the Serajevo crime. This 
was the first great error committed that precipitated the gen- 
eral war, an error of over-haste and passion for revenge, by 
Austria. 

Meanwhile Russia had secretly begun to mobilize her army, 
ostensibly in protection of her semi-ward Serbia, 'but in 
reality to bring on a conflict with Austria, for reasons which 
we have amply set forth. She answered Austria's declaration 
of war on Serbia by a partial mobilization of reservists, July 
29th, 1914, and by a general mobilization order, July 30th, 
1914. Germany, on her part, having done all she possibly 

84 



could to influence Austria to moderation, gave the powers to 
understand that the Triple Alliance was a binding compact 
none the less, made on the honor of her sword, and that she 
would stand by Austria to the end, as the assaulted country, 
even though her demands for retribution might be excessive. 
Germany demanded the immediate cessation of mobilization 
by Russia as the sine qua non condition of avoiding a greater 
war complication, and called upon England and France to 
use their influence and all necessary pressure upon Russia to 
effect this. Diplomatic notes passed between the powers 
hourly for three to four days on this main bone of contention 
and crux of the dangerous situation — Russia's mobilization. 
Personal letters, telegrams and telephone communications were 
exchanged between the Kaiser and the Czar and King George 
of England with the object of avoiding the catastrophe that 
drew visibly near. Helas! nothing availed; the terrible pas- 
sions of distrust, hate and strife were fully aroused! France, 
lying low like a tiger ready to spring, secretly assured Russia 
of her unflinching support as her Entente ally, no matter 
what might develop. England, in the background, scheming, 
conniving — now pushing, now halting — played a double-faced 
game of vacillating "note writing," of impossible proposi- 
tions for a "conference," and of ostensible working for delay 
and peace but, meantime, hoping secretly that the continental 
powers would become irretrievably embroiled and all but com- 
mitted to war. This would leave her free to step in at the 
last critical moment to reveal and impress upon Germany 
and Austria the crushing fact that the Entente was a full 
offensive and defensive alliance and that she, England, was 
committed to stand by France and Russia in the case of war. 
Then should come her supreme hour of diplomatic triumph 
by the unconditional backdown of Germany! Never was there 
a more cunning and unscrupulous fox in control of the 
diplomatic moves of a great country in a dangerous crisis 
than Earl Grey, England's Foreign Minister in those fatal 
days, proved, himself to be! 

In that hard-headed country — Germany — however, neither 
the Kaiser and his advisers nor the people were for a moment 
given to any delusions as to all this "public play of pretenses"; 

85 



they knew, they felt that that which had long been prepared 
against them was now about to come: they knew that if 
England were sincere, she would but need to speak to Russia 
the one plain bold word: "DEMOBILIZE! or we will be against 
you, and that the air would in a moment have been cleared 
of danger. THAT WORD WAS NEVER SPOKEN! Well 
may the reader imagine the feelings of outraged national dig- 
nity, of unspeakable wrath against their enemies that per- 
vaded the German people when they thus saw themselves 
face to face with being torn from their path of peace and 
plunged into a desperate war in defense of their existence 
against an overwhelming enemy, into a struggle behind which 
there stood no honorable justifiable cause, nothing but the 
lowest motives of greed, jealousy, revenge and the purpose 
to dominate over them! When Germany's patience was ex- 
hausted with the whole disgusting play of falsehood and 
chicanery among the powers to the point that her self-respect 
and courage demanded action and she was convinced that 
war had become inevitable, she took the bit in her grim 
mouth and ran away with it: On August first, 1914, Germany 
formally declared war upon Russia. 

For days during the passage of these events the world 
dared scarcely breathe, in mortal anxiety over the outcome; 
when that declaration of Germany fell, the heart of the world 
stood still! Something awful, something immeasurably terrible 
had happened! Civilization was now to be torn asunder and 
the nations of Europe were to fly at each other's throats 
like wild beasts! The blood of the brothers of men was to 
flow in rivers and soak into the ground to make the mother- 
earth shudder in horror! The fruits of dtecades bf up- 
building and vaunted progress were to be dissipated like sands 
before a windblast! Death, mutilation, destruction, desecra- 
tion, suffering and want were to displace peace and happiness 
on earth! 

The declaration of war on Russia had opened the eyes of 
the Entente to the ominous reality that they had miscalculated 
the temper and resolution of Germany. The latter, now fully 
aroused to her perilous position, immediately called upon 
France for definite assurances as to her intentions in regard 

86 



to Russia. The answer was a defiant and curt reply, followed 
by an order for partial mobilization. Evidently, there was no 
desire to maintain peace with Germany and to restrict the 
conflict; evidently the obligations of the Entente powers to 
each other were as strong as those which compelled Germany 
to fight for Austria. Seeing herself open to immediate attack 
from two sides, Germany could not hesitate long, but resolving 
to be first in the field, declared war on France, August 2d, 
1914. Meanwhile Russia had not received that word, or 
demand, from England which alone could have saved the situa- 
tion at the eleventh hour. She continued her mobilization 
at top speed and began to move troops upon the Austrian and 
German frontiers. Thereupon Austria ordered full mobiliza- 
tion against Russia, in agreement with Germany; and after 
England had made her all-deciding move, on August 4th, 
Austria formally declared war upon Russia, August 6th, 1914. 
Thus the dial of war moved forward with the relentless preci- 
sion of fate! Mankind stood aghast, trembling, at the thought 
of the events to come ! 

Upon England the declarations of war by Germany had 
fallen like a thunderbolt! The nation was stunned at first — 
then awoke to the terrible realization that her design had 
failed. Instead of a backdown, Germany, girded to the 
loins and ready, was resolved to face the world! No cringeing 
there, abject submission before the superior power of her 
enemies! The structure of Anglo-Saxon cunning was brought 
to collapse by the blunt honesty and self-reliance of German 
character! England now saw herself drawn into the maelstrom 
against her will, into a war which she had hoped others would 
fight for her and for which she was not prepared. She was 
thus brought face to face with two alternatives: To fight, 
or to go down in dishonor, relinquishing all the objects for 
which she had planned for years. There could be no doubt 
about the decision : England could neither abandon her allies 
nor her own purposes. Further attempts at temporizing and 
dissimulating on her part had now become useless and would 
have looked cowardly in face of the resolute stand which the 
continental powers had taken. The drama was ready to be 
unrolled! On August 4, 1914, England declared war on Ger- 
many. 

87 



From the foregoing it is evident that each of the six 
nations — Germany, Austria, Serbia, Russia, France and Eng- 
land — has its share in the responsibility for the war, but there 
must certainly be one to whom attaches the chief responsibility 
for its actual consummation. That nation is England, un- 
questionably. Austria created a belligerent condition by 
exacting almost impossible terms of satisfaction from Serbia 
— which is only another name for Russia — and the latter was 
only too ready to seize the carefully prepared opportunity 
to come to an immediate contest with Austria for supremacy 
in the Balkans. Germany was- drawn in on the one side by 
her obligations to Austria, on the other by the expressed 
revenge attitude of France, allied with Russia, and on general 
grounds by the plain purpose of the combined Entente to 
thwart her fui-ther political and industrial progress. But 
England held the balance of power and the deciding word. 
Without her, the Triple Entente was incomplete in action and 
scarcely sufficiently preponderating in strength against Ger- 
many and Austria. When England saw the political drama 
develop quite contrary to her intentions and calculations, and 
was fully aware of the coming of the titanic world war she 
should have wielded the controlling power and ppsition which 
she held to arrest the catastrophe, or at least to reduce its 
proportions. A bold and open stand for peace on her part 
from the beginning, instead of an attitude of connivance and 
hesitation, a decisive woi*d to Russia and France instead of 
the ambiguous one given, could have prevented war even 
after the German war declarations had been made, or at 
least confined it to a limited continental conflict. To England, 
therefore, belongs the ultimate greatest responsibility for the 
world war's character and proportions and least of all to 
Germany who, without intent, became the center of the 
tornado whose forces had gathered outside of her! 

It is the prevalent opinion that Germany erred in her 
haste of declaring war on Russia and France while proposi- 
tions for a conference of the powers were being considered. 
She may, however, have been in possession of information, in 
addition to the impression of years of a settled design against 
her, which deprecated all hope of favorable results from a 

88 



conference. As a matter of fact we know to-day — and Ger- 
many knows it — that the whole of the diplomatic moves of 
those days were a clever trap to manoeuvre her into a position 
where she could do no other than make the first war declaration 
and thus lay herself open to the charge of provoking and 
"wanting" the war. As to what might have been the effect 
of her waiting a week more before declaring war is, of course, 
pure speculation; it might have revealed more clearly to all 
the powers the abyss towards which they were trending. Ac- 
cording to our best information today, war would have come 
in any case ; but by greater self-restraint on Germany's part, 
England and, perhaps, Italy — later — might have been kept 
out of the conlest and consequently no food blockade been 
instituted. Germany and Austria would, in these circum- 
stances, probably have defeated Russia and France. In such 
a case would England have been content to let them carry 
off the victory without action on her part? Scarcely! This 
reflection reveals the intricate difficulties of the situation. The 
war spirit was up; for fifteen years previous, Europe had been 
at the "breaking point"; only the most insistent and persistent 
efforts had been able to preserve the peace ; the pent-up feelings 
had now been aroused to fever heat and cried for action, not 
for conferences. Germany, having lost all confidence in the 
possibility of avoiding war, rushed ahead to gain the military 
advantage of being first in the field and enabled thereby to 
throw the war into the enemy's country. She won this ad- 
vantage (except in East Prussia and a small section of Alsace) 
and was able to maintain it to the last, but she may have paid 
an incalculable penalty for her precipitate action made pos- 
sible by her preparedness. Who could venture to say how 
matters would have gone if Germany had waited? But as 
we can hardly assume that a short delay would have greatly 
jeopardized her military advantage, yet might have minimized 
the war and given it a different character, we cannot escape 
the conclusion that Germany's haste was a great error, the 
second committed that launched the war into action. 

Immediately following upon her declaration of war, Ger- 
many opened the campaign against France by invading Bel- 
gium to gain a short through-route for her northern armies 

89 



into France. This unprovoked and to all outward appearance 
unwarranted invasion of Belgium was probably Germany's 
greatest mistake and wrong in the war, politically, militarily 
and morally. Of this important event and all its sad con- 
sequences we shall speak in detail in a special article. It 
was the third great error committed in the war and is largely 
chargeable to Germany alone. These events — the hasty decla- 
rations of war on Russia and France and the invasion of 
Belgium — have been the mainstays of the charge that Germany 
purposely plotted to bring on the war to realize aims of 
aggression against other nations, even world conquest! After 
all the arguments we have made in previous references to 
this subject, it should not be necessary to point out the total 
absence of relevance or connection between this charge and 
the occurrences in question. As to her "preparedness," Ger- 
many was ready for defensive action at a few days' notice 
ever since 1871; it was an outcome of her political and geo- 
graphical situation — a necessity — as acknowledged by Lloyd 
George himself in a famous Guild-Hall speech. We have 
shown that Germany's prime need was PEACE for her internal 
consolidation and industrial development. As for the inva- 
sion of Belgium, it was not political or with the definite first 
object of conquest, but purely military — to afford a through- 
passage into France — and, beyond that, at most to keep 
England and France out of that country by her presence there. 
Germany was reasonably sure of Holland's neutrality in the 
war but not of that of Belgium, for reasons which we shall 
argue in detail later. The clashing difference between Ger- 
many's real objects in the steps she took and the wild charges 
thrown at her in blind hate and cunning self-defense by her 
enemies should now be apparent to the reader. 



T^NGLAND, having taken her decision, turned with savage 
rage upon her enemy, that enemy who had already, in a 
sense, defeated her by upsetting her entire chessboard. Not 
only upon the battlefield was this enemy to be beaten by shot 
and sword, but even more so in the subtler fields of diplomacy 
and publicity by a propaganda of "inuendo and suggestion" 

90 



to fasten upon him the odium and responsibility for the war! 

The real causes and issues of the war were to be buried under 
an avalanche of misrepresentation, deliberate lies — artful or 
coarse, and inflaming accusations: "Not for the supremacy 
of her political position, industry, shipping trade, commerce 
and navy, not for the defeat of Germany's eastern policy and 
the Berlin-Bagdad railroad had England formed the Entente 
alliance and stimulated France and Russia to bring their own 
individual ambitions to realization, but to eradicate this en- 
slaving curse of "Prussian militarism," this odious government 
of "German autocracy" that was an eyesore to the other 
nations and an offense to their superior sense of rights; to 
unmask this arrogant braggart Kaiser-tyrant, with his audacity 
to defy England, France and Russia together; to defeat these 
preposterous designs of "world conquest" which were to sub- 
ject all the nations and about which these Germans had been 
writing and talking since years with their "Deutschland Ueber 
Alles," and to execute which they had purposely planned and 
precipitated the war! This hated rival was not only to be 
beaten in the war but discredited before the world forever, 
his culture and achievements derided, his character defamed; 
the whole German nation was to be struck upon the cross of 
infamy and left to die the death of a moral criminal against 
mankind ! 

Such was the program of English revenge against Germany 
— the most colossal scheme of blackmail ever floated upon 
the world — such the diabolical conspiracy for the deliberate 
murder of a great nation! France and Russia were impressed 
into this scheme; all other allied peoples were to be inveigled 
into this network of lies, befogment and abuse. It was launched 
in the early period of the war and was in full dissemination 
by the spring of 1915. (The reader should glance again at the 
concluding resume of the preceding article and the one at 
the opening of this art'cle.) Especially those "far-away" 
nations whose general unacquaintance with European politics 
would make it impossible for them to properly distinguish 
between truth and falsehood in the statements made were to 
be enlisted in this "campaign in the service of humanity." 
The constant iteration of these charges, to which soon those 

91 



of "atrocities" in Belgium were added, and the continuous 
hypnotic influence of this appeal to "high ideals of government, 
morals and human sympathy" were trusted to obliterate in 
the minds of the people of all nations the original impressions 
as to the causes and objects of the war. The English laid 
their plans with that unmatched skill in diplomacy, Machia- 
vellan cold-blooded cunning and marvelous depth of design 
which belong to them above all other peoples. With their 
consummate knowledge of human nature and of the particular 
leanings, foibles and general characteristics of other races, 
they spread this new view of the war over Europe, the British 
possessions and the United States with an assurance and 
infallibility of method that brought immediate and complete 
success. No means that could contribute to the planned result 
were neglected, from speeches of Prime Ministers to editorials 
in country papers. The leading foreign-nations daily press and 
magazines were bought or subsidized for this propaganda, and 
in England itself special publications were selected "to give 
the key note" in this campaign. Over all these activities was 
spread the control of a scrupulous censorship. Books, pamph- 
lets, public addresses by paid speakers, posters with harrow- 
ing pictorial appeals to the emotions, inspired indignation 
meetings, anything and everything possible was employed to 
maintain the pressure of this phantom upon the public mind. 
Unlimited funds were available. Nothing more thorough in 
method in the "publicity" line has ever been organized and 
carried out. Such was the English propaganda to fasten the 
war-guilt exclusively on Germany, such the campaign for 
"saving civilization from the Hun"! 

The result was inevitable : The victory was easy, the effect 
prodigious. The stoppage of mail service to and from Ger- 
many to all countries of the Entente and to all overseas 
countries made effective reply in protest and explanation 
almost impossible; the proscription as "disloyal and traitorous" 
of any utterances in speech or print in opposition to the 
"official fabricated diagnosis of the war" which had been 
attained by this propaganda in most countries, particularly 
in the United States of America, silenced even the spasmodic 
protests of just-minded and truth-loving men. By skilful and 

92 



unscrupulous interpretation and elaboration of every circum- 
stance, occurrence, parliamentary declaration, speech by Prime 
Ministers or the Kaiser, that came from Germany — even of 
the several tentative German peace offers — all such were 
twisted into evidence in support of that dastardly accusation. 
Every contumely that could be manufactured was heaped upon 
the head of that country and the Kaiser until the public mind 
reached a state of insane frenzy, intensified to the danger 
point by ever more weird and horrifying reports of "barbarities 
and devastation" in Belgium, France and elsewhere. In Amer- 
ica there was added to all this the inflaming recital of the 
anti-American official propaganda by Germany and of that 
by Germany-born citizens. This combination swept public 
reason off its feet in this country, and produced a state of 
hysterical morbid fury that vented itself in deplorable exhibi- 
tions of hate and violence. (This particular subject will be 
discussed in detail in a later article.) Germany, in short, 
was painted as a decadent, inhuman people of pervei*ted 
feeling, of a peculiar and irrational psychology, of untrust- 
worthy character and unfit for association with other nations; 
she was loudly called to confession, contrition and repentance 
of her crime, before she could again be considered a member 
of the family of civilized peoples! The extravagance of 
language used, of malicious insinuation and accusation, of 
disdainful attitude passed the bounds of common decency. By 
continued repetition and elaboration of this whole disgusting 
fabric of slander and unreasoning hate it grew to an im- 
penetrable maze of iniquity of which even its authors lost 
the tracks and which defied every attempt at unraveling. Yet, 
gradually the time came around for the truth to be revealed 
and recognized even by the most obdurate. As the peace con- 
ference at Paris drew along its tortuous course, the real 
motives of the war reappeared; as the fruits of victory were 
sought to be gathered in, the selfish objects of the different 
nations and the indescribable meanness and bestiality of the 
Entente's spirit towards their adversary stood forth in glaring 
nakedness. The low conspiracy of the British propaganda 
was unmasked and stands revealed! 

To fully assay the moral decrepity of this British propa- 

93 



ganda of false charges and defamation of every species we 
must never lose sight of this illuminating fact, already stated 
or intimated: That neither England, nor the Entente as a 
whole, expected Germany to stay long in the conflict, once 
she had become fully conscious of the overwhelming array 
of force against her. It was, therefore, through Germany's 
heroic persistence in the war that the Entente powers were, 
likewise, compelled to continue in a struggle such as they 
never had anticipated and which taxed and wrecked them 
almost as much as it did their foe. It was this condition which 
raised their hate to a state of malicious rage and projected 
forth this ignoble propaganda of calumny as an act of savage 
revenge. They conspired to roll off their own share of war 
responsibility upon their enemy and to heap upon him all 
the fault and all the ignominy! 



The Serbian Ultimatum, etc. The Serbian government 
took no active steps to disclose the Serajevo murder conspiracy 
until it i-ealized Austria's determination to take stern meas- 
ures. From the first it was evident that all would depend on 
Russia's attitude — whether she would stand aside, or come 
forward in her old role of champion of plan-slavism and the 
Greater Serbia movement. She took the latter course — her 
historic course — as given in previous explanations. It is 
revealed now that Serbia received assurances of positive sup- 
port from Russia as early as July 24th, 1914, soon after the 
presentation of the Ultimatum from Austria. Germany hoped 
for a peaceable outcome and worked towards that end to 
the last; her pressure upon Austria for moderating her terms 
to Serbia went to the limit of what was possible between two 
allied powers. She finally succeeded to induce Austria and 
Russia to take up direct negotiations between themselves as 
to all the questions of the dangerous entanglement. All this 
was frustrated and all promises of "direct conversations" in 
St. Petersburg and of rescinding mobilization orders were 
broken by the trickery of Russian diplomacy — even to counter- 
manding the Czar's own orders. This Russian diplomacy was 
under the direction of M. Sazonoff, Foreign Minister, who 
was in close relations with the French chauvinistic party, led 
by President Poincare himself. 

Simultaneously France, conspiring with Russia instead of 
helping to work for peace by pressure upon her, was busily 
engaged in soliciting positive pledges of support from England. 
In the latter the war spirit had meantime risen perceptibly; 

94 



the war party came out in the open ; the Bank of England 
raised its discount rate to 8 per cent — an infallible barometer 
on the general trend! England, by her marine strength, wealth 
and resources, held the balance of power — and the decision 
for peace or war lay in her hands. By her failure to restrain 
Russia and France, she incurred the chief responsibility for 
the war! (The oft-repeated story of a "Kronrath" (Crown 
Council) in Potsdam, by the Kaiser, his ministers and generals 
purported to have been held as early as July 5th, 1914, and 
in which the attitude of Austria towards Sei'bia, the terms 
of the ultimatum, and all military measures were asserted 
to have been discussed on the basis of a full determination for 
war, has long been disproven a pure myth.) 



The Final Agony. It was proven later, in the Szukomlinoff 
trial, that those circles who were in control in Russia at the 
time were absolutely determined for war and acted to destroy 
all bridges which could possibly have led to a peaceful solu- 
tion. This attitude was due not only to the support of France 
but to the fact that England made no representations to Russia 
and that the latter felt herself absolutely sure of England's 
acquiescence in war and probable active support, all as ex- 
pressed by Earl Grey to M. Cambon, Ambassador of France 
on July 29th, 1914. The situation as here presented was estab- 
lished at the time by the diplomatic correspondence of the 
Ambasador of Belgium at St. Petersburg, and has since been 
corroborated by all the accumulated war, revelations and 
publications of the several countries. When the entanglement 
between Germany, Austria, France and Russia had become 
acute, Earl Grey adroitly brought up the subject of "Belgian 
neutrality" to gain a good pretext for England's participation 
in the coming events — one which would placate the British 
public. The Serbian plot of assassination was too far re- 
moved for this pui-pose — and it is doubtful whether England 
would have entered a conflict confined to Germany, Austria 
and Russia. It required the addition of France and the 
raising of the question of "the balance of power" on the 
Continent, together with that of Belgian neutrality, to furnish 
England with her desired "casus belli." Accordingly, all the 
diplomatic moves of the Entente were planned so as to entrap 
Germany into a position from which she would not be able 
to escape without either declaring war or submitting in humili- 
ation. 

From this trap Germany, contrary to calculation, declared 
war on Russia and France ; and when this terrible consum- 
mation had been reached, England, seeing no escape from 
her participation and seeking for a plausible war pretext, 

95 



raised the question of Belgian neutrality! This opened Ger- 
many's eyes as to -England's position and intentions, and 
thenceforth Germany made frantic efforts to obtain England's 
pledge of neutrality. It was all futile, however. Germany 
offered to respect Belgian neutrality; she offered to guarantee 
the integrity of France and of her colonies in case she should 
win the war; she offered to abstain from all action by her fleet 
against the coast of France and against French commercial 
shipping — all in vain: England's purpose was plainly revealed 
by her failure to state conditions to Germany on which she 
would remain neutral and by Sir Edward Grey's final avowal 
that "England desires to keep her hands free." 

This ultra-tense situation had been reached by forenoon 
of August 1st. Meanwhile, the time limit to Russia had ex- 
pired without an answer having been received in Berlin. Then 
followed the declaration of war on Russia by Germany and 
the request to France "to declare her attitude." At this 
moment a ray of hope seemed to break through the gathering 
storm in the inquiry by Earl Grey "whether Germany would 
guarantee not to attack France if the latter remained neutral." 
This inquiry, however, proved quickly to have been entirely 
insincere and was smothered in a maze of contradictions and 
denials. Instead, France answered Germany's "inquiry" by 
an order of mobilization. August 2nd, Germany answered this 
by her declaration of war on France, and began moving troops 
towards the Belgian border. On the following day England 
sent the sly inquiry to Germany "whether, or on what con- 
ditions, she would respect the neutrality of Belgium" — know- 
ing well that German troops were already crossing the Belgian 
line. This gave to England her hypocritical excuse for war, 
which she followed with her declaration of August 4th, 1914. 
We see plainly from the foregoing that instead of restraining 
Russia and France, England's diplomacy was solely occupied 
with manoeuvering Germany into a position from which there 
would be no escape but humble submission. Instead, Germany 
decided to defend her honor and security with her blood and 
treasure, as any self-respecting nation would do in like cir- 
cumstances — and refused to submit to such brutal and un- 
paralleled coercion! 

That England would have entered the war just the same 
if there had been no false-pretense case of Belgian neutrality 
has since been fully made clear. She was, practically, the 
bounden ally of France and Russia (for the complicated pur- 
poses we have explained) ever since the first definite pro- 
posals for forming the Triple Entente were made, in 1911. 
Her guarantee to France, of August 2nd, 1914, "to protect 
the French coast and shipping against attack by Germany, in 
case of hostilities breaking out," antedates her Belgian neu- 

96 



trality anxieties by two days!! Strange, indeed is the Anglo- 
Saxon character in its mixture of honesty and mental sturdi- 
ness with a studied hypocrisy of motives and the moral cow- 
ardice to avow its real purposes. 



Germany's Relative Modernity. The golden age of Ger- 
many, politically and before 1871, was in the Middle Ages, 
up to the Reformation. That religious turmoil, which brought 
on the terrible thirty-years' war of 1618-1648, also divided 
Germany more sharply than ever into a number of politically 
separate "states" under the leadership of Austria, a leadership 
more a traditional compliment than an effective actuality. It 
was strictly confined to matters of external politics, the term 
"Germany" being really comprised in the identity of language, 
race traits and customs, territorial and ethnological rather than 
political. As times advanced, these independent German 
States became more numerous and more clearly defined in 
their separate territories' and other interests towards each 
other; and after the defeat of Napoleon and the peace con- 
gress of Vienna, some thirty-seven large and small States 
were recognized as independent "countries," the total making 
up the limited political entity of "Germany" as it still 
lingered from the Middle Ages. The largest separate State 
was the Kingdom of Prussia, followed by German Austria, 
the Kingdoms of Hannover, Saxonia, Bavaria and Wurttem- 
berg; the Grandduchies of Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg and 
Oldenburg, and a number of smaller Duchies and Principali- 
ties. Out of this indefinite and conglomerate national exist- 
ence the sentiment for a "unitel fatherland," as of old, grad- 
ually revived and became the poetic dream of the German 
people. How all this developed slowly — through the tortuous 
paths of revolution, reaction, and internal antagonisms — up 
to the time of the great test-war between Austria and 
Prussia (1866) and the Franco-German war of 1870-71, and 
establishment of the new German empire, has been related 
in some detail. 

We see, therefore, that from the end of the seventeenth 
century to the year 1871 Germany was an insignificant country 
politically, compared with France, England, Russia, Turkey, 
Spain, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian States; she was 
devoid of any large-scale manufacturing industries, foreign 
commerce, a navy or colonies. The army establishments of 
the different German States were distinctly separate and with- 
out any "national" basis. Thus, in the historical view, the 
modern German empire was an innovation, regarded by the 
older countries with surprise, at first, later with apprehension 
— as an usurper, a pretender without legitimacy. This feeling 

97 



accounts for much of the jealousy which was at the bottom 
of the war, independently of the specific factors of power 
and numbers, commercial and naval competition, etc. But 
going back, again, to our historical thread, we must note the 
fact that this condition of national German disi-uption — up 
to 1864 — and the constant fear of aggression from their 
powerful neighbors produced that character of craintiveness, 
submissiveness, timidity and racial dejection for which the 
German people were known for two-hundred years. 

That year of 1864 was the turning point, not only in the poli- 
tical life of Germany but also in the people's character; it 
had come with the success of Prussia in the war with Denmark 
and the new inspiration which flowed from it. Thence, it was 
a steady march forward to 1871 — and with the new united 
empire came Germany's second golden age. There were 43 
years of brilliant national life which brought great transfor- 
mations, material and psychological. But while the German 
character became changed with this new atmosphere — became 
bolder, more self-reliant and aggressive — the old attributes 
were not fully eradicated; it would i*equire a hundred years 
of five generations to accomplish that, in any people. And 
when the disaster of the great war broke over them, much 
the old traits of fear, lack of confidence, ready submissiveness 
and ti'ibal antagonisms reappeared! No people fully possessed 
by a strong sense of national identity, national pride, self- 
esteem and determination — France, England, the United 
States, Japan, and others — would in similar circumstances have 
submitted to the terms of a peace like that of Versailles; they 
would have defied the enemy to do his worst, to invade and 
occupy the whole country, rather than selling themselves into 
virtual slavery for three generations voluntarily! By their 
lack of internal unity, and by moral cowardice at the end, the 
German people have not only lost the war but all the prestige 
of character which they had acquired from 1864 to 1914! 
These reflections are in line with similar opinions arrived at 
from other viewpoints, as expressed in different parts of 
this book, and are a condemnation of the "fatalistic" lean- 
ings of German thought, of the many strange weaknesses which 
accompany the many excellent traits of German character. 



IX. THE FOOD BLOCKADE 

Its After-War Effects 

Of the military measures taken by England to win the 
.var and crush Germany, the blockade of the German North- 
sea coast, intended to operate particularly against importation 



98 



of food materials, must be given a position of prime im- 
portance. With a thorough understanding of Germany's eco- 
nomic situation as created by the war, England was certain 
from the beginning that a rigid food blockade might be the 
means of bringing Germany to her knees ultimately by 
producing exhaustion and starvation of the entire people, a 
condition against which no nation could fight indefinitely. The 
Entente expected to win the war by that means if a military 
victory should not be achieved at an earlier time. If England 
could but succeed by her policy of alternate persuasion and 
cajolence to bring all the great food-producing countries — ■ 
America, Argentina, Brazil, etc., to the support of the En- 
tente countries for food and war materials, and, at the same 
time, practically prevent all food importation into Germany 
the war was won from the start providing, always, that Ger- 
many and her allies could be kept from achieving a decisive 
military victory before reaching the fatal stage of their ma- 
terial exhaustion. Why this military victory was not attained 
in time, after Germany's brilliant deeds of arms, will be 
argued in a latar article, but the final outcome of the war 
proved that the food blockade was without question the; 
greatest single factor that defeated Germany. When the 
breakdown came she still had a formidable army and navy, but 
food supplies were nearly exhausted; the people had reached 
the lowest endurable point of physical deprivation! The 
blockade also brought on deficiency in metals, leather, rubber, 
woolen and cotton cloth, silk, paper, chemicals required in 
metallurgy and for explosives, etc. — and the collapse had to 
come. This silent and relentless pressure of the blockade was 
comparable to the steady closing of the jaws of a giant steam 
vise operated by an infallible mechanism. It took English 
cold-blooded perseverance to see it through to the end — to 
watch and wait with set teeth for four long years and observe 
it slowly fulfilling its ghastly purpose: THE STARVING OF 
AN ENTIRE PEOPLE as a military measure. No other 
nation we know would have been able to stand the strain of 
such an act of deliberate, calculated, cynical cruelty so long! 
This blockade was carried on in violation of international 
law as established by the Hague conference, and of recognized 

99 



international rights of neutral shipping upon the High Seas, 

but its moral wrong overshadows every other consideration. 
Was there, perhaps, a special significance in the fact that so 
little information about the working of the blockade, so few 
references to it appeared in the public press during the war? 
Was England, with her constant declaration about "humani- 
tarian warfare" and "inviolability of non-combatants" per- 
haps conscious of the incompatibility of her blockade action 
with these declarations; was she, perhaps, inwardly ashamed 
of this incomparable war crime of starving the civilian popula- 
tion of Germany, of inflicting upon millions of aged and infirm 
men, upon women and tender children the tortures of hunger, 
slow decline, general want of physical comforts, clothing, fuel, 
linen, etc. — ending in sickness, physical collapse — death?! 
This most cruel, contemptible and cowardly measure was only 
indirectly a war measure; England knew well enough, from the 
exigencies of war, that neither the German armies nor the 
navy would suffer for want of food through the blockade, 
that the fighting men would be kept in trim above all other 
considerations. The purpose was more insidious in its nature ; 
it was to exert a "strong moral pressure" upon the govern- 
ment through the sufferings of the people, and to break down 
the latter's resolution to fight the war through to the end ! 
And even while this horror was proceeding and detailed news 
of its deadly effect was being carefully kept from the Entente 
peoples and America, the world was filled with strenuous ap- 
peals for pity and help for peoples in other parts of the world, 
suffering — no doubt — but in a much lesser degree. "Help! 
help! lest they starve and die!" — but the German non-com- 
batants might starve and suffer and die without so much as 
a thought being given to their undeserved fate— because they 
were of the ENEMY! Oh! shame and execration not only 
upon the British food blockade but upon this sickening "mock- 
humanitarianism" which was being paraded with so much 
blatant ostentation in this war — conduct which justifies fully 
the arraignment made and conclusions drawn by the author 
in the article, "The Summit." 

The awful effects of the blockade upon Germany became 
fully known only after the armistice; and the latter did not 

100 



abrogate it till many months later, after the signing of the 
peace treaty, and then only partly, so that its operation and 
consequences are felt even today, two years after the armistice. 
Its effect during the war was that all stocks of food in gran- 
aries, warehouses, farms and mills, hotels, public institutions 
and large private estates gradually became exhausted and the 
entire public, rich and poor alike, were brought to a hand-to- 
mouth existence of meagre "government rations" doled out 
from the national depots. These rations of the absolute nec- 
essaries for life became smaller and smaller as the war con- 
tinued, and only the young and vigorous were able to support 
life adequately upon them. Coarse, indigestible bread, only 
partly made of grain, a minimum of potatoes, beans and peas 
were the monotonous staples upon which the great body of 
the people were forced to live — and even that in very small 
quantities only — with a meat allowance of a few ounces only 
per week during the last year of the war! Coffee, tea and 
sugar, eggs and butter and other fats were inprocurable 
except by the rich; babies and young children dropped into 
early graves by tens of thousands above the normal rate from 
lack of mother's milk and cow's milk, both, and the women 
bore dead or puny children. Cows, chickens and goats found 
no fodder on the untilled fields. 

Since the close of the war, the meagre harvests of 1919 
and 1920 and the restriction on food importation, which con- 
tinued for a year after the armistice, have made it impossible 
to accumulate stocks of food sufficient for the normal feeding 
of the population of Germany and Austria. Poland, Russia, 
Hungary all shared proportionately in the awful conditions 
of misery which flowed from the British food blockade because 
of their economic interrelation with Germany. And these 
conditions continue to exist today as far as the great masses of 
the people are concerned; only the very rich are able to buy 
a sufficiency, because of the high prices. Speculation and 
profiteering have added their share to the general conse- 
quences of the blockade, and over all is cast the gloom of 
political and social demoralization and hopelessness. In 
Vienna, former capital of music, mirth and humor, the con- 
ditions are the most pathetic — a real tragedy, the poor and 

101 



middle classes starving and dying, the children being sent 
away to Switzerland, Italy, Holland, Sweden to save their 
young lives for the nation. 

What a spectacle for mankind to reflect upon, to shudder 
at, — to be ashamed of! What a horrible aftermath of this 
horrible war! The reproach and ignominy of this is England's 
for the ages to come! Let her bow her head to the earth 
in shame and remorse! Let France and the United States 
hide their faces in disgrace as accomplices in this crime against 
the species! What must not be the dream visions of that man 
in Washington, one corner of his mouth still filled with abuse 
of Germany and the other with "humanity" talk; who had the 
war decision in his hands through the irresistible power of this 
nation and who failed to demand the abrogation or ameliora- 
tion of the food blockade from England in return for Ger- 
many's offer to stop the U-boat war, and in return for our 
assistance to the Entente Allies. May the haggard faces of 
the starving people of Europe rise up before him out of the 
dark with the accusing stare of: 'Thou! thou! thou!' Let the 
world now swear solemnly that never again in any future 
war shall a food blockade be enacted against the civil popula- 
tion of an enemy! 

Germany's answer to England's measure was the inaugu- 
ration of the U-boat war and the Zeppelin raids. Thus one 
act of brutality begets another till reason and moral feeling 
are lost in the reign of revengeful violence! Where do they — 
reason and sense of right — flee to and hide themselves in the 
terrible times of war passion when man abandons all his 
graces and returns to the status of a mad beast infuriated by 
a red rag? Have "religion" and "civilization" achieved a real 
and durable advance and refinement of the species "man"? 
These questions will be seriously discussed in the later articles 
on the ethical aspect of the war. 



102 



X. ITALY, GREECE AND ROUMANIA IN THE 

WAR 

Those Irredentas 

In Article VI we described the relations which existed 
between Italy, Germany and Austria through the compact of 
the Triple Alliance. While there is some ambiguity as to 
the exact extent in which Italy was bound to the other two 
powers, offensively and defensively in the case of a European 
war, there is no doubt that she was bound in any circumstances 
which might occur at least to the extent of maintaining a 
position of benevolent neutrality. After the declarations of 
war had been made, Germany and Austria hastened to assure 
themselves of Italy's attitude and to exact her cooperation 
to the fullest degree possible under the existing agreements. 
Italy, in reply, immediately advanced a treaty interpretation 
which relieved her of giving her active assistance to the 
other two powers. The Entente allies approached Italy at 
the same time with the same object of ascertaining her position 
and, if possible, severing her from the Triple Alliance. Much 
preliminary work had already been done in this direction, as 
indicated in preceding Articles. In this endeavor, therefore, 
they knew themselves not only possessed of excellent chances 
of success, but that the advantages they would derive there- 
from for themselves warranted the utmost efforts. Prince von 
Buelow, ex-Chancellor of Germany, and credited with being 
her foremost diplomatist, was entrusted with the mission of 
guarding Germany's and Austria's interests at Rome. Between 
him and the ablest diplomats of the Entente a battle royal 
was fought for about eighteen months at the court of Rome 
with the king and ministers of Italy in the effort to retain 
their adherence to the Triple Alliance compact. Von Buelow 
succumbed at the end, due to the ascendency of the "greater 
Italy" party in the parliament and the King's council — and 
Italy joined the Entente allies in the war from pure motives 
of gain. 

These are the bare outward facts. Behind them lies the 
tragedy of Italy's broken word and sullied honor. While she 

103 



may have had the right to wriggle out of "offensive and defen- 
sive obligations" towards the Triple Alliance by a literal in- 
terpretation of the agreements, she was bound to them by 
stronger ties — moral obligations — and should at least have 
remained benevolently neutral. But the advent of the world 
war had stirred up powerful forces of national ambition in 
Italy which, under cover of the "irredentist agitation" 
conceived the execution of designs of territorial annexation, 
along the eastern shore of the Adriatic, which had long been 
entertained. The old enmity against Austria, the former 
dictator of Italy, was fanned to new flame by this advanced 
"patriotic" party. It was not so much the racial animosity 
against these Austrian "tedescos" (Teutons) that worked as 
the incentive, but they, Austria, were in possession of the 
Trentino and Trieste districts and the entire upper end of the 
eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea, as far down as Montenegro. 
These were the very sections which Italy had coveted since 
decades and set her heart upon to acquire. In these border 
districts and seacoast strips, of preponderatingly Slavic and 
German-Austrian population, there lived also some 75,000 
to 80,000 Italians, or half-Italians, partly disseminated and 
partly in scattered concentrated settlements, the remainder 
of the "Italia Irredenta" which had not been "redeemed" or 
joined to Italy when Venice was won from Austria and the 
last peace settlement and border delineations made between 
the two countries, in 1866. This cry of "Italia Irredenta" 
had been smothered during the years of the Triple Alliance, 
from which Italy enjoyed so many advantages while engaged 
with her work of internal consolidation and African adven- 
tures of colonial conquest. In those days the friendship and 
protection of Austria and Germany far outweighed to her the 
possession of these few hundred square miles of Adriatic terri- 
tory and the accession of this comparatively small number 
of semi-nationalists. That slogan was, indeed, a "fake" cry: 
It was not these few people and these small strips of land — 
as such — which animated Italy's ambition; for these alone she 
would never have violated her honor and undertaken the 
sacrifices of war on the side of the Entente. The real "Italia 
Irredenta" upon which patriotic and ambitious Italy had set 

104 



its mind since years, awaiting only the favorable opportunity, 
was the possession of the Austrian ports and cities on the 
Adriatic — Trieste, Pola, Fiume, Zara and all the minor ones 
down to and including Cattaro — and, with it, the control of that 
entire sea. 

A study of the map will elucidate the geographical ele- 
ments of the question and explain this perfectly natural object 
of Italy. The Adriatic Sea is a long-stretched bay, some 525 
miles in length by an average width of a little over a hundred 
miles, but narrowing at the southern entrance into it from 
the Mediterranean to a width of only about fifty miles between 
Otranto in Italy and the harbor of Avlona in Albania opposite, 
and to about sixty-five miles between the important Italian 
port of Brindisi (situated less than fifty miles north of 
Otranto) and the above-named port of Avlona. From Brindisi 
northward the entire west coast of the Adriatic is more or 
less shallow and barren of first-class harbors for deep-draught 
naval or mercantile vessels, whereas the east coast is a rocky 
and deep-harbor coast, with the fine Austrian harbors already 
mentioned. Additional ones, not to be overlooked in the 
calculation, are those of Antivari and Scutari in Montenegro, 
and of Durazzo, in Albania, including the afore-mentioned 
one of Avlona at the mouth of the bay. It is apparent that 
with modern far-carrying artillery, and Italy in possession 
or control of Avlona, she could easily and entirely dominate 
the entrance to the Adriatic from the Mediterranean Sea. The 
value of this bay to Italy for naval stations and commercial 
shipping is, therefore, beyond measure and was well worth 
securing by a country looking forward to political and in- 
dustrial expansion. And, as we said above, as long as peace 
reigned in Europe and the Triple Alliance remained un- 
challenged, these aspirations of Italy had to remain sub rosa; 
they were, then, represented as the "dreams" of an extreme 
nationalistic faction only; but as soon as the great war had 
opened there arose a new political perspective which brought 
them within the range of practical realization and made them 
the debatable objects of diplomatic negotiations. The Entente 
fully understood this; and by exploiting the situation and 
pledging the satisfaction of Italy's Adriatic aims, as far as 

105 



compatible with other interests in that sphere which they 
were bound to consider, they slowly turned Italy in their 
favor against the voice of right and conscience. When, in 
addition, they promised the settlement of the dispute with 
Turkey over the "Dodekanese" (the twelve Ionian islands 
situated along the coast of Asia Minor and which Italy claimed 
as a promised "compensatory concession" by Turkey arising 
out of the war with Tunis) in Italy's favor, the latter's na- 
tionalistic frenzy turned her head and threw her into the arms 
of the Entente as an ally, forgetful of her obligations to the 
Triple Alliance. 

Previous to this final outcome there had been protracted 
negotiations, conducted by Prince von Buelow from Rome, 
between Italy and Austria in an endeavor to prevent this 
result through the agency of Austrian concessions to Italy; 
but with every offer made by Austria, Italy's demands ex- 
panded until it became clear that she was only playing (or 
time and the ultimate of pledges obtainable from the Entente 
before avowing her long-determined course. Austria had of- 
fered the limit of concessions which she could make in due 
justice to the Slavonic and German peoples of the districts 
involved. The rights of these, Italy did not consider in the 
least in her ambitious course. Low and sordid motives won the 
victory over honor, decency and moral obligations! This "win- 
ning-over of Italy" was a great triumph for the Entente powers 
and helped much to decide the war in their favor; but whether 
Italy, after all, made a good bargain is very doubtful from 
the present situation of the question. Had she remained 
faithful to the Triple Alliance, at least to the extent of re- 
maining neutral, it is probable that she would have obtained 
as much compensation, even under the defeat of the Central 
powers, as she is to obtain now under the treaty of Ver- 
sailles and the private "London pact'" after having made all 
her sacrifices in blood and treasure and borne the sufferings 
of her population through the war. The adjustment of Italy's 
Adriatic and other claims was one of the most difficult prob- 
lems for the Paris peace conference, and the final disposition 
has only recently been arrived at after d'Annuncio's spectacular 
exit from his Fiume dictatorship, nearly two years after the 

106 



signing of peace, and is likely to be a source of further 
trouble in the future. The creation of the new State of 
Jugo-Slavia introduced an element into this problem which 
had not been foreseen when the Entente made its liberal 
pledges to Italy in the secret pact of London! Whatever Italy 
may achieve in the future, politically or otherwise, it will 
never be forgotten that she sullied her honor in this war and 
proved herself a low calculating bargainer and a traitor to 
the two nations under whose protecting wing she grew to 
power and prosperity! This verdict will be Italy's just punish- 
ment for her perfidy! Her defection is the fourth great error 
committed in the war; it complicated the issues and extended 
its duration, and is solely chargeable to Italy! 



T^HE story of Greece and Roumania is much like that of 
Italy. While neither of these two countries was openly 
known as an active member of the Triple Alliance, there is 
authentic reason to believe that treaties of "material and moral 
obligation" existed to cover possible political emergencies, and 
which bound them to the Alliance and to Germany particularly 
as a necessity of her near-east extension plans. In both cases 
there were also personal relationships which were expected 
to prove helpful to the joint political interests. The former 
Queen of Greece is a sister of Emperor William, and the King 
of Roumania was originally a Prince of a branch of the house 
of Hohenzollern. Greece and Roumania also had "irredentist 
movements" for the acquisition of adjoining territories popu- 
lated in part by their respective "nationalists" or by related 
stock. In Greece there had been going on for some years a 
strong agitation for establishing a republic and abrogating 
the monarchy. 

The position and purpose of the Entente towards both 
these countries were, therefore, the same as in the case of 
Italy: To tempt them to break their engagements by pledging 
to them the realization of their nationalistic ambitions in ex- 
change for their support in the war against the Triple Alliance. 
As in Italy, these advances, naturally, had to be made through 
the political party representing these policies and against the 

107 



conservative elements who placed honor above mere gain and 
political feeling. King George of Greece made a noble fight 
for the principles for which he stood and the policies to 
which he had committed Greece and himself personally — 
adherence to Germany by observing strict neutrality in the 
war. But, largely through the internal strife and disorgani- 
zation produced by the "republican" movement, the King 
succumbed ultimately and was compelled to resign the throne 
for himself and his direct heir, the crown prince. After a 
short regime by the second son of King George, the provisional 
Greek Republic was definitely established, under President 
Venizelos, and recognized by the allies, and quickly joined 
the Entente side in the war. The shameful cajoling of Greece 
by the Entente, the hounding of the king, the high-handed 
duress exercised over the country, its partial occupation by 
Entente troops, seizure of arms, blockade of ports and other 
acts of brutal coercion and dictation is one of the darkest 
pages of the Entente's record and makes up an international 
crime of usurpation seldom exceeded! 

As to Roumania, her action, from the moral point of view, 
is probably the meanest deed of the entire war, exceeding in 
wanton faithlessness that of Italy. There had been absolutely 
no friction between Germany and Roumania ; there was no 
strong movement in that country for a republican form of 
government and overthrow of the monarchy to complicate 
the difficulties of a consistent and honorable policy towards 
Germany and Austria. There was but the reign of wild and 
unprincipled lust for advantage and power — from the highest 
bidder — using the feeble slogan of "Transylvanian irredentism" 
as the club upon Austria for concessions and guaranties, coupled 
with the scarcely veiled threat to join her enemies in the war. 
How could Austria be expected to pledge the turning-over of 
peoples and districts which had belonged to her empire since 
ages simply because there was a certain small proportion of 
Roumanians — semi-Roumanians — living in these parts? Above 
all, how could this have been done in the midst of war and 
without being able to ascertain the preferences of this popula- 
tion by popular vote or majority sentiment of their represen- 
tatives? All offers of concessions and conditional promises 

108 



on the part of Austria were futile in the face of the set 
design of pelf by Roumania. The Entente's promises and 
guaranties again carried the day! Roumania joined the allies 
and declared war on Austria, and by implication on Germany. 
She opened hostilities by the invasion of Transylvan'a. 

But the hand of swift and terrible retribution overtook her 
in the campaign of Field Marshal Mackensen and his Austro- 
German armies. He quickly crumpled up the Roumanian troops 
of invasion, forced them back through the Carpathian moun- 
tain passes, after stubborn fighting, entered their own terri- 
tory, won battle after battle, took city after city and con- 
quered the whole country, as in triumphal march, in a period 
of less than three weeks, all excepting a small section in the 
north-eastern mountain district. This Austro-German cam- 
paign to repel the Roumanian invasion of Hungary — in the 
total absence of any hostile provocation — this campaign of 
self-defense and just punishment of a treacherous govern- 
ment, was later heralded to the world by the British propa- 
ganda as the unprovoked invasion by the Central powers of 
heroic Roumania fighting for liberty and civilization! 

In the cases of Greece and Roumania we may freely con- 
tinue the parallel with Italy as regards the ultimate permanent 
fruitfulness and success of the course of these countries in 
listening to the seductive pleas of the Entente powers. It is 
doubtful whether their expectations will ultimately be realized 
more than, or as fully as, the Triple Alliance would have been 
able to realize them, even if only partly victorious. Hungary 
has made a strenuous protest that must be, will be heard, 
against being robbed of her choicest eastern section, parts of 
her territory since centuries and populated to 70 per cent by 
Hungarians. Russia, when she reaches settled conditions, will 
want to know who had the right to take Bessarabia from her 
and turn it over to Roumania without asking so much as a 
question about it. By these outrageous "allotments" of the 
Paris peace conference, without ethnological investigation, 
plebiscites, mutual agreement and compensations the seeds for 
more wars have been sown ! 

The details of the course of war between the Triple Alli- 
ance and the "three perfidious nations" are matters of the 

109 



regular history of the war, and will not be pursued here further. 
We are chiefly interested in the moral delinquencies exhibited 
in these cases, in connection with the views expressed in the 
later articles of the book on the ethical aspect of the war. 



King Constantine's Return. The return of the Greek King 
to his throne recently, following an overwhelming popular 

demand, brings the fullest corroboration of the above presen- 
tation of Greece as an "Entente ally." Next to the Kaiser, 
King Constantine was the most outrageously maligned ruler 
in Europe. The complete reversal of minister Venizelos's 
"entente-financed" republic by the Greek people is an eloquent 
testimony of the nefarious work done in Greece by France and 
England! But nothing was able to wipe out the impression 
of capability, honesty, fairness to all political parties and en- 
lightened patriotism which the King had secured among the 
Greek people of all classes; and when the Entente, at Paris, 
proved the utter hollowness of the extravagant promises made 
to Greece, the reaction of justice and repentance came quickly. 
It is peculiarly interesting that in this country the reversal 
of Greek political sentiment and policy was given only the 
slightest possible notice in the public press, with studied avoid- 
ance of all critical comment. This transformation and avowal 
of error, naturally, did not "fit in" with America's artificial 
and nebulous conception of the European war and the noisy 
"liberty and democracy" doctrines of universal salvation in- 
jected into it — backed up with guns and sabres! 



XI. AMERICA IN THE WAR 

A. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY. SENTIMENTAL INFLU- 
ENCES. INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS ON THE HIGH 
SEAS. THE U-BOAT WARFARE. SINKING OF 
THE LUSITANIA. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
MOMENT NEGLECTED 

The active entrance of the United States of America into 
the war was the startling sensation of the European conflict, 
so unexpected, so entirely opposed to the traditions of American 
foreign policy. How America came to be drawn into the war, 

110 



the tremendous and successful preparations made, the patriotic 
fervor aroused, and the details of our participation and victory- 
are familiar to all in their outward course. But below that 
there lie hidden the secret and complicated motives, the 
powerful extraneous influences and the artificial emotional 
appeals made which are not so readily discernible. It is these 
which are the burden of inquiry in this article. 

At the outbreak of the war America declared that its 
policy was to be one of strict neutrality. It required but a 
little time, however, for conditions and influences to become 
operative which affected that resolution of principle and trans- 
formed our attitude to one of benevolent neutrality towards 
the Entente powers. As the war in Europe progressed on its 
terrible course of violence, American sympathies and interests 
experienced a gradual transformation to an attitude of out- 
spoken enmity towards Germany and Austria, ultimately cul- 
minating in the declaration of war on Germany by the 
American Congress, on April 6th, 1917. The factors which 
brought about this change of sentiment were both political 
and material, but also sentimental and of such intricate inter- 
relation as to make it difficult for the plain patriotic American, 
standing within this turmoil of forces as a spectator and par- 
ticipant at the same time, to form a clear and correct estimate 
of the great drama which was taking place. 

The first direct friction with Germany arose over the inter- 
ference with American merchant shipping. Germany, in 
answer to the British blockade of her coast, had established a 
freight and passenger-boat prescribed zone against enemy ship- 
ping, covering strips along the British, Dutch, Belgian and 
French coasts and along the Mediterranean enemy coasts. 
Within these prescribed "zones" such enemy vessels became 
subject to immediate destruction by German regular warships 
or her submarine boats, without previous warning, as seizure 
was not practicable for German warships to make under the 
British blockade, and entirely out of the question for sub- 
marines. At once the question arose of Germany's right, 
under the recognized code of International Law on the High 
Seas to establish such prescribed zones and use of the new 
submarine power as announced. Gei'many's assumptions were 

111 



denounced by the enemy powers as illegal under their inter- 
pretation of the said code. These new regulations held great 
dangers for all neutral merchant shipping, as mistakes in 
identification — through bad light, change in rigging, etc. — 
were sure to follow. The United States, as well as the Euro- 
pean neutrals, suffered such accidental depredations repeatedly, 
each individual case leading to diplomatic remonstrances, claims 
for indemnities, demands for apologies. Naturally there were 
contradictory accounts and contentions in each case, exaggera- 
tion by the injured party, belittlement by the offenders; but 
each case ended with an increase of acrimony and resentment 
in the United States against Germany. 

On her part the latter set up the plausible defence that the 
British blockade was the original offender in the matter and 
cause of these extraordinary measures; that she had the right 
to protect herself with all means at her disposal, having been 
challenged (according to her conception) to a war in defense 
of her existence, for which she had given no hostile cause, 
and that the new weapon of the submarine was as legal as 
any other agent of destruction in such an unjustified and 
unequal contest; furthermore, that she had the right to estab- 
lish such new rules of sea-warfare as the peculiar character of 
the submai'ine torpedo boat — its vulnerability and other limi- 
tations — together with the British blockade of her coast, de- 
manded. Pursuant to these arguments, Germany asserted that 
neutrals should realize and acknowledge by their attitude that 
a new kind of war on the High seas had come, different from 
those of former wars, and that it was their duty and their 
interest to submit to these new conditions by willingly ob- 
serving the established zones in order to avoid accidents. She 
held herself ready and accountable for damages and indemnities 
in cases of accidents, damage and loss of life occurring 
through mistakes of officers, illegibility of signs and code signals 
or any other uncontrollable causes. All the European truly 
neutral countries accepted the reasonableness of Germany's 
explanations and guaranties in view of her geographical posi- 
tion, the unwarranted blockade of her coast, and her naval 
inferiority which made the raising of this blockade by force 
almost impossible. Hence, the European neutrals, holding, 

112 



also, a local .and rational view of the real war motives and 
objects and of the unequal contest forced upon Germany by 
the Entente, were prepared to acquiesce to her rulings, con- 
fining themselves to protests and presentation of claims arising 
out of individual cases of accidental violation, but conceding 
Germany's title to her sea policy. 

Not so the United States of America. In this country, 
unfortunately, the original official intention of observing a 
strict neutrality in the war, and of judging all political and 
technical questions which might arise with absolute imparti- 
ality and reasonableness, came to grief in the first few months 
of the war and was transformed, as we have said before, into 
a state of benevolent neutrality towards the Triple Entente. 
This change had not come from any act of enmity by Germany 
or Austria but from the steady and subtle process of social and 
sentimental amalgamation with England which had been going 
on for forty years and which might well be designated as "the 
bloodless re-conquest of the United States by Great Britain." 
There is nothing reprehensible per se in this drawing-together 
of mother country and daughter. Our culture-civilization, if 
you prefer — is essentially English in character, language, 
political ideas, law structure, social customs, etc., in 
spite of the strong admixture of German, Scandinavian, Italian 
and other races of different language in the present makeup 
of the American people. Time had softened the once bitter 
feeling against England dating from the war of the revolu- 
tion, the war of 1812, and from England's attitude in our 
Civil War. The hundreds of marriages concluded between 
the scions of important English and American families have 
drawn the two countries together, racially and socially. Im- 
portant busines and financial associations sprang up in the 
course of time. In this way English tact and patience ac- 
complished a remarkable transformation in the relations be- 
tween the two countries; it built up an international Anglo- 
American exclusive social caste and created a pro-English 
party — for peace or for war — in the United States long be- 
fore the great European war was thought of as an acute 
possibility. In consequence of this intimate relationship, a 
strong pro-English war feeling asserted itself in this country 

113 



immediately after the war had broken out, and, -inferentially, 
a feeling of distrust and enmity towards Germany. 

This favorable sentiment here was skilfully worked up to 
full activity and expression by the British war propaganda, as 
described in all its aims and methods in Article VIII, which 
utilized every means possible to disseminate false impressions 
in the United States about the events transpiring in Europe — 
the causes of the war, the motives of Germany, the invasions 
of Belgium and France, the reported atrocities, the excesses 
of the U-boats — and to exasperate this country by similar exag- 
gerated "inventions" about the diabolical schemes of German 
propaganda in America. The object was plainly to work in 
every way possible upon the racial sympathy of this country 
with England, upon its political predilections, its humanitarian 
instincts and, proportionately, to feed its irritation and ani- 
mosity against Germany and Austria, whose every act and 
motive were distorted and painted in the blackest colors. The 
English censorship and the isolated, defenseless position of 
Germany made this scheme of attack and conquest a com- 
plete success! 

To this American pro-English sentiment there became 
adroitly joined a parallel pro-French sentiment by a propaganda 
of re-awakening and strengthening of the sympathetic ties 
long existent between America and France in a latent state, 
and of now vitalizing them to a keen reality by the recalling of 
Lafayette's and Rochambeau's heroic devotion to the cause of 
American liberty, and of France's generous diplomatic and 
financial aid and inspiring sympathy in the years of the bitter 
struggle for our independence from England and the founding 
of this republic. There was nothing per se reprehensible in 
this agitation either; the sentiment in both was good, but 
the motives of the leaders who aroused them were thoroughly 
bad because intended for a purpose of hate and war! Once 
started on their insincere and enmious course, the entire press 
of the country, practically, was impressed into the service of 
nourishing these sentimental predispositions. Additional sup- 
port accrued to this campaign of creating anti-German feeling 
— the British propaganda of hate and defamation working all 
the time meanwhile — by the awakening of the American manu- 

114 



facturer, speculator and financier to the "business aspect" of 
the European war, the commercial possibilities of a liberal 
application of "benevolent neutrality" towards the Entente 
allies in the enormous struggle which was developing abroad. 
And, still more, the American army and navy organizations 
began to see in a possible participation of America in the war 
a grand opportunity for honors in the service, promotion and 
emoluments which made an enticing vision. All these factors 
combined worked to transform the British propaganda in 
America into a genuine native American propaganda with new 
features and objects added, and with the distinct purpose of 
familiarizing the public mind with the thought of war. 

The author, at this point, emphatically disclaims any idea 
of wishing to imply that America had no genuine war motives, 
that Germany committed no acts of hostile provocation ; but he 
does believe that under the combined stimulus of the 
two propagandas — the false information spread, the senti- 
mental factors brought into play — the aggressions of Germany 
looked to us in the superheated state of our feelings out of 
all proportion to what they really were and appear to us 
to-day. Except for a small but influential war clique of the 
most varied composition, the war motives of the American 
people were absolutely honest; we believed what we were told 
— and went ahead! In the feverish circumstances which we 
have analyzed above it needed, at the height of tension, but 
the injection of some grand motive, some inspiring unselfish 
thought to lift the growing war feeling out of its false and 
restricted foundation into a higher plane of disinterested ideal- 
ism from which war might be contemplated without a shudder! 
A commanding war cry had to be found, though it be invented, 
to which would fit those terrifying words: Enlistment, con- 
scription, the blood sacrifice of thousands, agonies of soul 
for loved ones, suffering untold on beds of mutilation, enor- 
mous loans and the depletion of the public wealth, complete 
disorganization of the country's normal life of peace! 

But the master minds at Washington were equal to the 
occasion. Our great mesmeric war President issued the call: 
"To Arms! for Liberty and Democracy; To Arms! for Universal 
Justice and the Freedom of the World! To Arms! to crush 

115 



German Autocracy, Kaiserdom, Militarism and World Con- 
quest!" And behold, the miracle was done; as simple as all 
miracles: Ye must believe, if ye would be saved; ye must 
have a faith if ye would go to war with a good conscience ! 
The country now had its "crusader" war cry; but alas! the 
noblest of all sentiments — patriotism and love of liberty — 
had been invoked and violated to the service of a false and 
ephemeral issue! The public did not know this, and the en- 
thusiasm was now unbounded; the inspiring war slogan was 
flung to all the breezes and trumpeted from all the house tops ; 
the conscience of millions of the more sober and peaceable 
was lulled or cajoled to silence — but truth lay strangled on 
the ground!! It was not true, as then represented, that Ger- 
many or the Kaiser had wanted and plotted the war for world 
conquest or any other motive ; that her government had been 
oppressive under a tyrant autocrat; that the German people 
were thirsting for the blessings of a republic; that unusual 
atrocities and destruction had been committed by Germany 
in the war. 

The practical effect of this evolution of our war attitude 
was that every accident which happened to any of our vessels 
in consequence of the German zone regulation was enlarged 
to an acute "casus belli" which no explanations from the 
German side was allowed to appease. America refused to 
accede to the German contention that the old International 
Code had become obsolete, and broadly claimed the right for 
her citizens to travel unmolested, zone or no zone, anywhere 
they pleased on regular passenger ships of neutral or enemy 
nationality. Meanwhile the export of American war materials 
of every kind and of food to the Entente countries, which had 
begun as soon as the war had started, assumed larger and 
larger proportions and had taken place in ships of all nationali- 
ties. It led to energetic protests from Germany as being in 
violation of our neutrality, especially when taking place in 
passenger vessels, in which cases the presence, on board, of 
American passengers was intended to form a "protection" 
to such vessels against challenge and search in passing through 
the zones. The question was argued at length in the American 
press and in the Congress. The view finally taken was that 

116 . 



such exportation of arms, etc., was not against American 
rights as a neutral as long as it was done without discrimina- 
tion against German purchasers in our market, and that it 
was not the fault of America if Germany could not purchase 
and import our arms and food because of the British blockade 
of her coast. 

As to this traffic taking place in passenger vessels, this 
country denied knowledge of such practice and threw the 
burden of proof upon Germany. In answer, the latter claimed 
that it was the duty of this government and of the different 
shipping and harbor authorities to see to it that passenger 
ships observe the international rules on cargo and that none 
carrying "contraband-of-war" be given port clearances, be 
they freight or passenger vessels. As to the great volume of 
this traffic earned on in enemy bottoms and neutral ships, 
Germany contended that exportation of food and war materials 
by a neutral country to an enemy of another country to such 
an extent as to practically constitute that enemy's ability to 
carry on his side of the respective war and also supply many of 
his general necessities, while the opposing enemy was pre- 
vented receiving similar support — particularly food — by an 
illegal blockade of his coast, was an action by a neutral so 
overwhelmingly prejudicial to one side of a conflict as to con- 
stitute a flagrant breach of neutrality, being a measure of 
assistance so decisive as never to have been contemplated by 
international law as permissible — and that there was no record 
of any such practice in any previous war. 



TN course of time the German government claimed to have 
received positive information from its agents in America 
that the large and swift passenger vessels of the English 
Cunard and White Star lines — the Adriatic, Celtic, Mauritania, 
Lusitania — were engaged regularly in this illegal traffic and 
that these vessels were being armed with six-inch afore and aft 
guns for attack against U-boats, in case of pursuit. The Ger- 
man government made an insistent protest against this prac- 
tice and threatened measures of a serious kind in self-defense 
and reprisal. For several weeks spirited "notes" were being 

117 



exchanged between the two governments on this dangerous 
controversy. The German position was very clear, much more 
so than the American: "The vessels used in this way and 
particularly complained against were enemy bottoms — British 
chartered and owned ; they were regular passenger boats, not 
freighters; they solicited to carry American-citizen passengers 
— for their protection in the illegal traffic of conveying arms 
and ammunition to the enemies of Germany. The American 
government was asked tersely to use its power over the English 
companies and its own citizens to eliminate the illegal and 
intolerable features of this traffic which, in the German view, 
were acts of open hostility in which the American government 
was participating, failing repressive action. 

Nothing came of these diplomatic exchanges except more 
distrust and irritation on both sides; our government took 
no steps to prevent a catastrophe. Finally the German govern- 
ment, seeing the futility of its endeavors, and being advised 
that the steamship Lusitania was being thus illegally prepared 
and loaded to sail from the port of New York with a con- 
siderable cargo of small arms and shells, and a large passenger 
list of distinguished Americans, losing all self-control in the 
face of this exasperating and open defiance by the United 
States, issued public warnings for two weeks before the sail- 
ing date that the safe passage of the Lusitania through the war 
zone could not be guaranteed by the German government 
under the new instructions recently issued to U-boat com- 
manders in regard to this hostile passenger-steamer traffic. 
These notices were posted up in all steamship agencies and 
railroad offices and were published conspicuously in a large 
number of the leading newspapers of the country, at an outlay, 
it was said, of over $30,000. There is absolutely no question 
of the warning having been given in an explicit and extensive 
manner. Still our government took no steps to avert a cata- 
strophe; no warnings to the public were issued; the British 
line was not called upon to halt their plan ; the port authorities 
received no orders to refuse clearance papers. There were 
misgivings in many quarters, as revealed by letters to the 
papers and other evidences of anxiety, but on the whole there 
was a disposition "to call Germany's bluff" — and take the 

118 



risk! On the morning of her sailing the passengers of the 
ship were made fully aware of all the circumstances; a very 
few canceled passage; the majority indulged themselves in 
unseemly hilarious gibes and tirades against German "boasts 
and frightfulness." The witty and famous "Fra Elbertus" 
(Elbert Hubbard of Aurora) was a passenger and was reported 
to have exclaimed: "I will sail on this ship to interview the 
Kaiser if I will have to go to hell to do it." Whether he went 
to hell the author cannot say — probably not, but he went to 
the bottom of the sea — the Lusitania was sunk!! 

A shriek of horror rang through the world; America was 
struck dumb in rage and grief! It had not been thought pos- 
sible! We, in America, were too far removed from the pres- 
sure of the war in Europe to understand the grim earnestness 
of Germany to stop these ships, each one of which carried 
enough ammunition on each trip to kill fifty thousand German 
soldiers! And, while it is true that more stringent U-boat 
instructions had been issued, and had to be issued ahead of 
time, it was confidently expected in Berlin that the final re- 
monstrances made in Washington and the issuing of the "warn- 
ing" notice would have their effect and cancel the Lusitania's 
sailing and stop the nefarious traffic. This awful catastrophe, 
which occurred on May 7th, 1915, preceded our declaration 
of war by almost two years, yet it wrought up public feeling 
to such a pitch and reacted so irresistibly upon Congress and 
the President that it undoubtedly made one of the final decid- 
ing factors for our participation in the war — although we 
clearly felt our share of responsibility in the awful occurrence. 
In saying this, the writer has not the slightest intention to 
excuse or belittle this wanton act by Germany of sinking 
the Lusitania; we condemn it unreservedly. But whether this 
act was a deliberate one, done under definite instructions, or 
an accident, or due to misinterpretation of orders by the U-boat 
commander is not fully established even to-day. The most 
reasonable explanation is that the German representatives here 
waited till the last moment, hoping that this government would 
take expected repressive action, and that when this hope was 
disappearing it was too late under the difficulties of war com- 

119 



munication in Europe, to arrest previously given orders to the 
U-boats. 

The sinking of the Lusitania, with its appalling loss of life 
and scenes of terror, caused as profound an impresion of sorrow 
in Germany as in this country; it was deeply regretted in 
German official circles and sincerely deplored by all sections of 
the German people despite their well-grounded wrath against 
the United States in this matter! The guilt of Germany for 
this disaster is great, possibly the greatest as between the 
three countries concerned, but we cannot escape the conclusion 
that America and England must share heavily in the respon- 
sibility. It was the consciousness of this in the popular mind 
of this country which accounted for the absence of violent 
outbreaks of feeling, at the time, in proportion to the im- 
mensity of the horrible occurrence — we knew that we were 
guilty in part. It was the consciousness of this which also 
accounted for the lame-footed "investigation" into the disaster 
by the English Admiralty Court and the silence of the British 
people — they also knew that they were gu'lty in part. The fol- 
lowing conclusions are incontrovertible: Either England should 
have ordered the canceling of the passenger list of the Lusi- 
tania, in face of Germany's incontrovertible declaration, or 
America should have publicly prohibited the booking of Ameri- 
can passengers and, failing compliance, have refused issuance 
of the necessary port-clearance papers. We had no right to 
send out that ship; she was illegal, internationally and morally. 
These acts of callous indifference and defiance in a situat'on 
of so much risk make England and America jointly guilty 
with Germany for the sinking of the Lusitania. There is no 
question that this is the sentiment today both in England and 
in this country. This crime is the fifth great error committed 
in the war and is jointly chargeable to the three powers in- 
volved in the case. 



npHE diplomatic representations which followed, demanding 

A on the part of the United States admission of guilt and 

disavowal by Germany (at that time there was no open thought 

of guilt on our part) and reparation resulted after various 



120 



minor concessions, at the end of about a year, in the offer 
by Germany to modify her U-boat warfare in deference to 
our remonstrance and the President's clear and positive warn- 
ing to restrict it to the cruiser-type of "conditional attack" 
after previous warning. With her offer Germany coupled the 
implied expectation that America shall, in return, use her 
good offices and, if necessary, pressure with England to have 
the food blockade raised or at least favorably modified in the 
interest of her civilian population. This offer and return action 
might have proven the happy turning point in the war towards 
its restriction to more reasonable and humane lines than those 
into which it had fallen. In expectation of responsive action 
by our President, Germany left the U-boat war in practical 
abeyance during the summer and autumn of 1916. Germany's 
contention had always been that her U-boat warfare against 
merchant vessels of every kind and nationality was her answer 
to England's indefensible blockade of her coast, her object 
being to cripple England's commerce and to pi'event her 
receiving supplies of food and other materials — it was a 
stra'ght policy of retaliation. England had been the challenger 
in these unnatural and inhuman measures used by both sides! 

Was the gra^rd opportunity for turning events into a better 
channel seized, was there a "humanitarian response" by Presi- 
dent Wilson, the American people or England to Germany's 
offer after all their loud protests against the cruel innovations 
of the war — poison-gas, dum-dum balls, submarine torpedo 
boats, air-craft, etc.? No! there was no prompt response; 
the precious opportunity was allowed to pass the door un- 
called! President Wilson took no notice of the implied re- 
ciprocity which the Germans had asked for, or claimed, in 
their truly conciliatory note except to say, very formally, that 
"his protestations on the U-boat warfare, if met by Germany, 
carried no return obligations by the United States; that 
compliance was a matter of abstract justice on Germany's 
part!" There was no sense, as yet, of divided guilt and re- 
sponsibility for the coming of the war, no recognition of the 
illegality of the food blockade and North Sea war-zone order 
by England, all and everything connected with the war was 
Germany's fault exclusively! The attitude of the President 

121 



was one of negation and inaction which he must have difficulty 
today to reconcile with his conscience, and which impartial 
history w!ll set down as a proof of his insincerity and commit- 
ment to the cause of the Entente. The indifference by the 
public will, likewise, be set down against the honor and good 
faith of the American people, except that we may urge that the 
people were at the time too much in the throes of a wild war 
passion to be able to comprehend the deep import of each 
passing event. The whole matter of Germany's offer was 
smothered in silence in press and speech by order and example 
of our government! A prompt and energetic responsive action 
at that psychological moment might have turned the whole 
history of the war; the frightful spirit of hate, revenge and 
savage violence which had settled upon the world might have 
been turned back! 

This inaction was the sixth great error of the war, second 
in importance to none, and is wholly chargeable to the United 

States. Not until December 22, 1916, after the German peace 
offer and its rejection by the Entente, did the President come 
forward with a proposal for a "conference of neutrals" with 
the object of securing bases for peace. In midst of the terrible 
turmoil and stress in which Europe was trembling, it took 
the President from September, 1915, to November, 1916, to 
decide to make this peace move. (See below.) 

It may be urged, as a matter of argument, that this country 
had no power to dictate the policy of England in the premises, 
and might have been unsuccessful in the attempt. But there 
can be no doubt whatever that the energetic intercession of 
the President in London would have carried the day. The 
war had already lasted about two years; its exhausting drain 
upon the nations, its disrupting effect upon civilization, its 
total uncertainty of outcome were being felt by all. England 
was at that time — fall of 1915 to end of summer 1916 — not 
yet on her full industrial war footing and largely dependent 
on this country for arms, ammunition and food, and could not 
have repelled our solicitations. But in the absence of pres- 
sure being put upon her by America, she detei'mined to pursue 
other plans than those of compromise and reconciliation ; for 
the achievement of her purposes she had already, by the 

122 



agency of her aggressive propaganda and other influences we 
have described, fastened her claws upon this government and 
country in an unshakable grip! We were in her power — 
committed to be the tool of her international crime! Nothing 
proves this so fully as the dead silence and submission with 
which the President took the curt rebuff by the Entente allies 
of his belated peace offer. To rebel, we had already gone 
too far, we should have had to stultify ourselves — admit that 
we had allowed ourselves to be deceived and imposed upon 
on the war issues! This was not possible to do at that time; 
only few saw it; we were not even in the war as yet but 
were running around like a mad bull smelling blood, and 
furious for a fight! 

After this unequivocal revelation of mind and shackled 
position on the part of America there followed in Germany the 
coldness of disillusionment as to the real value and meaning 
of President Wilson's generous phrases on political morality, 
disinterestedness and international justice. It was seen plainly 
that he either lacked the will or the power to influence the 
policy of England and that nothing that Germany might 6ffer 
short of complete submission would be considered by America 
and the Entente. Thus, thrown back upon herself and into 
a struggle of desperation for her life, Germany, on January 
29, 1917, gave notice that the U-boat campaign would be 
resumed at the end of that month. In this second, unrestricted, 
phase of this sinister warfare, a still greater zone restriction 
was instituted, accompanied by the assignment to the United 
States of a definite sea lane to a port in Wales, with a one-boat 
schedule per week, to and fro. 

This extreme step of resentment and retaliation on the 
part of Germany was equivalent to "throwing down the gaunt- 
let" — and the gauntlet was taken up — gladly in fact! For, 
in America also there had been a recoil effect from Germany's 
expectation of reciprocity — an inverse effect of disillusionment 
which crystalized the issue. Had we acted favorably on 
Germany's peace offers, it might have meant the avoidance 
of our entering the war — a result not at all desired by the 
political war conspirators, the profiteers, the army of officials, 
the sentimentalists and an inci'easing section of the general 

123 



public in America, aroused to a high degree of unthinking 
patriotism. Thus it was felt that we were at last committed! 
Our failure to act for improved understanding at the oppor- 
tune moment had revealed our cards, and there was no further 
dissembling possible of our real purpose. Diplomatic relations 
with Germany were severed on February 3, 1917, on the 
ground that the new U-boat war was in violation of the pledge 
of May 4, 1916, "not to sink merchant vessels without warn- 
ing." With the new U-boat war additional cases of depredation 
upon our shipping by Germany now occurred ; then came the 
revelation of the Mexico plot of conditional alliance against us 
— and our cup was now full with many imaginary and a few 
real aggressions by Germany and her allies. On April 6, 1917, 
this country declared war on Germany! It was the seventh 
great error committed in the war and the second by the 
United States, one which cooler judgment could easily have 
avoided! 

Germany took no official notice of our declaration of war, 
made no reply whatever! Nothing could have intensified the 
war feeling in this country more than this contemptuous 
silence and defiance of America! Our pride and vanity were 
stung to the quick! It made us feel that we must win against 
her at all costs! There had been those who up to the last 
moment had hoped that Germany would recede before us; 
now all this hesitation was swept away and we stood united 
for victory! 



May 7, 1915, to February 1, 1917. Following the Lusitania 
sinking and the exchange of a number of "Notes" between 
the United States and Germany on the U-boat warfare, an 
acceptable basis of concessions by Germany and acquiescence 
by America had finally been reached by the summer of 1916. 
From this time on Germany looked forward anxiously to the 
reciprocal steps expected to be taken by President Wilson in 
respect to the English blockade of her coast. Under the 
terriffic stress of the war and the belief by many of her ablest 
leaders that the U-boat weapon was her only way to a quick 
and sure victory, Germany's patience had already been sorely 
tried by President Wilson's dilatorious course in the "note" 
exchanges and by his general studied "doctrinariness" and 
evasiveness in a question entirely practical and requiring quick 

124 



action. (We must, perforce, put ourselves in the place of 
Germany to be able to understand her attitude and action.) 
When, therefore, after the above juncture had been reached, 
no better progress was made by America in putting pressure 
upon England, Germany became not only exasperated but 
greatly alarmed by the military setback which the practical 
stoppage of the U-boat warfare had entailed upon her. It 
began to look to her now that the whole of the dilatorious pro- 
ceedings by the President were merely a play to gain time 
for the allies and to curtail the submai'ine damages she might 
have been able to inflict upon England. This explains the 
renewed pressure upon the German government by the U-boat 
partisans and many sections of the people for the resumption 
of the U-boat war — in June, 1916, and thenceforth. Reference 
to this is made in Count Bernstorff's book on the war "My 
Three Years in America." He advised his government that 
such resumption would mean war with this country, and worked 
strenuously for peace ; but his attitude and opinion plainly 
show that he failed to realize the pressing military necessity 
of Germany and allowed himself to be influenced too much 
by that mysterious advisor to the President, Colonel House. 
As time advanced and no action came from America, Ger- 
many lost all hope and confidence and finally, in the beginning 
of December, launched her first peace move, of her own initia- 
tive, and addressed directly to the war powers. This move 
failed completely of any sympathetic response. Germany's 
independent peace action had stung the President's ego-centric 
nature to the quick as he saw its threat to defeat his great 
ambition of acting as "the savior of the world" in a "peace 
without victory"! Thereupon he launched his tardy peace 
move, of December 18th to 22nd, addressed to the neutrals 
to "discuss disarmament and the freedom of the seas, and 
finding bases for peace between the belligerents." We need 
not be astonished, from the frame of mind into which the Ger- 
man government and people had drifted through the depress- 
ing course of events from September to the end of the year 
1916, that this late peace move of our President found no con- 
fidence in that country and that Foreign Secretary Zimmermann 
could cable to Von Bernstoff, on January 7, 1917, that "Ameri- 
can intervention for definite peace negotiations is entirely un- 
desirable to us owing to public opinion here." On January 
9th, the Entente's crushing rejection of President Wilson's 
peace move was published, together with their own irreconcil- 
able terms to Germany which plainly proclaimed war to the 
finish! The increasing effect of the British blockade had, 
meantime, made the resumption of aggressive and "unre- 
stricted" submarine war against England absolutely necessary 
to Germany, now that hope of peace by any move was gone. 
This resumption was decided upon on January 10, 1917, after 

125 



the receipt of the Entente's answer to the President's note, 
but for obvious reasons it was only published on January 29th, 
and set in action on February 1st. 



B. THE AMERICAN ANTI-GERMAN PROPAGANDA. THE 

GERMAN ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA. OUR 

DISINTERESTED MOTIVES. POLITICAL 

EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON AMERICA 

I 
The hostile developments and exaspei'ated state of feeling 

just related were followed immediately by a virulent campaign 
of American propaganda against Germany, German residents 
in this country and German-born citizens, which exceeded 
anything previously done in this direction by the British pro- 
paganda. In order to inflame the public mind to the utmost 
and win the people's full support for the war, three American 
themes of attack were marshalled to the front by the adminis- 
tration leaders of this propaganda, in addition to the British 
propaganda's European stock of themes. They were, first, 
the assertion that it was Germany who wanted and forced 
war with the United States; second, the so-called German 
propaganda of disaffection and terrorism in this country; 
third, the alleged German plans of "world conquest" as applied 
to America. These charges must be examined in detail to 
show that our violence of feeling and apprehension were 
without foundation of facts of sufficient importance to warrant 
the rabid enmity we had assumed. Regarding the first charge, 
it is almost too silly to be seriously discussed but for the 
fact that in the existing state of public prejudice there were 
many here ready to believe anything said against Germany 
without further question or reasoning! But why should Ger- 
many have wanted war with the United States? Her every 
interest commanded her to remain at peace with this country, 
the great source of supply of food and other materials neces- 
sary in war and of which she still was receiving at least a 
small share via the northern neutrals; the country where she 
might float war loans; where millions of Germans were living 

126 



and many millions more of German descendants whose natural 
sympathies with "the fatherland" in its hour of distress would 
be a welcome moral and financial support; the country in 
which German business interests directly and indirectly reached 
into the thousands of millions of dollars and the protection 
of which demanded a condition of peace. To reverse the 
question : "How, in what direct and indirect way could Ger- 
many have profited by a war with the United States"? The 
question is unanswerable except for those who firmly believed 
in the "world conquest" scare. There were no pending diplo- 
matic matters of irritation or dispute between this country 
and Germany when the war broke out in 1914; the relations 
were normal and peaceful. 

As to those which arose during the war up to the time 
of our entry, Germany had, at all times, scouted the idea of 
war with America as something quite impossible; she may have 
been flippant in regard to the dangers of our attitude, believing 
that the distance across the ocean, the lack of our military 
preparedness, the traditional policy of this country not to 
be drawn into European quarrels, the long and cordial friend- 
ship existing between the two peoples would make all subjects 
of irritation, which might be unavoidably produced by her war 
of self-defense against numerous enemies, amenable to diplo- 
matic adjustment without doubt. The German "notes" in 
connection with the various incidents with American vessels, 
which had started the "acute" friction in this country — even 
to the Lusitania sinking — claimed (and proved in most in- 
stances) that her dire war necessity alone had occasioned these 
violations. Some of them had been mere unavoidable acci- 
dents. In each case she expressed her sincere regret and 
declared herself ready to make liberal adjustment for damage 
and loss of life. Many more such "incidents" had occurred 
with the vessels of other neutrals — Holland, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Spain, etc. — without having produced more than 
temporary irritation. As stated before, these countries were 
disposed to recognize the stern necessities of Germany's ter- 
rible situation and to meet them in a spirit of true neutrality. 
America, on the contrary, was unbending in her demand for 
unabridged rights for her citizen-passengers and, in some 

127 



cases, advanced unwarranted insinuations that her vessels were 
being singled out specially by Germany for attack by her 
U-boats. 

The second theme of attack was the charge of "German 
propaganda" in America to spread disloyalty and terror through 
the country. Resting upon a minimum of facts and the policy 
to stamp as "propaganda" every legitimate act and inquiry 
of self-protection on the part of the German government, this 
subject was inflated to enormous proportions to hide from 
view the multifarious workings of the American and British 
propagandas of deceiving the public on the real issues of the 
war. The people were to be whipped into a state of war 
fury by being filled with the idea of a Germany bent upon 
defying and humiliating us, of the Germans as a people base, 
cruel, irresponsible and undesirable for association with us. 
The tales of the German plotting, disloyalty and "frightful- 
ness" were to be constantly droned into the people's ear to 
fire and sustain their idea that we were disinterestedly fighting 
for a righteous and justified cause and for those high ideals 
which had been so adroitly put forward to cover up the morbid 
and materialistic motives of the American war party. This 
German propaganda was charged with maintaining an elabo- 
rate system of espionage on American political and industrial 
doings, of attempting to bribe officials to divulge war secrets, 
of buying or controlling newspapers to influence public opinion 
in favor of the German view of the war, of maintaing a 
campaign by paid agents (like Dernburg) in the same interest, 
of plotting and executing terrorizing demonstrations of violence 
by blowing-up of munition factories, warehouses, vessels load- 
ing cargoes for the allies, public buildings and bridges. 

We will concede without question that Germany main- 
tained in this country (as every country does even in times 
of peace in foreign lands) a secret information service to 
report to her on the state of public opinion on pending political 
questions, on industrial and commercial activities of special 
significance, etc., and that these agencies were probably under 
the general direction of the embassy in Washington. When 
the "special situation" due to the outbreak of the European 
war arose, it became necessary for the German government, 

128 



in its desire to secure the full neutrality of this country, to 
increase this information service and to employ it in all legiti- 
mate ways to influence American public opinion in favor of 
Germany's interpretation of the war. There was nothing wrong 
about this; it was perfectly proper self-interest and self- 
defense; the same was done by every country in every other 
country, belligerent or neutral. This activity was, in fact, 
made imperative upon Germany because England had on 
the very first day of the war cut the German transatlantic 
cables and begun the censoring of all news items from Germany 
for transmission to America — and vice-versa. Thus America 
received all German news, and Germany all American news 
(excepting direct government cipher communications), only 
as arranged and interpreted for each by the British propaganda 
for its war purposes. 

A little later, when American neutrality had assumed a 
very ambiguous character in favor of England and France, 
making it necessary for the German government to take official 
notice thereof, when munition factories on a large scale began 
to spring up all over this country to furnish war materials 
to the enemies of Germany, it was surely not anything out 
of the way that so-called "German spies" should be found 
prowling around these factories and around docks where ships 
were loading up with these supplies, in order to gather exact 
information about what was going on for their government. 
This "spying" was absolutely legitimate, we must admit, in 
a country pretendedly neutral. It took much German money 
to carry on this service, considering the extent of the United 
States; and, consequently, the German government had to 
send over those large sums of money of which so much was 
made in the investigation of these so-called spy activities. 
There was absolutely no "criminal espionage and conspiracy" 
in these German inquiries into what we were doing, as was 
daily being charged in the newspapers to keep the public mind 
a-boiling. This German propaganda work, naturally, became 
more extensive and determined after our declaration of war 
and, in consequence, the U. S. Secret Service charged with 
its investigation and the running-down of actual and threat- 
ened plots of violence, presently unearthed a perfect crop of 

129 



such "plots and conspiracies" of violence in all parts of the 
country. Some few of these proved to be genuine; the majority 
were revealed as spurious rumors. Every explosion in . a 
manufacturing plant or on a ship, every unexplained outbreak 
of fire in such localities, every wreck of a freight train carry- 
ing munitions or food for the allies, every "strike" of munition- 
factory workers anywhere were promptly charged to the 
"German propaganda" without waiting for an investigation 
of the facts. Numbers of men were arrested all over the 
country and imprisoned, of whom only a few were convicted 
of any offense. Offices were raided and papers seized on the 
most trivial suspicions, newspapers suppressed, the secrecy of 
the U. S. mail invaded, and a general hubbub kept up to hold 
the public in a state of frenzy against everything German. 

All this activity was out of pi'oportion with the revelations 
of fact which followed. The majority of the "cases" were 
made up of gross exaggeration, absolute fabrications, false 
swearing and but a modicum of actual deeds or intentions of 
a "criminal" character. There was, undeniably, some hot-headed 
plotting; there were a number of cases of positive and serious 
crime; but these deeds were committed by super-patriotic in- 
dividuals or small bands of German nationality and not trace- 
able to the German government's agents here. It was but 
natural that in the heated atmosphere which prevailed at the 
time such "outbursts" should occur; observance of the law 
is but a step removed from crime when passions run high! 
In our own domestic disturbances of the peace by strikes in 
the mines, building trades, printing trade, on railroads, etc., 
we have had bomb plots, incendiarism, assassination, open rifle 
battles between State police and troops and strikers. On the 
whole we must admit today, under the calmer view now pre- 
vailing, that the total amount of proven criminal German pro- 
paganda, by private persons or government instigation, was in 
ludicrous disproportion to the public fear and sweeping 
charges made, to the flaming headlines in the newspapers, to 
the general attitude of enmity, abuse and insult dealt out to 
Germans and German-American citizens in every part of 
the country. 

130 



The third theme of the American propaganda against 
Germany was the charge of that country's alleged plans of 
"world conquest and dominion," as spread about from the 
beginning of the war by the British propaganda. We have 
before intimated that this is about the most absurd of all 
the charges made against Germany. Many books have been 
written — English, American, French, Italian — with wonderful 
maps attached, in which this Caesarian course of the terrible 
Germans is described as completely as if it were a finished 
piece of history! The foundation of much of this charge is 
undoubtedly to be found in those sadly misinterpreted pan- 
German writings and demonstrations to which we have previ- 
ously referred — a kind of super-patriotic university-professors' 
conquest of the world — on paper! Doubtless, also, the Berlin- 
Bagdad railroad scheme, the large increase of Germany's 
commercial fleet and navy, the acquisition of colonies, the 
rapid growth of her wealth and population were factors from 
which such a suspicion might be evolved by those interested 
to do so. But if there ever was a "bogyman" of the nations 
invented, here he surely was in the character of the "German 
conquest of the world"! In some inexplicable manner, Ger- 
many had evidently succeeded to thoroughly scare the whole 
world! But did not, perhaps, that famous English art of 
hypnotic suggestion have something to do with the spread of 
this artificial apprehension? In the book by a Mr. Wellman 
on the world war it is plainly stated "that the German rulers 
promised the German people the conquest of the world." Sim- 
ilar statements are made in the book by a Mr. Smith, entitled 
"What Germany Thinks" ; many other books and many speaker:; 
indulged in these irresponsible assertions. This representa- 
tion of Germany's policy was not due to a sincere conviction; 
it was a false pretense only, made in the interest of the 
general policy of the two propagandas of creating distrust 
of Germany's diplomacy and declared aims. 

Why should Germany have wanted to harbor such designs; 
what did she actually do to give color to these charges? The 
plan to reach the Persian gulf for legitimate trade extensions; 
to try to acquire more colonies; to increase her shipping fleet 
in proportion with her rapidly expanding industries and com- 

131 



merce; to extend her intercourse and intellectual relations with 
all the world for mutual benefit were steps far removed from 
designs of territorial aggression or political domination over 
other peoples. Have not England, Holland, France, Spain 
done these same things; and why is that which is accepted 
in their case as "legitimate extension" turned into charges of 
usurpation and conquest when done by Germany? The charge 
is nothing more or less than a malicious suggestion under the 
spell of which England hoped to hide her plan of crushing 
Germany's political rise and trade competition and with which 
she attempted to fasten upon that country alone the guilt of 
provoking the great war! It has always seemed incomprehen- 
sible that this intelligent American people should have taken 
"this play of England" as seriously as they did, unless, in 
fact, they shared in England's deeper motives! But it is a 
fact gathered from the newspaper expressions of that time 
that the ordinary public in its imagination actually saw the 
Kaiser march up Broadway in New York at the head of his 
army! 

This state of mind was at its height at the time of the 
arrival of the first German merchant submarine, and the 
wonderful escape of that boat, under command of her famous 
captain Koenig, from Chesapeake bay, with a dozen British 
and French warships at the three-mile limit line watching to 
take or sink her! But America has proven in many other 
ways — slavery and emancipation question, Cuban independence 
movement, woman suffrage, temperance movement ending in 
compulsory prohibition, in our Presidential-elections excesses 
of lies and slander — that we are a highly emotional and im- 
pressionable people, given to sudden lurches all in one direction, 
with temporary loss of balanced judgment. The directors of 
the American propaganda seized upon this German-conquest 
scare, these startling incidents and this national disposition 
as welcome fuel with which to feed the fires of patriotism 
and war enthusiasm. They represented the German propa- 
ganda as undermining the security of our democratic insti- 
tutions by its preaching of monarchical doctrines and by 
exposing the weaknesses of our political system and methods. 
They accused the German government of fostering the existing 

132 



enmity of Mexico, Argentina and other South-American states 
against us; and when, soon after the severance of diplomatic 
relations, political correspondence between Germany and 
Mexico was intercepted which indicated a tentative proposition 
for a defensive alliance with that country in case of war 
between the United States and Germany, not only did feeling 
run in the highest key but the intrigue was represented as 
giving direct proof of Germany's world-conquest plans. 

To these three themes of Amei-ican propaganda were 
added the specifically British ones of Germany's exclusive war 
guilt, of the cruelties committed in Belgium and Serbia and 
of the devastation wrought in Belgium and France. To the 
latter two subjects we have devoted a special article because 
of the large place they occupy in the public mind of America 
to this day and the strong obligation the author feels in the 
service of absolute justice to remove as much as possible the 
accusing but largely exaggerated and erroneous impressions 
which they have created. These two subjects, which touched 
so deeply the springs of human sympathy in the heart of 
America — a heart ever responsive to suffering and misfortune 
— contributed almost more than any others — rightfully or 
wrongly — to fill the measure of Amei-ican wrath against Ger- 



many 



T^HE combined effect of the two propagandas was to pro- 
■*■ duce an abnormal mental and moral condition of the . 
American public mind, approaching a state of acute hysteria. 
All classes were seized by the war spirit; all opposition was 
shouted down! A majestic wave of patriotism swept over the 
country, a readiness for unlimited sacrifice ! It was an in- 
spiring sight; but to the few who realized that this splendid 
enthusiasm was founded on error, that this ideal spirit of devo- 
tion of a generous and impulsive people to what was honestly 
believed to be a great and righteous cause was the result of 
excusable ignorance and of the heartless exploitation by an 
interested and unscrupulous war clique of these noble qualities 
of this people — it was, on the contrary, a most depressing sight! 
But the conflagration which had been started could no longer 

133 



be arrested. Like a hurricane it overwhelmed the Germans 
and German-Americans in the country. The violence to which 
it rose exceeded the bounds of all reason and decency and is 
scarcely comprehensible as we look back! Immediately the 
strictest police measures were inaugurated against German 
aliens, men and women. German-Americans (German-born 
American citizens) who were known or assumed to have strong 
German sympathies were closely watched. The slightest word 
made a man a suspect. Thousands of loyal citizens, men and 
women, were arrested and "interned," torn away from their 
families and business interests on the flimsiest of charges. So- 
cieties of hysterical women were formed to ostracize German- 
Americans socially, to boycott them in business, to have the 
German professors in the universities dismissed, the German 
teachers in the public schools, and others, who expressed Ger- 
man sympathies expelled. The teaching of the German lan- 
guage in the public schools was prohibited, the reading of 
German newspapers in public — street cars, trains, restaurants, 
etc. — attacked as "disloyal," the sale of German-language 
papers interfered with and their publication denounced as an 
insult to Americans. Boycotts were instituted against German 
music, opera, art and artists ! In Washington the statue of 
Frederick the Great, presented by the Kaiser to the American 
people as a token of friendship, was pulled off its pedestal by 
an infuriated mob and thrown into some public cellar. Today, 
after the lapse of four years, it sounds like some story from 
the Spanish Inquisition! Is it possible for man to become 
more narrow and befuddled in his normal view and feelings 
by the reign of unreasoning war passion? 

We will cite in detail just one case of persecution, that of 
Dr. Karl Muck, director of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, 

because of the gentleman's prominence. He was subjected 
to the humiliation of public odium, the indignities of arrest 
and imprisonment in Boston, and was interned for nearly two 
years as a dangerous alien enemy! He was torn out of his 
artistic career in a vulgar and violent manner. His alleged 
crime consisted in refusing to have his orchestra play the 
national anthem at the opening of his concerts. His principal 
reason was that he did not consider it correct musical taste 
and tradition to open concerts of the class he conducted with 
a piece of music of that description. (This objection is 

134 



probably incomprehensible to all but those of high musical 
training and feeling.) After a violent agitation in the papers, 
and pressure brought upon him by Col. Higginson (Prest. of 
the B. S. Co., and a noble American) in the interest of the 
orchestra organization, Dr. Muck consented to have the anthem 
played. But this came too late to soften the public attitude, 
and the persecution went its course ! Was this man in any 
sense an active enemy of the United States? After the most 
diligent inquiry into his social relations and private corre- 
spondence absolutely nothing incriminating was found against 
him except the general fact that, as a born German and a 
German .citizen — he being only an occasional professional 
visitor to this country — his war sympathies, naturally, were 
with his own country and that he held the German conception 
of the war. Could this man do otherwise, honorably? No 
American in like circumstances in a foreign country would do 
differently. There was no crime, no serious provocation even! 
He was just one of the other thousands more who had to be 
thrown into the maw of the great man-eating moloch of 
American patriotic fury! Probably his physical and mental 
buyoancy and career as a musician have been ru'ned by his 
terrible experiences. 

Daily the most absurd statements and tirades appeared in 
print and speech about "the seditious sympathies of the Ger- 
man-Americans with their fatherland," taunts about their 
being only "hyphenated Americans," about their questionable 
loyalty to this country. Yet it still remains to be shown that 
there is any wrong in a man clinging to his kindred race and 
to the place where his cradle stood, even though he be a citizen 
of a new, adopted, country; to be shown that the one sentiment 
is not compatible with the conviction and duty of the other! 
In times when men are in their right senses such feelings are 
taken as indicating a man of good character and healthy na- 
tural instincts. Can a man who is a man ever forget his native 
country and language, the lyric masterpieces of his people, its 
songs, its history and deeds of glory, its sufferings, his own 
family's story of achievements?! Do other races who immi- 
grate to our country forget these things? Does a foreigner 
change his flesh and blood and "racial" traits by becoming 
an American citizen? Are not the Germans, next to the 
Irish, the most determined and permanent of our settlers, the 
most faithful of all to their new country? And is it un- 
natural for any of these immigrant peoples to feel a keen 

135 



interest in a war in which their homeland may be involved, 
and, perhaps, to take sides with their countrymen if they do 
not think them at fault? But the passions of war corrupt 
reason and feeling alike! The German-born men and women 
who only yesterday were our friends well met, our business 
associates, our faithful industrial helpers, our intelligent and 
devoted fellow-citizens, always found on the right side of 
every movement for political and social betterment, whose 
domestic felicity and sociable qualities made them a valuable 
asset in our national life were suddenly transformed into un- 
welcome, disliked and distrusted strangers! Everything of 
sentiment, appreciation, justice was forgotten; everything that 

Germans had been and done for America even the men "who 

went mit Sigel," Burnside and McClellan — forgotten the people 
who above all others had brought joviality, kindliness, humor, 
music and song into the stern and crude realities of American 
pioneer life! 

The degree of abuse meted out defies adequate description; 
it is a page of shame to bring a blush to American cheeks! 
Where England was malicious, destructive and unspeakably 
cruel, where France was savagely vengeful and hurled her 
unmeasured scorn and disdain at Germany it remained for the 
United States to be coarsely insulting and vulgar in all her 
anti-German war manifestations! We exposed therewith the 
superficiality of our culture to the view of the whole world! 
That lack of "decent respect for an adversary" which is so 
deplorable a feature of our politics and election campaigns 
was outdone a hundred-fold. Newspapers and magazines vied 
with each other in the boldness of their misrepresentations 
and the virulence of their abuse. The few who strove to 
maintain at least a semblance of reason in this pandemonium 
of hate, and to uphold the torch of American chivalry and 
fairness, were cried down as being "pro-German, unpatriotic, 
seditious!" Think again of those shameful newspaper head- 
lines: "The Huns! the Barbarians! the Outlaws! the Savages! 
the Murderers!; those insulting illustrations in the press and 
in war posters!; those rabid expressions of hate and contempt 
in public addresses, books, from the pulpit even!; those despic- 
able books of manufactured "revelations" about German po- 

136 



Iitical and social conditions or the personality of the Kaiser 
in the style of that venomous book by former Ambassador 
Gerard!; those scandalous plays like "The Kaiser, the Beast 
of Berlin"!; the whole monstrous structure of lies, insults and 
hate makes an exhibition of abandoned passion the parallel of 
which has not been seen in the world before! No such revolting 
expression of war hate was shown in any country of Europe ; 
the American pupil had far outdone their British and French 
masters! It was comparable to a tempest of the cosmic ele- 
ments let loose over the land and which nothing could arrest 
till its fury was appeased by a brute-force victory — right or 
wrong! Blood! Blood! Blood! was wanted; this peaceable 
nation had become a ferocious monster thirsting for the life 
of a fellow-people — one who had done America no intentional 
and ill-willed wrong such as might have justified the drawing 
of the sword! 



T17E have previously expressed the conviction that 95 per 
" ' cent of the American people were perfectly honest — 
though misguided— in their war motives and beliefs. Even in 
a republic the majority is led by a minority ruling element 
which shapes policy and imposes its will. What this element 
lacks in numbers, it more than makes up in power — ability and 
education, social position, international connections, wealth, 
financial influence, business interests and connections, material 
ambition to make money, to direct affairs, to acquire distinc- 
tion! We have already indicated that there was a war clique, 
or party, a minority directorate of the above character in 
America which stood behind the general public, "more or less 
hidden, and directed this country intentionally towards war. 
The motives which animated them were not in all respects 
the same ones which were advanced to the general public; 
some were of a kind not to be publicly acknowledged amidst 
the thunder of our high-flown program of fighting for liberty 
and universal justice. In a previous article the author drew 
attention to the envy and jealousy aroused in American visitors 
to Germany by the exemplary progressive institutions, the 
capability and honesty of administration of that country. These 

137 



achievements were felt to be a reproach to our country, in 
which under free democratic government there were, by com- 
parison, most glaring deficiencies. Nor were we untouched 
by a sense of envy and resentment at Germany's growing com- 
mercial position in the world, at her keen competition with us, 
at her magnificent shipping fleet and great transatlantic liners, 
as fine as any in the world, second in size only to that of 
England and built completely in her own yards — at the power- 
ful hold she had on Mexican, Argentinian, and other South- 
American trade while we went almost empty-handed! These 
Germans had to be downed; they were too clever and too 
enterprising! Did, perhaps, English and American business 
men "put their heads together" in those pleasant after-lunch 
confabs in the Pall Mall club houses and London city cafes? 
And was there not something very tangible behind this jealous 
feeling close at home? There was, unquestionably! 

After the enactment of the Dingley Protective Tariff, the 
German manufacturers found themselves hard hit; importation 
into the United States of many of their products had been 
made almost impossible by the high duties. But there was a 
way open. They were in possession of many valuable patented 
processes and special machinery for such, against the products 
of which competition would be almost impossible if they could 
manufacture these goods in the United States and thereby save 
paying those tariff duties. The American public wanted these 
goods, without doubt. After investigating all the legal and 
material difficulties in the way of such a plan, they found 
that it could be carried out and made a success — and they 
went right to work to do it. Thus, during nearly twenty years 
before our entry into the European war, a considerable number 
of large German manufacturing concerns established branch 
factories in this country, under American incorporations, in 
such protected special-process lines. These establishments 
were backed up by effective selling agencies and banking re- 
sources. They did a large and profitable business, were cap- 
italized at nearly a billion dollars, and cut a great swath into 
native American business in some lines. Naturally they en- 
gendered envy and stiff opposition. 

When we declared war on Germany this jealous and of- 

138 



fended American business sense came to the front immediately 
and found ways and means of making itself felt. Here was a 
grand opportunity to get rid of a troublesome competition in 
business and get possession of a fine line of factories and a 
fleet of fine ships at one stroke! Accordingly, one of the first 
acts of the government to prove our "material disinterested- 
ness" in the war was to seize the entire fleet of German ships 
in the United States ports at the time, amounting to a very 
large tonnage and comprising many of the finest and largest 
ships afloat, of a value of over two hundred million dollars. 
America thus acquired over night a fleet which twenty years 
of ship-building under unlimited subsidies could not have pro- 
duced ! The second practical war act of the same "disin- 
terested" class was to establish the office of the "Alien Property 
Custodian," whose duty it became to ferret out, investigate, 
seize, dissolve and acquire for American owners and operation 
the entire number of those German manufacturing and com- 
mercial branch establishments of which we have spoken, in- 
eluding all patents, royalty rights, machinery, equipment, stock 
and real estate. This second acquisition represented over 750 
million dollars' worth of property. It eliminated the offensive 
competition, at least to the extent that the money to be made 
out of these establishments in the future would be for Ameri- 
cans and not for Germans! In these measures of "alien-enemy" 
control were, furthermore, included German shipping lines 
from American ports to South America and other parts of 
the world, financial institutions; life, accident and fire-insur- 
ance companies; metal-mining and development syndicates. 
These seizures were possible to be made with great assurance 
because the degree in which Germany might be able to "re- 
taliate in kind" upon American establishments in Germany was 
trifling in comparison. What a spectacle of sordid, narrow- 
minded rivalry and jealousy the world presents! What a hollow 
mockery our high-pitched speeches! While with r.he mouth we 
talk "ideals," we draw the dagger of selfishness from our 
breast and strike our fellow-man helpless to the ground! 

That business interests were the real motives behind these 
seizures was publicly admitted by A. Mitchell Palmer, the 
Alien Property Custodian at the time, in a statement made 

139 



before the N. Y. City Bar Association on the evening of De- 
cember 10, 1918. He also furnished the information that of 
chemical-dye patents some 4,500 were seized and the estab- 
lishments which owned them organizd into a million-dollar 
American trust for their further exploitation for American 
benefit. The large hold which German firms had obtained over 
certain lines of the American metal trade and mining opera- 
tions was similarly broken up by the seizure of the stock and 
properties and their organization into American controlling 
syndicates. At Paris, in the financial and economic commis- 
sions of the peace conference, similar "disinterested" ideas 
were at work in making it a part of the peace settlement to 

cancel all the German pre-war contracts for raw materials from 
other countries, amounting to the sum of one billion dollars 
annually, the object being to throttle the revival of German 
manufacturing and trade after the war, and for years to come! 

The shortsightedness of this policy of greed and vengeance 
has since been proven, to the detriment of all, in the present 
condition of Europe. With one hand we deprived the stricken 
peoples of the means with which to work and live and drove 
them into total helplessness, with the other we dole out to 
them pittances of assistance to keep them from actual annihi- 
lation — and we take great credit for our show of generosity 
and human sympathy! The open exultation of the American 
press at these "successful business reprisals" against Germany 
was general; its joy refused longer to be suppressed when it 
was believed that she had been downed for good and would 
be unable ever to retaliate for our acts in the future. This 
"superior efficiency" and "super-man business" was at last 
out of the way! 

We must not neglect to speak of the ten or more billions 
of dollars of money loans — war credits — we made to our allies 
in Europe — who never really were our allies or, rather, to 
whom we never were properly "allied" for the full interests 
to be won out of the war — only for the obligations to be shoul- 
dered! All of these countries have accumulated enormous 
war debts; all of them, with the exception of England, are 
practically bankrupt. For many years to come their entire 
prospective surplus incomes are pre-empted to pay the in- 

140 



terest on their own war-loan issues; the principal will probably 
run on for a long period of years and may even be repudiated 
in some cases. What are our chances of having the loans 
repaid? There is an insidious insinuation being spread, in 
fact, that we should cancel these loans out of the fulness of 
our generosity. It is even hinted that — really — we owe this 
amount — or more — for an advance of money made by Louis 
XVI of France to the revolutionary government. The whole 
matter is a strange entanglement! First we sold to these war 
nations large supplies of food and war material; when orders 
came from them mounting into the hundreds of millions, we 
were obliged to lend them billions to enable them to continue 
their war expenditures at home and their purchases in this 
and other foreign countries; we were obliged to protect our 
manufacturers and merchants in these transactions by paying 
them out of our own treasury and charging the amounts off 
against the loans, so that, out of the fulness of our strict 
neutrality, we furnished them with both arms and the money 
wherewith to get them. When these allies were on the point 
of losing the war — and would have surely lost it without our 
help — we were compelled to go on in this endless-chain tread- 
mill and lend them more billions, and go into debt ourselves 
for about twenty billions of dollars to raise an army and go to 
war to save these our pseudo-allies from defeat and ruin. Had 
we not done this, all our loans and investments would probably 
have been worth as little as any other scrap of paper. We 
do not mean to say that this was the only or the chief reason 
why we went to war with Germany, but that our deep financial 
entanglement with Europe doubtlessly was a powerful factor 
for war! The interesting question arises: Did investments 
and other material considerations on our part precede the 
idealistic views we advanced — or did these ideals dictate them? 
In other words, did investments and other cold facts dictate 
pretended ideals, and did these, later, furnish the grounds for 
more investments and even terrible war? From the chrono- 
logical dates of events we can gather that we had sold our 
friends enormous bills of supplies and lent them over three 
billion dollars before any one had heard of "liberty and democ- 
racy" having been a leading factor in the origin of the Euro- 

141 



pean war. From these tantalizing propositions we may draw 
the deduction that the exact determination of our true or 
pretended idealism in our war actions, and of our disinterested- 
ness of motives, will be a problem of nice balance between 
material and moral values for the future historians of the war 
to determine, when the lapse of time will have laid all the 
facts bare beyond the possibility of a doubt! 



n^HE political measures which our entry into the war made 
necessary, and the effects which they will produce upon 
our future, are matters of the utmost importance. We have 
spoken of the objectionable steps taken to regulate and suppress 
alien enemies, German-American "sympathizers," agitators 
and native "pacifists," but these measures wei*e, after all, 
more in the nature of political police regulations. Of much 
more sweeping nature and far-reaching consequence were the 
restrictions imposed upon the guaranteed personal liberties of 
the people — the freedom of speech, of publication, of public 
assembly and open discussion of the war issues and actions. 
Through these stringent measures any and every expression of 
opinion in criticism of our entry into the war and of the 
steps taken by the government in its prosecution, whether 
uttered in private conversation, public address or by publication 
were declared to be treasonable and seditious practices, subject 
to a heavy punishment. Sundry zealot organizations were 
formed, local and national, to spy out and accuse of disloyalty 
business men and political men who refused to subscribe to an 
unconditional endorsement of the war. The most notorious 
of these was the National Security League whose illegal activi- 
ties of blackmail, financial election-pressure, etc., were exposed 
and denounced in t the Congress. This submersion — perhaps 
permanent abrogation — of the liberties guaranteed by the 
U. S. Constitution to every citizen is the denial and violation 
of the most fundamental principle of popular government which 
affirms that there shall be no arbitrary power reposing at any 
point in any department of the government, in peace or war, 
capable of depriving the people of these rights. The declara- 
tion of the Constitution is emphatic and beyond qualification 

142 



that the citizens of this republic shall have the right of "free 
deliberation" and "expression of their opinion" in any situa- 
tion whatever affecting the national welfare or their individual 
happiness. 

By these measures of suppression the spirit of "freedom" 
of our institutions was ignored and the country forced into 
submissive silence, into docile acquiescense to whatever steps 
the administration pro tern deemed proper to take. It was the 

substitution of the imperial one-man principle for the demo- 
cratic one of the popular will. These measures of repression 
were not confined to the people at large but were imposed 
upon the work of political clubs, associations of progressive 
citizens, upon the U. S. Senate itself, which, being opposed to 
the war administration on party-majority lines, was practically 
ignored in the conduct of the war. The President took no 
counsel with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in regard 
to the war policy to be pursued, and no consideration in the 
makeup of the numerous American peace commissions for 
the Paris Conference was given to the senators individually, 
of either party. The public press, being in the power of the 
war propaganda and censorship, completely lost its former 
position as the vehicle for the free expression of popular opinion 
except such as was in laudation of the war. In this way 
enlistment, conscription, war loans, high taxes, rise in the 
cost of living, disruption of business and income all went 
down the country's throat without resistance. No such strangl- 
ing of free opinion had been enacted in England or France, 
nor even in autocratic Germany or Russia. The American 
people was completely "gagged"; it was, furthermore, "goaded" 
daily to greater war fury by the ranting calls: "Stand behind 
the President"; "follow the President"; the country, right or 
wrong! Can there be anything more presumptive? The moral 
law must ever be the highest guide for nations as well as 
individuals! The country was not only prevented but pro- 
hibited forming a calm, rational opinion about the events 
going on ; those who attempted to steer the way to reason were 
arrested as "traitors" and sent to prison; the country's opinions 
were officially supplied to it fi*om Washington in the ingenious 
and resounding text: "Liberty and Justice"; "Make the World 

143 



Safe for Democracy"; "Down with Militarism and the Kaiser"; 
etc. But all the while liberty was being struck down at home! 
To this degree had the American people allowed itself to be 
abashed, schoolmastered and commandeered! 

Many of our foremost and patriotic men are deeply alarmed 
about the inevitable consequences of these arbitrary departures 
from correct constitutional practice. But another kind of 
error was committed, one not specifically a violation of any 
written rights of the Constitution but of an essential "implied 
right" of popular government — the right of the people to be 
directly heard in special cases — a right now embodied in many 
State Constitutions under the name of the "Initiative and 
Referendum." This error, or fault, was the refusal of the 
government to submit the question of our declaring war on 
Germany to the judgment and direct decision of the people 
after insistent demand for this had arisen in all parts of the 
country. If there is one thing which should favorably dis- 
tinguish a republic from a monarchy it is the right of the 
people to be directly heard on questions of great weight, such 
as a declaration of war — in which they will be called upon 
to do the fighting and bring the sacrifices. It is precisely 
this autocratic power in the hands of a King or Kaiser and 
his immediate advisers — the right to declare war — that has 
brought on many a revolution. In our case, moreover, the 
European war had gathered in so short a space of time that 
our representatives and senators cannot be said to have held 
"a mandate" from the people on the issue, nor even the Presi- 
dent himself. The situation at the time of the fall election 
of 1916, as to war, while dangerous was not yet acute and 
still in the stage of negotiations as to our expected "responsive 
action" on the U-boat warfare. The President had, in fact, 
been largely re-elected on the point of "having kept us out 
of war with Mexico" and as being a man committed to main- 
taing peace. 

Therefore, when the situation had rapidly changed for the 
worse and war seemed imminent, there arose a loud call from 
all sections of the public that the question be submitted to 
a direct majority vote of the people. Apprehension was felt 
that the extra "war powers" which the President had already 

144 



obtained and which would be greatly augmented by actual war, 
together with his studied disregard of the Congress (Repub- 
lican) and dictatorial attitude, which limited the proper func- 
tioning of that body as the representative of the people, would 
create a situation of peril to the nation — an unconstitutional 
extension of the executive power. Hence it was felt that a 
free popular discussion of the war issues was the only way 
to bring the light of truth and reason upon the complicated 
problem, and a popular majority vote the only method of deci- 
sion which would carry with it the authority of the whole 
people's right and might! But the powers and interests behind 
the scenes, who wanted war and directed events, did not wish — 
did not dare — to submit the question to a popular discussion 
and vote; they knew very well that they would be overwhelm- 
ingly defeated! There was, without doubt, a growing feeling 
for war, a strong resentment against Germany, seemingly 
justified ; yet, as we have argued at length, much of this was 
built up on misinformation and artificial pressure which, under 
a full discussion might have been dissipated and changed to 
calmer views and saner counsels! There might — probably 
would — have been a reaction for remaining at peace with Ger- 
many and confining ourselves to a stricter neutral'ty observance 
and the resolution to keep to an equable position amidst the 
great storm ! 

To summarize this topic, the following facts are apparent: 
The people of the United States, either directly or indirectly 
through their representatives in Congress, practically had no 
voice in the decision for war or in its measures; the Congress 
had been reduced through the President's authoritative methods, 
and its own lack of initiative and sense of responsibility, to 
the position of a complaisant "recording body"; the war was 
"wanted" and decided upon by a composite war party of 
American "jingoes," Anglophiles and Francophiles, political 
and humanitarian "sentimentalists," our military and naval 
cliques, American and international financiers, and last, but 
not least, by a covetous horde of "business interests" of every 
description which scented the great fortunes which might be 
made out of such a conflict. The war was directed and the 
country governed by the President and his cabinet of appointed 

145 



chiefs and by the various special administration boards, the 
directors of which were appointees of the President. The 
President thus practically was "the country" — much more so 
than the Kaiser ever was Germany or the Czar Russia! Thus 
the President's almost unlimited authority and personal power 
can only be compared to that assumed by Emperor Napoleon 
the Great! Special enactments were passed by the Congress 
to convey these powers upon him, not willingly, but because 
he demanded them and continued to demand them until the 
Congress acquiesced, the President claiming "war necessity" 
for his justification. By these concessions the divided con- 
stitutional duties of the legislative and executive departments 
were in many instances "rolled into one." Just where we 
stand exactly in regard to these matters or how they will 
be "unrolled" is not easy to say. 

Another serious violation of the national Constitution and 
infringement of the people's "personal liberty" has been the 
enactment of national prohibition, under the guise of a war 
measure. It represents the imposition of the will of a fanatical 
but powerful minority upon a helpless majority, made im- 
potent through the cupidity, or personal leanings in a matter 
of social habit, of the members of Congress and State legis- 
latures. These remarks are made without any relation to the 
merits of the subject of "temperance" or "total abstinence." 
The legislative and popular-rights aspect of this question and 
the "social or moral aspect" thereof are two distinct matters 
but not incapable of solution with full satisfaction to each 
if the perversion of view caused by an attitude of selfish 
fanaticism and ignorance were eliminated. All we are con- 
cerned with, in this place, in connection with this act is its 
character of usurpation, intolerance, ruthless domination of 
a limited section of the people over the whole body, and with 
the plain infringement of the Constitution as understood by 
the people. This question, like that of peace or war, is one 
that the people should have the right to decide for themselves 
by popular majority vote, either by national or state refer- 
endum. 

The great uncertainty in all these infringements and inno- 
vations is this: Where are we going?; where will we finish 

14G 



up? To what extent are these matters chargeable to faults 
and derelictions of individuals — egotism, personal ambitions, 
perverted views, disturbing theories — and to what extent to 
fundamental defects in our political system? Has the demo- 
cratic form of government revealed weaknesses through the 
war previously not suspected? Must we acknowledge that in 
times of great stress — war — when events crowd each other 
with lightning rapidity, when often great risk would attend 
the submitting of delicate matters of diplomacy to deliberative 
bodies, when quick decisions must be taken which leave no 
time for long debates with "ayes and noes," when the "large 
view" must prevail and quibbles over details are insufferable - 
popular representative institutions without an independent ex- 
ecutive head (as the King in England or in any liberal mon- 
archy) break down and the one-man principle must step in 
and take the helm to secure efficiency? This is what really 
happened in the late war; it has happened before in history. 
What a strange irony of fate has overtaken us! While claim- 
ing to be engaged in a holy crusade against monarchy and 
autocracy and for extending the blessings of popular demo- 
cratic government to other peoples, we were compelled, in 
order to be able to carry out this policy, to employ that very 
system and power of one-man concentrated government! How 
strange, furthermore, that while we were in the midst of 
our exasperated denunciation of our German fellow-citizens' 
sentimental interest in their native land, our own President 
should arise and proclaim the principle of "race nationality" — 
the unconquerable tenacity of racial feeling and character — 
as the corner-stone of a new era of peace in the world! Thus 
does war make strange bed-fellows of man's so-called con- 
victions, aspirations and inconsistencies! 



The Madcap of War. One of the instances of the "tem- 
porary insanity" which possessed this country during the war 
was the prosecution and imprisonment of Eugene V. Debs, 
Socialist leader and Presidential candidate of his party, for 
disloyalty in opposing the selective draft for compulsory mil- 
itary service in the war. He held it to be unconstitutional or, 
leather, opposed to the democratic principle of our form of 

147 



government, as the question of peace or war had not been 
submitted to a vote by the people at large. There were millions 
of rational and well-informed men in the country who held 
the same opinion, not referring to men of German )iationality 
or descent nor to the so-called "conscientious objectors" on 
moral or religious grounds. Nor did Mr. Debs' opinion have 
anything to do with his Socialistic convictions as such. But 
being a Socialist, a "radical" and agitator for reform, progress 
and improvement in all social and political matters, he was 
made a "war victim" and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, 
and is still in prison to-day. He is a man of remarkable in- 
telligence, clearness of view, sincerity and honesty of character, 
and is of unquestioned American ancestry. 

The Reign of Blind Hate. The author herewith desires to 
pay his compliments to those five distinguished ultra-rabid 
Anglophiles and Francophiles and haters of Germans, indi- 
vidually and collectively — William M. Evarts, Joseph H. 
Choate, Paul D. Cravath, Frederic R. Coudert and Martin W. 
Littleton — all distinguished lawyers and men of the highest 
intellectual and educational attributes. Mr. Choate had also 
been our Ambassador to England, and American chief delegate 
to the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. Mr. Evarts had 
been a U. S. Senator from New York, U. S. Attorney-General, 
U. S. Secretary of State, and counsel in national and interna- 
tional affairs. How men of such equipment and position for 
obtaining correct information can hold the passionately and 
blindly biased opinions about Germany and the causes of the 
war, as expressed by them on numerous occasions and in 
language devoid of all restraint, passes comprehension ! Their 
utterances are on record in the files of the public press and 
magazines and are, doubtless familiar to most readers of this 
book. We cannot give the space to quote them here fully, 
but must utter our abhorrent protest. As to Mr. Evarts and 
Mr. Choate, the author refers particularly to the virulently 
abusive anti-German sentiments expressed by them as given 
in the communication to the New York Herald of October 31, 
1920, by Mr. William V. Rowe, on the hopes of these two 
men for a "World Peace" plan through the agency of the 
Hague International Tribunal. Mr. Littleton capped his many 
impassioned anti-German war utterances by his scurrilous 
speech at the late "Rhine Horror" meeting in Madison Square 
Garden, New York. 

But the above men are not singled out for arraignment 
for any personal reason but because of their professional oc- 
cupation as practicing lawyers, from whose habits of thought a 
more judicial, objective and logical treatment of the case of 
Germany might have been expected! Other distinguished and 

148 



intellectual men of prominence — President Wilson, Charles E. 
Hughes, ex-President Taft, Elihu Root, Senator Lodge, Presi- 
dent Butler of Columbia University, ex-Attorney-General Wick- 
ersham, Henry P. Davison, Red-Cross chairman and many more 
— uttered the same opinions in at least pai-allel terms of 
vehemence. Meanwhile thousands and thousands of Americans 
of equal intellectuality who differed from these views felt 
themselves committed to silence from patriotic motives. How 
can we explain this violently unbalanced state of mind in these 
extreme "American patriots" against" a country and people 
which have never done America any harm? For, it must be 
understood that these sentiments were avowed and nurtured 
in America for twenty years before the outbreak of the war, 
while we were at peace with Germany and professed friend- 
ship for her and admiration for her achievements. We can- 
not but reiterate our previous statement of the silent building 
up of pro-British and pro-French — and anti-German — feeling 
by the British propaganda ever since about 1880, by which 
time the empire-consolidation of Germany had been accomp- 
lished and the policy of industrial and political expansion of 
that country had become plainly evident to England. In her 
far-seeing political view, England felt the arising of a formid- 
able rival to her power and position within a measurable dis- 
tance of time ; and it behooved her not only to lay plans for 
combining with France and Russia in a concerted policy against 
Germany in every field where she might be encountered, but 
also to win America to her support because of her physical 
resources. 

Hence the fostering of these international American mar- 
riages, this coddling of Americans in London and Paris society, 
this fulsome flattery and petting which was showered upon 
them. In every avenue of private, political and business in- 
tercourse the British and French object was to impress their 
point of view of "Germany's upstart rivalry," of her "crime 
against France in 1871," of her "dangerous militarism," of 
her "oppressive autocratic political system," etc., upon Amer- 
icans who, in their innocence of European political affairs, 
believed whatever they were told. In this way a strong pre- 
judice grew up in high American circles against Germany 
and was ready to assert itself openly when the war broke out. 
A sense was bred among Americans of position that by their 
kinship with England and their social and sympathetic relations 
with France they were to become members of a "triumvirate 
of superior nations" — England, France, America — which were 
destined to lead the world and which stood heads above Ger- 
many and the other continental peoples! 

This is the amazing presumption and conceit which was 
nurtured in Americans and which is eloquently summed up 

149 



in the above-quoted Herald article giving the political interna- 
tional views of Mr. Evarts and Mr. Choate. It pictures Ger- 
many as an intractable, recalcitrant political brute among the 
nations, the Germans as barbarians and huns, still in "a low 
animal state of civilization," efficient in many ways but yet 
"brutish" and incapable of understanding the superior moral 
nature and principle of the three elect nations — England, 
France, and America! The Germans and the other nations 
are "not in a class" with the three anointed of the Lord, can- 
not comprehend "their disinterested world views"; you "cannot 
make world peace with such a lot of unrefined, undeveloped 
brute nations." And more: "England, France and America 
understand each other"; they have the sense of "moral obli- 
gation" and could conclude a world peace treaty, but "Germany 
could never be brought into such a treaty" because "what 
does she care or know about morals or moral obligations as 
we understand them?" And more: "The German people are 
now (1889) back in the dark ages, in a class by themselves; 
they are a shocking menace to the good order of the world — 
like any other beast in cultivated surroundings — and cannot be 
trusted." Mr. Choate, who, at the Hague in 1907, was par- 
ticularly incensed against Germany because she would not 
agree to the proposed arbitration and partial disarmament 
proposals, is reported, in this Herald article by Mr. Rowe, as 
having said: "Arbitration and peace do not fall in with her 
(Germany's) views at all. She is a tough one! We must 
shut her out." Also: "The Prussians are the world's barbari- 
ans, utterly lacking in any understanding of or capacity for 
spiritual development!" 

The author submits that this is the summit of unreasoning, 
ignorant, hateful abuse and cannot be characterized! Such 
utterances can only be treated with contempt. They are quoted 
only as part .of the author's argument. As we have pointed 
out before, the reason for Germany's opposition to the arbitra- 
tion proposals of "these three moral nations," in 1907, was 
that Germany had ground to distrust the motive in these pro- 
posals in view of the envious stand of England, France and 
Russia against her in the Morocco question, in African coloni- 
zation plans and in the Asia-Minor development and transpor- 
tation schemes. In her geographical position, agreement would 
have made her helpless against a sudden combination of these 
three powers against her — which she had every reason to 
fear at no very distant day! If we grant that modern Germany 
(since 1871) compared with England and France, was a young 
and upstart nation and that the encroachments threatened 
through Germany's policy were, in a sense, invasions upon the 
privileged domains claimed by the older nations, this in itself 
does not constitute a charge against Germany. Her enhanced 

150 



position and growing necessities cleai"ly entitled her to the 
right of instituting her policy of material expansion, and the 
opposition to it was dictated not because "there was not enough 
to go around" but by jealousy against a newcomer and mean 
greed by England and France to have all the world advantages 
to themselves (leaving special political motives out of the 
consideration). Germany's attitude in the prosecution of her 
policies was always conciliatory and accommodating, with the 
object of preserving the peace of the world. 

At all events, we can say quite positively that the growth 
of American sentiment against Germany before the war was 
not due to any specific hostile act or intention on her part 
aimed against this country, so that, beyond a certain feeling 
of political and business jealousy (as pointed out in the ar- 
ticle on Germany) there remains only the influence exerted 
by the British and French social and political propagandas 
operating since 1880, to account for this general enmity and 
acute race prejudice. To this influence must be added a certain 
superficiality in American political and general education which, 
unfortunately, stops short of thorough study and investigation 
and makes us deficient in the valuable habit of ethical analysis 
of opinion and conduct. 



XII. THE INVASION OF BELGIUM AND THE 
ENEMY COUNTRIES 

The Belgian Atrocities — The Devastation Charge 

The so-called "invasions" of Russia, France, Serbia, Rou- 
mania and Italy by the German and Austrian armies were 
natural and legitimate operations of war. There having been 
in all these cases a regular declaration of war previous to these 
military moves, there can be no question of "invasion" about 
them in the correct meaning of that term, i.e., an "unexpected 
and unprovoked incursion" of an enemy force into another 
country for conquest or plunder. The right of a "declared" 
enemy to throw the fight into the other's country for the 
obvious advantages which this gives has never been questioned 
in military practice. We draw attention to this merely for 
the reason that, in consequence of the systematic intent of the 
Entente allies to be unfair to Germany and Austria in every- 
thing they did in the war, these entries of their armies into 
their enemies' countries were stigmatized to an uninformed 

151 



public as unwarranted acts and as examples of their wanton 
methods of warfare. This construction was especially applied 
to the case of France. But if Germany had not invaded France, 
the latter would have invaded Germany; in that case it would 
have been German towns, villages and cathedrals which would 
have suffered destruction (see the historical Articles) as it 
cannot be assumed that French shells would have been any 
more clever or sympathetic than German shells to evade 
churches, cathedral spires and similar high objects in the 
flight to their intended military targets beyond. 

The invasion of Belgium by the German armies, however, 
appears on the surface at least as a real, unprovoked and 
entirely unwarranted invasion of a neutral country, of a 
neutrality guaranteed to be respected by all the joint signa- 
tory powers of the treaty of London, of 1832, by which Bel- 
gium was created a separate Kingdom after her successful 
revolution for independence from Holland. Prussia was a 
party to that covenant, and the late German empire un- 
questionably took over this obligation; in fact, no attempt 
to repudiate it has ever been made by Germany. This charge 
of the invasion of Belgium, against Germany, has been so 
assiduously exploited by the propagandas by the careful ex- 
clusion of all explanatory and extenuating facts that it will 
be difficult to change the pi'evailing opinion that Germany's 
act was a deliberate violation of Belgian neutrality. But there 
are qualifying circumstances in the case which it is no more 
than just to state in order to throw an impartial light upon 
every phase of this question. In the first place, it cannot be 
contended that Germany entered Belgium as a wilful enemy to 
make war upon her; there was no definite reason for such 
an action. Her sole object was to obtain through-passage into 
France; and she opened peaceable negotiations with Belgium to 
obtain this. She offered full pay for everything that would 
be requisitioned for the army in its passage, and for all damage 
that would unavoidably be done. But it is clear that Belgium's 
consent to this request would have been an un-neutral act on 
her part towards France. It can hardly be assumed that the 
German statesmen could take any other view of this matter, 
provided they believed in Belgium's honest intention to remain 

152 



strictly neutral in respect of the Entente allies; and in this 
case Germany's insistence can only be explained as a presump- 
tion that her power would overawe Belgium and compel her 
to yield — an act of forceful coercion! But — if Germany had 
reason to doubt the reliability of Belgium's neutrality in respect 
of the Entente powers, the entire case obtains a different 
aspect! Whichever may be the correct hypothesis, the unex- 
pected happened — Belgium refused to yield and threatened 
to resist! When Germany was face-to-face with this dilemma 
she should have renounced her object and retired — unless she 
had absolute proof of Belgium's unreliability. There Were 
other ways open for her to get into France, and she cannot 
plead the justification of that extreme physical necessity which 
in war supplants all rights, agreements and other considera- 
tions. And, while these delicate and dangerous negotiations 
for this desired through-passage were in progress, the Ger- 
mans, confident that Belgium would ultimately yield, advanced 
steadily and crossed the border for a few miles in a few 
spots, and slight skirmishes occurred with the Belgian soldiery 
and civilians.- Suddenly a Niagara was reached: As the Ger- 
mans emerged in front of the outlying forts of Liege — only 
a few miles from the German frontier — they were met by a 
rain of shells and bullets. That ended all further negotiations. 

But behind the surface course and meaning of these events, 
there was, without doubt, a deeper significance, as we have 
already hinted. Diplomacy is a very secret business, and many 
of its most intricate schemes are not put down on paper; they 
are in the form of verbal understandings the existence of which 
can only be surmised from circumstantial evidence. Quite apart 
from the exact value of the assertion that the Germans, on 
reaching Brussels, found accusing documents in the govern- 
ment's archives pointing to secret agreements between Belgium 
and England in favor and support of the latter in the case of 
a European war, we know that from the very time of her 
erection to an independent power Belgium had been the ad- 
vance agent and listening post on the continent for England's 
international politics. An intimate friendship had existed for 
years between King Leopold and Queen Victoria. England 

153 



backed Belgium's conquest in the African Congo and shared 
the riches drawn from there with her. Similarly the affilia- 
tion of Belgium with France had been close through race 
relationship, language and historical traditions. In times of 
political troubles in France, Belgium had been the principal 
haven for her refugees and emigrants. Newspapers and books 
were issued from there which could not have been produced 
in France. It appears therefore not only reasonable but ir- 
resistible to draw the inference that Germany had excellent 
general reasons to assume and believe that Belgium would be 
on the side of the Triple Entente in the war — and against her; 
that she would, inevitably, become their helpmate and — tool; 
and that her neutrality would become "a scrap of paper" in any 
case, the matter depending merely upon which of the great 
powers would be the first to succeed to lay her hand upon her! 
A truly horrible revelation of the "inwardness" of European 
politics, but absolutely true!! Full proof that this was the 
position of Belgium — that she was destined to be a helpless 
victim in either case — may be disclosed before very long. 

Viewed in this light, Germany's action obtains a different 
appearance. In entering Belgium to march through it into 
France, she may have seen the opportunity — without creating 
hostilities — of keeping her enemies out, of laying her hand 
quietly upon a nest of dangerous intrigue against her of which 
she may have had some proof, in short, of compelling Belgium 
to disclose her exact position. That the existence of such 
secret understandings between the Entente and Belgium should 
be strenuously denied by them was to be expected. For 
Germany it was absolutely necessary, from the military point 
of view, to know Belgium's political position; invasion of 
German territory from there by France or England, under a 
false pretended violation of neutrality by Belgium towards 
them, was a danger of greatest importance to Germany. Of 
Holland she felt reasonably sure; her own French border she 
could protect, having only an open enemy to face; in Belgium 
there lay the danger of intrigue and surprise! In such situa- 
tions of perplexity — particularly in war — the strong man takes 
the bull by the horns to prevent him goring him! 

154 



/ T*HE charges of inhuman outrages against civilians in Bel- 
■*■ gium by the German soldiers and military authorities, and 
of wanton destruction of public and private property in Bel- 
gium and France were responsible more than anything else 
almost, after the war had well begun, for the intense feeling 
manifested against the Germans in this country. We cannot 
go into details of individual occurrences because even today 
reliable and unexaggerated accounts of these are impossible 
to obtain. To be able to appraise the whole matter at an 
equitable valuation, it is necessary, first, to acquire accurate 
conception of what war really is in idea and practice, and, 
second, to form a just appreciation of the psychological attitude 
of the Germans in regard to this war in general. War is 
a step of desperation — the final appeal to material force and 
challenge to mutual destruction! In that grim purpose of 
violence for violence is, unfortunately, associated every other 
excess and crime of war — destruction of property, theft, dese- 
cration, rape of women, outrage and killing of innocents and 
the helpless old alike. Not that these excesses are sanctioned 
by the army chiefs, officers and public opinion, but they are 
the unavoidable accompanying results of the bi'utal atmosphere 
of war. It is an unleashing of all the instincts of vengeance 
and injury in the most morbid individual soldiers and officers, 
in the one savage purpose to defeat and ruin the enemy. In- 
ferentially, therefore, the more terrible war is made, the sooner 
it may end ! This analysis applies with especial force to a 
war of unjust aggression which puts in danger the national 
existence of a people. There have been set up humanitarian 
agreements as to many details of warfare, institutions to 
ameliorate its horrors of suffering of every kind, also rules 
for the treatment of the non-combatant people of an enemy 
country and against the needless destruction of their private 
property; yet those of US who believe it possible to make war, 
in a sense, "civilized," to prevent excesses of passion under all 
circumstances, to confine its operation and effects strictly to 
the military forces and to prohibit the employment of new 
means of destruction or exclusive forms of weapons are certain 
to be disappointed! The development of modern war, in scope 

155 



and purpose, has made such views untenable. Looking back, 
even in the great Napoleon's time, war was confined to rela- 
tively small armies of professional soldiers, but since the 
advent of popular intelligence and interest in national political 
affairs — a result of the French revolution — and the introduc- 
tion of compulsory military service, started by Prussia, the 
whole aspect of war has become changed. 

Today, war is no longer merely a challenge of the "German 
army" to the French army," etc., as of old; the armies today 
are the people and the people are the armies, the challenge is 
from one nation to another and its entire man-power and 
resources for a desperate combat to annihilation of either — or 
both. Any means which contribute to that purpose are re- 
garded as legitimate. Implements of appalling power have 
been created; every resource of science and ingenuity is en- 
listed to the end of killing, maiming, destroying! The stakes 
are so great, the methods so gigantic, the developments of 
action in the field so rapid and terrible that "incidental ex- 
cesses," important enough in the subjective view, are ignored 
and swallowed up in the grand, overwhelming awful objective 
of the whole. In the late war there were the new terrors 
of the deadly machine gun, of poison gas, of artillery of in- 
creased caliber and amazing carrying power, of the "tank" 
monsters, the birdlike aero-planes and the wonderful "Zeppelin" 
airships, of the sinister submarine torpedo boats, of fixed and 
floating mines, of grand battleships of wonderful design and 
destructive equipment — all added to the improved weapons of 
former wars. In the midst of the employment, on both sides, 
of such colossal means of life-destruction or mutilation, and 
with millions of men to operate them, how can there be left 
any niceties of consideration or application in isolated cases 
of individual provocation? It is beyond the power of human 
nature to give! 

Modern war is like a great cosmic visitation — tidal wave, 
tornado, conflagration, volcanic eruption — that stop for noth- 
ing in their path! In such elemental commotion the psycho- 
logical condition of "the human war machine" — the individual 
soldier or officer — becomes a factor of great moment. In the 

- 156 



horrible scenes and situations of actual battle he is not any 
more a human being of normal feeling and thought but an 
insensible, irresponsible mechanism like the machine gun which 
he turns! His eye is dulled by the sight of blood, of frightful 
injuries and ghastly death; his ear to the cry of pain and the 
appeal for help; his whole sensibilities are blunted and drowned 
in the reign of wild excitement and confusion all about him : 
Thousands of dead lying on the ground with an accusing stare 
to heaven ; the wounded in every stage of mutilation and suf- 
fering, scenes to turn a stone to tears — heads blown off, 
legs and arms torn out, jagged bones protruding through the 
bleeding flesh, breasts cut open and abdomens disemboweled, 
dismembered hands and feet strewn over the ground — all 
around the roar of a thousand cannon mouths belching forth 
shells and shrapnel and tens of thousands of machine guns 
rattling amidst the detonations of exploding bombs and shells, 
the whole a deafening, suffocating, bewildering turmoil that 
makes it impossible to speak a word of comfort or a sad adieu 
to the comrade falling at your side! Add to this the life of 
exposure in the open or in the trenches, the dangers of the 
dugouts, the living hell inside the "tanks," add hunger and 
thirst and superhuman physical exertions — and we may realize 
how impossible it is for the soldier to remain a human being 
of normal mind and feeling and rational judgment in the 
grasp of such a cataclysm ! ! 

That men so placed and affected will, at times, commit 
excesses of unthinking rage and revenge under special provo- 
cations, of desperate protest against their hard lot, deeds at 
times inhuman and brutal is comprehensible; that officers even, 
whose higher intelligence and training should tend to fortify 
their characters, should lose their self-control and sense of 
responsibility and order or condone such acts of brutality is 
also comprehensible. Not even the high degree of discipline 
which has ever distinguished the German army and been its 
proudest record was able to guard entirely against such ex- 
cesses. The charge, however, that the responsible German 
army command and its sub-officers had instigated, countenanced 
or condoned a spirit of vengeful violence against Belgian and 

157 



French civilians, to be given free vent irrespective of special 
provocation, must be dismissed as pure and unsupported slander! 
As to the charges of wanton devastation of Belgian and French 
cities, private estates, churches, factories, mines, etc., there 
was, with rare exceptions, no other motive than that of justi- 
fied military action or military necessity. It is not to be 
denied here, that there were a number of cases of such depre- 
dation which cannot be excused. One matter which was assidu- 
ously worked up by the propagandas to evoke a great deal of 
acute sympathy and indignation in this country was the so- 
called "wholesale deportation of Belgian workmen" to work 
in German factories, etc. Information since released on this 
subject shows that this deportation was fully warranted on 
moral and social grounds; the men, and women as well, in 
their idleness, mental suffering from the war and half-starved 
condition were falling into sloth and vice from which regular 
occupation alone was able to rescue them. Such facts the 
British censorship never allowed to come to America; there 
was no limit to its capacity for spiteful calumny, either by 
commission or by omission. 

To all the preceding explanatory and extenuating state- 
ments to weaken the charges under consideration we must add 
the psychological factor, the mental attitude of the German 
soldier and officer, of the whole army, of the whole German 
people towards the war, as repeatedly described, to enable 
US to comprehend the point of view from which they regarded 
the enemy in France and Belgium, his country and cities, the 
non-combatant inhabitants, the very ground upon which the 
war was fought!! They saw their fatherland suddenly arrested 
in its path of progress and challenged to a war of life and 
death, their enemy avowedly bent upon its destruction; they 
heard false and ignoble motives invented to chai-ge upon them- 
selves the guilt for the terrible war; they were outraged and 
insulted by false or exaggerated charges of inhumanity, while 
their own civilian non-combatant people at home were being 
subjected to the greatest inhumanity perpetrated in the war — 
slow but certain physical attrition, starvation and finally col- 
lapse through the working of the British blockade! What a 

158 



proposition — all this together^to put before a people of sixty- 
five millions, one of the leading nations of the world! Under 
such unbearable provocation — unparalleled in all history — could 
there be expected from the Germans a punctilious weighing 
of minor facts and considerations; could men and officers be 
expected to exercise strict self-control and impartial judg- 
ment in all situations in the face of the exasperating provoca- 
tions offered them by the enemy civilians and the town ad- 
ministrations, amidst all the bewildering circumstances of the 
war that moved along from day to day with lightning rapidity? 
Under this perspective, were these occasional isolated out- 
breaks of cruel violence and revenge against the people of 
Belgium, France and England for bringing this trial and 
injustice upon the German nation anything so very remarkable 
and inexcusable? What were the few deaths caused by the 
Zeppelins in England and in Paris, those in the proven cases 
of "atrocities," the deaths by submarines, by the 70-mile 
cannon in Paris, by military executions compared with the 
four-hundred thousand deaths of civilians in Germany by slow 
starvation and the physical breakdown of several millions of 
them by the operation of the British blockade — a measure of 
silent but sure annihilation, and which was continued for six 
months after the signing of the armistice by these allies of 
pretended "humanitarianism"? 

The preceding is the broad view to bring upon these much- 
exploited charges against Germany. There were, admittedly, 
many proven cases of violence and outrage and wanton destruc- 
tion which served no military purpose or necessity. It could 
not have been otherwise with an ai*my of from four to five 
million men. On the other hand it is undeniable that over 
the actual facts there was spread a network of malicious and 
gross exaggeration as to the number and character of these 
cases, as a part of the general program of defamation by 
the British propaganda, and particularly to inflame the imagi- 
nation of the American public. It should be allowed that no 
war has ever been fought by any nation without many inci- 
dents of violence and brutality having occurred apart from 
the regular actions of war. Alas! human life, suffering, rights 

159 



are cheaply held among the torrent of passions which war 
lets loose and which shame those boasts of "sentiments and 
sympathies" which we so loudly make in times of peace — 
and even in the midst of cruel war! History only will be 
able to weigh this charge against Germany with accuracy! It 
will require the lapse of ten years more before the true facts 
and the proper perspective on these events will be obtained, 
but it may be confidently predicted now that the present judg- 
ment thereon will not be sustained ! 

XIII. THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY AND HER 
ALLIES 

A. STRAIN UPON GERMANY. DEMOCRACY'S OPPOR- 
TUNITY. THE WILSON GOSPEL. MILITARY PUZZLES 
EXPLAINED. AMERICA TURNS THE TIDE TO 
VICTORY. THE AFTERMATH. 

In our previous article on Germany we drew attention to the 
many measures of social amelioration for the benefit and se- 
curity of the working classes which had been inaugurated by 
the German government. Although a semi-autocratrc mon- 
archy, Germany had really become the most advanced socialistic 
State in the world, not excepting any of the republics. To some 
extent, however, this socialist progress had the character of 
"patronizing class legislation"; it was not the result of the 
evolution of the State as a whole to political freedom, and not 
due to the full recognition of the rights of the individual on 
principle. The German worker was subject to "class limita- 
tions" beyond which it was difficult for him to reach and rise, 
and his political freedom and equality were restricted, especially 
in Prussia proper. A similar limitation prevailed in the sec- 
tions of the people just above the working classes in the social 
scale. It is not easy for the American reader, reared in com- 
plete freedom of personal recognition and opportunity, to re- 
alize to how great an extent "class spirit, limitations, preroga- 
tives, animosities" were still prevalent in the German empire 
in spite of the advanced institutions previously described. 
Similar conditions exist, in the other countries of Europe, even 

160 



in democratic England and republican Fi-ance; they represent 
the tenacious spirit of the past still active in the changing pro- 
gressive present. Yet Germany had, as much as France, been 
for many years back the fighting ground for progress towards 
the democratic ideal of freedom, for establishing the republican 
form of government. We have in previous articles spoken of 
these successive periods of republican attempts and subsequent 
reactions in France and Germany and other countries of Europe. 
With the advent of the German empire — in 1871 — and its polit- 
ical and material success, these strivings of many sections of 
the people for greater political liberty became somewhat sub- 
merged in the general satisfaction with the new conditions, and 
were at least partially disarmed by the practical socialistic con- 
cessions of which we have spoken. 

For, in Germany, as much as in France, the development of 
thought towards political democracy was paralleled by a move- 
ment even deeper and more powerful — because more directly 
personal — this humanitarian movement of "socialism" as per- 
taining to increased individual rights and consideration in all 
the material matters of life affecting individual and collective 
wellbeing, satisfaction and security of physical existence. The 
beginnings of this movement reach back to the writers who pre- 
ceded the French Revolution, and were augmented, later, by 
the systems of practical application as evolved, step by step, by 
such men as Proudhon, Louis Blanc, Fourier, Lasalle, Engels 
and finally Karl Marx, with his famous book "Das Kapital," the 
corner-stone of modern co-operative socialistic theory. Marx 
was followed by Bebel and other German, Russian, French and 
English social writers who modernized some of his theories 
about capital, labor and property. The ideas of this school of 
thought were spread among the German people under the em- 
pire (not without official opposition) by books, newspapers, 
societies, addresses, and reached all classes. The propaganda 
resulted in the formation of "the socialistic-political party" — 
of various groups of opinion — which finally grew to such num- 
bers that it secured representation in the "Reichstag," the Ger- 
man national parliament. It was in a large measure through 
the agitation of this party that the socialistic enactments for 
the working classes were secured. 

161 



From the above explanation, therefore, the American reader 
will understand that socialism is, in a measure, a movement 
independent from that for political democracy. A man may 
be a staunch democrat — strong for representative popular -gov- 
ernment and personal rights and freedom — and yet opposed 
to even moderate socialistic views on property, co-operative 
working of industries, public ownership and working of public 
utilities, etc. This condition of opinion is illustrated by all the 
existing republics, none of which are distinctly or in equal de- 
gree socialistic, and most of which have less of such legislation 
than Germany possessed under the empire. In the United States, 
for instance, up to 1885, all socialistic propositions were de- 
nounced as being "paternal legislation" and politically objection- 
able. On the other hand, however, all socialists are, m the nature 
of things, democrats and in favor of representative government; 
but with them the socialistic side usually dominates the political 
side; if their aim is a republic it is the socialistic republic, and 
the precise ideas as to such a republic may differ as widely as 
do their socialistic leanings. This accounts for the fact that in 
the new German-republic Reichstag of today (since the revo- 
lution) there are three democratic-socialistic groups (with minor 
divisions) and several democratic anti-socialistic groups, all of 
which together make up the "republican-majority party" op- 
posed by the conservative monarchical minority pai'ty. Quite 
similar was the character of the various groups of "socialists" 
and "liberals" in the old imperial Reichstag, except that the 
spell of the empire lay upon the former almost as much as upon 
the latter and the conservatives, and confined their activities to 
the framing of additional enactments for the social betterment 
of the dependent working classes of all degrees. While all 
was well and went well, and sentiments of appreciation of the 
Imperial government's attitude and efforts for the welfare of 
the country as a whole pervaded all classes of society and all 
political parties (excepting the very extreme wing of the so- 
cialistic "radicals") plans for attempting more radical reforms 
affecting the fundamental political constitution of Germany and 
carrying these democratic and socialistic aspirations to their 
logical conclusion had to be deferred to a later and more oppor- 
tune day — a day that has now come. 

162 



The government ruled with a strong hand and had a working 
majority of consei'vatives and allied groups of monarchical con- 
victions; yet the combined vote of the democratic liberals and 
socialists of the 1914 Reichstag represented a formidable oppo- 
sition. The propaganda of the socialists was by no means con- 
fined to the lower working people but had entered the middle 
classes of society, the army, the navy and the civil sei-vice. 
Only the deeply religious sections and the agricultural popu- 
lation had not become much affected by it. In the cities, fac- 
tories and among the industrial workers generally, socialism 
was strongly prevalent. This situation ran strangely parallel 
with that in the larger political life of the nation: While all 
seemed secure externally, on the surface, yet there was the 
ever-present, ever-growing threat of war; while all seemed 
serene internally, yet there was the ever-present spread of 
social discontent and socialistic and democratic-political agi- 
tation. 

The preceding recital, or sketch, may seem uninteresting and 
irrelevant to some readers, but the author must ask for their 
kind attention as this sketch is of vital consequences to the 
development of the main argument of this article, to wit: That 
Germany was defeated more by her internal political schism 
and its harassing effect upon the government leaders, the 
military chiefs and the fighting forces than by her external 
enemies! When the war broke out, the first, the only apprehen- 
sion felt by the ruling classes of Germany and the government 
was in regard to the attitude which these very political parties 
— the democratic liberals and socialists — would take in regard 
to the war. The Kaiser and his "cabinet" held the prerogative 
right to declare war, but the financial measures necessary to 
carry on a war required, under the German constitution, to be 
approved by the Reichstag; the latter, by refusing to vote the 
budget had it in its power to frustrate the war and defeat the 
government policy. But no such show of unpatriotic vacil- 
lation occurred at the opening of the war, in spite of socialistic 
and democratic rumblings. When the moment came for the 
Reichstag to sustain the government, after the declarations of 
war had been made, and to vote the needed supplies and ex- 
traordinary powers asked, patriotism won the day easily over 

163 



the separate and specific interests of these parties, and they 
rallied to the support of Kaiser, government and fatherland 
with splendid unity and enthusiasm! This spirit would, no 
doubt, have continued, had the war brought an early victory; 
but under the long-continued strain which ensued and the vision 
of ultimate defeat it was gradually swept aside. 

After a brilliant opening by Germany, followed by the check 
at the Marne, the war proceeded on its exhausting course with- 
out decisive results despite the remarkable deeds of German 
arms. Russia had been defeated and Poland and the eastern 
provinces occupied, November, 1916; England had been forced 
to retire from the Dardanelles campaign by the splendid de- 
fense made by the Turks under German leadership; Roumania 
had been punished, conquered and overrun, December, 1916; 
Serbia was prostrate, September, 1915, and in the possession 
of Austria, her army and government driven out. Bulgaria 
and Turkey were holding well in Macedonia, Mesopotamia and 
Palestine; the submarines were sweeping the seas; France had 
been checked and held steadily after the first repulse of Ger- 
many at the Marne and varying successes on both sides in the 
different positions between the Moselle and the Somme; Eng- 
land, in the northern war sector, had been repulsed and driven 
west after her two successful advances towards Bapaume; Bel- 
gium was completely in the power of Germany except for a 
small area in the neighborhood of Nieuport. Yet, there was 
neither a real victory for Germany nor a real defeat for the 
enemy; the latter was hard-pressed but stubborn and defiant; in 
military achievement the central allies were easily in the lead 
but in power of further and long-continued resistance the En- 
tente allies held the advantage. Meantime the strain upon 
Germany had been terrific; the losses in casualties were colossal; 
the cost of the war had mounted into many billions of marks; 
under the relentless pressure of the blockade, the extra hard- 
ship of two meagre harvests and but scant relief from the stocks 
of food captured in Russia and Roumania the shoe was begin- 
ning to pinch. The civil population was not only living on 
starvation rations but suffering the most intens'e mental distress. 
Stocks of metals, leather, rubber, nitrate and other materials 
needed for war were running low. It was the beginning of 

164 



being ground to pieces between the upper and nether millstone 
if a quick military decision could not be brought about or an 
acceptable peace obtained by negotiation. 

Germany and Austria, individually, had made several over- 
tures for peace, but without success. President Wilson, also, 
tardily made a move for peace. All this has been related. The 
effort of the Pope of Rome had found no response, either. It 
was quite plain: The allies did not want peace; it was not a 
question, so much, of the bases of negotiation which Germany 
had offered as of the growing conviction that they — the En- 
tente allies — had a strong chance to win in spite of their pre- 
carious military position — win by endurance! This was the sit- 
uation from the fall of 1917 to the spring of 1918, before the 
opening of the great German drive towards Amiens and Ypres 
from their positions on the St. Quentin-La Fere line. The allies 
understood correctly the coming economic exhaustion of Ger- 
many and Austria and the political tribulations which were 
brewing for the undoing of both. America's entry into the 
war had not yet begun to count actively, but the most gigantic 
preparations were being made. Material and men were arriv- 
ing; depots and camps had been constructed, training was in 
progress; there could now be no further doubt that the mag- 
nificent promise made was being carried out. Why make peace 
when the sun of victory was about to rise? Germany was in 
a trap from which, though still strong, she had but small chance 
to escape, with this new, unlimited, help from America added to 
the allies' strength and all the other influences for her defeat. 



*T*HESE increasing difficulties began to overwhelm Germany, 
but not militarily at first, but politically and morally. The 
people began to lose heart; they were tired of the war! Mal- 
nutrition was sapping their moral stamina; hope for relief of 
their physical suffering was waning; confidence in the ability of 
the government to win the war was tottering; the belief in the 
"invincibility" of the German army and the unquestioning de- 
votion of the people and soldiers "for god and king" was break- 
ing up. This popular frame of mind found political expression 

165 



and sent increased democratic and socialistic representation to 
the Reichstag; under the constant urging of these leaders it de- 
manded the reform of the Prussian electoral system to a more 
extended and "undirected" declaration of the popular will 
through the introduction of the secret ballot and the re-appor- 
tionment of voting districts so as to produce increased popular 
representation; above all it demanded the speedy conclusion of 
the war. Thus the time had arrived when the combination of 
discontent and anxiety in the country, together with moral de- 
pression due to hunger, offered a great opportunity to the pro- 
gressive parties to pluck a political victory from the tree of 
perplexities with which the Imperial government was beset. It 
appeared to them clearly necessary that an acknowledgement of 
the war situation be made, that the same be frankly and reso- 
lutely met by a policy working for peace, that pressure — of an 
extreme kind, if necessary — be brought upon the imperial gov- 
ernment to follow this line of action. 

In July, 1917, the famous Reichstag peace resolution of "no 
indemnities and no annexations," as a basis of peace offers, had 
been adopted. Insistent demand was now made that effect be 
given to this resolution by more liberal peace terms to the allies; 
the immediate enactment of the Prussian electoral-reform bill 
was demanded as an implied condition of further war credits 
being voted by the Reichstag. The government, however, pur- 
sued a policy of indecision, of hesitation between one of peace 
and one of determined war resistance, alternately allowing itself 
to be swayed by each of these opposing political currents. The 
conservative parties in the Reichstag, the government, the mili- 
tary and navy were unfalteringly in favor of unbending re- 
sistance unless peace terms in proportion to Germany's posi- 
tion in the field, and in agreement with her conception of the 
war, could be obtained; yet they lacked unity of view and effort 
and, above all, unity of determination against the onslaught of 
the social-democratic peace parties. Thus the necessity to act 
was more and more put before the latter, both in their own 
interest as well as in that of the entire German nation. (See 
the explanatory notes — "The Chancellor Crisis and New Peace 
Moves.") 

166 



This progress of sentiment in Germany for peace and for a 
change to a democratic form of government was powerfully 
stimulated by the Wilsonian propaganda, the seductive Ameri- 
can war calls of "liberty and justice to all the world" which 
the western breezes wafted across the ocean. The simple- 
minded German people, in their state of suffering and deep dis- 
appointment over the war situation, received these alluring sen- 
timents with open hearts, as a word of hope and help. The 
many declarations of President Wilson had found entrance into 
Germany in various ways and had been eagerly read in wide 
circles; they came to their distracted ears like a new gospel: 
"Peace without victory, no peace with any autocratic Hohen- 
zollern ruler! No war upon the German people! only upon 
their arbitrary government; peace with a duly authorized 
government representing the German people!" In these com- 
manding words, added to those others of "liberty, democracy 
and justice for all" there was contained the promise of a speedy, 
an honorable, a fair peace, an end to their misery, the promise 
of the political reorganization of the fatherland to a new future! 
They took it all in real earnest — people and leaders alike ; they 
little dreamt how cruelly, how shamefully they were to be de- 
ceived! But the armistice terms opened their eyes to the awful 
reality. 

Towards the fall of 1917 the Imperial government, the con- 
servatives and the military party were beginning to be overawed 
and harassed by these developments — the spectre of a revo- 
lution rose before their eyes. The various peace overtures to 
the Entente had brought no results ; it was useless to go further 
upon that road in spite of the pressure, the threats of the 
political opposition and the popular clamor. It had become 
demonstrated beyond a question that the allies were resolved to 
continue the conflict — and the government now turned with re- 
newed determination to military resistance. A victory in the 
field — or a defeat — was the only way to end the war and, 
equally, the only means of regaining public confidence at home. 
In pursuance of this new determination for aggression^ the 
Germans and Austrians undertook early' in November, 1917, 
the great advance movement against the Italians who had, so 
far, been victorious against Austria, had advanced into the 

167 



Trentino, captured Goritzia, in the east, and pushed forward to 
within fifteen miles of Trieste. The campaign of the com- 
bined Austro-German armies against the Italians was one of the 
most brilliant operations of the great war. The enemy was 
rapidly thrown back across the three main rivers in the province 
of Venice — the Tagliamento, Livenza and Piave — and dis- 
lodged from his Trentino Alpine heights, all within the time 
of about one month. Then, however, came a draw and stand- 
still — the first of the military puzzles. The Teutonic allies had 
the Italian plains before them; the cities of Vicenza, Verona, 
Padua, Venice were seemingly at their mercy; the Italians were 
utterly routed and demoralized and had suffered heavy losses 
in killed, in prisoners and artillery captured by the enemy. 
Why was this victory not pressed home? From December, 
1917, to June, 1918, there was, unexplained, next to total in- 
activity on this battle front. This great "drive" had cost the 
Teuton Allies heavily, no doubt; the winter season in the Tyro- 
lean Alps was unfavorable for active operations. Yet, it was 
plain that the victory was not exploited ; even a small addi- 
tional army, operating from the south, would have dislodged 
the Italians in the passes and compelled them to seek a new 
stand in the Lombardian plains. 

Again, in the spring of 1918, Germany prepared to launch 
her great offensive — from about the middle of March to the 
end of April — against the French and English in the advance 
from the St. Quentin-La Fere line. In a stupendous campaign, 
in three separate onslaughts,, her armies swept everything be- 
fore them, from Ypres to Montdidier, on a front of a hundred- 
and-fifty miles, and had arrived to within nine miles of the 
city of Amiens. The defense and retreat of the French and 
British had been skilful and tenacious, yet they were steadily 
driven back with heavy losses in men and cannon. The cost to 
the Germans had been even heavier; still it was a great victory 
for them and a wonderful military feat that stiri*ed up afresh, 
for the moment, the moral courage of the nation and faith in 
the final outcome. The enemy was not only driven back but 
badly demoralized and thrown into consternation lest their 
military calculations should, after all, be defeated. Then, how- 
ever, instead of a decisive blow and victory at one of the main 

168 



fronts by the German armies — there came another draw and 
stillstand — the second of the military puzzles. With the full 
advantage in their hands, and ample reinforcements available, 
within sight of the spires of Amiens cathedral and scarcely 
more than twenty-five miles away from Dunkirk in the North — 
why was this victory not pressed home, at least at one or two 
of the most important points? Instead, there was practical in- 
activity for many weeks. In this case, also, the exhaustion of 
the Germans, their losses and other difficulties do not seem to 
fully explain their failure. 

Again — at the end of May — the Germans began an offensive 
of the most determined character between Rheims and Soissons. 
They stormed the Chemin-des Dames successfully and pushed 
across the Aisne and drove the French out of the Northern part 
of Chateau-Thien-y. This was followed by a movement be- 
tween Noyon and Montdidier, extending as far south as Com- 
piegne, by June 15th. The initial success had been rapid and 
decisive. Then came another halt and stillstand of a full month 
— the third of the military puzzles. In these later actions the 
German forces encountered stiff resistance by the French at 
Noyon and by the Americans at Belleau Wood, June 12th. The 
American effective help in France had now reached some 
600,000 men, and they showed a fair degree of training, and 
unlimited courage. They had come in the very nick of time to 
rescue the French and British from their desperate situation. 
The German armies suffered proportionately greater casualites 
than those of the enemy in these campaigns; yet, there was no 
actual defeat of the Germans at any point, no rout or surrender. 
The entire series of negative campaigns, since the fall of 
1917, cannot be explained on military grounds alone. What 
was going on? 

A fourth great offensive was launched by the German com- 
mand on July 15th, a forward movement southeast and south- 
west of Rheims in the Marne and St. Mihiel salients. They 
crossed the river with masses of artillery at several points and 
turned westward — to Paris perhaps. But now a new kind of 
stillstand and hesitation occurred — they met a superior enemy 
and were checked! The French and Americans had been or- 
ganizing for weeks for determined resistance — and succeeded. 

169 



It turned out to be the beginning of the German Armageddon! 

Indeed, the most important effect of the German series of at- 
tacks had been to rouse the Entente powers to the utmost ex- 
ei'tions, backed by America's promise and new British contin- 
gents and stimulated by the new unified command under General 
Foch. The check was the more remarkable as subsequent dis- 
coveries revealed that this campaign had been equipped with 
very large supplies for artillery and machine guns, distributed 
in reserve depots along the line and indicating that large bodies 
of troops were to follow the advance army. Why was this 
strong attack not properly supported, as planned, and allowed, 
instead, to be checked, driven back across the Marne, the Aisne, 
the Vesle, the Chemin-des-Dames and all the way to the Hinden- 
burg line? What had happened to the German army? 

For the full answer to these military puzzles we must turn 
to Berlin. The political battle raging there had assumed greater 
intensity and importance even than the military moves in 
France. It was the battle between the confident and aggres- 
sive social-democratic forces and the disconcerted and vacil- 
lating forces of the government. The elements of this struggle 
have been outlined above. The demand was for immediate 
peace, for stopping the war at almost any price. The call 
was loud for no more bloodshed; enough men had been sacri- 
ficed in battle ; enough had died from starvation ; enough public 
and private wealth had been wasted; the cup of the German 
people was full! There was no permanent "responsive ela- 
tion" over the brilliant deeds of the armies in these campaigns, 
from the fall of 1917 to July 1918. The struggle in France 
was looked upon as a useless sacrifice of lives and treasure; the 
war was believed to be lost beyond retrieve ; the people seemed 
to realize better than the government and military leaders that 
the combination of forces against them was insurmountable ! 
To these general motives of the ascending popular parties for 
ending the war by a peace "without indemnities and annexa- 
tions" — even by one of humiliation — must be added their sel- 
fish political motives, the political opportunity it brought to 
them: The charging of the loss of the war upon the Kaiser and 
his government, and their consequent disgrace and overthrow; 
they did not want them to win a victory in the field because that 

170 



would have rehabilitated them with the people. They had suf- 
ficiently demonstrated their incapacity to conduct the war to 
success in the diplomatic line, and almost equally so in the field 
and on the sea. The German people had brought the sacrifice 
of sacrifices in vain; the time had arrived for a new government 
to take charge — a government of the people ! 

For, had it been merely for obtaining an occasional enact- 
ment, by grace and concession, of socialistic measures for the 
benefit of the toiling masses that they had striven and battled 
these many years in the political arena? By no means! The 
object had been a wider and greater one. They were convinced 

not only of the obsoleteness of form and idea of an autocratic 
monarchy but of the natural right of the German people to 
freer institutions; they were convinced of their fitness for a 
republican form of government, for a socialistic republic even. 

And here was the opportunity spread befoi-e them — strangely 
enough — by the lamentable disaster of the war — an opportunity 
which they were justified to seize (from their political point 
of view) to achieve in six months of a parliamentary revolu- 
tion what, under the empire, might not have been achieved in 
sixty years! Hence, even a mediocre military victory under 
the auspices of the Imperial government and its supporters was 
to be deprecated because of its political effect and the possi- 
bility of its leading to a passably favorable peace under their 
direction and prestige., Therefore, from the time that these bold 
views and conclusions had penetrated to the clear consciousness 
of a political program — from the summer of 1917 — the Reichs- 
tag majoi-ity rose in loud and angi*y protest at every new 
military move, at every partial success in the field, at the U-boat 
warfare, and cried: "Halt!, halt!, peace!, peace! No more 
bloodshed; we cannot win!, and held up the military arm with 
the threatening spectre of revolution and the demand for the 
Kaiser's abdication. This was the conflict of the Kaiser, the 
government and the military party with the Reichstag majority 
and the people at large who stood behind. it. It accounts for 
the many changes of policy, of Chancellors and Foreign secre- 
taries, and of the several instances of puzzling hesitation in 
the field, /as above recounted, at the very moment of successes 
which should have led to victory if pushed home with unity and 

171 



confidence! That this was not the attitude of the influential 
and wealthy social and business classes of Germany, of the 
aristocracy, the military and government circles need hardly 
be stated, but it was the majority attitude of the great masses 
of the people who were in political ascendency by and through 
their representatives in the Reichstag and ultimately carried 
the day. 

The demoralizing effect upon the German troops in the field 
of this policy of alternate advance and hesitation, of this callous 
wasting of their lives and strength, may be easily imagined ! 
Was the soldier no more than a block of wood to be thrust into 
the fire, pulled out of it and thrust back by the necessities or 
the caprice of political machinations? The influence of this 
feeling upon the men must have been more disastrous than a 
defeat by the enemy! It ruined their morale, sapped their 
courage, weakened their discipline, took the heart out of their 
fighting, after four years of battling and trench life. The 
troops which had been withdrawn from the Russian front and 
sent west and the new recruits from Germany brought no in- 
crease of moral fibre to the veterans of the western front. These 
soldiers were in touch with the political drama developing at 
home and knew of the disruption going on there; they felt that 
their efforts and sacrifices were useless, that any day might 
bring a political storm which would lead to an ignominious 
peace. They, too, had heard the Wilson gospel, and had been 
similarly affected like the people at home. No particular propa- 
ganda for democracy was necessary among them, and they were 
60 per cent socialists before they had been called to the war. 
All this made them, from the summer of 1918 on, a different 
body of troops for a determined enemy to meet. At this favor- 
able conjunction the Americans entered the conflict! 



^pHE entry of the United States into the war, April 6th, 1917, 
had been received by Germany with sullen silence and out- 
ward indifference. She did not expect much practical effect to 
come from this decision. One reason for this opinion was the lack 
of military preparedness by America, and the other the great 
distance across the sea. That an army of a million or more of 



172 



ready fighting men could be raised, trained, equipped and trans- 
ported across the ocean, with cannon, aeroplanes, and all other 
necessities in time to become a real factor in the conflict was 
not thought possible. Yet it was seen that the unbounded re- 
sources of America, which now would be put at the allies' call 
without reserve, would play an important part in the final re- 
sult. It was a great surprise to the German commanders, there- 
fore, when they finally realized that a magnificent fighting force, 
splendidly equipped and supplied, was coming in large numbers 
from America to help the French and British. And these husky 
Yankee boys — the pick of the prime manhood of a physically 
strong nation of a hundred million people — were, many of 
them, filled with the ideal and ambition that they were to fight 
for freedom, justice and democracy, that they were to beat the 
Germans and to end the war. When they struck the discour- 
aged German troops in Belleau Wood, at Chateau Thierry and 
in the St. Mihiel salient, there was no giving way on their part! 
With all-defying recklessness and unshakable determination — 
in true football style — they threw themselves into the fight and 
by the impetus of their enthusiasm turned the tide to victory! 
Their glorious example inspired the French and British with 
new courage and resolution to win. They too, like the Ger- 
mans, had begun to feel the reducing effect of four years of 
terrible warfare. With the beginning made by the Americans 
and French in the Marne Salient, which was soon followed by a 
French and American offensive in the Amiens sector and by 
British movements north of Arras, Marshal Foch, the new 
Generalissimo of the allies, attacking and pushing at different 
positions of the battle lines — now here, now there — incessantly 
driving and tearing, gave the surprised and dejected enemy no 
chance to draw his breath, to pull himself together, to concen- 
trate for a determined stand. The fighting, thenceforth, be- 
came one continuous push-back and retreat, one long-drawn 
rear-guard action, from Lorraine to the Belgian coast, with 
heavy losses to the German armies in men and guns. Line 
after line, army after army fell and retired before the unceas- 
ing hammering of the allied troops! The vaunted Hindenburg 
and Wotan lines of trench fortifications melted away before 
the withering fire of the British artillery, and the. fleeing Ger- 

173 



mans crossed the border at various points to. prevent capture. 
Political events had, meantime, moved apace and the armistice 
commission was in session during the last actions of the military 
struggle. All was ended with the signing of the armistice on 
November 11th, 1918. 

While these disasters to the German arms were taking place 
in France and Belgium, England was defeating Turkey in Pale- 
stine, Syria and Mesopotamia, and the French and Serbians 
were driving the Bulgarians in front of Salonica to surrender, 
after which they quickly reconquered Serbia. In the middle 
of June, 1918, the Austrian forces began to move down from 
their Tyrolean mountain fastness and to drive the Italians 
westward across the Piave river. The latter, however, rallied 
quickly and reversed the action, pushing the Austrians back 
eastward and across the several rivers, exactly as they had come 
in the preceding November, and soon to final defeat. All the 
allies of Germany were completely exhausted, and Germany 
herself was unable to render them any further assistance. 
Armistice agreements, involving complete submission, were con- 
cluded with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey in the first days of 
November. These depressing events greatly hastened the Ger- 
man collapse in France and ended the war with the defeat of 
the Central powers on all fronts. 

Whether the Entente powers could have won the war without 
the dash and inspiration of the Americans to fire them to new 
life is a question difficult to answer positively; they would 
probably have succeeded to do so in a somewhat longer space 
of time provided that America's material aid had continued. 
The greatest help, therefore, of America to the Allies was the 
material help with money, food and war supplies. Had this 
fallen out at any time, France and England and Italy must have 
succumbed unquestionably! With the full recognition of 
this fact, and adding thereto the brilliant direct military 
help and inspiration given by us, it must be conceded that 
to America must be accorded the ultimate credit of having won 
the war! What a stain it is for all time to come upon England's 
proud escutcheon to be compelled to admit that she could not 
beat her hated rival militarily, not even with the aid of France, 
Russia, Belgium, Italy, Serbia, Greece, Roumania, and of her 

174 



colonial troops from Canada, Australia, Africa and India! Of 
Japan and China and the South Amex*ican republics we will 
not speak at all in this sense. She was compelled to resort to 
the ignominious blockade of the German coast, and even with 
that far-reaching aid was saved from utter defeat only by 
America's timely and powerful arm! This brings us to the 
startling conclusion that it is the United States of America who, 
first, by her open unneutrality and, second, by her active en- 
trance into the war has deprived Germany of the victory which 
belonged to her both by force of might and force of right. No 
matter what our explanations and excuses may be, this verdict 
is an unalterable historical fact which cannot be without de- 
plorable consequences unless America will do the act of admis- 
sion and redress called for in this book. 



TTAD Germany suffered a real, a complete military defeat? 

A ■*■ This can scarcely be said ; there was no surrender, no rout 
at any point. Considered only militarily, the end was more a 
sullen retreat under the conviction that they could not cope 
offensively with the overwhelming forces of their enemies along 
the entire battle front. Had this enemy been concentrated at 
one or two points, the Germans, also concentrated, might have 
risked a great battle, but with a long drawn-out line it was 
impossible for them to resist effectively against his superior 
forces. Their problem was to prevent an encircling movement 
and surrender, at any point, in great numbers and — for politi- 
cal reasons — to save as much as possible of the army, while, in 
the meantime, armistice negotiations were being carried on with 
the object of definite peace. The German generals accom- 
plished this defensive slow retreat movement with admirable 
skill. The military movement to save the army, the political 
movement for a revolution and republican form of government 
and the movement for securing peace all went hand in hand. 
The march of political events in Germany in the last few 
weeks of the war was startling and gigantic. Chancellor Hert- 
ling had resigned and Prince Max, of Baden, had taken his' 
place, late in October, 1918. New peace overtures with Wash- 
ington now followed, and President Wilson's "fourteen-points 

175 



program" was accepted by Germany as the basis for negotia- 
tions. While pourparlers were being carried on by America 
with the Entente Allies to obtain their agreement to the peace 
request by Germany, the revolutionary committee of the social- 
democratic forces — now resolved to seize power — imposed upon 
Prince Max not only the demand for the immediate conclusion 
of an armistice — on almost any terms — but also for the abdica- 
tion of the Kaiser. To exert additional pressure upon him on 
the armistice count, a report was secured from General Head- 
quarters declaring that the position of the armies was most 
precarious and that an immediate armistice must be concluded 
to prevent a surrender disaster. This report, frequently de- 
mented at the time, has since been affirmed by General Luden- 
dorff; it was made for reasons which are explained in Article, 
XVI. As to the Kaiser's abdication, the imminence of a bloody 
revolution was held before the Prince-Chancellor in case of 
refusal. 

But the sinister forces of open revolt, nurtured for so many 
months, no longer could be restrained, no matter how the 
Kaiser would act. The revolution actually broke out in Berlin 
on November ninth, accompanied by acts of great violence and 
intensely hostile demonstrations against the Kaiser and his 
government. Other leading cities followed suit. The insur- 
rection of the naval forces at the port of Kiel had preceded 
the outbreaks in the cities, and similar demonstrations occurred 
at the ports of Hamburg, Bremen, Stettin and others. The 
granting of an armistice to Germany had, meantime, been 
agreed to by the powers; commissioners were appointed and 
deliberations held, under the presidency of Marshall Foch. An 
agreement on the conditions was reached in about a week's 
negotiations and signed by the German representatives in spite 
of their strong protest against the unprecedented harshness of 
the terms and the total disregard of the Wilson'an fourteen 

points which were to be the basis of the peace. The Germans 
were helpless; under the political and military situation which 
prevailed, acceptance was imperative; they would have signed 
almost any terms! This armistice was one of the most impor- 
tant compacts ever concluded in history, as it ended, provision- 
ally at least, the greatest war of history. It was signed on the 

176 



morning of November eleventh, 1918. By that day Germany 
was in the full grip of the revolution ; bloodshed, destruction 
and terror were reigning in all parts of the country. 

Under the joint pressure of these tragic events the Kaiser 
had abdicated his throne, November ninth, and seeing the fu- 
tility of returning to Germany, (he was at military headquarters 
at Spa at the time) and the danger of his capture by the enemy, 
fled to Holland. Army and navy chiefs. and government heads 
likewise scattered in all directions; the military caste, the 
nobility and the monarchical and conservative business classes 
sank into obscurity and inactive resignation to the cataclysm 
which had broken over Germany. Political and social chaos 
settled upon the country. What an incomprehensible transfor- 
mation in four short years! From the heights of renown, power 
and adulation fallen to the depths of misery and contempt! 
Poor old Germany! bled to death on the battlefield, starved to 
death at home and now groaning in the throes of a revolution! 
Her people were called to the apotheosis of suffering and sacri- 
fice for their country! 

This unparalleled national disaster had been brought about, 
as we have shown, by three agencies: The weakened condition 
and moral depression of the troops in the field; the economic 
and moral pressure of the food blockade; the political pressure 
of the revolutionary parties who saw their opportunity for 
breaking the imperial government in the hour of defeat and 
establishing a republic amidst the existing resentment and con- 
sternation. And it is quite certain that, but for the latter 
cause, Germany need not have fallen! This conclusion bears a 
terrible complexion, carries a terrible accusation, but it is irre- 
sistible. The internal strife had broken up the moral coherence 
of the empire and the determination to resist to the last; the 
Wilsonian call to political freedom had borne terrible fruit in 
Germany at a time when the nation needed internal unity to 
devolop its strength in adversity ! . . But for this political and 
moral disintegration there would have been a united parlia- 
mentary and military direction ; the magnificent army and navy 
would have been confident and irresistible; successes would 
have come and been driven home. There were still nearly four 
million soldiers under arms at the breakup, and abundant equip- 

177 



ment; Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey Gould have been effectively 
supported and their collapse prevented. And, if, under all 
the conditions, a sweeping victory by Germany was scarcely 
possible, the final outcome of the war might have been such 
as to leave her at least partly victor and greater and stronger 
than before. 

Under such an outcome the empire would have been polit- 
ically regenerated and preserved. What a vision of magnifi- 
cence this calls up! A great, powerful central-European state 
— firm, enlightened and liberal — to impress its authority, prin- 
ciples of order, system, honesty, efficiency and general spirit 
of progress, of wise and safe social-justice legislation upon all 
the neighboring continental nations east of the Rhine to an 
orderly and rational development! Instead we have chaos and 
disintegration in all these countries. Two splendid empires 
are broken up, ruined politically and economically, liberated 
to violence and anarchy by suffering, exasperation and remorse. 
The newly formed states are floundering helplessly in a fierce 
wrangle of factions, their political character a blank, their 
economic organization a zero, their whole future as independent 
"nations" as uncertain as a lottery! It is a grand achieve- 
ment for the allies, with their professions of lofty pui'poses! 
And yet, it would not be just to ascribe all of this debacle 
to the political factors of the war and the exorbitant and im- 
practical peace terms. A considerable measure of it attaches 
to the growth of extreme socialistic and disintegrating ethical 
ideas which, while resting upon sound premises, are, as yet, 
deficient in clarity of thought and firmness of system. While 
the old codes and moral guides are disregarded because uncon- 
vincing, no new satisfactory ones have been perfected for 
practical application. This important topic, so intimately con- 
nected with the war, will be discussed in the succeeding articles. 

Before leaving the subject of Germany's spectacular political 
and military collapse, it may be well to focus once more the 
interrelation of the events of the last months of the war — so 
incomprehensible at the time and so unclear to many even 
today. We have explained the meaning of the unfruitful cam- 
paigns of the fall of 1917 and the spring and summer of 1918. 
At this time, seeing the coming of the political storm, it was, 
no doubt, the purpose of the Kaiser and his advisers to check- 

178 



mate the rising revolution by a military victory. They failed 
in this; but not so much because the armies failed but because 
they, the leaders, lacked the resolution to bring their military 
work to a successful finish and to challenge therewith the polit- 
ical forces, which were opposed to these campaigns and a pos- 
sible success in the field, to an issue. For, it must be recognized 
that the object of the army leaders and the government party 
was not only to achieve a victory of arms to save Germany 
politically but, equally, to save the monarchy! That, however, 
was the exact opposite of the object of the revolutionary 
parties at Berlin. After timidly relinquishing their military 
plan of aggressive action from fear of the political conse- 
quences, the government leaders veered around once more to 
the "peace movement" method of attaining their object. In 
Austria the political and military situation was exactly parallel 
to that of Germany. From both governments, from late in 
August to middle of October, new "feelers" and suggestions 
for peace were now issued, addressed to America and Belgium. 
Germany declared herself willing to accept the "fourteen 
points" of President Wilson as the basis of the negotiations 
and to meet the President's dictum against the Kaiser and any 
government "not the expression of the will of the German 
people"; they indicated a liberal reform of the Imperial Con- 
stitution. This, together with the pronounced social-democratic 
majority just then returned to the Reichstag, the ending of 
the Hertling chancellorship and appointment of the liberal 
Prince Max in his stead, was hoped would be accepted by the 
President and the Entente as a government not only having the 
support of but being "of the people," and that an acceptable 
peace would be concluded with it and the monarchy saved from 
destruction. 

Part of the plan of the defensive retreat on all fronts in 
France was to save the army for Germany — and particularly 
for the support of the monarchy. It was in pursuance of this 
general object that the strong representations were made by 
the High Army Command to Chancellor Prince Max of the 
supposedly "imminent peril of the armies" — foreshadowing a 
possible surrender to eclipse that of Sedan — and pressing him 
to bring about the armistice (in the interest of the monarchy) 
as speedily as possible. But the governmental plan was doomed. 

179 



Early in the first week of November — when the armistice nego- 
tiations were already assured — the startling information came 
to headquarters from Berlin that the moves for a republic and 
the deposition of the Kaiser and imperial government could no 
longer be arrested. At the same time sufficient had become 
known from the preliminary negotiations for the armistice to 
indicate what those terms would be and, also, that the revo- 
lutionary parties were prepared to accept almost any condi- 
tions in order to prevent interference with their planned polit- 
ical coup. Upon this the military and government party re- 
versed their poliqy once more at the eleventh hour, and the 
generals .called upon Germany and the army to make a last 
determined effort in the field to -wrest sufficient of a victory 
from the enemy to defeat the imposing of onerous terms of 
armistice and peace, to save the monarchy and stifle the revo- 
lution ! 

But these efforts came to naught by the rapid march of 
events; the floodgates of Germany's destiny were wide open 
and nothing could retard the rush of the Niagara of destruc- 
tion! While the army chiefs were issuing their call and making 
preparations for a last great stand, the armistice commission 
had begun its sessions. The insurrection at Kiel and other 
ports was already under way, and on November 9th the revo- 
lution actually broke out in Berlin. That ended all for the 
Kaiser and his government. He abdicated on the same day. 
Two days later the armistice was signed. The author holds 
that no other explanation than the above is possible of the 
strange and contradictory events of the closing months of the 
war. His views have since been fully confirmed by the publi- 
cations quoted in Article XVI "After-Peace Conclusions." 



The Chancellor Crisis, New Peace Moves and Reichstag 
Resolution of July 17, 1917. These events are of such impor- 
tance in the German war story and so closely interrelated that 
a short detail sketch seems desirable for the better under- 
standing of the great diplomatic year of the war — 1917. After 
the failure of the German peace overture at the end of 1916, 
as related in the preceding text, and of President Wilson's 
procrastinated move of December, 1916, to January, 1917 — 
followed by the new submarine campaign of February 1, 1917 
— there ensued a series of new essays for peace, beginning in 
April and extending into August. In this series of peace 

180 N 



essays must be included the German Reichstag peace resolution 
of July 1 7th because it was, in its essential character, a new 
indirect peace bid by Germany through the Reichstag and its 
inherent pressure upon the government. At the time these 
various peace overtures appeared as disconnected, separate and 
even "secret " moves and were only obscurely understood, but 
today we know 'that a connecting thread of agreement in aim 
ran through them all. The first of this series was the attempt 
made by Austria, early in April, 1917, to approach France 
through Prince Sixtus of Bourbon Parma, brother-in-law of 
Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. It was a very guarded 
venture, knowledge of which was confined to the emperor's 
most immediate circle, to President Poincare of France and 
Premier Ribot and a confidential officer of the French war 
bureau. It is possible that Germany was in ignorance of this 
move in its inception. These negotiations soon came to a dead- 
lock. (See below.) 

The second overture directly from Austria was that con- 
ducted through Count Revertera of Austria, and Count Armand 
of France, an officer of the second bureau of the French war 
office. The first phase of this second approachment occurred 
early in June, but was soon discontinued, probably through 
pressure fi-om Germany. It was resumed at the end of July, 
after the fall of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, and this 
time secured the sympathetic attention of France and also the 
approval of Prime Minister Lloyd George of England. The 
King of Spain was favorable to the move and offered to act as 
mediator, if required. It really looked, for a time, as if a 
favorable result might be achieved. The sincerity of Austria's 
desii - e for peace was not questioned and evidence was abun- 
dant of her growing internal political difficulties, her economic 
pinch and the stress of her association with Germany. In judg- 
ing these "separate peace" moves of Austria it must not be 
forgotten that, while she was an ally of Germany under the 
Triple Alliances, she was still an independent political entity 
with conditions and problems of her own. On the part of France 
the general uncertainty of the war and the defection of Russia 
as an active ally, through the outbreak of the revolution against 
the Czar's government in March of the same year, made the 
moment opportune for a separate peace with Austria to relieve 
the general tension of the war and weaken the chief enemy, 
Germany, at the same time. Meanwhile, Germany had become 
fully informed about Austria's move ; and when the final inter- 
views between the intermediaries took place- in Switzerland 
all these fine schemes — which had even contemplated a fake 
Austrian defeat in the field to give countenance to her separate 
peace efforts (towards Germany) — came to naught through 
Austria's definite refusal to surrender Trieste and a section of 
the Trentino to Italy, as part of the peace price, and through 

181 



Germany's positive assurances of being able to achieve a mili- 
tary victory in a short time. 

While this demarche towards France was proceeding, Aus- 
tria was also devising means to influence Germany. This step 
was in connection with a highly confidential report made by 
Count Czernin, Austrian Premier, to Emperor Charles, setting 
forth the exhausted condition of the country and the progress 
of political disaffection; and urging him to press upon Emperor 
William of Germany the advisability of a free surrender of 
Alsace-Lorraine to France as the prime requisite to secure the 
peace which was so badly needed by both countries! It was 
an appeal to Emperor William against the policies of the Ger- 
man militarist and annexationist parties, whose objects Count 
Czernin felt to be the great obstacle to a "joint peace" and 
even to a separate peace for Austria. This important repre- 
sentation, made April 12th to 14th, was intended solely for 
the two emperors and the German chancellor; yet, this secret 
report came purposely into the possession of Mathias Erzber- 
ger, prominent member of the German Center or Clerical 
(Catholic) party in the Reichstag, through a confidential inter- 
mediary representing Emperor Charles himself. Of this secret 
"leak" Count Czernin was not advised at the time. The evident 
intention was for Herr Erzberger to use this report in Ger- 
many in the most effective manner in the interest of peace, 
guarding only the secret of its high origin. In fulfillment of 
this intention Herr Ei-zberger read the report to the members 
of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Center party of 
the Reichstag, in a secret session held at Frankfurt during 
the Bethmann-Hollweg Chancellor crisis, and under injunctions 
of the strictest secrecy. The high and confidential character 
of the report, and its exact wording, were guarded for a long 
time, but the essence of the communication soon became known 
in the higher political circles in Germany and also in the 
Entente countries. 

The effect of this revelation of Austria's condition and 
"frame of mind" was tremendous! In Germany it achieved its 
object; it powerfully influenced the passage of the "July peace 
resolution" of the Reichstag. To the Entente, however, it was 
a stimulant for war and not for peace. It was to them a reve- 
lation of major import; taken together with the Chancellor 
crisis and the fight for the Prussian electoral reforms bill, it 
disclosed to them "the Achilles heel" of the Central powers — 
internal political dissentions and growing physical exhaustion — 
at a time when they, the allies, were at a disadvantage mili- 
tarily, were being closely pressed by the U-boats and were 
fast drifting into a disposition to make peace. These revela- 
tions put new courage into them — and this effect upon the 
Entente was immediately demonstrated by its defiant answer 
to the suggestions of the Reichstag peace resolution — its bid 
was disdainfully rejected. It need scarcely be pointed out that 

182 



these several peace efforts by Austria, more or less secret and 
"separate," were very irritating and depressing to the German 
government, especially the suggestion for the voluntary sur- 
render of Alsace-Lorraine to France, which was indignantly 
rejected. 

Even while all the above related peace manoeuvres were 
proceeding, the Pope of Rome was actively preparing his peace 
appeal to the powers, issued August 1, 1917, in the name of 
humanity, mercy, religion and sound reason. Its arguments 
were worded with force and lofty dignity of language and con- 
tained practical proposals for opening negotiations between the 
belligerents. Alas! it mostly fell on deaf ears, on minds filled 
only with war passions! Germany and Austria were the only 
countries which made prompt, polite and sympathetic reply 
to the Pope's entreaty. Of the Entente countries, President 
Wilson alone replied — at the end of a month of waiting — in a 
violent tirade against Germany "that this usurping power must 
give much more definite declarations than were contained in her 
answer to the Papal note" before overtures of peace could be 
considered. The other Entente powers merely made a short 
acknowledgment of the Pope's note and concurrence in Mr. 
Wilson's reply. The reaction of hope and defiance which re- 
sulted from the July Reichstag resolution, etc., was already 
at work! We may safely add that Mr. Erzberger's action in 
Germany, as related above, was largely inspired by private 
knowledge of the Pope's proposed peace move (in addition to 
the Emperor Charles' secret step) and the desire to make it 
successful and win the glory of this achievement for the Catho- 
lic party and church and for the Pope personally. He probably 
had no idea of the "contrary effect" upon the Entente which 
followed upon the damaging disclosures; he shared with his 
party and the majority social-democrats the fatal illusion that 
it was the aggressive aims of the German government and the 
so-called military party which were the obstacles to all the 
peace proposals which had emanated from Germany and Aus- 
tria and the Pope of Rome, instead of the determination of the 
Allies to fight the war to a victorious finish, to beat and humili- 
ate Germany and attain all the sundry selfish objects for which 
they had set out. 

From all this it is apparent that the famous Reichstag reso- 
lution of July 17, 1917, was a fatal mistake. It probably cost 
Germany the war! It was preceded by, and was partly the 
cause of the von Bethmann-Hollweg Chancellor crisis. His fall 
was brought about by a coalition of parties against him from 
contrary motives, and accellerated by the opposition of the 
military leaders who suspected h.'s willingness to accept "the 
resolution," and justly feared a weakening influence from this 
upon the spirit of the army. The Kaiser and conservative 
parties did all they could to hold him, being convinced of his 
ability, but the Chancellor himself was persistent to leave, 

183 



weary of the unreasoning opposition against him. The depths 
of political passions which had been stirred up in this compli- 
cated crisis may be gauged from the fact that the famous reso- 
lution was prematurely published in the press as a "fait accom- 
pli" before its actual adoption. The crisis had come at a 
moment when it was particularly necessary for Germany "to 
keep its nerves" in order to reap the benefits available from 
the favorable external situation : The U-boat war had begun 
to tell seriously upon England ; the British and French offen- 
sives were being resisted successfully; the progress of the cam- 
paign in Poland against the Kerensky government of Russia 
was rapidly putting that country out of the war. It behooved 
Germany and Austria now to hide their internal troubles, eco- 
nomic and political, and to deceive the enemy by a confident 
attitude. Instead there came this resolution of self-abnegation 
— and all the attendant revelations — which disclosed to the 
enemy the real situation and steeled him to renewed resistance! 
And while the July crisis ended with the adoption of this reso- 
lution by a large majority and brought a new chancellor and 
the Kaiser's definite pledge for the Prussian electoral reform, 
it proved a failure, internally also; it did not achieve the polit- 
ical party harmony and firmness of purpose so badly needed, 
nor a smooth working between the new chancellor and the mil- 
itary chiefs. Chancellor Michaelis, who had, confessedly, ac- 
cepted the results of the July crisis with "a reservation of his 
own," being a thoroughly honest man and at heai't a "Con- 
servative," soon felt the untenability of his position and re- 
signed — and was compelled to resign for other reasons also — ■ 
on October 7, 1917. He was followed by Count Hertling, 
former Bavarian Premier. His advent signaled the change 
from the German Constitutional to the "parliamentary" sys- 
tem of government; 

The Entente's Persistence in War. That the Entente 
Powers were resolved to continue the stx*uggle to victory is 
further attested by their haughty declination to participate 
in the "Conference of peace and disarmament" which the 
Russian Bolshevist government proposed to the war nations at 
the end of December, 1917, after their success in the November 
revolution. They had no interest in the lofty altruistic pro- 
posals issued by the Russian dreamers. Russia was now lost 
to the Entente as a war ally, but the nose ring and chain of 
the Russian bear were tightly fixed on the American people, 
with a tenfold compensation. The reigning harmony was sub- 
lime! The utterances of President Wilson for the necessary 
"democratization of Germany and against the Hohenzollern 
monarchy, as the source of all evil, were seconded by similar 
speeches by Prime Minister Lloyd George in December, 1917, 
and notably by his important speech of January 5, 1918, in 
answer to the above Russian peace conference proposal. This 

184 



speech, in its turn, was seconded and emphasized in all essen- 
tials by President Wilson's speech to the American Congress, 
a few days later, supplemented by the famous "fourteen points" 
of peace settlement which were given out as the final answer 
of the Entente, through its American spokesman, to all peace 
overtures which had preceded. It was these "fourteen points," 
together with many others, which were strangely lost when 
the Allies had won a military victory. In France the declara- 
tion of policy by Premier Clemenceau and President Poincare 
ran in perfect unison with those of England and America. Thus 
one buoyed the other, and the result was a "confidence in vic- 
tory" which was in reality not warranted by the situation in the 
field before the failui*e of the great German spring offensive 
of 1918. 



B. THE ARMISTICE. ABDICATION OF KAISER- WIL- 

HELM II. THE REACTION OF DESPAIR. A NEW 

GERMANY REVEALED. THE MODERN DRIFT. 

A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE NEEDED. 

THE GERMAN STATE. 

As the author's concern is more with the ideas underlying 
the historical happenings than with the occurrences themselves, 
he will now endeavor to analyze the ideas and the spirit re- 
vealed by the armistice terms. We have already spoken of the 
humiliation, chagrin and poignant disappointment felt by the 
German people at these terms in view of what they had been 
led to expect from President Wilson's declarations. Were 
these the terms of "justice," of "a peace without victory" after 
a war "not waged against the German people" ; were they the 
terms of a war fought "for political and social ideals" on the 
part of America? Were these terms of armistice fair to a 
valiant foe who was not even fully beaten on the battlefield 
but was compelled to give up the struggle because a political 
revolution had gripped his country and because the non-com- 
batants at home were being starved to death by a cruel food 
blockade? No, the truth about the war was at last revealed! 
These were not terms to a foe merely political, but such as are 
imposed upon a hated rival, a feared race, feared because of 
their great qualities, to a people that is to be destroyed, anni- 
hilatd utterly!! These terms of armistice — the essence of the 
prospective peace terms — were not such as properly arise out 

185 



of a military victory or surrender, with its justifiable exulta- 
tion and reasonable self-interest on the part of the victors, 
but were the consummation of a deep and detestable plot — 
Kaiser or no Kaiser, autocracy or republic — to despoil another 
nation from motives of envy, jealousy, revenge, greed for ter- 
ritory and domination! These terms of armistice left no fur- 
ther doubt as to the real objects of the war as far as England 
and America were concerned; there never were any as regards 
Russia, France, Italy, Greece and Roumania. 

When the truth became known to the people of Germany 
the shock was cruel beyond description, stunning, paralyzing. 
It followed upon the tremendous nervous tension of that mem- 
orable week of intense excitement — from November 4th to No- 
vember 11th — of those momentous rapid developments — revo- 
lution) formation of a provisional government, abdication of 
the Kaiser, armistice and end of the war. Then, at the end, 
came those outrageous terms to grip the heart of the people 
in awe. They had hoped for a peace of honor and possible 
recuperation; instead they were given this sentence of death! 
It seemed beyond the power of belief: "Was it really true or 
merely a nightmare?" And now the question arose with a ter- 
rible accusation: "Why were such terms accepted?" This 
question has continued to be asked with pressing insistence 
in Germany ever since, and gradually the answer is beginning 
to be understood. We have partly given it; while the military 
situation had made peace necessary (ostensibly, as we have 
explained, to prevent a disaster to the army and the invasion 
of the country), while peace was urgently required to save 
the imperial government and the monarchy, it was even more 
indispensable to the working-out of the political transforma- 
tion in Berlin. The consummation of the revolution in gov- 
ernment absolutely demanded peace and, above all, avoidance 
of invasion, because that would have precipitated an eruption 
of popular rage and violence of such magnitude that the 
orderly establishment of the republic might have been de- 
feated thereby. Any armistice terms, therefore, short of absolute 
surrender of the country were ordered to be accepted by the 
revolutionary executive committee which had the fate of Ger- 
many in its hands! From the point of view of the new gov- 
ernment to be, this was effective and justified policy — and 

186 



it achieved success. Had the armistice been rejected — with 
revolution spreading over the country and the Kaiser and his 
government dethroned — -the dejected armies in the field would 
in all probability have been routed and driven to surrender, 
and Germany would have been invaded. Beyond that point all 
else that would then have happened is beyond the power of 
conjecture. 

We are now .enabled to see fully — in connection with the 
concluding paragraph of the preceding article — that the sink- 
ing Imperial Government as well as the rising republic both 
strenuously desired and worked for armistice but from oppos- 
ing motives (in the purely political sense) and that it was in 
fact a race between them as to which would be the recog- 
nized power and government in Berlin at the consummation of 
the great event. The republic won the race ; the Kaiser and 
his government were dethroned on November 9th, the armistice 
was signed by the republic on November 11th, 1918! 

There are those who insist, with a cynical smile, that the 
rulers of Germany were in their inmost heart glad rather than 
otherwise to see the venturesome republic step in and take 
upon itself the odium and dangers of the acceptance of the 
armistice and, later, of the signing of the degrading peace of 
Versailles; to assume the difficult and thankless task of lead- 
ing Germany out of the mire upon a new and clean road; that 
they, perhaps, hoped then to step in and take possession by 
the instigation of a strong monarchical reaction, assisted by 
the uoual military cotip. If this insinuation is correct, it would, 
nevertheless, be no more ignoble for honest and sincere mon- 
archists or imperialists to strive for the restoration of the 
monarchy than it is for honest and sincere republicans to strive 
for the establishment of a republic. These political endeavors, 
provided they be not merely vehicles for personal ambitions, 
are matters of vital convictions, surely, but in regard to which 
the absolutely right and best has not yet been fully determined 
by experience — the verdict is still in the making. But in say- 
ing this, the author has in view, only the most advanced form 
of constitutional monarchy. It, therefore, remains for the 
uncertain future to determine whether the German republic 
will prove wise, strong, popular and successful enough to with- 
stand the attacks of the monarchical reaction which will surely 

187 



be directed against it sooner or later. But we may dismiss 
without further thought the above insinuation that the Kaiser 
and monarchical parties would not have been willing to assume 
the making of the armistice and peace and the reconstruction 
of Germany if this had seemed possible without causing a great 
civil strife that would have torn the country to shreds internally 
and delivered it into the complete dictation of the enemy. 



^HE abdication and flight of Wilhelm II to Holland has 
■*~ been termed ignominious and the act of a coward. It is, 
certainly, difficult, from the popular-hero point of view, to con- 
done his act and appreciate his self-restraint and self-sacrifice 
in the proper light and not with a sense of pity. But all in- 
formation on the situation in Germany at the time showed the 
uselessness, the criminality of resistance to the popular trend. 
The forces which worked for the republic — the inroads of 
democratic and socialistic propaganda during decades, the sacri- 
fices and suffering of the war, the lack of real ability in the 
war crisis on the part of the government, the final inglorious 
defeat, the Wilsonian message of freedom, the whole terrible 
situation of Germany at the brink of an abyss for which the 
government was held responsible — were too much to overcome ! 
We should consider, also, that the Kaiser was informed about 
all the slanderous accusations which had been made about 
him by the British and American propagandas and even in his 
own Germany. It had produced its effect upon a sensitive man 
who had for years become used mostly to praise, who had at 
all times tried to do his duty and felt himself innocent of those 
heinous charges. The Kaiser undoubtedly had the moral right 
to save himself in order to see himself and his government and 
people vindicated in time and the ocean of abuse rolled back 
upon the foreign and native enemy after the subsidence of 
the storm. 

Under this viewpoint it was both wise ana patriotic for the 
Kaiser to efface himself from the political strife and avoid 
complicating the troubles of Germany by a challenge to a 
contest — involving invasion and civil war — but it may not have 
been very heroic in the popular view to thus retire in grief and 
without protest. Any one of the great heroes of old, and some 



188 



modern ones, including his eminent ancestor, Frederick the 
Great, would probably have acted differently. To die at the 
head of your army in defeat, to throw yourself upon your 
sword no doubt appeals to the imagination more than to choose 
self-sacrifice, to take your cross upon your shoulders and walk 
away with bowed head! But there has always seemed to the 
writer something selfish, bombastic and arbitrary about the 
heroes of history, a disposition (in most cases) not so much to 
sacrifice themselves as their armies, their people, their country, 
their friends for their own advantage and glory. Wilhelm II 
chose renunciation and martyrdom for the love of his native 
country and people whose emperor he had been. He failed to 
prove himself a truly great man and ruler in a great crisis; he 
made serious mistakes of judgment and showed fatal weakness 
at important situations in the war; he carries a heavy respon- 
sibility for Germany's debacle, but he was honest and devoted 
through it all, a man of high moral honor — and no coward! 
The whole world has sinned against this man, but America has 
surpassed every other country in venomous, insane, ignorant 
and most brutal abuse of him. This wrong will, no doubt, be 
seen by the American people in time; but volumes of retrac- 
tion and decades of regret will not wipe out the reproach! 

As to the Kaiser's attitude within the German tragedy, his 
earnest desire to preserve the peace at all times, before the 
war, and at its beginning and during its course, is indisputably 
established. And in regard to his future policy — in case of a 
German victory — we are assured by Karl Helfferich, ex-German 
vice-chancellor and a man of unquestioned probity, who had ex- 
tended conversations with the Kaiser in November, 1914, when 
all indications pointed to an early German victory, that the 
Kaiser saw the happiest outcome to flow from the war in the 
establishment of a strong practical continental union of coun- 
tries having the sole object of securing mutual development 
within peace by a rational removal of all points of friction. 
Especially towards. France the Kaiser hoped to see all misun- 
derstandings and distrust removed and sincere friendly rela- 
tions established. This is the man who has been painted in 
America as a blood-thirsty tyrant, arbitrary autocrat, usurper, 
oppressor of his own and other peoples and bent upon unscru- 

189 



pulous world conquest. What a blessing it would be if his victory 
and his program were established facts today instead of the 
chaos of misery and doubt in which the world is floundering! 



'HpHE collapse of Germany leads to strange revelations and 
-*■ painful reflections. With all her great military machine 
of finest equipment and discipline and the splendid deeds of 
this army and its generals, success was, after all, not attained. 
Considering her dominating position in the field on all fronts, 
including Italy and Macedonia, in the spring of 1918, before 
the great offensive, the reversal which followed seems almost 
incomprehensible ! We have pointed out the causes in part, 
as they operated towards such an ending. To those described 
must be added many diplomatic weaknesses and absolute blun- 
ders committed in all the various acute situations of the war, 
particularly with America and in connection with the peace 
overtures of the last two years of the war. The diplomatic 
side in a conflict of such ramifications almost surpasses in 
importance the military side. Clearly, there was a lack of 

commanding ability in the diplomatic direction of Germany's 
course in the war. The remarkable fact is revealed that 
this highly intellectual country, occupying the topmost po- 
sition in human achievement in every field, did not, under 
all the prodding stress of war upon her, produce a single ti'uly 
great man of superlative ability, of penetrating insight to direct 
with a clear and firm purpose the conduct of Germany's affairs. 
No Bismarck arose as a statesman, no Moltke as a strategist; 
the Kaiser himself did not develop into the leader that had 
been expected of him ! There was ordinary ability of the high- 
est quality, marvelous organizing and general executive talent 
shown — but no genius! But this — real genius — is what the 
situation required, demanded! Never before in the history of 
the world, not in Greece, not in Rome, not in France under 
the great Napoleon was there ever a country with but few allies 
engaged in a struggle of such magnitude and intensity, against 
such powerful and numerous adversaries of equal technical 
equipment and more abundant material resources. Such a situa- 

190 



lion demanded higher degrees of capacity, steadiness of purpose 
and diplomatic finesse of direction than Germany's leaders 
displayed. 

But the people itself as a whole, as expressed in the Reichs- 
tag representation with its one-sided warring "parties" and 
innumerable "groups" and also in the public press showed sim- 
ilar deficiencies in character and political ability. Starvation 
had done its share to undermine the steadiness of opinion and 
purpose of the German people, but there was also something 
else at work. The thousands of individuals who were doubt- 
less an exception to this criticism were lost in the millions and 
were unable to penetrate to the front! The fall of von Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, under the pressure of surging internal politics 
was not only a serious blow to Germany's success but furnished 
an early proof, and at a most inopportune time, of the author's 
contention that the restless ambition of the social-democratic 
parties, their lack of broad vision and self-control, lie at the 
bottom of Germany's defeat. But — with more ability and 
courage — the government, after first making the Prussian elec- 
toral concessions, might have defied these disruptive political 
forces at their first determined stand and challenged them to 
the utmost — to revolution even in the midst of war — instead 
of placating them by promises of stiH more concessions. Not 
that their demands were not justified and long due; but domes- 
tic legislation of that class was inopportune in the midst of war 
and could have waited! What was needed was unity of front 
and burying of all factional strife. A strong hand would have 
re-established confidence at home and in the ranks of the army 
and navy, and the elation of ensuing military success would 
have swept all difficulties of Germany aside and brought a final 
satisfactory peace, with or without full victory. 

Von Bethmann-HoIIweg, while not a brilliant man, was the 
ablest and firmest of the chancellors; had he been allowed to 
continue to the end, Germany would probably not have ended 
with the suicide of November 11, 1918. His successor, von 
Michaelis, was a man of record as a bureaucrat, of proven ability 
and character, devotion and sterling honesty of convictions, 
but was in no sense a "diplomatist" and leader of thought in 
the foreign-affairs department of Germany, and his appointment 

191 



as chancellor has remained somewhat of a puzzle to this day. 
We have, in the preceding text, briefly indicated the reason 
for his early exit from power. Chancellor Hertling, his suc- 
cessor, was a man of the highest ability and of wide political 
experience in internal and external affairs, but perhaps too 
advanced in years and conservative in his sympathies to be 
able to fully estimate the strength and purpose of the social- 
democratic movement and check it in its gravitation towards 
revolution. He was very ably seconded by his Foreign Secre- 
tary, von Kiihlmann, who directed the difficult work of the 
Brest-Litowsk peace treaty with Soviet Russia and the treaty 
with Roumania. In the end, however, he fell a victim to the 
growing friction with the military chiefs and to his statement 
in his Reichstag speech of June 24, 1918, "that victory by 
Germany was no longer possible by the military forces of the 
government alone," that it would largely have to be "a victory 
of negotiation." Von Hertling soon followed him in retirement, 
unable to stem the increasing pressure for exclusive power by 
the social-democratic majority party. 

Prince Max, of Baden, was likewise a man of ability and 
highest culture, and much more sympathetic to the progressive 
tendencies of the day than Count Hertling, but lacked initia- 
tive and daring in circumstances which precisely demanded 
these qualities. Instead of acting promptly and secretly upon 
his alleged plan — of early November, 1918 — to go to head- 
quarters and discuss the dangerous situation directly with the 
Kaiser and the military chiefs to ascertain with certainty the 
position of the armies and their chances to win or, at least, to 
hold out till the political storm had been firmly taken in hand, 
and thereupon formulating a definite and concerted plan of 
action, he allowed himself to be kept in Berlin, and proceeded to 
discuss his plans with Representative Ebert and his party 
associates — the very men who at that very hour were plotting 
the fall of the government. On the evening of the same day 
of his intended departure for France, he was tendered the 
ultimatum from these same men demanding the immediate 
abdication of the Kaiser and retirement of the Imperial govern- 
ment! 

The history of these successive chancellorships shows the in- 
sufficiency of these men to firmly direct the German ship of State 

192 



in these turbulent currents of internal factional politics added 
to all the external problems of the war and, instead, to drift 
along with them to the common cataract! In the military line, 
also, there is evidence in abundance, lately supplemented by 
the personal opinions of Marshal Foch, that, while technical, 
organizing and executive ability of the highest order were 
shown in every German campaign and battle, be it in attack 
or in retreat, real far-seeing strategical capacity was wanting. 
There was a lack of comprehensive objective plan, a want of 
co-operation of the separate units, a lack of intimate direc- 
tion by headquarters. Too much was left to chance and to 
planning "in the field" according to the momentary situation. 
These defects in broad plan and definite military object — 
beyond the general one of beating the enemy somehow — 
faults of general-staff leadership and of over-confidence — were 
responsible for the occurence and loss of the first battle of the 
Marne and for the negative results which ensued from the 
brilliant attack campaign of the 1918 spring offensives, as far 
as the latter were not influenced by the political schisms at 
home. In the press in Germany during the war the wrangle in 
the Reichstag was not only reflected and repeated but en- 
larged. Popular sentiment on the war situation, on the sub- 
marine campaign, on the peace overtures was one. continued 
gamut of change from the highest pitch of elation to the low- 
est depths of depression. There seemed to be a lamentable 
absence of strong confidence, firm self-reliance, settled opinion 
of the people as a whole as to the reason, nature and objects of 
the war and its conduct by the government. 

Towards the end of the year 1917, the increasing disap- 
pointment and fear of ultimate defeat opened up the flood- 
gates of unrestrained criticism of everything and everybody 

actively connected with the war and the government from the 
Kaiser to the last official, and even the "particularism" of the 
original German states — long believed buried — raised its head 
again. Into the midst of this raging sea of dissention and 
dejection, broke the voices of a number of miscreants, traitors 
and spite dogs, the like of which no country of the Entente 
allies had produced! That deceitful, conniving, calculating Erz- 
berger; that abject, pitiable, traitorous Maximilian Harden; that 

193 



string- of venomous "authors" and "journalists" who did not hes- 
itate to use the country's dire war situation as an occasion to 
vent their personal spke and revenge for past injuries done 
them by the Kaiser or the government and to exasperate still 
more the maddened public; that horde of. radical socialist agi- 
tators who had no scruples to exploit the government's diffi- 
culties and the discontent of the people in the interest of their 
own political creed and policy of surrender; those minority 
socialists — Haase, Dittmann and Vogtherr — who were disclosed 
as connected with the revolt of sailors in Kiel harbor, early in 
October, 1917, having the object of making the navy ineffective 
for the remainder of the war through the refusal of obedience; 
that band of radical cynics, devoid of ethics or religion, who 
openly counseled the people in the large cities to abandon honor 
and honesty, to defy law and authority, to go profiteering, 
stealing, robbing, repudiating contracts, murdering even for 
gain and in "resentment" against the government for its in- 
ability to conclude the war and relieve the people's hardships! 
This condition appeared in the early fall months of 1918. The 
moral fibre of the lower classes of the population of Germany 
literally went to pieces under this combined onslaught; it made 
a ghastly exhibition of the union of empty heads, empty hearts 
and empty stomachs ! 

When we take together all the facts in regard to Germany's 
conduct of the war and in the war, from her leaders down to 
the body of the people — the absence of really great capacity, 
unselfish patriotism, unity of purpose, stamina, steadfastness in 
adversity, all joined to a certain haughty attitude and over- 
confidence — even those who are sympathetic with the German 
people in their great failure and plight and willing to allow 
fully for all adverse circumstances are tempted to say "that 
Germany deserved to lose the war" ! There is an unavoidable 
reflex of great sadness, of deep disappointment^of disdain 
even — from all this lamentable story of collapse of a great em- 
pire, government and people! But this conclusion does not 
justify — nor even excuse — the frightful treatment, the unheard- 
of punishment meted out to Germany by the Entente allies in 
the armistice and the treaty of Versailles — that instrument of 
political and economic greed inspired by race hate and jealousy 

194 



that stands unapproached in the world's long list of political 
wrongs! But most monstrous of all and least justified by Ger- 
many's true measure of guilt and mistakes is the crime of heap- 
ing upon her the odium of alone bearing the responsibility for 
the great war! This wrong at least — this moral wrong of the 
Entente allies — must be righted, even if the material punish- 
ment should finally be left but little altered from the present 
demands. 



The Kaiser's Failure. It was not merely the want of com- 
manding ability and force of character which prevented Wil- 
liam II to rise to the height of the war situation but also the 
constitutional limitations of his position which made of him 
more the "representative figure head" of his country than its 
actual political ruler, this in spite of his many "autocratic" 
prerogatives. This explains that during the war we heard of the 
Kaiser only occasionally when making a patriotic speech in 
some city or to the army, or when he was called upon in some 
political crisis in which his prerogatives were involved — as with 
the chancellor changes and the Prussian electoral reform mea- 
sures. The chancellor was the active and responsible political 
head in Germany, and in formulating his policy he stood be- 
tween the ideas and wishes of the Kaiser and the ruling Reichs- 
tag majority. A stronger man than Wilhelm II would have swept 
these political limitations aside and assumed full power and 
responsibility. Thus the Kaiser's attitude in the various chan- 
cellor crises was not that of "directing and insisting" but rather 
of "conciliating" the contending factions. He endeavored hon- 
estly to produce harmony between the Reichstag majority, the 
chancellor and the military direction of the war, but failed to 
see the futility of his endeavors and the real political objects of 
the parties opposed to the government. Instead of arresting the 
stream, he drifted with it as much as his chancellors did! 

The determined design to. seize power by the majority so- 
cialists was clearly revealed (in our present view) at the mo- 
ment when Count Hertling had finally decided, after much 
hesitation, to assume the chancellorship on the condition that 
before doing so "direct pourparlers shall take place between 
himself and the majority parties' representatives in order to 
arrive at a full understanding on all questions and thus secure 
future unity of parliamentary action. This "condition" was con- 
trary to German constitutional practice but had been willingly 
conceded by the Kaiser. When the moment for these prelim- 
inary conferences had arrived, these majority representatives 
were not to be found; in the midst of this acute crisis they had 
left Berlin and were only recalled with difficulty to incomplete 

195 



conferences! What is the explanation? None other than that, 
at the last moment of the full acceptance of their own condi- 
tions by the Kaiser and the prospective chancellor, these party 
leaders lost heart in their own proposals, fearful lest they might 
bind themselves thereby to a "too intimate working agreement 
with the new chancellor" which might — later — jeopardize their 
freedom of action in those ulterior revolutionary purposes 
which were being harbored even at that time — fall of 1917! 
In the light of to-day, no other explanation is possible. Evi- 
dently, the Kaiser's policy of conciliation was destined to fail; 
with every concession new demands were presented. The 
Kaiser yielded at every step, fearing for the existence of his 
government and hesitating before the threat of a revolution. 
This was the moment for establishing a "military dictatorship" 
and handing the definite challenge to the obstructive Reichstag 
majority — but again hesitation shut the door to possible safety! 

The recent publication of the third volume of the memoirs 
of Prince Bismarck (heretofore suppressed by the former Im- 
perial government) has again opened the painful subject of 
Bismarck's dismissal by the young emperor William, in 1891. 
Never in the history of the world has the failure of grateful 
recognition by a ruler of the merits of a great national states- 
man borne more terrible fruit! It is not possible here to enter 
into the details of that political and personal cabal. That the 
Kaiser has long and sincerely regretted his action cannot be 
doubted from his public and private declarations! Had he al- 
lowed himself to be tutored and guided by that genius in pene- 
trative diplomacy and constructive statesmanship, Germany, to- 
day, might not merely "have a place in the sun" but "be the sun 
itself" in the constellation of prosperous and peaceful European 
States! That his genius and its influence upon the Kaiser— had 
he permitted it — during the remaining decade of Bismarck's 
life would have made the occurrence of the great war impossible 
may be asserted without fear of challenge ! 

The Kaiser has written a book on the war, giving his con- 
ception of the causes, his own aims and attitude in the great 
crisis of July-August, 1914, and thereafter. A short reference 
to this book appears in Article XVl. 

The Prussian Electoral Reform Measure. The battle for 
this measure in the Reichstag — a measure for the introduction 
of the secret ballot and full male suffrage in the Prussian agri- 
cultural electoral districts, from which it had been heretofore 
excluded — illustrates more than anything else the stubborn ob- 
stinacy of the Prussian conservative agrarian parties against 
any progress in the line of modern political thought. This 
measure had been demanded for years by the liberal parties in 
the Reichstag as one due to the spirit of advancing political 
freedom. Why had it not been passed? Not so much through 

196 



the Kaiser's opposition as through that of the conservative 
parties who saw in it a curtailment of their ancient "rights." 
Yet it was fully in the Kaiser's power to declare for the justice 
of this measure and press its adoption. 

When this proposition was again brought forward, with in- 
creased insistence by the liberal parties during the war, the 
Kaiser seeing in the demand no wrong and only the threat of 
additional parliamentary friction and popular protest against 
his rule, promptly ordered its early adoption as the policy of his 
government. Yet the struggle for the measure in the Reichs- 
tag was a tremendous one. It was an essential part of every 
chancellor crisis! Had this measure been passed in the times 
of peace, it could not have arisen as a "terrible nemesis" in 
the crucial days of the war and at that especially critical con- 
junction of events of the summer of 1917! This electoral 
struggle sharpened the opposition of the Reichstag majority to 
the Kaiser's government along the entire line. The great ses- 
sion of October 6th, 1918, showed fully the depth of grim de- 
termination of the various opposing political parties and the 
hopelessness of united action on the war problems. In the ses- 
sions of October 9th, it became plain that the majority social- 
democrats were resolved to prosecute their "peace-at-any-price" 
policy against the "All-German" or "Fatherland" party at all 
hazards as proven by the revelation of the Kiel insurrection 
plot! 



/t T THE root of these weaknesses exhibited by Germany there 
-**- lies the material and moral transformation of large sections 
of the "masses" of the people, which had been going on for 
forty years in the evolution of Germany to a great "industrial" 
state ; and this change had not taken place without a corre- 
sponding effect upon the highly educated, the wealthy and busi- 
ness sections of the population. The war alone was not re- 
sponsible for this change, or influence; it only accelerated and 
intensified its consequences. The Germany of 1914 was not 
that of 1870! A different spirit had taken possession of the 
majority of those who may be broadly called "the workers," 
all those in the industries and living in the large cities. The 
consequences of modern industrialism and commercialism had 
spread the doctrines of socialism and democracy among them 
and, together with the growth of atheism and general irreligion 
and a crop of negative "philosophies of irresponsibility," had 
changed the modern German of those classes to a different 

197 



character of man from that of 1848 and 1870. Gradual depart- 
ures in the former educational system in favor of "practical 
studies" at the expense of the classical, the sentimental, ideal, 
at the expense of the study of history and literature contributed 
much towards the transformation. 

The increased well-being and consequent diminished neces- 
sity of constant frugality, humility and self-discipline trans- 
formed a people once peculiarly sentimental and sensitive to 
one more "practical" but also more materialistic, more callous 
of restraint, more aggressive. The old German modesty of 
bearing and timidity of expression and the contentment with 
humble life expectations had largely disappeared. A fatal dis- 
illusionment had taken place (not yet replaced fully and in all 
cases by a new perspective) so that Schiller's grand poem of 
"Die Ideale sind zerronnen" had come true for much of latter- 
day Germany. Under the empire the sentiment for national 
growth, big activities, wealth, power, life enjoyment had gradu- 
ally supplanted that for abstract study, contemplation, "the 
humanities," etc., formerly so all-pervading. These changes in 
the fundamental bases of character among a large proportion 
of the German people — excepting the aristocracy, the very 
wealthy and the agricultural class — had occurred parallel with 
each other and worked together hand-in-hand at the same time 
— general materialism, skepticism, socialism and republicanism 
— all permeated by a general "pessimism" as to the value of 
effort or virtue, of life itself — it is the modern drift everywhere. 
For the masses of the people, those whose education is con- 
fined to the practical essentials of information, the loosening 
of their former moral basis — doctrinal supernatural religion — 
was particularly disastrous in the absence of an effective sub- 
stitute; they were deficient in that deeper philosophical per- 
ception and firm ethical conviction which are the possession of 
the thinker and the highly educated man and supply to these 
that confidence and serenity of view which it has heretofore 
been the great practical office of religion to supply to all, par- 
ticularly to the man of lower endowment — an office and power 
now rapidly waning! 

Considering socialism singly and without its association with 
morals or political thought, the unfortunate result of its doc- 

198 



trine and promises upon those of only medium mental and 
educational equipment consists in its disintegrating effect upon 
their sense of personal independence and responsibility, and 
upon the moral quality of self-reliance, by producing an ab- 
normal, unbalanced perception of human society as a whole 
and an exaggerated idea of dependence from and upon others. 
Their understanding of socialism is narrow, subjective, one- 
sided ; they expect of it immediate rectification of all their 
grievances, real and imaginary. It seems to them that the 
introduction of the more equitable distribution of property, of 
the co-operative working of industry and commerce, and all 
other parts of the complete program, should be simple of ac- 
complishment. These high expectations produce a state of ex- 
asperation against society in general, of morbid impatience of 
restraint, of revolt against every kind of authority — all cul- 
minating in periodical outbreaks of violence — because of the 
long-continued strain of seeing these promises and expectations 
unfulfilled. While Socialism is a plan of reform for all classes 
of society and all activities, it finds its largest field and support 
in modern industrialism, in the abnormal life of millions of the 
workers in the crowded cities and depressing manufacturing 
towns where the months and years roll by in the dreary, soul- 
killing thud of monotonous work for mere existence! Next to 
these, socialism finds its field among those of particularly hard 
and hazardous occupations — the miners, transportation men, 
chemical factory men, plumbers, excavators, etc. The condi- 
tions of living and working in these occupations are clearly 
abnormal and a getting-away from nature, and must bring 
their penalties! 

But socialism, the promised remedy, is itself largely a get- 
ting away from nature, a denial and defiance of her laws, and 
also an ignoring of human-nature traits. Before it can become 
a rational guide in public life, society and business it must be 
purified to a doctrine of broader reason, self-restraint and equal 
justice to all interests. As now mostly taught and understood, 
socialism contravenes in many respects those laws of order, of 
subdivision in graded ascendency from the lower to the higher 
endowed, of authority and submission which we find throughout 
in the operations of nature and which are reflected in the char- 

199 



acteristics of human nature. Neither seems capable of any 
fundamental change in scope and character, as demonstrated by 
nature and man throughout the recorded historical centuries. 
The same inequalities and imperfections of endowment, the 
same passions, impulses, caprices which are illustrated in the 
history of the earliest peoples prevail and rule to-day. This 
contradiction in the theory of socialism to that which is inborn 
by nature and unalterable is emphatic and an elementary defect 
in the system which will make it a failure in practice. Unless 
changed in idea and aim in the direction here indicated, social- 
ism can only be a force which will tear down, divide and scatter 
instead of unite and build up to a successful whole. The 
present result in Russia, as far as it is not produced by other 
causes, is an object lesson. The possible spread of this "ulti- 
mate expression" of the socialistic thought to the other coun- 
tries of Europe, particularly Germany, is filling the world with 
keenest apprehension. 

This. Russian "Bolshevism" is socialism expanded to a com- 
plete and radical social-political plan; it means the full pro- 
gram of a communistic state in all the relations of life and 
work, combined with "internationalism" — being the deprecat- 
ing of narrow nationalism and race patriotism and the merging 
of all the peoples of the world into one brotherhood of the 
ruling proletariat. The basis of this idea, naturally, is the 
fact, that the dependent workers and the discontents — all those 
who gravitate towards socialism — outnumber overwhelmingly 
the aristocratic, rich, independent and so-called "privileged" 
classes in every country of the world — that they are the vast 
majority of mankind. This bolshevist idea (meaning, from its 
origin in Russia, the full radical program to its last conclusions) 
has not yet taken political form anywhere except in Russia, but 
its gospel is fast being spread to all the European nations and 
America by aggressive and extended propaganda. It is finding 
in organized labor, everywhere, already permeated by socialism, 
not only its easy converts but its agent and active partner. 
Labor, by its restless agitation for ever more rights and more 
' pay and shorter hours of work, by its strikes and boycotts to 
obtain by intimidation, threat of financial loss and physical 
violence what equity, the general interest and cool reason must 

200 



reject is the most active international bolshevist co-worker. 
Together they will soon uproot society, governments and peoples 
in a world-wide compound cataclysm if more "natural and 
rational" conceptions are not grafted upon this socialistic labor 
movement. 

The steps necessary for curbing and purifying the socialistic 
communism known as "bolshevism" will be discussed in detail 
in a later article. As to the arbitrary material demands of 
labor, the problem is really more difficult — there is no visible 
end to its extravagant aspirations. The final step may not only 
take the form of a general reluctance to work, already much in 
evidence, but of a revolt against the unequal apportionment of 
occupations, especially of such of a dangerous, injurious and 
disagreeable character. The point taken is the query: Why 
should it be the lot of some men, their sons and sons' sons for 
generations to come to be coal and mineral miners, sewer dig- 
gers, sailors, freight-car couplers, plumbers, sulphur or arsenic 
workers, ship-boiler stokers or workers in any others of the 
many low-grade occupations — not so much because of these 
being particularly hard work but because of their being dan- 
gerous to life and health, unclean and offensive to the senses 
— while other men and their descendants are privileged to fol- 
low occupations of comparative ease, security and cleanliness? 
The fundamental justice of this question and protest cannot be 
denied, yet any attempt at solving it by means of the current 
socialistic ideas will destroy civilization and send man back to 
the caves. Supernatural religion has a ready and effective 
answer to the conundrum, and as long as it held implicit power 
over men's minds was able to discourage this inquiry, but 
philosophies of mere negation cannot answer it. 

In rationalistic thought, as we hope to explain it later, with 
its positive moral foundation in nature and purely mundane 
conceptions, relations and objects, an answer will also be found; 
a force of restraint and willing acquiescence as strong as that 
of religion was but more effective and permanent because more 
convincing! It is this philosophy which must be grafted upon 
labor aspirations and socialistic doctrine for their purification. 
But in regard to the coming socialistic political democracy this 
rational life philosophy will also be the agency capable of sup- 

201 



plying that stability and rectitude which have so far been 
wanting in republics; it will furnish an ethical foundation which 
will be harmonious with free political institutions — the un- 
trameled exercise of the intelligence and personal will, in oppo- 
sition to the spirit of autocracy and dictation which animates 
religions and their monarchical associates. 

The changes of character and outlook described in the 
foregoing study of Germany in the war apply with no less 
pertinacity to the other modern nations — they are the universal 
attributes of our materialistic, iconoclastic and conceited age; 
but they are so much more conspicuous in the case of Germany 
because of the stronger contrast there with conditions of for- 
mer times. The statements made were painfully illustrated by 
many features of the conduct of the war by Germany, but 
especially by the opportunistic selfishness of the motives which 
dictated the conclusion of a precipitate armistice at any price, 
and later by the rabid radicalism and shocking violence which 
accompanied the German revolution. The deeds of fanatical 

fury, of moral degradation, of defiant, exultant disregard of 
all the fundamentals of civilized human society which occurred 
in the German revolution at the end of the war approach closely 
to the wildest excesses of the great French revolution of 1789- 
1793 and of the Bolshevist revolutions in Russia, in March and 
November, 1917. A thoroughly depraved state of the percep- 
tions and emotions only can explain these insane excesses. 
None of these aberrations and brutalities of conduct would 
have been possible in Germany forty years ago; the fact of 
their occurrence is proof of that demoralization (in the literal 
sense of the word) which we have described. 

But this denunciation of the rough outward effects of the 
imperfect understanding of the ideas of the new drift, moral 
and social, must not be interpreted as a condemnation of the 
great thoughts of progressive social and ethical philosophy 
which underlie these conditions, nor of the natural and logical 
principle of modern democracy. Our strictures are against the 
methods of propaganda, argument, teaching by which these 
programs are put before the ordinary man and woman of only 
partial education, resulting in the deploi'able effects upon them 

202 



which we have stated. What they understand and expect is quite 
a diffei"ent thing from that which the great thinkers who have 
launched these systems expect from them in their practical 
application. The mischief is done by the professional and 
"interested" propagandists, interpreters, proselyters and politi- 
cal party leaders who bring the message from the fountain 
heads to the people — but instead of instructing succeed, in most 
cases, only to confound and corrupt. It is probably the greatest 
of all problems before the world — for the orderly development 
and direction of the stream now running — to so devise the 
methods of propagation and amalgamation of modern political 
and sociological thought that its rising flood may not overwhelm 
us! This subject will be pursued to a fuller conclusion in the 
article "The Summit.' 

In the case of the German people's lunatic and repulsive 
revolutionary violence, it should be allowed, in fairness, that 
the psychological change we have described was accentuated by 
their fury at the loss of the war and their chagrin at realizing 
how they had been coldly deceived and their trust abused by 
the sonorous and assuring declarations of President Wilson 
which had been so flagrantly disregarded in the armistice terms. 
To their understanding the policy of the social-democratic 
leaders to conclude the armistice at all hazards, in their political 
interest, had no connection with the plainly expressed moral 
obligation of the Entente countries, particularly of America, to 
keep the promises given! 



IN Germany, as an empire, there had arisen and been prac- 
ticed the ideal of the individual citizen merging himself and 
his all, in "the State," and the State, in return, existing for the 
best interests and advancement of the individual. It was the 
greatest cooperative society yet devised, in idea and numbers 
concerned! This political ideal has been applied to a similar 
degree and result by no other people so far, ancient or modern. 
In Germany it was at the bottom of the empire's development, 
it was its ethical foundation and the complexion of its internal 
administration. This principle produced a distinctive kind of 
civilization or "Kultur," based on a definite thought which per- 

203 



vaded all relations and activities and lent its tone even to 
private life. Its results were so remarkable, considering the 
comparatively short period of its reign — about forty years — 
that the German empire as a State of a distinctive character 
will be a source of study for the political philosopher for many 
years to come; it may in future times be the inspiration to 
similar endeavors by other peoples. The outward political 
form of this State, a semi-autocratic monarchy of much demon- 
strative pomp and circumstance, was but a conventional garb, 
a traditional embodiment. As the heart of the German em- 
pire's political life was the thought of the intimate and con- 
fidential inter-relationship of all its parts and people to the 
whole — it was, in reality a true democracy, in principle at least 
if not in details and external form. Thus in fighting, or pre- 
tending to fight, German "autocracy," President Wilson and 
the Entente allies fought a Quixotian windmill ! We are quite 
sure that the Kaiser and the leaders of the government and of 
political thought considered Germany to be, in idea and objects, 
a democracy — a conservative one, certainly — but no autocracy. 
There was no such thing in the real sense in Germany; all that 
we have said above and in article VI and elsewhere proves this 
abundantly. The political contention in Germany was not 
about the democratic idea, as such, but about its shade and 
degree of application. The color of German democracy, how- 
ever, was always more socialistic than purely political. 

When this peculiar partnership between government and 
people was put to the test in the great war it produced, in the 
beginning, an exhibition of harmonious action and wonderful 
power which challenged the admiration of the world ; but when 
the government, as the executive head of the State, failed to 
win victory, and the war in its terriffic strain brought physical 
exhaustion and moral despair, it was but natural that the polit- 
ical partnership should suffer and finally collapse, and lead to 
the collapse of the country itself. The tie was preponderat- 
ingly political and materialistic, voluntary but not deeply sen- 
timental nor unselfishly patriotic, and could not withstand the 
strain of external defeat! Like a partnership in business is 
chiefly for making money and a reputation, the German part- 
nership between government and people was for building up 

204 



prosperity and national success. All this is now changed under 
the new republic ; instead of two positive agencies working 
hand-in-hand we have that peculiar "looseness and uncertainty" 
which has so far been the curse of full popular government. 

It remains now to be seen what Germany will do with her 
real, complete democratic republic. She is in many respects 
better equipped for this form of government than most other 
countries through her experience in cooperation under the 
empire. Will she succeed where so many have failed; will she 
be able to overcome by her preparation, the intelligence of her 
people and their better-balanced education, their natural hon- 
esty of purpose and thoroughness of method those obstacles 
and human deficiencies because of which so many republics, 
ancient and modern, have run to seed and final dissolution? 
But whatever may happen in the future, and with full apprecia- 
tion of what the empire stood for and accomplished, we may 
be sure of one thing, and rejoice in it: The old idea of the 
monarchy "by the grace of God" is dead and will nevermore 
be resurrected! The connection with the people having been 
violently rent asunder, the spell of tradition and outward suc- 
cess broken and the nimbus of a ruler "by divine mission and 
unction" dissipated, Germany will never again return to the 
monarchy and imperialism of the former empire. If monarchy 
is again to come, it will require to be of the most advanced, 
liberal and fully representative form. Any other would be an 
offense to common sense and the healthy instincts of our times 
of personal rights, political freedom and responsibility of the 
individual citizen. 

The idea of the "Prussian" and "Bourbon" monarchy is 
obsolete, childish, ludicrous for our day and temper! Presi- 
dent Wilson spoke a true word when he held up to ridicule 
and scorn "the mediaeval pomp and trappings and pretense of 
divine sanction" of the orthodox conception of monarchy as 
illustrated before the war in Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, Russia 
and Spain. There is more than enough of these unwarranted 
pretensions and silly court practices left in the monarchies of 
England, Belgium, Holland, etc., of today! It would seem to 
require the atmosphere of the Middle Ages for monarchy "von 
Gottes Gnaden" to be sustained by genuine conviction on the 

205 



part of the people. The return of the old monarchy in Ger- 
many would plainly be in contradiction with the advance to those 
freer and bolder ethical conceptions, at the expense of super- 
natural religions, which we have indicated, a movement of which 
we shall speak more fully later and in which Germany will be a 
foremost leader. 



MORE LIGHT ON SUNDRY TOPICS OF PRECEDING 
ARTICLES. 

A. World Conquest and German Jingoism. The political 
parties which are credited with being the so-called "militarists" 
and "jingoes" of Germany are variously known as the Con- 
servatives, Junkers, Fatherland party, All-German party, gov- 
ernment party, in opposition to five or six groups of Liberals, 
Socialists, Democrats, People's parties. Much was made during 
the war of this German "World Conquest" charge without it 
having had any real foundation in fact, as we have shown. 
Granted that there was such an element of national ambition- 
ists in Germany, they were only a small minority of the Ger- 
man people and their aims did not emanate from the Imperial 
government nor represent its policy. As a matter of fact, the 
designs of these parties were not at all for the ruthless con- 
quest of any other people's territories, but merely for friendly 
arrangements by treaties and compensation, purchase, etc., to 
extend Germany's economic and commercial facilities, made 
necessary by the rapid growth of the country. No specific 
charges of world conquest policy, plots of annexation, etc., 
have ever been brought forward by the Allies against Ger- 
many; the charge has been nothing more than an artificial 
manoeuvre of the war! Nowhere in the world is the German 
known as particularly aggressive, quarrelsome, pugnacious, 
selfish and unkind to others. And where, in the past and in 
the present, has there ever been a worthwhile nation which has 
not had its "expansionists" and "Jingo" parties and policies? 
Today the French are openly charged with following such mili- 
tarist and annexationist ambitions to a dangerous degree — 
even by President Wilson. With the British they have been 
"second nature" since centuries and account for their world 
empire. They have been the mainspring of the policies of 
Russia, Italy, Greece and Roumania in the war. The activities 
of these aggressive parties of the different nations made the 
history of the European wars! Why is Germany thus singled 
out for condemnation in a trait which is a part of every na- 
tion? Even this country was seized by a jingo spirit which 
swept us into the great war against our better judgment; be- 

206 



cause, no matter how we may justify this trend from other 
points of view, it was largely a yielding to the temptation of 
taking an important position in international affairs — if not 

for great material or territorial gain, then, at least, for national 
pride and distinction! 

As for the German nation as a whole — from this world- 
conquest point of view — a very large section thereof were 
already too much "socialistic" and even "internationalistic" in 
feeling — altruistic if you will — to be selfishly ambitious for ter- 
ritories and domination at the expense of others. This is a 
great truth the realization of which should open the minds of 
Americans now filled with prejudice against Germany on this 
topic. When the war began to go against her, the conquest 
visions of her limited jingo parties vanished faster than they 
had come because they were unnatural to the psychology of 
the race, to the majority sentiment of the nation. It was really 
due in a good measure to the weakness of German world ambi- 
tions, to the pessimistic mental habit of a considerable part of 
the people and their leaning to "fatalism" that Germany lost 
the war. The shortcomings of which we have spoken in detail 
are largely traceable to the German's habit of taking the "objec- 
tive view" of things, of philosophical analysis and ethical casu- 
istry — all points to his credit generally, but opposed to the 
requirements of political leadership in a world of overwhelm- 
ingly unscrupulous selfishness. 

The Germans are a nation of thinkers, investigators, organ- 
izers and administrators, students in every branch, ardent 
and thorough workers — but no politicians or diplomatists; they 
are great theorists on principles of government and society, 
intense partisans and earnest debaters but unable to negotiate 
and compromise for the obtainable practical result! Their 
method of "directness" in thought, repugnance at sham and 
subterfuge in argument, temperamental impatience and im- 
petuosity unfit them, in a measure, for exhibiting the highest 
skill in diplomacy. This we know very well in America from 
their record in party politics. For their number, intelligence, 
degree of education, wealth and business position they have 
achieved only a mediocre position in our national politics and 
furnished a surprisingly small proportion of men of prominence 
and influence, although their sincere devotion to the welfare 
of the country cannot be questioned. 

B. The Relative Responsibility of Peoples and Their 
Rulers. In political discussion, whether it concern the prob- 
lems of war or peace, there is no subject of greater import 
and perplexity than that of the relation of a country's "people" 
to its "rulers" and of the degree of responsibility of each for 
any political action taken — particularly in a decision for war — 
be these rulers emperors or kings, autocratic or liberal, a con- 

207 



stitutional Prime Minister and his parliamentary majority or 
the President and Congress of a republic. Volumes have been 
written on this topic; it is the corner-stone of rational political 
doctrine and success, especially in a republic! These questions 
ever and ever recur: What is really understood by the expres- 
sion "the country," and who really are "the people"; which 
section of the population is "the people" truly representative 
of the essence, character and will of their country? And this 
other question occurs, independently of who the "rulers" may 
be : Are "the people" willing victims of their "ruler's" personal 
opinions, objects and decisions and without responsibility in 
their acts? 

This assumption, the author believes, must be entirely re- 
jected. It could only be the case in an absolute monarchy of 
the oldest type, without any popular representation, in a people 
uneducated, stupid, in the bonds of fear and superstition. Leav- 
ing aside the conditions under the republics of Greece and 
Rome we must, at least since the time of the French revolution, 
assign to the people of a country a share in formulation of 
the opinions and aims of their rulers and the responsibility 
for their acts. In England since Cromwell, in America since 
1776, on the Continent of Europe since the French revolution, 
"the people" have been advanced enough in intelligence and 
self-confidence of thought to have acquired this influence and 
responsibility in greater or lesser measure according to their 
degree of modern enlightenment. This interest and influence 
has, however, not been strong enough to impress its view deci- 
sively upon the rulers until the more recent times ; but in pro- 
portion as it developed in strength, the "rulers" have gradually 
become less independent and more nearly the figureheads and 
spokesmen only of the nations whom they represent; their 
"personal" opinions and objects have become merged into the 
national aim and will, and "the people's" share of responsibility 
in its government's policies fully established and recognized. 

It is this point which interests us in connection with the 
war, as the "responsibility" of the German people for the 
acts of their rulers and government, of the French, English, 
American and other peoples for their respective rulers and 
governments have been frequent points of debate and differ- 
ence of opinion. As indicated, the author holds the view that 
the people share in the responsibility for their government's 
acts. Neither should they, in defeat, hide themselves behind 
their ruler's faults, nor, in victory, be denied their proper share 
in its attainment. This said, we have still not established who 
"the responsible people" are or, properly, should be. In a re- 
public the "majority" rule must prevail in order that political 
action be effected, as it would be impossible to expect abso- 
lute agreement on any question by all those entitled to vote. 
But who are they who constitute this voting majority? Natu- 
rally, it is the large body of the ordinary working population 

208 



of a country, the lowest section in the social scale, who pre- 
dominate decisively over all the other sections or "classes" in 
every country. These, also called the "higher classes," are 
such not entirely by higher natural intelligence and education 
but mostly by the possession of wealth and the power it gives, 
and by social position derived from meritorious ancestry, dis- 
tinguished public service, etc. Thus the ruling majority, while 
not necessarily stupid and uneducated as individuals, does in- 
clude, from the natural circumstance of its social and material 
position the largest percentage of the stupid, ignorant, unedu- 
cated of a nation — which also carries with it other well-known 
delinquencies. 

We can say, therefore, that in a republic "the people" is 
the aggregate of the voters who possess the right to exert 
political power by voting and the "ruling majority" of these 
voters are preponderatingly those of the lowest social, intel- 
lectual, educational and moral standard. Their time is mainly 
occupied with the business of making a living; they are the 
least "responsible" of the citizens because they have the least 
to lose in any policies involving sacrifices; they are the most 
dangerous to the commonwealth, internally, because the most 
open to the harangue of the agitator trying to make them see 
their lowly position as a just grievance and onerous burden 
in comparison with that of the better situated man. 

The above would make a rather sad picture for a republic 
if these majority voters were left to themselves and thrown 
entirely upon their own resources (intellectual, educational and 
moral) to decide political issues. No matter how bright their 
natural intelligence, it could not in all questions overcome the 
handicap of insufficient special information and the prejudices 
attached to ignorance. In practice they are guided by their 
party leaders, the opposition speakers and independent think- 
ers to find the light and the right way "by having the questions 
at issue explained to them and their feeling and judgment clari- 
fied. It is for this reason that the decisions by vote of "the 
majority of the lowest classes" (for the "majority" necessarily 
always includes these lowest classes) in many instances makes 
the decision which agrees with the intelligence, education and 
sense of moral responsibility of the classes of higher position 
and endowment. 

Two pointed exhibitions of the working of this principle 
occurred in the history of the United States of recent years; 
one in the "Bryan" free-silver campaign of 1896, the other in 
the last election on the war issues. In both these elections 
"popular opinion" was at first strongly opposed to the final ver- 
dict rendered by it, but was successfully convinced of its error 
by the literature and oratory of the campaigns. The danger of 
a possible mistake of decision roused the clearer thinking and 
more "responsible" element of the voters to unusual efforts to 
"lead the blind numerical majority" out of the woods of igno- 

209 



ranee and prejudice. But this method involves enormous labor 
and outlay and carries great risks to the nation, as there is 
no possible guaranty of its successful working in all cases. A 
better method is imperatively demanded to give to the "people's 
majority" a higher character of intelligence and reliability. 

Reasoning merely from points of ordinary common sense 
and observation, it cannot be gainsaid that the part of a popu- 
lation most broadly representative of a country's character 
and aims are the educated middle classes — all those of a more 
settled existence than the mere workingmen, those possessed 
of some means and homes of their own, of at least a grammar- 
school education, and including also the intellectual and pro- 
fessional classes generally. Numerically, this class is the largest 
in any nation, above the level of the ordinary workingmen 
(laborers, factory employees, farm and mine workers, menial 
servants, etc.), and this "middle class" joined to the uppermost 
section of society and business would appear to be really the 
representative and responsible "people" of a nation. The above 
division, however, is largely "theoretical," in practice and fact 
no hard-and-fast rule of class separation can be drawn. The 
only way to effect this desirable— necessary — separation is by 
a qualification test (educational and character) of men and 
women voters — by limited qualified suffrage — as advocated by 
the writer in his book "National Evolution," and sustained by 
facts and logic not easily controverted. Such a process of 
selection would give to any nation based on suffrage by men 
and women its "real, responsible people." There can be no 
question that political power and responsibility of a people 
should attach to a majority of qualified voters only and not to 
the numerical majority of all those who under the present laws 
are entitled to vote, and who may, in any election, reduce this 
qualified majority to a minority by the mere foi*ce of their 
numbers. 

From this argument we see "who properly should be the 
people in any country," and also that in constitutional mon- 
archies, in which suffrage is restricted to householders and men 
of a certain minimum income, settled occupation of an advanced 
class and some personal pi-oven character and responsibility, this 
principle is much better realized than in republics of unqualified 
suffrage. Were it not for the fact that other conditions and influ- 
ences which obtain in monarchies prevent the full and just 
application of the principle of qualified suffrage, they would 
possess a certain degree of political superiority over republics 
in regard to this question as to "who the responsible people 
of a country are or should be." For this reason, every existing 
republic which desires to advance on the road of purifying and 
fortifying its political representative system should, in the 
writer's opinion, embody in its electoral practice the principle 
of limited and qualified suffrage. 

210 



C. AUSTRIA, TURKEY AND BULGARIA IN THE WAR, 

SELF-DETERMINATION OF NATIONS. POLAND. 

OPPORTUNITIES FOR RETALIATION. 

The political and economic relations established by Germany 
with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey have been sketched in con- 
nection with the story of Germany's eastern extension plans. 
The Triple Alliance had previously drawn intimate bonds be- 
tween Germany, Austria and Italy. As to Turkey, from the time 
of the treaty of Berlin, after the Russo-Turkish was (1878), she 
looked to Germany for her economic, financial and military reor- 
ganization ; similarly with Bulgaria. This relationship was a natu- 
ral result of mutual interests. It brought political security, com- 
mercial enterprise and prosperity to Turkey, Bulgaria and 
Austria, and in return Germany obtained those concessions and 
guarantees which allowed her to plan and float her Berlin- 
Bagdad railroad scheme. How great the benefits from the suc- 
cess of that scheme would have been to these three countries 
can easily be imagined; Germany's success would have been 
their success! There was never the least question or suspicion 
of political subjugation of these countries by Germany, and 
the attempt of the Entente to represent them as vassals of 
Germany was but one of its many deceiving war inventions. 
In fact, the development of the war showed that in the case 
of Turkey and Bulgaria the political bonds tying them to Ger- 
many were anything but categorical in case of war, and both 
countries took some time to consider their course before they 
reached the voluntary conclusion ttoat their moral obligations 
as much as their best interests dictated their entry into the 
war on the side of Germany. Turkey's decision was announced 
several months after the opening of the war, while that of 
Bulgaria did not follow until the beginning of October, 1915. 

The military operations of these three powers are on record 
and do not concern us much in detail. Austria's offensives 
were specially directed against Russia and Italy; those of 
Bulgaria against Serbia, in the beginning, and later against the 
combined French and other Entente troops in Macedonia, in 
front of Salonica. Upon Turkey fell the heavy task of defend- 
ing Constantinople, which had been threatened by a combined 

211 



Entente land and sea attack upon the forts on the peninsula 
of Gallipoli. Turkey also had to defend her vast territories in 
Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt against 
the British, and the Caucasus and Armenia against the Rus- 
sians. The military assistance which Germany derived from 
Austria in the first two years of the war in the campaigns 
against Russia was considerable. As to Bulgaria and Turkey, 
they needed Germany's help, rather than otherwise, in the 
prosecution of their own immediate tasks. As Austria grew 
weaker, she, also, became more of a strain upon Germany than 
a support. But it must be acknowledged, as a matter of moral 
credit due to them, that all three allies of Germany displayed 
splendid loyalty and faithfulness to Germany in her great 
struggle; they fought by her side valiantly and to the limit of 
their resources and to the very last until complete exhaustion 
compelled them to give up. As to Germany's faithfulness to 
her ally Austria from the very inception of the Entente con- 
spiracy and beginning of the war, as well as to Turkey and 
Bulgaria, in spite of all the sacrifices they brought upon her, 
it is a monument to her character! 

For the general purpose of this book the interest of this 
article centers in the breakup of the Austrian monarchy as a 
result of her defeat. Austria's defeat was similar in all re- 
spects to that of Germany — military discouragement and slack- 
ing of discipline in the armies, economic exhaustion, starvation 
of the civil population and political disruption — all working 
together. The latter was, in the case of Austria, not only 
socialistic and democratic but ultra-Wilsonian on the subject 
of the issue of racial self-determination of peoples which had 
been injected into the European peace-and-war turmoil. In the 
earlier article on Austria we explained the conglomerate 
racial composition of the country and the troubles which this 
had given the Hapsburg monarchy to govern over these antag- 
onistic interests, nourished continually by intriguing outside 
agitators. To this condition must be added the spread of the 
socialistic doctrine and the general trend towards democracy. 
In consequence of this co-working of disrupting influences, the 
dissolution of Austria had been freely predicted for years to 
occur soon after the death of the old and venerated emperor 

212 



Francis Joseph. But in the last decade before the war new 
constructive ideas had come to the front, represented by Arch- 
duke Francis Ferdinand, who was assassinated at Serajevo. 
(All this is partly recapitulation, due to the author's purpose to 
present a rounded narrative or argument in each article.) 

This outward cause of the war — the Serajevo plot — cannot 
be stated too often because it reveals the complicated and 
determined motives behind the war. No misrepresentations 
made by the Entente nations in their intent of fastening the 
guilt of the war upon Germany exclusively will avail over these 
plain facts: First, that the character of the Serbian con- 
spiracy and the refusal of that government to allow Austria 
herself to examine into the secret police records prove con- 
clusively that that country could not face the revelation of the 
facts because she had given herself up as a willing tool into 
the hands of Russia for the furtherance of the latter's political 
designs; second, that imperial Russia had, from compound rea- 
sons which we have previously examined, arrived at a stage 
of such pressing political necessity that she did not hesitate 
to use desperate means to precipitate a war with Austria ; third, 
that this entire situation was well known in England, France, 
Germany and Austria. There was no nlystery about the out- 
break of the great war; neither in its long-view motives nor in 
its short-view provocation! All those "exchanges of notes" 
and "conference propositions" were mere diplomatic play to 
gain time, to perfect the moves, to put one of the powers, — 
Germany — the intended victim — in the position of being first 
in declaring war! 

The dissolution of Austria in the whirlwind of the war, 
snatched away, as she was, from the opportunity of her re- 
generation to an enlarged political destiny, is even a greater 
tragedy than the fall of Germany because it seems definite and 
irremediable, whei*eas Germany will rise again and continue to 
live as a national entity. Austria has been roughly torn 
asunder by the application of this "self-determination of na- 
tions" idea which fell upon particularly fertile ground, in her 
case. This pi'inciple is theoretically rational and just, provided 
all the conditions for success in its application be present; if 

213 



not, then this principle may block real national progresss and 
work injustice to its adherents and opponents alike. To be 
successful the "nationality" concerned must be real and de- 
veloped to full consciousness of racial character and aspirations, 
unity of sentiment and absence of strong religious dissensions. 
This feeling and complexion must not be confined to a limited 
number of the most advanced classes of a people but should 
be shared by a good majority of the population. There should 
also be present in such embryo states such physical and cli- 
matic conformation as to provide a diversified agricultural and 
industrial activity in order to insure to the nation "a living" 
and a fair degree of material independence. Without these 
guarantees no modern independent country can thrive in the 
vortex of present-day necessities and competition for existence. 
Are the Czecho-Slovacs, the Hungarians, the Jugo-Slavs and 
the German- Austrians so situated? We think not; the latter 
are the best equipped of them, except economically. They 
could, however, by their natural and strongly desired union 
with the Greater German Republic as one of its members have 
arranged for themselves very favorable conditions of economic 
life, combined with necessary national attributes and practical 
political independence. The denial of this desire of German- 
Austria by the peace conference, lashed by French jealousy, 
speaks volumes for the lack of political capacity and the nar- 
rowness of motives of that body. Of the other three embryo 
states not one possesses the conditions we have named, as neces- 
sary for the promise of permanence and success; each carries, 
even now, in the circumtances of their formation the seeds of 
dissension and failure which no League of Nations or other 
artificial agency will be able to control. As we expressed it 
before: "An ethnological pedigree alone is not a sufficient basis 
for erecting in security an independent national state. These 
three peoples have for many years indulged in dreams of inde- 
pendence, inspired by advanced patriots, without having had a 
very clear perception of the how or the wherefor, or any real 
unity of effort; nor have they shown any decided ideas as to 
the political form, whether monarchy or republic. Their 
strongest animating impulse had been to be free from Austria 
chiefly because professional agitators and outside interested 

214 



plotters had made them believe that they were being oppressed, 
that they were being hindered in attaining their national des- 
tiny, that they were being "bossed" by their German-race 
rulers. 

By thus having distrust, jealousy and enmity planted into 
their hearts, they were blinded to the substantial benefits which 
they were receiving in education and general wellbeing; they 
totally missed the rational point of view of their position and 
opportunities as members of a well-ordered and important 
State. Upon their distracted state of mind the Wilsonian doc- 
trines fell like a fructifying shower of rain and quickly con- 
firmed these peoples in their phantastic fervor for freedom and 
political independence.- Similarly to the case of the German 
people, the strain and suffering of war, the mental agony ever 
present and the increasing hunger were the ready handmaids 
of the whole process of revolution. Now it is done; and left 
to themselves these misguided peoples will soon discover how 
much they have lost, how little they have gained ; how much 
they are still in the age of tutelage and how little they are 
fit for independence, especially for a republic. To tear down 
is easy, but to build up from the ruins created is quite another 
matter. Never before have any "aspiring nationalities" started 
out on their pilgrimage to independence with a more uncertain 
step and dubious prospect! 



T) EGARDING Poland a situation exists of similar character- 
-^ istics but of even greater perplexity. Not only has the 
central province of the former Russian Poland proper, with 
about 60 per cent of real Polish people, been erected into an 
independent State by the peace settlement, but also all those 
parts of the old kingdom of Poland which were separated from 
it in the first and second partition of Poland (1750-60) and 
were joined, respectively, to Russia, Prussia and Austria. This 
old Kingdom of the 1 8th century had at no time been a real 
homogeneous State as to race and language, and had for decades 
been a countay of dissensions and strife. It was this disorder 
and lack of political ability which brought on the wars of con- 
quest and annexation by Prussia, Russia and Austria and the 

215 



partition of the country by these neighboring states in order to 
obtain settled political conditions. These three parts, of mixed 
population even at the time of the partition, have in the many 
decades which have since elapsed become so thoroughly trans- 
fused by the people of the respective ruling nations, and by 
the all-permeating Jews, that they are today Polish only to the 
extent of from 25 to 40 per cent of the total inhabitants. 
This remnant of original Polish stock now left in the former 
Russian, Prussian and Austrian provinces belongs in overwhelm- 
ing proportion to the lower classes of the people. The Polish 
middle class had died out, leaving only the poor peasants and 
the land-owning nobility. The business life and progress of 
these provinces and all the activities of education and refine- 
ment were in the hands of the respective Russian, Prussian 
and Austrian nationals and of the upper "mixed classes" of 
the native population, who were not more than 15 per cent of 
the total. The idea that these provinces were "conquered sec- 
tions" and still in a state of amalgamation had almost dis- 
appeared, especially in the large cities, except in the joint use 
of the Polish language together with German, Russian and 
Yiddish. 

In spite of these indisputable facts, the Entente allies have 
not hesitated, under the impulse for a free and independent 
Poland, to sanction the Polish claims to the German province 
of Posen, to parts of German Silesia, to a large part of former 
Austrian Galicia and to the outlying Russo-Polish sections and 
to include all this tei'ritory, with Old-Poland, in the new State. 
All these parts had become thoroughly amalgamated with the 
countries to which they belonged in 1914. This disposition 
was particularly unjust to Germany. Not only had the pro- 
vince of Posen been entirely Germanized, but all the large 
manufacturing cities of Old-Poland — Plock, Lodz, Lublin, War- 
saw itself — were almost wholly German cities in all their busi- 
ness and social activities. Granting fully the justice of creat- 
ing a free and independent Poland, the preponderatingly German 
province of Posen should have been left to Germany, providing 
for liberal expropriation by purchase for such of the Poles as 
would not have cared to remain. For identical and equally 

216 



strong reasons, the section of Silesia which has (subject to a 
plebiscite) been awarded to Poland, should have been left to 
Germany. Every consideration of equity, political wisdom and 
stability of the peace should have dictated such a decision. 
But, not enough with this high-handed imposition of the arro- 
gant will of the victor, it was further decided at Paris to take 
from Germany a strip of land cut out of the heart of her own 
country, and separating thereby East Prussia from West Prus- 
sia, to provide a sea-coast continuity for this greater Poland to 
the Baltic Sea, with the fine sea-port city of Dantzig at the 
end thereof, a city German to the core back to the Middle Ages. 
A truly wise and noble scheme it is — this Polish settlement — 
one that does honor to the Paris conference of justice and en- 
lightened action for the prevention of future wars! The bold 
outstanding fact of the arrangement is this: The cupidity of 
motives of the Entente nations was so great and their political 
density so deep that it appeared fair and proper to them to rob 
and dismember Germany to make the "sentimental experi- 
ment" of setting up as a nation this half-developed people — 
mixture of Poles, Russians, Czechs, Ruthenians, Slovacs and 
Jews — ^which makes up the geographical term of the new 
greater Poland! 

What has this Polish people ever been and done to deserve 
all this consideration? The true explanation is simple: In the 
case of Poland as in that of the four new states carved out of 
former Austria, independence was literally thrown at them 
by the victorious Allies because the defeat of Germany and 
Austria and the existing impotence of Russia made it possible 
for them to give ostentatious application thereby to two of their 
much-advertised "idealistic war principles" without risk of op- 
position, the principles of the protection of small nationalities 
and that of the right of self-determination of peoples. But in 
the case of Ireland — an island nation, racially clean-cut, able, 
virile, complete, advanced, the mother of a good share of Eng- 
land's greatness in every direction, the case is different because 
her liberation is opposed by one of the Entente partner nations 
— a powerful one, ready to make opposition — England. She 

217 



needs but to say: "Hands off; this is a domestic question and 
our own private affair" — and, behold, the "self-determination- 
of-nations" call is smothered and buried in a maze of explana- 
tions, accusations and exceptions! 



T N view of the fact that whatever there is, today, of wealth, 
established business enterprise, public improvements, com- 
merce, education and culture in these countries of Poland, 
Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Jugo-Slavia is due to the extent 
of fully 75 per cent to the direct work or inspiration of Ger- 
many and German-Austria, respectively, and considerably also 
to Russia, these countries would be justified to bring every 
possible reprisal upon these ungrateful and treacherous peoples 
who forsook their benefactors in their great hour of need. 
This stricture applies much less to German-Austria and Hun- 
gary than to Bohemia, Poland and Jugo-Slavia. These per- 
fidious would-be nations deserve nothing but cold indifference 
and contempt from Germany and Austria in their struggle to 
stay on their feet. But measures of practical retaliation are 
also justified to be undertaken and are, in fact, partly under 
way: Retirement from these countries by the German forces 
of energy and advance, and carrying away of their capital, 
business organizations, machinery and other transportable 
equipment and property to their own home lands. This done, 
signs might se set up along the highways of these countries 
reading: "If you fall behind and need any help, apply to the 
Entente nations." 

This sentiment of retaliation might also very properly be 
the attitude of Germany and German-Austria towards their 
Entente enemies, — England, France, Italy, America and Japan 
— in protest of the shocking abuse and wrong inflicted upon 
them, — if a juster attitude towards them will not soon be in- 
augurated. The threatened English and American boycott of 
German and Austrian manufactures may very readily be made 
a "two-edged sword of Damocles." If a change of feeling will 
not soon take place, business men and manufacturers, financial 
men, scientists and artists, technical experts and helpers, 
teachex*s, linguists, artisans, commercial clerks and high-class 

218 



mechanics, men and women, citizens and aliens will be justified 
to pull up stakes, and with their families, money and belong- 
ings leave these countries and return to their native peoples. 
This would apply especially to the United States of America 
where the character and qualities of Germans have been as- 
sailed and defiled in a manner to bring the fire of rage and 
scorn and eternal hatred to every German and Austrian who 
has been a witness of this abuse. With the coming political 
and commercial amalgamation between Germany, German- 
Austria and Russia, and not unlikely Hungary, into a territory 
of over two-hundred millions of people, commanding untold 
natural resources in coal, oil, wood; iron and other metals; clay, 
building stone, minerals and chemicals; with unlimited and 
diversified agricultural lands, a great railroad, river and canal 
system of transportation ; with sea-coast front in the North, 
on the Pacific and in the Black Sea (now with unrestricted 
passage through the Bosporus and Dardanelles) — and the Scan- 
dinavian countries, Holland, Spain, Bulgaria, Turkey, China, 
Mexico and Argentina friendly — this "continental economic 
union" would be big and self-supporting enough to be able to 
live and prosper without the favor of the Entente countries, and 
could dispense with it if conditions of mutual respect and a 
remodeled peace of Versailles of honor and fairness cannot be 
obtained from them. 



Influence of the Russian Revolution on the Course of the 
War and on Germany's Defeat. This influence was twofold, 
military and social, through the revolution and the subsequent 
regime of "bolshevist" communism. The first Russian revolu- 
tion broke out against the government of the Czar early in 
March, 1917, and led in the course of a few days to the abdica- 
tion and imprisonment of the Czar and his family and the com- 
plete overthrow of the Imperial Government. The forces in 
this first rising included all shades of liberal democratic opin- 
ion, from Constitutional republicanism to extreme radicalism. 
The general aim was to found a liberal republic of, as yet, in- 
determinate shade of principles; to do away definitely with 
monarchy, autocracy and Court rule ; to continue cautiously the 
agreements with the Entente and participation in the war. 
The latter had been one strictly of the aristocratic ruling 
classes and government circles and was very unpopular with the 
people at large, as may be inferred from the previous articles 
of this book on the subject. 

219 



Professor Miliukoff, as President of the Conservative Con- 
stitutional Ministry, was in sympathy with popular feeling on 
the war, but Entente influence gradually obtained control, and 
under the leadership of the talented Kerensky, as Minister of 
War, a new offensive against Germany was begun in June., 
1917. This was of a desultory character, however, the Russian 
troops having been demoralized by the advent of the revolu- 
tion. Political sentiment meanwhile drifted gradually towards 
the radical parties, largely due to the popular discontent with 
the war, and on November 8th-9th, the second revolution broke 
out, directed against the Kerensky Constitutional Republic and 
placing power into the hands of the extreme socialist wing, 
represented by Trotzki and Lenine as heads of the Congress of 
Workmen and Soldiers. They assumed, or were given, the 
name of "Bolshevists," meaning those ready to occupy the 
extreme position on socialism and ready to apply the measures 
requisite to establish the radical communistic republic and the 
rule of the "proletariat." The movement was an aggressive 
one, realizing that it would have to combat strong internal and 
external opposition. It prepared for this struggle by measures 
and methods of great energy and authority in order to achieve 
success. This revolution was accompanied by much violence 
and bloodshed and wholesale arrests of the nobility and ad- 
herents of the former Czar's government. Many executions 
took place and a reign of terror prevailed for about two weeks. 

As this book is not a history of the war, we cannot go much 
into details of events, and the reader is assumed to be informed 
on the political and socialistic character of the bolshevist move- 
ment. Reference has been made to its general scope and aim 
and important "world interest" at several points in our text. 
The first act of the Soviet government which affected the 
course of the war and the position of Germany was its imme- 
diate call for a three months' armistice and an invitation to all 
the war nations to meet in a general peace conference. All 
former secret agreements between the Czar's government and 
the other allied nations were now made public and repudiated 
on the part of Russia. Germany and her allies accepted the 
proposal for an armistice and peace conference, and entered 
upon the negotiations at Brest-Litowsk on December 3rd, 1917, 
but the Entente powers declined to participate, refusing to 
recognize the authority of the Soviets as representing the Rus- 
sian people. (As we have shown in the text, they had at that 
time fully determined on a peace by victory only.) On December 
12th, 1917, the Russian Government issued its famous procla- 
mation for "a peace without indemnities and annexations" 
(adopting the wording and spirit of the German Reichstag 
resolution of July of the same year) and throwing the respon- 
sibility for the limited efforts at Brest Litowsk upon the En- 

220 



tente powers who had ignored Russia's call. The peace was to 
be one of honor, by the people themselves, concluded in frater- 
nity and justice and the right of "self-determination" for all 
individual counties. It called this the hour for the proletariat 
of all countries to come together, and for the beginning of a 
new and true liberty! It was an appeal over the heads of the 
existing governments to the people of the world at large, es- 
pecially to the socialist masses and the labor class, to rise in 
protest and insist on the termination of the cruel war. But the 
appeal failed : the people in all countries were under military 
domination and themselves affected and divided by their war 
sympathies; moreover, the tenure of power by the Soviets was 
arbitrary and uncertain, was itself sustained by "force" and 
not by the free voice of the Russian people as expressed in a 
representative elected body like the former "Duma" had been. 
This discouraged confidence in Russia's appeal. In conse- 
quences of the above proclamation, the Ukraine and the former 
Russian Baltic States and, later, Siberia declared themselves 
as independent republics. 

On December 17th, 1917, the armistice between Russia and 
the Central Powers was concluded, and a few days later peace 
sessions began. They were stormy meetings full of friction 
between all the participants. On February 9th, 1918, the first 
peace of the war was concluded at Brest-Litowsk, that between 
the Central Powers and the new independent Russian republic 
of the Ukraine. On the day following, Trotzki announced that 
on account of the inability to agree on peace terms between 
the Central Powers and Russia, the latter considered the war 
as ended between them even without a formal peace being 
signed, and would withdraw her troops from the fronts into 
Russia and begin their complete demobilization. This conclu- 
sion was not agreed to by Germany and Austria, as being in 
no sense a settlement of the many complicated territorial, racial 
and economic questions which had divided the peace confer- 
ence ; they construed it, on the contrary, merely as the termin- 
ation of the armistice. Accordingly, the German armies, on 
February 17th, 1918, began to advance upon Petrograd, and 
Austro-German forces prepared to move into the Ukraine to 
help that new State to defend its independence against the bol- 
shevist attack which was being planned. This combination 
brought the Soviet government to surrender, and to accept the 
terms of the Central Powers as laid down in Germany's ulti- 
matum of February 28th. Peace was definitely concluded on 
March 3rd, 1918. The peace was accepted by Russia under 
protest as "not one of understanding but of force," and in a 
proclamation the Bolshevist Republic called upon German labor 
and the soldiers in the armies "to rise in condemnation and 
defiance against this strangulation of their Russian brothers. 
But as in the former case, the call failed of response — not for 

221 



lack of agreement and sympathy but because of the iron exig- 
encies of the war. In the meantime peace negotiations had 
also been proceeding between the Central Powers and Rou- 
mania, and ended in peace being concluded on May 7th. On 
the same date a separate peace was signed with the indepen- 
dent Russian State of Finland, which had taken position against 
the Soviet Government and in favor of supporting the Entente. 
This ended the war on all the eastern fronts of the Central 
Powers. 

Of this eastern peace, however, neither the political nor the 
military x'esults came up to the high expectations which had 
been entertained in Gennany and Austria in regard to it. 
Politically, it hurt Germany in the eyes of the Entente and the 
world in general by the harshness of the methods and the 
severity of the terms imposed upon Russia, and it may be 
said that at Brest-Litowsk Germany laid the foundation of 
much of the hard treatment she herself later received at 
Paris. Also, by negotiating with Russia (after the conclusion 
of the general peace with the four Central powers) a separate 
supplementary convention in her exclusive interest, and in 
which Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey were ignored, she affronted 
them sharply, especially Austria, and with it laid the foundation 
for the diplomatic estrangement with her allies which, later, bore 
such disastrous fruit in their disposition to try separate peace 
overtures and act independently for peace Tat the end. These 
political currents developed apace while the German Mai'ch 
offensive in France had already spent its initial force and was 
in process of being arrested and turned into a reverse. Had 
the Central Powers held together politically and presented 
a united entity in defeat, their position at the Paris confer- 
ence would have been very different, and no such armistice and 
peace terms would have been written as were dealt out to them 
separately. The spirit of the negotiations at Brest-Litowsk and 
the succeeding steps were a great diplomatic blunder on the 
part of Germany of wide consequences. We can only under- 
stand these mistakes of Germany by putting ourselves in her 
position and realizing the feeling of resentment and vengeance 
which pervaded the whole nation for having the cruel war 
thrust upon her. 

Militarily, the peace in the East freed considerable masses 
of troops, ultimately, for use on the French fronts, but on 
account of the unsettled situation in Russia, the Ukraine and 
the new Baltic States, and in Poland, this retirement had to be 
made slowly; and these German eastern forces had become 
somewhat demoralized by their long-continued idleness and 
were filled with radical socialistic ideas by the bolshevist propa- 
ganda carried on among them. Hence, the gain to the ex- 
hausted troops in France was not as large numerically and as 

222 



stimulating morally as had been anticipated. The final result 
in France was scarcely affected by the additional strength they 
lent; but if these troops had been divided between the Turco- 
Bulgarian forces in front of Salonica and the Austro-German 
forces in the Trentino, the military result in these two theatres 
of the war might have been entirely different! 

While the peace with Russia had, truly, removed her as a 
military enemy of the Central Powers, a greater enemy to 
Germany has arisen thereby in Bolshevism to undermine the 
moral courage of the German people and armies and break their 
resistance. Pursuant to the peace, the Russian Soviet Minister 
Joffe arrived in Berlin in the late summer of 1918, ostensibly 
sent to pave the way for the resumption of diplomatic and 
commercial relations with Germany. He established himself 
in the sumptuous former Russian embassy, with a retinue of 
secretaries and servants. The German government received 
him cordially and extended to him all desired facilities for his 
mission of peace and rapprochement. But this same Minister 
Joffe was later disclosed to have been the head and front of 
an official bolshevist mission to disseminate these doctrines 
throughout Germany and in the armies by a flood of "litera- 
ture," personal proselyters, bribes and promises of political 
reward. The embassy quickly became the headquarters af the 
advanced groups of the German socialist parties, who were in 
sympathy with Joffe's work; they were then plotting the fall 
of the Imperial government and the establishment of a social- 
istic republic by revolution. This nefarious activity was finally 
discovered by the German government and eradicated, but not 
before much undermining work had been done by it which 
told its disastrous story on the battlefields of France, in the 
disrupting parliamentary battles in the Reichstag, in the armis- 
tice conspiracy, the degrading peace, the bloody revolution and 
ignominious collapse of the German nation! 

Materially, the results of the eastern peace were also very 
disappointing. The hoped-for stocks of food, materials, oil, 
coal, etc., which Germany and Austria had expected to find in 
Roumania, the Ukraine and Central Russia were not consider- 
able, and their ready transpoi-tation was made almost impossible 
by the complete breakdown of the railroad systems in these 
countries. Thus the expected relief from the pressure of the 
English Food Blockade did not materialize and the hopes of 
the suffering German people were dashed to the ground. 

There was also a dramatic sequel of intense hate, leading 
to assassination, to the eastern peace "by force." It had left 
a feeling of bitter resentment in Russia against Germany, 
which found vent in many demonstrations of violence in Mos- 
cow, Petrograd and other cities. It culminated in the brutal 

223 



murder of Count Mirbach, German envoy in Moscow, and of 
General Eichhorn, in the Ukraine. And when, in August, 
1918, in consequences of these occurrences, and to settle 
many details of the peace agreement, Karl Helfferich was sent 
to Moscow on a mission by the German government, he had a 
narrow escape of being overtaken by a like fate! 



XIV. PEACE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. 

A. THE PEACE AND LEAGUE OF FALSEHOOD. THE 
FUTURE ARMIES AND DISARMAMENT. THE WAR 
A FIASCO. IRELAND'S TITLE TO INDEPEN- 
DENCE. AMERICA'S DISAPPOINTMENT 
AND AWAKENING. 

In taking up this subject we shall approach and discuss it 
from an entirely different point of view than that which pre- 
vailed in the peace conference at Paris, in the newspaper treat- 
ment of it and which colors the past and present debate of 
this subject in America, in and out of Congress. The question 
whether or not the United States should shoulder the obligation 
of this league, and whether or not it was wise to include this 
league in the peace terms do not interest us so much at the out- 
set. For the purpose of this book this subject must first be 
investigated ethically before we can enter into the manner of its 
disposition. 

Peace and peace terms are obviously interdependent, almost 
synonymous conceptions. Peace is a state of agreement among 
a number of contestants who have been in a strife — and may 
be again arrayed against each other — to live together without 
open enmity on a basis of terms freely, if humbly, accepted 
by the party which lost the fight as a fair settlement which can 
and is intended to be carried out. The terms must be in ac- 
cordance with this fundamental idea. Any such rational peace 
will be a "peace of justice," any other which does not fulfill 
this condition is merely a settlement accepted under duress at 
the point of the victor's sword. From the information presented 
in the preceding articles it should appear quite clear that the 
position occupied by the peace-dictating side at Paris was not 
only one of error of fact but of inescapable and forcible decep- 

224 



tion in consequence of the web of hypocrisy, lies and slander 
which had been woven around the war. The victors were com- 
pelled to maintain, or to pretend to maintain, this position to 
the end ; they were caught in their own net of falsehood as to 
the origin and objects of the war, and in the false accusations 
which they had made against the Germans and their allies, and 
could not now easily disembarrass themselves of these and 
reach a basis of truth and equity. In consequence, the peace 
discussions were rooted in false pretenses and had to proceed 
in wrong and deception ; there was no one there — not even 
President Wilson, with all his avowed idealism — who had the 
moral grandeur to rise up and demand recognition of the truth 
and nothing but the truth, and thus prevent the colossal wrong, 
the monumental fraud of the deliberations at Paris and their 
final embodiment in the Peace of Versailles. Yet this truth 
was well known; the totally mendacious position of the Entente 
allies in the war and at Paris, as explained in a previous article 
of this book, was known to the Entente allies themselves, to 
President Wilson, to every diplomatist, to every well-educated 
man in Europe of any political acumen. It was due to the 
failure of England's calculations, the Allies' wrath at the unex- 
pected defiance by Germany, and their determination to throw 
the responsibility for the war upon her shoulders alone and, in 
revenge, to ruin that country for all time through the terms 
of the armistice and peace! 

What a horrible situation; how could a peace of justice come 
out of a situation so thoroughly perverted! The allies were 
strangled by their own deceptions, and the whole world — 
poisonously inoculated against Germany — had to follow suit 
upon fhis path of infamy! Such was the psychological charac- 
ter of the peace conference ; and it would have taken a miracle 
to change it. This miracle might have, possibly, happened at 
the last moment when the time had arrived for the presentation 
of concrete demands, for the revelation of the secret agree- 
ments, for the disclosing of inmost policies — to some extent 
at least. But it was right at this point that the League of 
Nations proposition stepped in and pi'evented a tense situation 
of threatening avowal of the truth by offering a refuge under 
the shelter of which secrecy and deception could be maintained 
to the end and public revelation delayed till the to-morrow. 

225 



Under cover of the League, with its plausible plan of peaceful 
world regulation without war which the four European En- 
tente nations and Japan assiduously acclaimed — these five 
powers saw that their real war motives and future schemes 
might very conveniently and safely remain unconfessed a little 
longer under the cloak of these sanctimonious pretensions till 
the overshadowing purpose of their deliberations had been 
accomplished- — a crushing peace for Germany, the complete 
destruction of Austria, reduction of Turkish sovereignty to a 
name only — and the exclusion of all these from the League 
(also Russia), in order to leave themselves free to exercise 
their domination over the smaller nations. Meanwhile they 
would be able to pursue their separate interests in individual 
alliances, but under the cover of this "league-of-peace" of 
merely complimentary functions! Of the impracticability of 
the League they were quite convinced, and for its altruistic 
purposes they felt nothing but supreme contempt. Thus was 
the humanitarian thought of the League of Nations, sponsored 
so enthusiastically and disinterestedly by pur President and 
the American people, quickly reduced at Paris to a proposition 
of false pretenses under which every iniquity of the war and 
every selfish design of future activity could be ignored with 
a brazen face and hidden ! 

That the peace terms imposed upon Germany, Austria, Bul- 
garia and Turkey cannot endure has. been abundantly demon- 
strated since their enactment. They were accepted only as a 
matter of physical necessity, absolute helplessness, after violent 
struggles to obtain conditions more within reason, honor and 
ability of being fulfilled. No matter what the final, definite 
settlement with all of them shall be, the terms will be observed 
only, in spite of "guarantees" and "sanctions," so long as the 
strongest compunction to do so shall exist. Can anything else 
be expected? This compunction is not at all one of "moral 
responsibility" on the part of the vanquished; moral responsi- 
bility does not apply when imposed under a threat of death by 
violence on a foundation of unreason ! Individuals and na- 
tions SO placed have the moral right to promise the impossible 
in order to save their existence! This being our conclusions 
on the peace which has been made and on the League "to pre- 

226 



vent future wars," it follows that the latter can, at best, only 
be a means of enforcing this onerous peace. Moreover, the 
enemy countries and Russia being excluded, this League will 
be an anomaly from the beginning and merely an association of 
the great powers to impose their will upon the others. But 
even for this purpose the League, having no definite and ready 
power for enforcement of its decisions, will be merely a for- 
midable threat, capable of being defied for a long time, even 
by a small nation; for history proves abundantly that when 
great passions or ambitions are aroused, the mere size of a 
nation is no limit to action. In such a case much disturbing 
work might be set in motion — starting of a revolution, invasion 
of another country — before the cumbersome machinery of the 
executive military forces of the League (formed by propor- 
tional contribution) could be set in motion. 

But such "disturbances" are precisely what we must expect 
in Europe under the present settlement. Is there anyone inno- 
cent enough to assume that the geographical boundaries of the 
old and new states, as settled at Paris, will be maintained for 
any great length of time; that the penalties exacted and the 
injuries inflicted will be accepted as binding forever; that the 
hindrances imposed will be submitted to without protest, as 
soon as protest can be made with confidence? On the contrary, 
the world and the League of Nations must be prepared for all 
of this! The consciousness of these uncertainties of the peace 
settlement was one of the secret reasons which commended the 
idea of the League to the Entente governments as an instru- 
ment with which to enforce the peace of duress upon the over- 
powered peoples and discourage dissatisfaction among the new 
nationalities! That the League — which is themselves — -would 
also prove an effective instrument to prevent war among them- 
selves is a paradox; for, who should decide and enforce? The 
perception of these points, together with the growing impres- 
sion that the peace of Versailles is a wrongful and stupid set- 
tlement (although this impression is as yet admitted only 
tacitly), all added to our general distrust of European di- 
plomacy as the result of our war experiences, were no doubt an 
important part of the reasons why the United States Senate 
refused to sanction the League pact without important modifi- 

227 



cations being made. It must be apparent to all who have 
succeeded to grasp the great breadth and depth of this subject 
that the present constitution of the League is too imperfect 
in foundation and scope, and too indefinite in its manner of 
action to lead successfully to the contemplated object. To 
become a real power for good the League must rest upon 
three propositions, now disregarded: 1. The free acknowledg- 
ment that the responsibility for the war must be borne jointly 
by all the six nations originally involved; 2. Upon such a revi- 
sion of the peace terms to the Triple Alliance nations as will 
be in accordance with the acceptance of the first proposition; 
3. It must include the defeated nations as full and free mem- 
bers. In addition, the League must have a more definite organi- 
zation of its police power than at present proposed, and the 
manner of participation therein must be made fully acceptable 
to the member nations. Without such a constitution of the 
League, Europe cannot reduce its armaments! This entire 
question, in its American and European aspect, has received 
more attention than any other part of the peace terms, both 
by the Senate debates and President Wilson's speeches. As it 
has since become the main subject of a great Presidential 
election and of discussion without limit, the author will reserve 
further explanations and criticisms on this topic for later 
articles. 



/^\ F THE peace terms of Germany, the proposition that she 
^-^ be compelled not only to reduce her army to the size of 
a mere police force (100,000 men), but also to abandon the na- 
tional and compulsory "manhood conscription" system and, 
instead, maintain a paid professional volunteer army is of great 
importance to all the nations as it might prove the means, in 
a short time, of compelling all of them (through popular de- 
mand) to adopt the same plan. The proposition indicates, 
however, that the statesmen of Europe still believe, League or 
no League — that wars will occur again and that the nations 
should be armed, at least on a moderate scale — and we in 
America seem to share this opinion by our war preparations. 
The propaganda for practical disarmament recently launched 

228 



in this country has made but little headway either in Congress 
or among the people because of the very uncertain inteima- 
tional situation still prevailing. Indeed, there can be no ques- 
tion that future wars are not only a possibility but a certainty 
— and even a necessity, especially in Europe ! Organized mili- 
tary foi*ce is primarily the necessary agent of the State to 
enforce law and order internally — in labor disturbances, polit- 
ical riots, etc. — and to insure its security externally in case of 
attack or in satisfaction of well-founded grievances. It would 
be ideal if the use of military force could be confined to these 
legitimate purposes; but this will be as difficult a task in the 
future as it has been in the past, because those human-nature 
traits which are at the bottom of great political eruptions — 
ambition to rise and expand, covetousness of advantages pos- 
sessed by others, vanity of race, economic necessity, etc. — have 
not changed in the ages! They appear, at times, to be well 
under control (particularly while the horror and effects of a 
a war still linger with a people), but soon revive to con- 
centrate upon even larger aggressive enterprises. (A more 
extended treatment of the ethical aspect of war will be found 
in Section "B" of this article.) The more the nations advance 
in population and power, the fiercer becomes the violence and 
the greater the extent of war when it does break out! From 
this point of view, the size of the army to be allowed each 
state and the manner of their organization become important 
points. Such regulation would be particularly the province 
of a League of Nations or of any similar World Tribunal, to- 
gether with all the related details of warfare; but whether the 
present League is strong enough to take and enforce any steps 
in this direction is very doubtful. In fact, the question imme- 
diately arises: Can regulations of this kind be enforced by the 
strongest kind of a League or Tribunal, and will they stand the 
strain of actual war? 

We have on a previous occasion made the observation that 
"modern armies are the people" and "the people are the 
armies," and the author believes that this must continue so in 
the future; it is a product of the times. It is not at all con- 
ceivable that another war among the nations of Europe could 
be confined to such limited armies as have been tentatively 

229 



proposed to be sanctioned under the League-of-Nations powers. 
Any future conflicts will immediately develop with great inten- 
sity to "wars of the nations," the whole nation on each side, 
and the actual fact of war will automatically suspend all artifi- 
cial agreements and limitations as to size and manner of the 
forces to be employed — each side will proceed to put forth its 
utmost effort. It is the writer's opinion, therefore, that a con- 
scripted "cit'zen soldiery" of short-term enlistment is far pref- 
erable to a long-term professional army. Not only is such an 
army, drawn from all ranks of the people as an obligation of 
patriotism, more national in character, but its plan conveys 
upon the entire manhood of a people the very desirable benefits 
of strict discipline and physical and moral training associated 
with the military service. Under this scheme, in case of war, 
the entire nation is prepared and ready to meet the enemy. 
The size of these "people's armies" could be regulated in some 
proportion to the total population of each country, and the 
drafting done in such relays as to furnish this training to the 
entire able-bodied manhood population, while maintaining the 
actual numbers in the graduating year, at any time, at the 
agreed total of effective forces. 

Much misinformation and bad logic have frequently been 
expressed, particularly in socialistic literature, as to the "crush- 
ing cost," the "awful burden upon the people" of such large 
national conscription armies. The figures of expenditure for 
them, certainly, appear enormous — but they are deceptive ; 
the cost is not all outgo; the hardship of taking men away from 
their regular occupations for a few years can be reduced by 
running government trade shops to do government work (at 
regular pay under contractors) for certain definite hours per 
day, or days per week. This plan would not interfere with 
outside labor and would keep the men in trim at their trades 
and also furnish them with extra income in addition to their 
pay as soldiers. The fact that neither Germany nor France, 
nor any other of the nations who had maintained universal 
military service before the late war had suffered economically 
from this institution in any manner — quite the contrary, they 
had all prospered greatly — is the best proof that the "crushing- 
cost" argument against it is not borne out by actual experience. 

230 



T OOKING back over the great war from the position taken 
-^ in this book, both the war and the victory must be adjudged 
a tremendous fiasco. None of the objects sought have been 
attained, at least not in the way and to the extent hoped for. 
Russia is not in Constantinople, and her southern-seacoast 
dreams are further removed than ever. Serbia has helped to 
crush Austria and has escaped the latter-s dictation over her, 
but at what cost! France — if she could but undo the war — 
would gladly leave Germany in possession of Alsace-Lorraine, 
and forget her desire for revenge! England has, temporarily, 
destroyed her rival, and no Berlin-Bagdad scheme will now be 
carried out by Germany, and the latter's commercial and naval 
competition is at an end for the present; but for how long a 
time and at what a price has England accomplished this? Italy's 
"Irredenta war" will turn out such a meagre practical success 
as to be almost a defeat, in view of the enormous cost to her 
in men and treasure. The once proud enpire of Austria is dis- 
membered forever, and the newly-formed states appear like 
old castle ruins looking _down upon a vanished past of a thou- 
sand years of stirring history! Poland is grinning a ghastly 
ironical smile and rattling the skeleton of her "national inde- 
pendence" at the scene of ruin all about her and at her own 
helplessness. Germany is beaten down and disorganized, 
crippled for decades to come; her case is that of a courageous 
man who meets six powerful bandits in the street who demand 
his money, but who resists, trusting to his strength and good 
right as a free man, but is promptly clubbed to death and 
robbed. America, who nervously hid her share of materialistic 
aims and pitiable jealousies behind the bold and disinterested 
face of democarcy, liberty and justice for all mankind — what 
has she achieved in the war? She has helped to bring about 
the fall of the German and Austrian empires, true; but has 
anything better taken their place, or is anything better than 
that which had been likely to come out of these arbitrary and 
violent transformations? Is it any benefit or "progress" to 
throw a string of half-cocked "nationalities" and "republics" 
into the world to live or die as best they may? 

And what about Russia whom we abandoned at the moment 
when she needed our encouragement, recognition and support 

231 



in her struggle for democracy to prevent her falling a victim 
to the terror of radicalism? Have we cleared up Europe and 
the rest of the world of autocracies, kings and kingdoms? 
There are still the following left requiring our attention — as we 
declared ourselves to be the elected authority for dictating gov- 
ernments: The kings and kingdoms of Great Britain, Holland, 
Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Serbia, 
Roumania; also the Sultan of Turkey, the Shah of Persia, the 
empire and Emperor of Japan, the British Indian empire, and 
sundry smaller principalities and princes of various degrees 
scattered over the world! We yet have a right goodly task 
before us! And how about justice? Has justice been done at 
Paris under the vaunted inspiration of our President? This 
answer we believe is given in this book, decidedly in the nega- 
tive, a verdict more and more supported by the public opinion 
of the world! 



T N CONTRAST with the artificial and almost "imposed" 
■*■ aspirations to freedom and national independence of the new 
countries named above there stands the case of Ireland, to which 
we have already briefly referred, of Ireland denied and defied, 
of Ireland so indubitably a people and a nation ! She possesses 
the absolute and unquestioned boundaries of an island in, the 
ocean, and an absolute racial solidarity and unity, except for 
the small minority of the Scotch-Irish in Ulster province. And 
this unfortunate — nay, disgraceful — internal division rests 
three-fourths on religious grounds and is only one-fourth polit- 
ical. This legitimate, historical and irrepressible aspiration of 
Ireland for freedom and independence, with which a large ma- 
jority of civilized mankind of every race and people is in hearty 
sympathy, has been coldly and offensively ignored by the peace 
conference at Paris — by the unmistakable order and insistence 
of England! She insists that the Irish agitation "is a domestic 
question"; that to encourage and sympathize with Ireland in 
her struggle "is to interfere in the domestic concerns of Great 
Britain" and to commit an unfriendly act towards her; that 
Ireland should be left to herself to settle the question with 
England, unsupported, unaided! The equal of this cold-blOoded 

232 



hypocrisy and ranting assurance of the British is not to be 
found on the face of the earth! And even we Americans, 
twenty per cent Irish in race, acquiesce in humble submission 
to the dictates of the British lion and convulsively but obe- 
diently gulp down our grandiloquent declarations about "the 
rights of small nations to liberty and independence." The 
author declares this to be a shameful attitude of dishonor, 
cowardice, injustice, self-condemnation that makes a pitiable 
parody of all our "war professions" and steeps our people in 
deep mortification! 

But Ireland's freedom must come as surely as the rising 
sun of to-morrow if there is to be any honor and honesty about 
this idea of assisting small nations to independence; if it is to 
be "a real principle" and not merely a political pretense in- 
vented to meet temporary exigencies. In that case the entire 
Entente world, including America, would stand convicted of 
hypocrisy and moral fraud beyond all measure! But we have 
stated the real crux of the Irish question in our previous refer- 
ence to it: "What was done, and done justly and to some ex- 
tent from noble motives, in the case of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, 
Hungary and Jugo-Slavia was feared to be done in the case of 
Ireland because of England's opposition! It is not that there 
is any doubt of Ireland's title to her independence; it is recog- 
nized that her title is greater than that of any one of the other 
peoples named, but the Entente allies and ourselves are en- 
tangled with England in the peace settlement and financially 
to such an extent, and are otherwise so thoroughly cast down 
with the fiasco and the burdens of the war, that action even by 
those whose sympathies are unequivocally with Ireland seems 
impossible at this time. May Ireland take courage — and gather 
patience and self-restraint — from these statements, and con- 
tinue her struggle in full confidence that but a short time more 
will see her hope and dream fulfilled, her faith rewarded, her 
glorious independence a reality! 

A T HOME, in America, the illusions of the war are still 
•**- largely prevalent, but a reaction and slow awakening to 
"its realities" has begun. We are beginning to see that we were 
deceived, our ignorance of Europe imposed upon and our gen- 
erous impulses exploited, but we have the good conscience that 

233 



we acted in good faith! Great, therefore, and well justified 
was the exultation of this country in the part it played in the 
war and in our military achievements! The victory celebra- 
tions and joyous troop receptions were an inspiring expression 
of our gratitude and satisfaction at the outcome. Too much 
honor and praise could scarcely be offered to our valiant 
troops! But, alas! for the dismal day not far distant when we 
shall fully come to realize that these brave boys — our crusader 
boys — fought for a chimera only, for an illusion revealed to 
have been a delusion! Fired with a noble but artificial ideal — 
as the whole nation was — our soldier boys were unknowingly 
deceived and sacrificed! What an awakening for us when we 
look upon the faces of "THOSE WHO HAVE PAID IN FULL," 
the faces of this fine young American manhood, to realize at 
the end the terrible truth that they have really died in vain! 
How maddening to think — and how pitiable — that all our fine 
patriotic effort, devotion, self-sacrifice, energy and skill of 
organization should have been wasted upon a false issue with 
a barren result! The "Huns" indeed! — but not the Huns in 
Germany, but the war-maker and profiteer Huns in Washington. 
Empty-handed we are! — we have achieved nothing! Nothing 
is better, no one is happier for our interference in the war; 
chagrin at the outcome, alarm for our future, a huge debt, 
personal sorrows and sacrifices are our reward! 

Are the couple of millions of German shipping tonnage 
we took over as helpless war prizes and those seven or eight 
hundred millions' worth of German-owned industries estab- 
lished here, which we seized, an adequate compensation for 
us? We should think not; not even if the entire German ship- 
ping and commercial competition against us were destroyed 
forever. 

How different our exultation, and pride would have been if 
we had gone to war in a real cause, against a real enemy who 
had tried to trample upon us, to interfere with our liberty 
and independence; how different if Germany or Austria had 
conspired against us politically and committed wilfull acts of 
enmity against us! But there was nothing of this kind going on 
against us in 1914 or at any time later, not till after we had 
declared war! The acts of "espionage" by Germany and Aus- 
tria before our entry into the war were acts of legitimate self- 

234 



protection only, mostly provoked by our own conspicuous un- 
neutrality. Those acts of offense and enmity which happened 
later — and which we greatly exaggerated to make out a good 
"casus belli" for our conscience, were mostly unavoidable re- 
sults of the existing state of war and its pitiless necessities. 
Had we had a real enemy before us, then, indeed, would Wil- 
liam Jennings Bryan's "million men have sprung up armed 
overnight" to guard the country's safety and honor! No need, 
then, to enact compulsory conscription, to suppress freedom of 
speech, publication and assembly, to hound innocent aliens, 
to insult and persecute loyal foreign-born citizens, to muffle 
and browbeat the Congress and to turn the country into a 
madhouse ! 



After-War Anti-German Demonstrations. The continuance 
of strong anti-German feeling in many quarters in this coun- 
try need surprise no one who has observed the scarcely abated 
activity of the British and American propagandas since the 
closing of the war. Adding to this the repeated inflaming 
speeches of President Wilson and other leaders and the un- 
changed hostility of a large part of the press, it is but natural 
that the "perverted view of the war" and its feelings of hate 
should still be with us. The fight against ignorance and deep- 
seated prejudice is ever a hard fight! Conspicuous in this per- 
sistent attitude are the American Loyal Legion, a national asso- 
ciation of ex-soldiers of the war; also the American Defense 
Society and the National Security League; also sundry organi- 
zations of women-patriots who seem to think it necessary to 
demonstrate their new political status by the extra zeal which 
everywhere characterizes the neovite. That our young soldiers, 
only a short time home from the war, their ears filled with the 
popular praises of "our heroes," should have an elated con- 
ception about the great importance of their services to the 
country is perfectly natural and fully justified. At this very 
writing, renewed affirmation is being made throughout the 
country — from Secretary of State Hughes down — of "the high 
idealism which inspired this people and our troops in the war," 
all in answer to Ambassador Harvey's common-sense speech of 
qualification made at the London Pilgrim Society dinner. While 
the administration evidently thinks the same or neax"ly the 
same as this foolhardy ambassador— for otherwise he would 
have been promptly disavowed and recalled — it is clear row 
that the sober view of the war is not yet deemed "good and 
safe knowledge" for the American people. Now, without wish- 
ing to utter one word or thought in disparagement of the splen- 
did showing which our troops and navy made on land and by 

235 



sea, the author submits that this extravagant language about 
their "idealism" is out of place and in bad taste, now that the 
war excitement should subside, because it is not in accordance 
with the facts. 

We all know that the call for volunteers was not a success 
and that the government was quickly obliged to institute com- 
pulsory national conscription to obtain the forces required. 
While it is quite beyond question that among these drafted 
troops there were many individuals who would have offered 
themselves as volunteers and who were animated by a deep 
interest in the war, high-minded patriotic devotion and "the 
humanitarian ideals" of the hour, it is not likely that these 
were more than probably 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the 
total numbers and that 85 per cent to 90 per cent of the men 
were in the war because of no particular enthusiasm and merely 
because they had been drafted and had to go! Resistance 
meant imprisonment; evasion and desertion meant death. This 
statement of the plain facts can scarcely be questioned; hence, 
the continuance of the exaggerated, fulsome talk about our sol- 
diers' "unselfish and voluntary sacrifice in the service of ideal 
objects," etc., stultifies both the men and those who indulge in 
it from a mistaken sense of patriotic zeal. 

A desirable sobering-up on this subject is gradually taking 
place among the more informed and thoughtful sections of the 
people and has found expression in the press and in Congress. 
Let us hope that it may soon spread among the general public 
so that we may regain our former international reputation of 
being a serious and sensible people! 

As to the "excesses of patriotism" of the Loyal Legion and 
other offenders, we repeat that they are chargeable to a super-* 
ebulition of animal spirits, national sentiment and war glory, 
perfectly natural and excusable but which should now be al- 
lowed to retire to the normal proportions and sober view in 
harmony with the facts. This applies to all that has happened 
in New York in this direction, from the blockading of the 
German opera to the "Rhine Horror" scenes and the following 
Ail-American demonstration and speeches in Madison Square 
Garden; equally to all similar occurrences in other cities. 



B. WAR AND CIVILIZATION. MISLEADING ILLUSIONS. 

A "NATURAL" VIEW OF LIFE AS THE REMEDY. 

THE TRUE HISTORICAL AND ETHICAL VIEW 

OF WAR. 

The most absorbing questions above all others within the 
awful war turmoil are these: "What about civilization; has 
it been lost? if lost, what was it and where is it gone? — or is 

236 



it still with us?" What is its character and position in rela- 
tion to the world tragedy just closed? There are thousands, 
millions who ask these questions, who have been deeply stirred 
by the occurrence of the war, who have lost all moral faith 
and self-confidence, who feel that we — mankind — have been 
deceived by our teachers, that we have wilfully deceived our- 
selves about ourselves and this pretense of civilization. In 
view of what has passed over us, the specific question knocks 
loudly at the door: "Is man really something more, something 
better than merely an educated and dressed-up animal?" How 
can we reconcile the terrible brutality of war with our pre- 
tensions of religion, education, refinement, humanitarianism — 
of superiority over the animal world? How can we recon- 
cile it with all else that we comprise in the terms "civilization", 
"civilized life", with our pretensions of being "higher beings" 
made in the image of an all-perfect creator, — embodiment of 
wisdom justice and all the virtues — God? 

The answer to these harassing contradictions which tor- 
ment so many of us and which outrage so poignantly our self- 
esteem and so-called "higher consciousness" is simple enough 
if we will but be honest with ourselves, strip off all accumu- 
lated artificiality, and contemplate the real natural Adam. But 
to perform this feat is not as easy as to state it; the great 
part of educated mankind are brought up to regard civilization 
and man from the exalted standpoint (above indicated) which 
supernatural religion or equivalent systems of egotistical phi- 
losophy have implanted in us and which, in spite of our doubts 
and disillusions, are firmly grown into the flesh and blood of 
the great majority of men. These make us regard ourselves 
as beings of a "spiritual nature", as standing apart from the 
remainder of created life, in fact as the very objects for which 
the world was created or, rather, exists. In practical applica- 
tion, however, "the world" shrinks quickly to the size of our 
little home-sphere, the earth; the suns and stars are but a set- 
ting and decoration for it; everything upon the earth is here 
for man „ alone; we are beings of a supernatural destiny of 
resurrection after death; we have an immortal soul, something 
which is distinct from the body and lives forever; animals die, 
and that is the end of them, but we die — and yet live again! 

237 



Such is the "monument of conceit" which man has made of 
himself and his terrestrial abode! Can there possibly be a 
more narrow view of "the world" and a more sophisticated 
one of the earth and its little insect-product man — when we 
think of the boundless extent of the universe, the millions of 
stars and other "worlds" which circle around, of the great 
forces which work all through this wonderful maze of cosmic 
activity and which, even at this "advanced" day, we but im- 
perfectly understand! 

Those who hold to this supernatural-life conception sur- 
round the real man with a glass house, a kind of showcase of 
self-admiration and exultation at our supposed select position 
in nature, — a showcase which for particular circumstances 
has its practical uses, but whose artificiality is incontestable. 
Inside of it is "the artificial man," man not "as and what he is" 
but as and what we, or they, tbe believers, would wish him to 
be, an ideal man, the goal-man, the god-man, the higher ego. 
With those who hold to this conception (with most of them 
merely a matter of acquired mental habit, not of self-evolved 
convictions) "civilization" in all its manifestations partakes of 
this same artificial character and point of view; hence, war 
is to them an atrocious, revolting, accusing, debasing, incom- 
prehensible contradiction. The terrible reality of its occur- 
rence makes their artificial creation tremble, and, for the 
moment, shakes their faith! And one should, indeed, think 
that this orgie of blood — war — with its thousands and thou- 
sands of the slain and maimed, its boundless suffering and 
sorrow spread throughout the world without a sign having come 
from this God in this Heaven would knock the last prop from 
under the belief in a personal, responsible and "benign" power 
as the creator and ruler of the world, and destroy all faith in 
the higher nature and destiny of man. But the oblivion 
brought by time restores the tottering confidence of "the be- 
lievers" and they soon return to their flattering weave of self- 
deception. History might teach them their error, but they 
close their ears; nature all about them could do so still better 
by her denials and contradictions: The living in filth and 
degradation of millions of these exalted humans; the starving 
to death of other millions annually from want, while "their 

238 



brothers" have super-abundance; the character of other mil- 
lions who are in sense and sensibilities below the stage of 
many animals; the hopeless depravity of other millions living 
in the very centers of progress and refinement; the shocking 
spectacle of the unpitying killings of millions of heads of cattle, 
sheep, hogs, beasts of the woods, birds, fowls and fishes for 
human food that this special creature — man — may gratify his 
Lucullian appetite when, yet, there is abundant palatable and 
more wholesome food in the world which is not of the blood 
of life of other creatures! All this evidence there is and 
more, but they, the believers, close their eyes and ears for 
fear of disturbing their vainglorious dream! 

We also have the evidence of our general helplessness and 
of the absence of any "specially favored destiny or protection" 
when a Vesuvius or an Aetna, a tidal wave or a monsoon, an 
earthquake or a great epidemic breaks loose and sweeps man 
and his works away like leaves before a wind! And, further, 
there is the death and suffering wrought by the lesser "acci- 
dents" of life due to the imperfection of man's own work 
or to his fallibility — railroad accidents, ship disasters, ex- 
plosions, conflagrations, inundations, machinery accidents, elec- 
tric shocks, cuts, falls, etc. With all these, and with "moral" 
pains and disappointments, we are "but a bit of chaff", helpless 
at the caprice of the unfeeling, unreasoning and irrespon- 
sible forces of nature. 

Or, would anyone be bold enough to say that in these visi- 
tations and accidents "the victims" are a specially selected 
congregation of humans or specially wicked individuals, in each 
case, ordained by the assumed agent of eternal justice residing 
in an assumed "heavenly" abode to be thus specially punished 
for wrongs each and every one so visited had committed? The 
proposition is too absurd to be entertained; but what, then, 
must be our conclusion? How can we reconcile these facts 
with our vain assumption that we are the objects of a "divine 
solicitude and providence" and of a pre-designed destiny for 
eternal, imperishable conscious life? No reliable sign and evi- 
dence of such conscious existence of man after death on earth 
has ever come! Nor is there any evidence of any intelligent 
destiny and direction to a steadily progressive purpose in the 

239 



history of the human race; there is no continuous advance 
from a lower level to a higher one, each individual, each people 
and period of civilization handing on to the next, unabridged, 
what they had inherited and what they had themselves won in 
order for them — their successors — to build further and higher. 
Such continuous progress appears only over periods of limited 
duration — a few thousand years at best — which are insignifi- 
cant in the arena of cosmic cycles of time. On the contrary, 
we climb — and slide back a little; we climb some more — and 
slide back some more ; we climb again — then slide back the 
whole length of the ladder to the bottom! Such is the history 
of the coming and going civilizations in respect of the various 
races and peoples of recorded time ; but in a later article the 
author will attempt to give even a larger perspective of this 
subject, from which it will appear that man's entire known 
period of existence is but one of many similar predecessors 
which all rose to their height — then fell to extinction, separated 
by ages of stagnation. 

Quite different from the supernatural is the "natural view" 
of life, the view in calm harmony with the facts of nature and 
with man's physical character, capacities, disposition, neces- 
sities and opportunities. It sees man as a product of this 
earth, similar in origin and makeup to all other animal life, 
merely of a higher order and development of facilities (erect 
stature, freedom of hands, articulation," etc.) bringing increased 
opportunities to learn and develop and with them the growth 
of "reflective intelligence." We perceive the structure and 
functions of our thinking and feeling apparatus to be similar 
to those of the higher animals, only so much more developed 
by constant practice and the ability of free movement over 
the earth and the sea, and by readier climatic accommodation. 
The sensations of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, pain and 
wellbeing, joy and grief, sexual desire, love of life and pressure 
of self-preservation link us to the animal world and to nature 
at large inseparably with unbreakable chains and in every 
way so categorically that it makes the opposite conception 
appear a mere childish freak of ignorance and foolish vanity. 
All this is demonstrated very prosaically (and in some respects 
very offensively to that refinement of sensibilities which is the 

240 



accompaniment of civilization) by the identical physical func- 
tioning of our bodies with those of the lower "animals" — the 
processes of breathing, nutrition, excretion, growth, reproduc- 
tion, disease, decline — death and dissolution. These truths are 
pitilessly destructive of our assumed pretense of importance 
and dignity as "special and immortal beings" ; if we were such, 
why are we not made different? Why has this immortal 
soul of man not yet been identified and proven different from 
the soul of the animal, the flower or the apple tree, that soul 
which is individualized in the myriad exhibits of nature — which 
is nature itself? While the gulf which separates the most 
advanced animals from man is immense, it is a difference of 
degree only and not of fundamental kind. Why have not all 
the countless ages of man's development succeeded to eliminate 
one dot of his animal physique and necessities, of his mental 
and emotional character, of the limitation of his understand- 
ing? We have the right to ask these questions of supernatural 
religion with its claims and confident assurances — but receive 
no intelligible answer. 

In this natural and truthful conception of life which the 
author attempts to convey "civilization" is not anything so 
very remarkably advanced, wonderful or exalted as we are 
wont to proudly believe; it only appears to us to be so rela- 
tively; the foundation, nature, and the material, man, are and 
remain ever the same ; it is astonishing and instructive to see 
how thin is this artificial product, how easily it is stripped 
off, how near man is at all times to his "natural" state. The 
war has, once again, pointed this lesson with a terrifying 
eloquence! That civilization is not regular, continuous and 
permanent we have already pointed out, nor is it at any time 
of very great absolute perfection. It should be regarded as 
merely a logical result of man's momentary state of develop- 
ment at any given epoch, the result of the challenge thrown 
out by nature to the forces within him to make their utmost 
demonstration under the many varried conditions of existence. 
It measures the degree of man's conquest over nature at any 
given time, over the many obstacles and uncertainties, the 
arbitrariness and unbending dictation which he encounters in 
the path of his struggle for self-preservation, for a living, 

241 



comforts, enjoyments, position and power over others, individu- 
ally and collectively, in various directions. 

In proportion as civilization advances, it is, in a measure, 
a getting-away from nature; and it is a nice question as to 
how far man may proceed upon this road, individually and 
in a mass, with impunity, i. e., with immunity from harmful 
consequences. Evidently, being nature's children (altogether 
so in our view) the artificial life of civilization must reach 
a limit at some time at the point where we begin to suffer 
and deteriorate physically, and where life, as such, becomes 
unenjoyable, where a state of weariness at the oppressive sur- 
feit of the artificial sets in. At that point we are compelled 
to stop and turn back. Individual men, peoples and entire 
periods of civilization reach that condition from time to time. 
As to attaining perfection of development, history shows civi- 
lization in its various periods among different peoples to have 
been one-sided and imperfect in each, now excelling more in 
this direction and now in that, here showing deficiencies of one 
class and there of another; also it shows it to have been irregu- 
lar and flitting in its coming and going from one people or 
part of the earth to another. Each period seems to have left 
some things attempted unattained, notable achievements of 
former times lost and forgotten, those of later periods not even 
dreamt of. However it be, it rises like a wave to its crest, 
then recedes to a calm, to exhaustion, to recuperation and a 
new rise and swell to eminence at some other place; it is 
the picture of ever-continuous life within transformation and 
death, the reflection of nature itself in her round of summer 
and winter, resurrection and burial. 

It follows that in the view of life and man's character 
here presented, war is not anything unnatural. All nature i? 
the scene *of perpetual war of contending forces; self-preserva- 
tion is a battle from the smallest creatures up to man; every 
living thing seems to have its "natural" enemy (by instinct) 
whom it wants to destroy, and many "live upon each other" 
for food; peace within this unceasing struggle is only re- 
cuperation for new effort of demonstration, acquisition, dom- 
ination ; absolute peace means stagnation and decay. Man's 
nature is animal — imperative physical necessities to be satis- , 

242 



fied, the passions of the flesh to be appeased, the emotions of 
love and hate, jealousy and vengeance, desire for possessions 
and of power over others to be asserted — and leads inevitably 
to contention and strife with his fellowman and equally among 
entire peoples. Nor is man, the animal, when aroused in his 
fundamental physical character, a gentle animal like a cow, 
a fish, a fowl or the little things which creep in the ground : 
on the contrary he is fierce, bloodthirsty and terrible like the 
wolf of the steppes and the tiger of the jungles. Thus the 
essence of war is ever present and ever the same whether man 
meets man with a spiked club, a flint-lock gun or a modern 
repeating rifle, with a Roman catapult or a fifteen-inch breech- 
loading gun! And while mechanical and scientific progress 
have, on the one hand, produced the awful agencies of destruc- 
tion, death and mutilation which this war has shown, they have 
happily, on the other hand, produced the amelioration of 
suffering by modern surgery, medicine and hospital nursing, 
and the vastly improved care for the soldier from every point 
of view. Hence, there is for those who subscribe to a rational 
and normal view of life, including war, no conflict, incom- 
patibility or accusation between war and civilization, no dis- 
illusionment and no remorse; these sentimental agonies belong 
alone to those who are morbidly illusioned and oppressed by 
an artificial conception of the character of man, his life on the 
earth and assumed destiny after death. 

But an important differentiation must be asserted. While 
war, in the view stated, is inevitable from time to time as a 
condition "natural to man" and as the final appeal and only 
definite conclusion in serious enmities between nations, there 
is, nevertheless, a great distinction to be drawn as to the 
character of wars; as to quality of motives and any real un- 
avoidable necessity. Those of the past which have been pure 
wars of aggression and conquest of the stronger upon the 
weaker for political and material gain, or those of injury and 
subjugation from mere envy, greed and racial jealousy, or 
those of mere monarchical or imperial self-perpetuation, or 
those — most execrable of all — of religious contention and per- 
secution are to be entirely condemned and should be made 
impossible in the future by every means which can be devised. 

243 



But there are other wars of the past — such as will also be justi- 
fied in the future — which have been as the beacon lights in 
man's general advance, intellectual, moral, material. Such 
were the wars in revolt of oppression by tyrannical, arbitrary 
governments, whether they were those of monarchical or 
popular tyranny; those for national consolidation and inde- 
pendence when conditions for such were ripe, above all those 
for man's intellectual and moral emancipation and for free 
popular government in agreement with modern thought and 
feeling. 

History is replete with these commendable, constructive 
wars : The wars of the Greek and Roman republics of old ; of 
Spain, Holland and Switzerland, and others more, for national 
independence; the wars of the "reformation" for religious 
freedom and tolerance ; that of America for freedom from 
England and establishment of our republic; the civil war for 
the maintenance of the American Union ; the wars of the 
French revolution for the intellectual and political emancipa- 
tion of mankind; the smaller modern revolutionary wars; those 
of Germany's and Italy's consolidation to nationality; finally, 
the struggles for free institutions in Russia and Germany as 
the result of the great war just closed. But of the condemn- 
able wars of olden and modern times none approaches in ab- 
sence of justification, in low grade of motives and falsehood of 
every species the war of 1914-1919 on the part of five original 
war powers of 1914, but overwhelmingly of the three Entente 
powers! Its cupidity was surpassed only by its stupidity; it 
was in fact, the unintentional result of a fatal diplomatic mis- 
calculation, as fully explained by the author in Article VIII. 
It forced Germany and her allies to challenge the world to -a 
war in self-defense of their honor and independence, the grand- 
est in scale, courage and devotion which the world has seen. 
This will be the universal verdict on this war in less than ten 
years from now, when complete calm will have replaced the 
present mental and emotional disturbance. 

In the largest view, however, the direct motives and in- 
cidents which led to the outbreak of the great war were not in 
themselves the primary cause, but, rather, an effect, a con- 
sequence of our decadent and barren system of morals which 

244 



is incapable of exercising effective control over men's minds 
and emotions and serves only as a cloak for the inherent evil 
impulses of- a race unchecked by genuine ideals. To this must 
be added the accompanying state of "Spiritual Inertia," previ- 
ously discussed in Article VII, mainly pi-oduced by our preoccu- 
pation with material subjects and achievements. But had there 
been in practice a sound system of personal and political ethics 
founded on natural facts and unprejudiced reason, one the 
truth and power of which men would have felt in their inmost 
hearts as a true guide to right action, this spiritual inertia 
could not have been influential! Now that the war is past 
and we realize its monstrosity and are cast down with chagrin 
and remorse, we make a concerted but imbecile effort to 
prevent a similar disaster by a purely political and one-sided 
scheme of a League of Nations. The more credulous pretend 
to believe that this means will be effective; but how should this 
be possible if the fundamental ethical errors and deficiencies, 
which we have named as the real underlying causes of our 
condition, are left untouched? We must go deeper — to the 
very bottom ; we must tear off our old dress of hypocritical 
and worn-out ideas and plunge into the fountain of real truth, 
naturalness and genuine human brotherhood-sympathy for our 
regeneration. A radical remedy is needed! While there is 
no harm in supernatural religious assumptions as a specula- 
tion merely of the imagination, as a subject for mythical poetry 
and art, as a pretty fancy for primitive peoples, children and 
the mentally simple, these fancies must not be transformed 
into beliefs in their actuality and made the foundation 'of our 
practical life conceptions and rules of moral action. Herein 
lies the danger and harmfully misleading influence of religion; 
it furnishes a false environment and perspective to our exist- 
ence, fills the mind of man with impossible illusions and puts 
him in constant contradiction with the hard facts of daily 
life experiences and the whole history of the race. This con- 
dition leads to a perversion of the judgment and the impulses 
until our whole position is become unnatural, diseased and 
theoretical — and we have, in short, the glass house and its 
inmate ! 

245 



It is an interesting question whether the periodical stag- 
nation and collapse of civilizations, this puzzling fact of 
climbing and backsliding and losing of achievement, this ab- 
sence of a steady continuity in man's advance may not be 
due to the influence of these unsound life views, these hallu- 
cinations about ourselves which from time to time are bound 
to end up in a climax of reaction, of revelation of their un- 
soundness, and in a consequent moral and spiritual debacle. 
In the rational view and practice of life, as suggested in this 
book, it is, on the contrary, possible to encompass the attain- 
ment of this continuity and the advent of a steady progress 
of man of unbounded scope and splendor! 



Excrescences of Religion. Apart from the many "sects" of 
the Christian and other religions which have, at least, some 
theological dogma or interpretation of the Bible for their foun- 
dation, there are all those strange modern vagaries — Spiritual- 
ism, New-Thought, Christian Science, Theosophy, Occultism, 
etc., which are neither religion, dogma, schools of ethics, sys- 
tems of philosophy nor anything else definite and classifiable. 
These negative "cults" are, however, very important for the 
author's argument by proving — from their great number and 
very large following — the utter dissatisfaction with orthodox 
supernatural religions by a growing section of the public, and 
its yearning for something more satisfying and convincing. 
With all that, these "cults" are not atheistc nor even strictly 
agnostic, and hold fast to the fundamental ideas of super- 
natural religions, as set forth in the preceding text. Regarding 
spiritualism, spiritism, re-incarnation, occultism, and all other 
forms which believe in "spirits", "messages", "manifestations", 
"materialization of the departed", etc., these strange vagaries 
have the ardent object of proving the theory of supernatural 
existence by finding and producing evidence of its actuality. 
(The evidence is "found" in various ways and very often 
"produced" in the literal sense). This object and its methods 
cannot be regarded as anything else but a species of pitiable 
self-deceit proceeding from, and appealing to, minds naturally 
weak or pathologically affected, in other words "unsound" in the 
sense of being super-credulous, morbidly impressionable, un- 
clear, and unable to bring logical reasoning powers to bear 
on the physical processes by which the various forms of "super- 
natural evidence" are manifested. The physical processes are 
the well-established facts and methods of mesmerism, trance, 
somnambulism, thought-influence or telepathy, hypnotism and 
every other form of "super-excited psychological manifesta- 
tions." Their names are many and impressive but their nature is 

246 



identical, and rests upon the general principles, facts and power 
of psychology and metaphysics. In the hands of the trained 
scientist, physician and minister of religion these facts and 
powers are of the greatest value — whether applied to spiritual, 
moral, medical or merely material problems — but in the hands 
of the half-trained professional "teachers" in these lines and 
the many unprincipled charlatans who thrive upon them and 
the public's credulity, they are mostly a deception and merely 
a means of financial exploitation. 



XV. THE SUMMIT 

The Nineteenth Century. Progress or Decay? The Philosophy 

of "Rationalism" vs. Supernatural Religions. Its 

Practical Application. 

When at the battle of Waterloo, in 1815, the great Napoleon 
was defeated and European peace established soon thereafter, 
a new era began to dawn upon the world. The European 
nations — the flower of the earth — were at last permitted to 
turn from the horrors and distractions of war to the hopes and 
beneficent employments of peace. A great mental reforma- 
tion, a resurrection or intellectual renaissance had been wrought 
by the French Revolution and the years of political, military 
and philosophical strife which followed in its wake. The new 
theories of individual rights and increased personal liberty — 
the new intellectual and moral freedom — had gone into the flesh 
and blood of men and become a living faith. Now that peace 
had come again with a fair promise of permanence, after a 
period of twenty-six years of turbulence, this new philosophy 
imperatively called for demonstration in all the fields of human 
endeavor — and the territory and all attendant conditions were 
ripe for this demonstration. It was, moreover, a case of urgent 
material necessity. The world had been impoverished, fam- 
ished, disjointed! Destruction in town and city, of farm build- 
ings and country estates, and devastation of fields and forests 
had been going on for two decades in France, Central Europe 
and Italy. The scale of living had been reduced to the mini- 
mum required for bare existence, except for the very rich, 

247 



and many of that class also had suffered severe privations 
through political persecution and exile. No wonder, then, that 
the world now began to draw a new breath. The problem for 
it was "to get on its feet again", to work and plan wi*h dili- 
gence to replace the waste, to accumulate new resources for a 
new era of material progress. In this new era, pursuant to 
the new ideas, a greater number of all the people should share 
in the material wellbeing hoped for, than had formerly been 
possible. 

At this period the world was a different one from that of 
to-day. It was a great world of new ideas in politics, philos- 
ophy, literature, art and music, in theoretical science and 
mathematics, but in applied sciences it was a world in its in- 
fancy compared to our day. Although only a hundred years 
behind us in point of time, it stood neai'er to Greece and Rome 
and the Middle Ages than to us. There were no power engines 
of any kind except simple hydraulic and other mechanical de- 
vices; no railroads or steamboats, no telegraph, telephone, gas- 
light and power, or electric-light and power; no automobile, 
aeroplane, submarine or wireless telegraph. Mechanical science, 
electricity, chemistry, photography, sanitation, medicine, hy- 
giene and surgery were still in their early stages of tentative 
development, pregnant of great things to come, but practically 
just emerging from the darkness of the Middle Ages. In the 
finest residences and hotels of those days there were no water- 
supply and heating systems, no sanitary plumbing apparatus 
and sewage disposal, nothing but candle light and primitive oil 
lamps, and the cooking apparatus and other domestic appoint- 
ments were of the simplest kind. Scientific ventilation was 
entirely unknown. Cities had no public water and sewer sys- 
tems. No long-distance communication of any kind existed; 
the post-chaise-and-four was the means of traveling and mail 
service ; everything in all these respects was of the simplest kind 
compared with the conveniences, comforts and advantages of 
our time. It is not easy for us to form a correct mental pic- 
ture of the living and working conditions of those days, . so 
great is the difference ! 

But the awakening of the world to a new life was on its 
way. James Watts had seen the kettle-lid moving; Volta and 

248 



Franklin were experimenting in electricity and galvanism ; 
chemists and physicists were delving and brewing; later the 
great Faraday came with his startling discoveries. Fulton had 
made the first tentative runs with his steamboat on the Hud- 
son, and the mechanism of the steam engine— that greatest 
single achievement of modern history — was being perfected. 
Soon that "wonder engine" set the wheels a-rolling, we might 
say all the wheels of the modern era, of the greatest of the 
centuries. In a short time there were railroads, steamboats, 
steam engines of every sort to drive mechanical-power plants, 
and manufacturing establishments arose of every variety. 
The loom, the lathe, the scientific pump, many kinds of power 
tools and wonderful hand tools were being invented ; the sew- 
ing machine and knitting machine came in due order. Mean- 
time, in the scientific world discoveries of a marvelous kind 
were being made which soon gave us artificial gas light and 
domestic water service, the telegraph, the telephone, the great 
printing press that works like a thing of life, the dynamo for 
producing electric light and the motor for power, the typewrit- 
ing machine, the phonograph, cinematograph and dictagraph, 
gas and oil and compressed-air engines, the gasoline engine and 
the automobile, the electric power battery and storage battery, 
the submarine boat, airship and flying machine, wireless tele- 
graphy and aerial telephony, and countless wonderful appli- 
cations of these forces and devices. Chemistry kept apace with 
its valuable discoveries in the field of the hydro-carbons and 
coal-tar products, in finding new substances and processes — 
liquification of air, many new gases, Roentgen rays and radium, 
refrigeration and food preservation processes, etc., while phys- 
ical and mechanical sciences hastened to apply these new 
means in the thousand-and-one ways and uses with which we 
are familiar. It was a stupendous century of research, study, 
invention, progress in knowledge and revolution in methods 
and scale of living, working and enjoyments! 

In all this there was the stimulus of a goal, the ambition 
to advance from that which had been attained, stepwise, to that 
which loomed up ahead as something still newer, promising, fas- 
cinating; and between pure experimental science and necessity 
— between the insistent demands for new conveniences and 

249 



facilities, new life benefits and attractions and the power of 
discovery and invention — there ensued the restless chase of the 
galloping nineteenth century for more and more of new thrills 
of achievement. We have been to the North Pole and the South 
Pole ; we travel upon the water, under the water and in the 
air with the certainty of land locomotion ; we have delved into 
analytical chemistry and biology to a point which brings us 
close to solving the riddle of life. The general advance in 
theoretical and mathematical astronomy has been so wonderful 
that with the aid of the modern monster telescope we can 
almost walk around on Luna and Mars as if they were the 
earth itself, and the progress in photography has fixed their 
pictures with astonishing accuracy. Utilitarian physics and 
chemistry have taught us how to turn the very dust and debris 
of the earth and the life processes into useful material! We 
fly across three-thousand miles of ocean in a few hours, and 
with the aerial and land telephone can talk around the earth; 
the engineering marvels of the railroads, with their tunnels and 
bridges, have been supplemented by the great canals of Suez, 
Kiel, Corinth and Panama. In our cities magnificent buildings 
for hotels and offices, of thirty to forty stories in height, have 
been erected and in their internal equipments are compendiums 
of everything that science and art have developed for the 
service and gratification of this luxui'ious modern man, while 
the ingenious subways and sub-river-tunnel railroads furnish 
rapid city travel free from interference from street traffic. 
Our transatlantic, lake and river steamers are floating hotels, 
wonders of strength, size, speed, ingenuity of arrangement and 
elegance of installation. It would seem that our every thirst 
and ambition for knowledge of the earth and of the heavens, 
of man and his life purpose, of physical satisfaction and plea- 
sures are now satisfied and that we are apparently arrived at a 
summit in all of these respects. The state of "continuous ex- 
pectancy" of the last seventy-five years is abating, the book of 
wonders is closing, the summit of our powers and dreams seems 
attained! 

In truth, what is there left for man to achieve of additional 
marvels to minister to his service or progress unless he develop 
some new intellectual sense, like the comprehension of the 

250 



fourth dimension, or turn to a new philosophical idea and life 
perspective, as he might, by abandoning the cult of the super- 
natural? There will, no doubt, be perfectioning of detail and 
increasing variety of all that we now possess, and extensions 
into related fields. The imagination can see a thousand things 
to which the powers which we now control may yet be applied. 
But, what essentially new great problems and ambitions in the 
lines of discovery and invention are there really and visibly left 
to us — objects of our ardent desires — links to our knowledge, 
necessities to the enlargement and improvement of our exist- 
ence? 

Only a few years back there was still the North-pole lure 
and the South-pole lure, the submarine boat, the navigation 
of the air, wireless telegraphy and telephony. Today we have 
left only two or three major problems of burning interest to 
excite our energies. One is the penetration into the bowels of 
the earth to such depth, and at sufficiently numerous points, as 
to enable us to solve the question of the structure of the earth's 
crust (if it be a crust) or of its interior formation — whether 
it be a mass of molten stone and metal or a cold solid of sili- 
cious and metallic nature — or, perhaps, a hollow space filled 
with hot gases. Modern engineering should be able to sink 
open steel-tube shafts to such depth — twenty-five miles or 
more — that a safe surmise, at least, might be made as to the 
earth's 'interior structure. Another problem left is the pene- 
tration into the air region around the earth to the limits of this 
gaseous envelope to ascertain its nature and, perhaps, beyond 
into the ether of light and electricity, even far enough to es- 
tablish communication with, or at least gain precise informa- 
tion about, the nearest heavenly bodies to our earth — our sate- 
lite Moon and the planet Mars and its moons. With the dis- 
covery of explosive agents of unbelievable power, and our 
ability to construct titanic guns of corresponding strength, the 
vision rises of our ultimately reaching these bodies ! These 
two quests into the unknown are no more chimerical than 
many of those which we have solved would have appeared to 
the people of a hundred years ago. The third visible problem 
is the continuation of advanced biological research to discover 

251 



the process of the spontaneous generation of organized self- 
conscious animal life — of our life. THIS IS THE GREATEST. 
These three major tasks still before us are, undoubtedly, 
of absorbing interest and scientific value ; yet, if we reflect, 
it may be seen that they are of much less direct human-life 
usefulness than those which were the effort and grand success 
of the nineteenth century. Thus the immediate future before 
mankind lacks, in comparison, the stimulus of similar power- 
fully incentive subjects of science and life problems as those 
were which gave such a zest of endeavor to the immediate past. 
Even the wonderful new cosmic theory of "relativity" as ex- 
pounded by Professor Albert Einstein — relativity of the values 
of time, space, motion, gravitation and all other cosmic forces — 
holding the prospect of completely changing our conception of 
the universe and all its processes, does not affect or interest 
us deeply in regard to our mundane life-existence. For a con- 
siderable period, no doubt, we shall remain at our summit to 
perfect, enlarge, exploit and enjoy our accomplishment. Then, 
if no new conditions shall arise to give a fresh aspect to life, 
with practical tasks of immediate necessity or great desirability, 
different in kind from the three stated above, and now hidden 
from our view, there must inevitably follow a period of in- 
difference, stagnation and decay similar to those of past ages. 



C O much for the outward demonstration and effect of things. 
But everything in life, every fact and exhibition, is founded 
on ideas and is guided by ideas. Behind the act there stands 
the thought, behind the intention and method the philosophical 
basis. That day when primitive man first stopped to act and 
desire from mere unreasoning animal impulse and began to 
think and reflect about things, including his own acts and feel- 
ings, and to develop the sense of right and wrong, was the 
greatest day in the history of this earth and its animated in- 
habitants. Mind and moral principles together — with neces- 
sity as the mainspring — determine quality and scope of action ; 
and as, from time to time, new levels of station are reached, 
new adjustments must be made, new perceptions and convic- 
tions translated into practice if action is not to deteriorate to 

252 



mechanical repetition. Thus in the world of pure thought and 
emotion — religion, morals, philosophy, political and social sys- 
tems — identical astonishing development has taken place in this 
remarkable nineteenth century, and we seem to have similarly 
arrived at a summit of outlook, scope and means where either 
new standards must be found or stagnation and decay result 
from the insufficiency of the old ideas to provide a satisfactory 
working guide and stimulating goal for the new future. The 
following reflections have been expressed in connection with 
the topics of preceding articles: "A new, vigorous, clear and 
bold philosophy is imperatively needed for the freely-thinking, 
emancipated sections of mankind, lest we be willing to see this 
civilization die of the poison of impotent resignation to the 
contradictions which confront supernatural religions and which 
other systems of thought are likewise unable to meet to our 
satisfaction. 

In the article on the ethical transformation of large numbers 
of the working and business population of the most advanced 
countries — Article XIII, Part B — we spoke of the inability of 
the new views of mere religious negation, of indefinite ethical 
theories and of unnatural human-rights doctrines to furnish a 
firm moral basis to the individual, especially when associated 
with an insufficient educational foundation. The state of con- 
fusion and exasperation produced by this mental condition is 
directly accountable for the unfortunate prevalent misconcep- 
tion of the ideas and aims of socialism and of popular political 
institutions by those so affected. Religious and other reliable 
guides are wholly or partly discarded in these cases without a 
firm level of new views having been gained. As We said, only 
few, in proportion, have in this struggle "attained the confi- 
dence and serenity of full new convictions," of a new rational 
moral outlook and conception of life. But these difficulties 
and errors and discouragements do not remove the causes of 
the existing doubt and distraction; the life-problems and the 
mental conditions, as we described them, cannot be removed by 
merely ignoring them; they are the stern reality with which we 
must deal — and the remedy and new rejuvenated confidence 
must be brought to all! What is lost entirely or become un- 
reliable by having proven itself insufficient cannot be rein- 

253 



stated, nor can the new positions and visions gained, even if 
yet imperfect, be dissipated by denial. These new ideas and 
feelings have come to. stay and they demand an answer, a 
satisfactory answer which will appeal to reason: It is our 
problem — the greatest problem before mankind — to give this 
answer, to furnish to all men and women that new and truer 
conception of mankind and life upon which a new era of civili- 
zation, of increased and more equal happiness may firmly be 
built and the fatal inertia and decay which face us be averted ! 
It is this new idea of life, this new moral basis which must re- 
generate man's imagination, disclose new paths and objects of 
work and living and thus prevent the surfeit of material 
achievement and the oppression of dead religious conceptions 
overwhelming him. 

What the character of this new faith and guide must be, 
and the reasons for its being and its acceptance, have now been 
outlined: It is'to be the naturally-ethical view of man and 
life, free from all supernatural attributes and destiny. Reason 
and physical probability must be the test; our attitude in all 
questions must be "rationally critical"; consequently we must 
repel the hypnotic thraldom of supernatural conceits and come 
down out of our artificial heaven upon this earth altogether, 
to the bosom of our mother, our alpha and omega, and make 
this life here our heaven, and our character and works our 
only possible, desirable and comprehensible immortality. This 
philosophy sets us in complete harmony with nature upon a 
basis of facts instead of illusions; it removes those doubts and 
fears which confront us the moment we shut ourselves up in 
that glass house, and, instead, gives clearness to our view and 
firmness to our purpose. It centers our moral responsibility 
directly in the individual, or in the community, and confines 
it upon this earth alone, free from any artificial reservations 
of "accounting" in a future state of life. Being of and through 
nature, this mode of thought must rest upon the study of her 
laws and works and upon the study and discipline of our own 
"human nature," making them jointly the source and guides 
for our code of practical morals and life ideals. In this way 
shall we acquire that clearness of thought, faith and aim which 
will permit us to bring the new socialistic and free political 

254 



ideas which are active everywhere into a successful combination 

with which to overcome our dangers and build a new period 
of progressive civilization. This system of life philosophy we 
will name "The true Rationalism." 

How is this revolutionary transformation in life-view, ethics, 
in social and political institutions to be promulgated and guided 
along? We are not only speaking of the correction and broad- 
ening needed in those already inculcated with the new thought, 
but particularly of the conversion of the yet unaffected or 
only partly touched sections of the people. On the practical 
side of this program there will not be much difficulty — it is even 
now almost conquered territory; the only real opposition will 
be from the rich and privileged who will have to surrender 
a portion of their favored positions and advantages for the 
common good. But on the ethical side the transformation will 
not be so easy or so rapid. The average man is quick enough 
to see the practical points in a new movement, but slow to 
assimilate the theory, the idea which is behind it, and to feel 
the close connection between the two. But this theoretical 
side, the philosophy of the new conviction and aspiration, is 
the most important part because it is the foundation of the 
practical embodiment. We know how deeply rooted with many 
is the fascination of the supernatural, the thought of our supe- 
rior quality and destiny, the hope of a blissful state in a here- 
after ! 

And yet it is the truth that these beliefs are today in over- 
whelming preponderance more a matter of early teaching, of 
mental habit, of force of association, of practical "business" 
value, even, than of true conviction! They flatter our vanities, 
lull our apprehensions, reassure superficially our natural timid- 
ity as to death being the ultimate and definite end of us — but 
they do not satisfy the critical reasoning faculties of very large 
numbers. The progress in breadth and boldness of intelligence 
of the educated man of our time over the same man of even 
sixty years ago is immense (excepting the small army of the 
pioneers) , and the similar progress of the ordinary man of 
today is even greater! The effect of the wonderful one-hun- 
dred years past has been to sharpen the reasoning faculties, to 
eradicate timidity and bugaboo fears of the supernatural and 
to make man self-reliant of opinion. The lure of "a heaven" 

255 



and fear of "a hell" are broken with millions and have become 
a matter of doubt with even greater numbers; in truth, if the 
mental inertia in matters of abstract thought, which holds so 
many captive, and all the social and utilitarian influences were 
removed from the practice of religion, the proportion of "seri- 
ous and convinced worshippers" in our churches would shrink 
to a surprisingly low figure. 

It is this indifference to, this disappointment with superna- 
tural religion because of its delusive teachings and impotent 
results, which has, in the absence of a clear and strong new 
philosophy to take its place, produced the moral bankruptcy of 
the masses and laid them open to every revolutionary theory 
in ethics and social and political reform. But it is the fact of 
the great war — the possibility of its occurrence — which has 
brought all this unbelief and dissatisfaction to a focus and 
added millions more of disillusioned and mortified humans to 
the others already in that condition ; it has given the knock-out 
blow to the pious belief in a kind and just heavenly father, a 
reigning providence and future eternal life of higher destiny! 
The conspicuous fact is demonstrated on all sides that there 
are great multitudes of men of all classes of society, and be- 
longing to the most advanced peoples of the world, who are 
ready for a new philosophy of life based on natural facts and 
reason which will remove their perplexities and bring firmness 
and a new hope to their thought; they are ready to receive a 
plain, simple and convincing view of man and his relation to 
his surroundings; they are eagerly waiting for the system and 
the teacher! With many of the highly educated and specially 
intelligent this hope and wish is an accomplished fact; for the 
others the advance must be secured through transforming our 
system of teaching the moral perceptions, the rights and duties 
of the individual to himself, the family, the community; the real 
relation of man to his fellow-man, to the animal world, the 
mother-earth and the universe. It has long been a conviction 
among thinkers and social students — and is a growing suspi- 
cion among the masses — that as long as man remains possessed 
by the idea of his special destiny and a life after death in which 
the inequalities and wrongs of the life on earth will be rectified, 
be will not attain to the exercise of his free untrammelled 
moral nature and will not extend to his brother-man that full 

256 



sympathy, helpfulness and justice of treatment which is his 
natural right — the right of each other — but will continue to 
deploy his one-sided selfishness and — with a grin — -leave the 
wrong he does, and in turn suffers, to the after-death adjust- 
ment, both for his victim and for himself. The moral threat 
of religion has lost its strength as against that of the passions, 
and creates unconsciously in the individual an unfavorable 
attitude for the exercise of the highest conscience and sense of 
justice and of a genuine interest in our fellow-man — the very 
opposite result of what religion claims to do and to achieve. 
It is the author's firm belief that the view of life he advocates 
will make man clearer and truer to himself, more honest and 
truthful, more just and kind to his fellows. 

Therefore, additional to the teaching of the general thought 
of the new rationalism, it is education — on the right lines — 
which must assist to break down this unfavorable influence of 
religion which centuries of habit have made a very part of our- 
selves! Compared with any faith of after-death religion, the 
new philosophy advocated will automatically produce the oppo- 
site mental attitude on all questions of earth-relations and con- 
duct by enabling us to realize the identity and equality of limi- 
tations of the destiny of all of us on earth. It must thus lead 
in a natural way requiring no arguments to the true brother- 
hood of man ! 

The system of teaching which the author believes to be re- 
quired will not be one of fixed tenets and precepts but rather 
of instilling and generating ideas and impressions which will 
lead to processes of thinking and feeling — in other words, the 
creation of an attitude and the building of character — to be 
won from the interested and attentive study of nature's laws 
and wonderful works, revealing lessons of order, system, grad- 
ation, submission of the lower in position and value to the 
higher, advancing in varied combinations to the highest devel- 
opment of variety within unity, of freedom within authority. 
With such perceptions solidly attained, and as much as possible 
in nature's workshop itself — by work on farms, in gardens, in 
woods, by breeding of animals, hunting and fishing, etc. — and 
supplemented by general education, the reading of history and 
good literature, the study of art and music, the result could 
not fail to be the intimate conviction of our wholly "natural" 

257 



origin and destiny and would become a living faith and stimu- 
lating life foundation. Once this position were attained, all 
that which is unsound in reason in present socialistic and polit- 
ical doctrines, opposed to our nature and impossible of attain- 
ment would be abandoned and the way opened for a new human 
society of true internal strength and boundless external possi- 
bilities! 

To resume and condense : The essential thought of the 
author is this that man's social nature, sense of responsibility 
and the ethical precepts for the conduct of intercourse between 
man and man, the social fabric as a whole — including also the 
political State — must rest upon a purely mundane foundation 
(excluding the whole array of "supernatural" assumptions) 
and must be evolved from nature's facts and laws and from her 
teaching. That which we know as "morals" — and which is 
ethics resting upon the ideas of supernatural religions, assump- 
tion of special origin, kind and destiny for man — must be trans- 
formed into "pure ethics" evolved entirely from our position 
on the earth, our relation to and complete dependence from 
unreasoning nature and our intercourse with each other, and 
with the animal world of which we are a part and the leading 
exponent. The teaching of ethics, as distinguished from re- 
ligious morality, has achieved a position of increasing impor- 
tance in modern educational work — as illustrated in America 
by the notable work done by the "Society for Ethical Culture" 
(New York) under the leadership and inspiration of its gifted 
founder and president, Dr. Felix Adler, and his able and earnest 
assistant teachers. Yet, all this work, wherever done, has not 
reached the full usefulness and effect which it should have had 
and has not found the extended following by the public which 
should have been its share, because its teaching has not repre- 
sented a clean-cut departure from supernatural religions. It 
has attempted to rest its "system" upon both the fundamental 
assumptions of "religion" and the conclusions of natural human 
"reason," two irreconcilable ideas the union of which cannot 
produce that clearness of conviction which is necessary for a 
true and vigorous philosophy of life. In the propaganda for the 
"rationalistic" system of thought, and in its methods of teaching, 
every form and manner of compulsion, not to mention persecu- 
tion and violence, must be l'igidly shunned. The primary requisite 

258 



from the public must be the concession of the equal right of 
existence and the full tolerance of this new life-view with all 
other forms of natural and supernatural religion or philosophy. 
As long as the purpose is pure and earnest, every road of in- 
quiry into man's character and life questions should have equal 
opportunity; thei'e must be no weapon of attack or defense used 
except that of persuasive argument resting on indisputable facts 
and man's ability to think and reason. Conquest in the kingdom 
of ideas must be won by argument and convincement only! 

We have on a previous occasion expressed the thought that 
the true democratic state is in its idea antagonistic to theism, 
and vice-versa, and that the perfected republic of the future 
will require the naturalistic system of ethics, as here presented, 
for its full success and assured permanence. As between mod- 
erate socialism and the fully developed form of communism 
now known as "bolshevism", the latter demands positively both 
political democracy and the ethical freedom of "rationalism"; 
it is, with all its present faults of theory and application, a 
complete doctrine of morals, society and political form com- 
bined in one system, and thus covers the three fundamentals 
which we have previously designated as the essentials of civil- 
ized life. This broad and definite position of bolshevism gives 
it a distinct advance over merely utilitarian socialism; it is more 
complete as a political theory and is also a creed of life. Bol- 
shevism believes, with incontrovertible logic, that SO long as 
socialistic projects and democratic political theories remain 
associated with a supernatural philosophy in contradiction with 
life-truth, and also with the idea of classes — be they of birth 
or wealth or pre-advantages of any kind — the combination can 
produce but an incomplete and contradictory scheme upon 
which no thorough remodeling of human society can be built. 
It believes in coming down to "rock bottom," free from all old 
shackles, and building up anew from there. Our criticism of 
bolshevism is in the main the same as of moderate socialism, 
as expressed in Article XIII, Part B. It must be brought in 
better harmony with the facts of nature and the traits of 
human nature — in other words, into full accord with the ethics 
of the true rationalism. How this can be accomplished by spe- 
cially directed education has been argued in the preceding par- 

259 



agraph and is further elaborated below. The correct concep- 
tion of the doctrine must first be thoroughly implanted and 
become fully appropriated by the masses before any really 
fruitful progress upon this path can be attained. When "thus 
worked out to greater perfection, bolshevism may in time be- 
come the universal system of a new society and civilization — 
an international democratic communistic state — socialism. 
(Additional comments on this topic will follow in Article XVI.) 



HERE, then, there is a call for a departure in education, a 
new direction and system to secure the basis for a practical 
new morality to clarify, reinforce and enhance our civiliza- 
tion to new life. Some progress has already been made in 
recent years on the road indicated as far as nature-study, 
manual training and hygiene are concerned. The new idea 
should begin with the grammar-school course; and in order to 
obtain more time for the new system, there should be rigidly 
excluded from it all those scientific subjects which really belong 
to a college or technical education and on which much valuable 
time is now spent without corresponding useful results. The 
same .criticism applies to foreign and classical languages; they 
should be studied in the High school or at home, or later at 
college. Combined with the nature-studies and practical gar- 
dening work, etc., must go the teaching of morals, or ethics, 
the principles of just and considerate conduct in daily inter- 
course and business, and also "the virtues" so necessary to 
health, beauty and refinement. All this is not anything new 
in itself; the newness resides in its new and free basis, point 
of view, or motive — in the thought behind it and in its ultimate 
purpose which, both, are mundane instead of supernatural. 

The above instruction must be given absolutely without the 
aid of any supernatural beliefs, fancies, threats of punishment 
or promises of reward, and must proceed solely from the idea 
and object of the system — the training of a human being abso- 
lutely natural and rational in its manner of reasoning, feeling, 
acting, views, tastes and ambitions of life! This same system 
of teaching must, necessarily, be continued in the home-training 
of the young to make the effect complete. Wu will leave it 

260 



to the professional educator, the student of sociology and the 
practical statesman to perfect the necessary details and devise 
the ways and means of setting the ideas here advanced in 
motion. The author firmly believes that this is che road to 
take to save us from the existing surfeit, confusion and falsity, 
and which must engulf our civilization if not checked by the 
light of a new guide and the inspiration of a new promise! 

Looking at this proposition of a new philosophy merely 
from the point of view of the everyday morality and average 
personal character of our time — from the outward exhibition 
of the inner want — the need of a change of the underlying 
ideas is shown by the shortcomings exhibited in these respects 
in all civilized countries. And, apart from morals, as such, 
normal reason and feeling seem to be upset, and there is urgent 
need of producing a better-balanced man, better balanced in 
his intellectual, moral and emotional nature than is shown by 
the average man of today almost everywhere. The race has 
become one-sided, super-nervous and morbidly emotional, in- 
tolerant and over-sensitive — all symptoms of the nervous ex- 
haustion of the period, the result of the severe tension and 
continual excitements of modern life. This lack of balance 
and repose is conspicuously shown by the American man and 
woman. Our intemperate, hysterical conduct towards our en- 
emies in the war is an illustration; another is found in the 
selfish and tyrannical fanaticism of the compulsory total- 
abstinence legislation (not to mention its violation of personal 
freedom and right) ; another by the sensational "religious re- 
vivals" bordering on the ludicrous and offensive ; another by the 
morbid and literally "hair-raising" character of the movie- 
picture presentations and the exploitation of savory "scandals" 
by newspapers and stage plays; another by the ever-abundant 
crop of "cranks", fanatics, faddists, reformers on every subject 
under the sun; by the "psychology exploiters" and "new- 
thought" conjurers, the "spiritism" and "theosophy" humbugs; 
another by the flagrant tendency to public indecency in the 
flesh-advertising style of women's costumes and in many of the 
entertainments offered to the public, even to young boys and 
girls. 

261 



In all lines the sensational, extraordinary, abnormal, huge, 
catastrophal, soul-tearing seems to appeal to us in preference 
to the reposeful, harmonious, beautiful! (Oh! memories of 
Greek art and philosophy!) Our minds seem to lack the sense 
of proportion, appropriateness and contemplative reflection, 
rushing hither and thither in the search for something still 
newer and more startling. Other nations have similar abnor- 
mal records of their own, the whole indicating an age deficient 
in mental balance and self-possession. It seems as if the world 
were losing its faculty of philosophical reflection, the habit of 
trying to understand the ideas underlying things! In Germany 
and France, where in former days this faculty was conspicu- 
ous, as evidenced by the rich literature relating to it, indiff- 
erence is growing. In England this trait was always obscure 
and held down by the rule of unquestioning orthodox religions; 
in America, it is almost absent among the general public. 
Thus the world is rushing along pell mell on the road of prac- 
tical work for material success, comforts, enjoyment, prosperity 
of the individual — but reflection as to elementary ideas and 
causes and the inevitable results to flow from the prevailing 
spirit and pi'actice are neglected. We stride along blindly, 
unconsciously towards an unknown end — it recalls in all its 
aspects the fall of ancient Rome! Does it suggest itself to the 
reader that this condition must in a large degree be due to the 
irritating contradiction existing between our plain "reason and 
observation" and the irrational ideas of our "supernatural 
character" which are driven into us when we are young and 
so difficult to shake off when we are older — making slaves of US 
to a lifelong attitude of presumption? 

As to the very cornerstone of any code of ethics — truthful- 
ness and plain honesty — the war has been a shocking revela- 
tion of our unbounded depravity! The author has repeatedly 
referred to its shameful record of lies, slanders, abuse, brutal 
selfishness, prostitution of patriotism, lowness and moral per- 
version of motives — for which ten millions of men were slain, 
or crippled and ruined for life ! And the part we — America — 
was compelled to play in this awful record by the actions of our 
war party was enacted under pretenses of high ideals and un- 
selfish purposes which were put into our hearts and mouths 

262 



without proper explanation. What a mockery of reason and 
truth! What a mountain of callous hypocrisy! What an ac- 
cusation of the impotency of supernatural religion to produce 
even these simple virtues of truthfulness and plain honesty in 
men! 

For, it cannot be said that this awful record was caused by 
a sudden irresponsible access of moral corruption due to the 
mental consternation produced by the war; it was, or is the 
plain reflection of our times. The above-stated cornerstone of 
all the virtues and moral covenants — the free exercise of truth- 
fulness and plain honesty — has disappeared ; what there is left 
of them in practice rests upon the existence of police courts 
and prisons! Men and women will lie, steal, rob with violence, 
repudiate their word, give and take illicit "graft" and criminal 
bribe money and commit every other violation of "good con- 
duct" with perfect unconcern and total absence of any sense 
of wrong or shame ! The spoken word today must be i*eceived 
with distrust and be "proven" before it can be accepted; the 
printed word in newspapers, magazines and books on matters 
of international events, home politics, public movements, etc., 
cannot be taken seriously. These publications do not exist 
today to give honest information, as in the days of Horace 
Greeley, for the general good but exclusively to advocate a cer- 
tain policy and defend its representatives, and to make every- 
thing subservient to this one purpose, by withholding or mis- 
representing of news, by lies and fabrication, abuse, slander. 
And, worst of all, there is in most cases behind all this not 
honest (if interested) conviction, not mistaken enthusiasm 
for a cause but mere lucre or other material reward. In mer- 
chandising there is diminishing reliability as to material, purity, 
weight and measure, and false statements are made with the 
boldest assurance. All mankind seems to be deceiving and 
defrauding each other! 

The High Cost of Living prevailing ever since the war, 
representing an advance of from 75 per cent to 150 per cent in 
prices, has long been proven by careful and impartial figures 
of professional statisticians, culled from income-tax reports, 
stock-company statements, etc., to have been caused to its 
largest extent by direct "profiteering" (artificial and arbitrary 

263 



raising of prices for extra profit) and only to the extent of 
about 25 per cent to reflex increase of wages, rents and other 
factors due to the war cost. It is thus proven to be over- 
whelmingly nothing less than wholesale and retail stealing, 
looting of the pockets of the helpless public in a veritable orgie 
of money making. When these "patriots" bought their "liberty 
bonds", did they make up their minds "to get their money 
back," even if they would have to rob the public to do it? Is 
it, perhaps, all a game on their part of "passing the buck" (to 
use an expressive curb phrase) through the people back to the 
door of the government? This seems to be the true explana- 
tion. And the government, being the people itself, returns 
"the buck" to them through increased taxation, and the people 
pass it back to the originators through increases in wages and 
retail prices of merchandise. 

Here we have the "endless chain", but with this important 
distinction, that those who have power and means can play this 
game to the limit, while the great mass of men who are de- 
pendent and not free can retaliate only partially. The high 
cost of living is thus exposed to be, fundamentally, an attempt 
by those who possess control of the necessaries of life and the 
staple materials of production to get back their compulsory 
liberty-loan investments in a few years by excess profits on 
these commodities, instead of considering them as bona-fide 
time loans to the government! And, as the limited retaliation 
which the people are making is, in the main, a matter of sheer 
necessity and self-defense, the crime of the high cost of living 
is directly chargeable to the rich and powerful! — and we have 
one more illustration of the moral laxity, the ease of con- 
science, the abeyance of the sense of fairness and plain honesty, 
the coarse greed for money which characterizes our times! 
To the author nothing appears more contemptible than this 
high-cost-of-living exhibition and nothing more pitiable than the 
inability of our government to arrest it! 

But face to face with the preceding "pictures", are we not 
entitled to ask this question: "Wherein is the merit of this 
supernatural religion on which our "morality" is based if this 
is its fruit, if it is thus proven powerless to restrain man's im- 
pulses and, instead, gives full reign to the lowest and meanest 

264 



passions of greed, covetousness, hate, revenge, lust, violence?" 

Think of the war! its horrors and sacrifices and sufferings; 
think of the indescribable fiendishness by these "sons of God"; 
of the murder of Mayor MacCurtain of Cork and of Magistrate 
Alan Bell of Dublin ; of the hanging of six young Irishmen in 
Mountjoy jail, March 14th, 1921, and of ten others at a later 
date, for no greater crime than the wish to see their own coun- 
tree free; think of the lawlessness in Germany, of the many 
brutal murders and great bank robberies in New York, of the 
era of exti'avagant and licentious life which seems to prevail 
all over the war-stricken world — in the very midst of the great- 
est misery and helplessness — all the result of a complete state 
of literal demoralization — the church doors gaping wide open 
all the time, but no live l'esponse, no message, no convincing 
explanation coming from within! 

Are we not also entitled to ask this other question : "How 
is it that under this popular-government form of the United 
States and other republics nothing can be done about these 
conditions? Why is this government of the people incapable 
of acting for the people's benefit and protection against those 
who hold power of position, money, influence, combination? 
Where is the tangible, practical demonstration of our much- 
advertised 'liberties' and 'rights' as free men governing them- 
selves?" As in the case of the churches, the doors of the 
capitol at Washington and of our State Houses are gaping 
wide open, but no response, no explanation comes from within! 
Such a combination of moral, social and political disorganiza- 
tion breaks down all confidence between man and man and 
begets a deep-set disgust of ourselves and of our civilization; 
it makes men who have not yet lost their "natural honesty and 
kindly instincts" to long for a simpler social and political and 
truer ethical existence in which the dangerous intricacies, the 
utter falsity and oppresiveness of our present civilization would 
be impossible — to a form of sound communistic socialism, in 
short — founded on a system of natural ethics, and combined 
with a simple form of equitable and real "people's rule." Can 
we pretend astonishment at, or utter our protest against, this 
revulsion of feeling, this radical departure from the tradition 
of the thought of 2000 years? No! the foundation for it is all 
too firmly laid ! 

265 



FROM the material of this article the thought previously 
stressed rises again with convincing force that the breakup 
of civilization is more a result of surfeit and disgust at general 
conditions, of moral inertia, of callous sentimental indifference, 
of coarse materialism and absence of real ideals and an honest 
ethical basis than of material and intellectual exhaustion. The 
philosophy upon which all is built becomes dubious and unsatis- 
fying and is left behind in the march of mental and material 
advance, leaving a void in that which is the most essential ele- 
ment of progressive development and happiness — a sound and 
fully trusted life-philosophy! (See also Article VII, in con- 
nection.) Something new must be found to take the place of 
that which has become discredited, or, in a short time, stagna- 
tion and decay must come. As to the present times, we have 
already stated that the various forms of supernatural religions 
have lost their power of conviction and fail to supply a rational 
faith that appeals to the advanced intelligence of the modern 
man and is capable of furnishing him with a trustworthy basis 
for the moral covenants of daily life. 

Also, in the preceding article, we drew a sketch of the in- 
completeness of past periods of civilization, of their erratic 
course and character. They all rose to a summit, remained 
stationary at the pinnacle for a time, then swayed and fell! 
Such periods have been those of Egypt, China, India, Assyria, 
Greece and Rome and the Middle-Age European empires. Why 
did these civilizations not continue on their road of progress? 
Why did they not, after a period of stagnation, revive and 
roll on? In answer we speak cleverly of "natural exhaustion", 
of "having run their course", etc., but the true explanation is 
that such decay was caused by the fact that a summit of effort 
had been reached with no more of great and inspiring aims in 
sight (such as might have been within the mental and physical 
range of these respective periods) and that interest and incen- 
tive to work and strive had been deadened because of the in- 
sufficiency of their religious or philosophical systems ! The 
sterility of their daily ethical code, resulting from such condi- 
tions, and the absence of spiritual imagination prevented the 
birth of stimulating new visions in harmony with the intel- 
lectual and material level which had been attained! 

266 



Not one of these past civilizations has been proven to have 
fallen because of unavoidable material ox 1 political necessity; 
in each case the foreign conqueror only came after decay had 
well begun. They died from moral and spiritual inanition! 
Doubt and contradiction between the new and the old caused 
vacillation and decay! Each such case needed a Messiah, a 
teacher to point a new way, but who failed to come ; — and thus 
they left the pomp and circumstance of their civilization and 
returned to the simple life — to the bosoni of nature for re- 
cuperation. Have we arrived at a similar stage and prospect? 
Are we, also, to fall to the ground with our civilization in the 
conflict between the categorical but unsatisfying Old, become 
a structure of tyrannical doubts, and the — as yet — unclear, but 
promising New, full of beckoning assurance of a larger, truer 
and better life? Will for us the Messiah come in the rise of the 
philosophy of "true rationalism", of the acceptance of physical 
truth and naturalness, in the clear recognition by us of our 
real character, position on earth and opportunity for happiness? 
If so, as we may well wish and hope, our present summit of 
material surfeit, intellectual unrest and moral distraction may 
prove but a short resting period of recuperation for the upward 
flight to yet greater heights of the twentieth-century phoenix! 



XVI. AFTER-PEACE CONCLUSIONS. 

The League of Nations and America. — Modification of the 

Treaty. — Revelations from Paris. — President Wilson's 

Position. — German and other War Publications. 

Present Situation in Europe. — England and 

France Show Their Hand at Last. — Final 

Summary of the Moral Aspect of the 

War. — The Russian Drama. 

The manuscript of this book was completed soon after the 
signing of the peace treaty with Germany at Versailles, June 
28th, 1919, but publication had to be deferred for various 
reasons. More than two years having elapsed since, during 
which time important developments have taken place and much 

267 



new information come to light, the author found it necessary 
to add this article to bring the book up to the date of its publi- 
cation. Some of this new material has been incorporated in 
the body of the original text at appropriate places or put in 
the form of special explanatory notes, and the balance and final 
resume appear in this special article. 

The opinion heretofore expressed by the author that the 
peace pacts concluded with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and 
Turkey are settlements of bad faith, vengeance and duress, 
and of bad judgment even from the position of the victors, 
has since been abundantly verified by the present political and 
economic condition of Europe. All this being matter of the 
daily records of the past two years, we can confine our re- 
marks to the principal featui-es. The League of Nations, to 
which so many had been led to look with great hopes, is al- 
ready proving its cumbersome inefficiency to deal with the 
problems of the Ruhr Valley and of Upper Silesia, and their 
solution is left in the hands of France, England, Italy and 
Japan, exclusively. 

The United States has not yet ratified the treaty of Ver- 
sailles because of determined opposition to the idea of the 
League of Nations, which was made an integral part of the 
treaty. After months of discussion over various proposed "re- 
servations" to the League by the United States Senate, as 
affecting specially the interests of this country, some of these 
reservations were adopted and others defeated and the treaty 
as a whole finally rejected by a decisive majority and returned 
to President Wilson for his further action, March 20th, 1920. 
This outcome furnished the world with a strange spectacle. 
In this country alone of the five Entente nations (Russia being 
put of the count), where the idea of the League had been 
eloquently advocated by the President and largely approved by 
the people, a determined opposition had arisen in the course 
of time to the idea of the League in general but especially to 
Article X which was interpreted as obligating this country to 
further participation in the contentions of the European States 
and to furnishing military forces in pursuance thereof. There 
was the additional objection to the proposed details of the 
voting in the League deliberations, which, by putting a con- 

268 



siderable preponderance of power into the hands of the Eu- 
ropean nations, particulai-ly England, limited the influence of 
this country in matters which we might deem incompatible 
with our judgment and interest. 

The above opposition took shape in the Senate, led by the 
Republican majority, but was also supported by a considerable 
number of Democratic Senators and backed by a large section 
of the people. President Wilson's position was clear and firm 
in this controversy (from his point of view) ; he vetoed the 
proposed reservations to the treaty and also the rejection of the 
treaty as a whole, and likewise the Senator Knox resolution for 
a seperate peace with Germany. The object of the "Knox" 
resolution was not only a final attempt to dispose of the treaty 
and the league but also to prevent the entire tangle becoming 
an issue in the Presidential election of 1920. That the oppo- 
sition to the League was well justified is proven by the fact 
that gradually many of the ablest political men of the country 
who had at first been in its favor changed their opinion, also 
by the attitude of the Press and the overwhelming verdict given 
in the said election. The entire matter was thus passed on to 
the new administration and Congress. The new Senate has 
recently passed a revised "Knox" resolution for a separate 
peace with Germany. This has now been consummated, all but 
final ratification. 

This tortuous, involved and-to-them-inexplicable action by 
the American government and people produced a distinctly 
"disconcerting" impression in Europe and has led to a weaken- 
ing of the confidence and cordiality formerly existent between 
us and our war allies. The League-of-Nations idea has re- 
ceived a serious check through our opposition ; on the other 
hand, the disposition of the leading members of the League to 
grant to America certain reservations rather than lose her as a 
member altogether opens the door to other nations also to 
demand special privileges in the League, all of which would 
tend to paralyze its essential idea. The elements of doubt 
thrown upon the peace of Versailles by this prospect, joined 
to its general inertia, has gradually produced a disposition for 
its revision, at least in respect to some of its most exacting 
and degrading terms. The foolish proposal to prosecute the 

269 



Kaiser as the "responsible author of the war" has been dropped, 
and Germany has been conceded her plea for the right herself 
to prosecute the so-called "war criminals" for alleged atrocities 
committed by them. The knotty problems of the war indem- 
nities due by Germany, of her "deliveries" required under the 
armistice, of her disarmament and of other lesser demands 
have, at last, been settled by the Supreme Council confer- 
ence of April-May of this year on a basis somewhat more rea- 
sonable and practical than that originally intended. These 
terms have now been accepted by Germany — reluctantly and 
in the same spirit of helplessness in which the armistice and 
peace terms were accepted — but they constitute at least a 
definite program for both sides and for some time to come. 
(See the special explanatory Note "The "Reparations Settle- 
ment.") The most important concession — the omission of the 
demand for her "war guilt acknowledgment" by Germany and 
its relation to the general spirit of the Versailles peace has been 
illuminated in detail in the above Note. As there slated, these 
revised, or rather adjusted terms, require tb.3 early additional 
elimination of the remaining unjust, impractical and dangerous 
provisions of this treaty which are today condemned by the 
most enlightened section of public opinion all over the world. 
The conscience of mankind, enslaved by the passions of the 
war, is regaining its normal balance and demanding a more 
reasonable final settlement of the great conflict than that ef- 
fected by the Treaty of Versailles. 

For, in addition to those terms which have now been slightly 
reduced, there still remain the crimes of awarding Alsace- 
Lorraine to France without the authority of a popular plebis- 
cite ; of giving Posen to Poland without compensation for the 
public improvements made by Germany; of seizing a strip of 
purely German territory — with the old German seaport of 
Danzig — to annex to Poland to form "a corridor" of access to 
the Baltic sea; of practically robbing Germany of the Saar 
valley and of Upper Silesia; finally, of confiscating every one 
of her foreign colonies in Africa, China and the Pacific Ocean. 
All this is exaction in addition to the financial penalties of the 
"reparations" terms, the surrender of all war material, sub- 
marines, aeroplanes and Zeppelins; of thousands of locomo- 

270 



tives and freight cars; of horses, pigs and cattle, sheep and 
barn fowls in great numbers — all these physical exactions were 
made under the armistice terms — and in addition to the enor- 
mous cost of a minimum fifteen-years' occupation of the left 
bank Rhine zones and the right-bank bridgeheads! These 
terms would deliver the German people into complete economic 
bondage — slavery — to the victorious Entente nations, mainly 
France, Belgium, England and Italy for three generations to 
come — 60 years — and into political extinction at the same time. 
Without an army, Germany would be at the mercy of every 
large or small "armed" country adjoining her; without a navy, 
her merchantmen would be subject to the caprice of any hostile 
port official in a distant land. 

Does the public of the United States comprehend and re- 
alize all this; does the world at large realize what the peace 
of Versailles means to all the peoples, not only to Germany 
herself? This peace must be rewritten in all its terms, not 
merely ameliorated in a few of its hardest conditions. And, as 
repeatedly stated in these articles, the basis of this revision 
must be the full acknowledgment by the other nations of their 
share in the war guilt! In the above review we have spoken 
only of Germany, but there are also unhappy Austria, wronged 
Hungary, pillaged and crumpled Turkey and Bulgaria, all vic- 
tims of this peace of political rape. The world can never be 
right again until all this is settled right! America must and 
will be the nation whose innate sense of justice and fair play 
will ultimately induce this revision! 

There are many who maintain that below the crushing terms 
of the peace treaty there are hidden blacker designs than those 
of mere political revenge and victor's lust; that it is the covert 
design of England and France to ruin Germany as an indepen- 
dent and self-asserting country forever and to convert her into 
a dependent helpless slave sweatshop for the benefit of the 
victor powers; that, as to France, the outspoken design is to 
acquire at least the now occupied territories on the left bank 
of the Rhine for permanent annexation and to have the whole 
of Upper Silesia, in spite of the plebiscite, turned over to 
Poland. The author hesitates to accept these fears in full, 
although in regai-d to imperialistic France the signs are omin- 

271 



ous; but he believes absolutely that America — as an enacting 
if not ratifying member of the Versailles peace powers — will, 
in spite of her present strong friendship for France, never 
tolerate an international wrong of such magnitude to be per- 
petrated! 



The Reparations Settlement. The first "Reparations" meet- 
ing in London, which followed the "Paris agreement" of Jan- 
uary, 1921, on a 226,000,000,000 gold marks indemnity, and 
which was called to receive Germany's acceptance of this de- 
mand or equally satisfactory counter-proposals, adjourned on 
March 7th, 1921, having failed of an agreement. The author 
of this book was at that time engaged on the final revision of 
his text. This afforded him an opportunity to introduce here 
some comment upon the speech of declination of Premier Lloyd 
George in rejecting the German counter-propositions. The de- 
tails are too recent to require detailed statement. In summing 
up, Mr. Lloyd George made an emphatic declaration on the 
English and Allied position on Reparation and the Versailles 
peace terms in general. He said: "He (Dr. Simons, Germany's 
spokesman at the meetings) refused to accept, on behalf of 
Germany, responsibility for the war, which is the very basis of 
the Treaty of Versailles. Not only did he refuse to accept that 
basis but appealed to history for revision of the sentence im- 
posed. The Allies cannot possibly enter into any discussion 
on that basis. The responsibility of Germany for the war is 
with them fundamental. The whole treaty of Versailles de- 
pends upon it." Here, then, we have the issue squarely put! 
Of course the responsibility of Germany is fundamental with 
the Allies; of course, the whole treaty of Versailles depends 
upon it. It is precisely because this responsibility is assumed, 
not proven, a mere assertion of the Allies, a colossal deceit per- 
petrated upon the entire world by the infamous British propa- 
ganda, that this false treaty with its revolting terms, fabulous 
reparation demands, robbery of territories and colonies must 
be uprooted and a new treaty written with terms based on 
facts, judicially ascertained from documents and personal tes- 
timony now available, if Germany and France are not once 
more to be drenched in blood! 

The second reparations meeting, held in London in the 
first days of May, has at last brought a result and settlement, 
even though it can only be a temporary one. Germany has ac- 
cepted the terms under protest, helplessly, unable to resist 
further and compelled by her economic and political conditions 
to settle down to a definite program of peace — and to go to 
work. This decision was largely influenced by an important 
change which accompanied the terms: The demand for admis- 
sion of the sole war guilt had been waived, at least tacitly! 

272 



This demand which had figured so prominently in the negotia- 
tions which ended on March 7th, (see the above quotations 
from the Lloyd George speech) had raised a storm of renewed 
indignation and protest in Germany and indicated to the Allies 
very plainly that if they really desired 'to arrive at a settle- 
ment without recourse to force, this demand would have to be 
excluded. Under the final terms, accepted by Germany with- 
out reservations and counter-proposals, on May 10th, 1921, the 
total reparations indemnity is to be about 133,000,000,000 
(133 billions) gold Marks, equivalent to about $34,500,000,000. 
But to this must be added 5 per cent interest. Germany is to 
pay annually about 2,100,000,000 gold Marks, plus a 25 per 
cent tax on her exports, to provide a fund for this interest 
charge, against which sum bonds will be issued periodically, or 
annually, in proportion. This arrangement restricts the in- 
terest charge to the amount of bonds actually outstanding — 
or, rather, vice-versa. Also, Germany is to fulfill the Ver- 
sailles treaty in all other respects — disarmament, punishment 
of war criminals, etc. 

But the mere omission from the final reparations settle- 
ment of the demand for Germany's admission of her sole guilt 
and responsibility for the war — done in a laudible effort to 
present the second settlement proposals becoming a fiasco 
like the first — is not sufficient in the way of admission and 
correction of a great wrong. As the claims of this sole guilt 
of Germany was the very principle of the sweeping armistice 
and peace terms, these terms must not merely be amel- 
iorated a little, but must be fundamentally remodeled on the 
basis of the fully admitted joint guilt of the five original war 
nations. No other settlement will ever bring a true and lasting 
peace! 

Additional Remarks on the Reparations Settlement. Now 
that this whole matter of Germany's war indemnity is settled 
for the time being, it is very useful to remind the reader of the 
utterances and incidents which occured in connection with the 
Paris conference of January and the first London reparations 
meeting of the end of February, 1921. At Paris, where the 
reparations amount was determined at 226,000,000,000 gold 
marks by the Supreme Council (without waiting for the official 
computations of the Reparations Commission) it was a signi- 
ficant accompaniment that during and after this meeting the 
French press and statesmen were prolific in announcements 
about the "enormous amounts of gold and other liquid wealth 
still owned and hidden in Germany" and about "how well able 
Germany was to pay" the amounts demanded by the Allies. 
All this was pure imagination, if not wicked fabrication. It 
is true that Germany was very wealthy in 1914, when the war 
broke out, but these French visionaries forget conveniently 
that she had fought a four-years' war during which gigantic 

273 



national loans had to be issued which gradually absorbed the 
floating wealth of the country. The clash between these col- 
ored assertions about "the hidden wealth of Germany" and 
the daily press reports describing the financial and economic 
collapse of that country, the starvation and general misery 
prevailing, was positively ludicrous. 

But the Supreme Council had its theory all worked out: 
"Germany can pay if she will but go to work; if she will but 
economize as the Allies have done; if the German people be 
but made to pay heavy taxes the same as the people of the 
Entente countries do." (Extract from Lloyd George's speech 
of January 28th, 1921.) This is surely amusing, especially 
when the Premier remarks that "the revival of German industry 
and trade was to be hindered by all kinds of restrictions and 
by the imposition of oppressive export duties"; for, said he, at 
the first London reparations conference at the end of February 
of this year: "Germany can only pay by being put on her 
feet again so as to be able to manufacture and export, but 
great care must be taken that she may not quickly manufac- 
ture and export too much and thus damage our own prosperity." 

In other words, Germany is to be given a chance to work 
and produce but no more than just enough to pay the repara- 
tions debt; she is to slave for the Entente allies for sixty years 
or more and remain poor, helpless and dependent as to herself. 
Here is where we can see the grand human ideals for which the 
war was fought! Mr. Briand, the French Premier, was like- 
wise very amiable in his utterance of January 28th, 1921, at 
Paris, when he said: "Germany must pay to the limit, and 
no sum must be fixed without thorough investigation (those 
cellars in Germany full of gold) lest it may quickly prove too 
small (only the modest sum of 226 billions of gold marks 
were being asked, equivalent to about 55 billions of dollars) 
and the Germans "jeer" at us for our ignorance and timidity." 
Mr. Briand, also, was in a very great hurry about collecting 
this little bill, and added : "A settlement of this difficult ques- 
tion must positively be reached before the end of to-morrow." 

It was fortunate for the Germans that, on their part, they 
were not in such a hurry to be intimidated. The Reparations 
Commission was, meanwhile, completing its figuring and 
brought in a final verdict for 132 ^ billions of gold marks — - 
a reduction of nearly one-hundred billions. Mr. Keynes is 
right : The war was largely an economic war, but diplomatists 
were allowed to camouflage its character into one of false 
pretenses, and were also allowed to settle the peace on these 
same false pretenses and, in other respects, on purely political 
lines. Can we be surprised that we have economic depres- 
sion and confusion and financial instability — two years after 
the war — of a worse kind than during the war itself? 

274 



In connection with the London reparations meeting of end 
of April, 1921, the incident of the German government appeal- 
ing to the government of this country for its good will and 
offices to endorse and submit its latest reparations offers to the 
Supreme Council is noteworthy for what it revealed. The in- 
cident disclosed, on the one hand, that the Germans had not 
yet learned their lesson, did not understand the depth of feel- 
ing engendered here against them by the war; on the other 
hand, as to ourselves, it disclosed the strange, distracted atti- 
tude of this country, torn between pride, resentment and an 
uneasy conscience and unable, as yet, to come to an honest and 
candid opinion on the war! (As we know, America declined to 
endorse and sponsor forward the German propositions, after 
having ascertained their unacceptability by the European allies, 
and advised Germany to negotiate directly with the Supreme 
Council in London.) 



T N corroboration of the author's position on the war, the 
A revelations made on the course of the Paris Peace Confer- 
ence are of first importance. These negotiations are now very 
fully disclosed through the book by Maynard Keynes, that by 
ex-Secretary of State Lansing, that by Charles T. Thompson on 
"The Peace Conference Day by Day", that by Col. E. M. House 
on "What Really Happened at Paris", that by Andre Tardieu, 
"The Truth About the Treaty" and through the articles by 
Lincoln Colcord in "The Nation" and by many other books and 
contributions by "intimates." (Additional reference to these 
books will follow later.) They have set free the fact that the 
Allies at first only accepted the League idea to please President 
Wilson and the American people, in order to win the continu- 
ance of our sacrifices for them. Later, when they supported 
the League more decisively, it was because of the discovery 
that it would offer a useful means of deception under which 
to continue, at the Paris peace table, the pretense of the false 
war motives of the propagandas. This revelation should show 
us how weak the sentiment for a League of Justice really was 
among the European governments. The politics of Europe are 
too intricate for an idea so simple and general; they must in- 
evitably gravitate towards secret diplomacy and secret treaties 
between the nations, in pairs or in groups of related interests; 
and this method has even now been resumed although the 

275 



League is fully organized in its formal existence in pursuance 
of the Treaty requirement. Under the prevailing sentiment 
and relationships in Europe, the League will prove to be no 
more than an association of the leading powers for the regu- 
lation of the smaller States who are members thereof. 

By comparison, the former "Hague Tribunal" was a judi- 
cial body instead of a political one ; its deliberations and judg- 
ments were to rest on general fundamental laws, accepted pro- 
positions and covenants as to international rights, regula- 
tions of warfare on sea and on land, use of special weapons, 
treatment of non-combatants and prisoners of war, etc. Its 
decisions were to be "judicial", based on evidence by plaintiff 
and defendants and were to be free from political, racial or 
personal bias — in short, were to be based on "law" as ex- 
pressed in codes and rulings and rendered impartially by 
"jurists" instead of by Prime Ministers, ambassadors, diplo- 
matists and army chiefs. Such was the conception of the 
Hague International Tribunal held by Mr. Evarts, Mr. Choate, 
Elihu Root and other leading American and European jurists. 
It may be confidently hoped that the prospective failure of the 
purely "political" League of Nations created by the Versailles 
Treaty will ultimately be transformed into such a "legally ad- 
vising and judicially deciding" league. Such a one is the 
vision of the best thought in this country — and probably the 
aim of the present administration — and could be whole-heart- 
edly supported by the American people. Its motto must be: 
Peace and international justice by law and understanding, but 
including the recognition of force and war as necessary and 
useful agencies of political and general progress. Arbitrary 
aggression from low motives and a false, maudlin sentimen- 
tality about war must be equally excluded from its program. 

In the United States, the opposition to the League is based 
not only on its political grounds, as examined above, but not 
a little on a feeling of resentment against our associates in 
the war, as before stated. This country has gradually found 
out a great deal about its former friends — England, France, 
Italy, Japan, Russia — and their political aims and methods 
which it did not know when it entered the war and the sum of 
which is a growing conviction that we were deceived by them 

276 



about the origin and issues of the war and their charges against 
Germany and Austria, also in regard to their faculty of mak- 
ing secret treaties among themselves — Pact of London on 
Trieste-Fiume agreement with Italy, pledges to Greece, Rou- 
mania and Poland, and the Shantung convention with Japan — 
while all the time acclaiming the American revived plan of a 
League of Nations and its cardinal principle of "open co- 
venants openly arrived at" and open diplomacy generally 
among nations! The secret agreements referred to were made 
before this country entered the war, but were purposely hid- 
den from us in order not to jeopardize our expected war 
decision; they were in existence at the time of the visit here 
of ex-Prime Minister Viviani and Marshal Joffre, of France, 
and of ex-Prime Minister Balfour, of England, and of the 
Italian statesmen, all of whom came here in the early summer 
of 1917 to stir our war fever into maximum action — and to 
obtain loans — but never did they breathe a word about these 
secret understandings for fear that our eyes might be opened 
to the abyss of hate, greed, bad faith and chicanery of Eu- 
ropean politics! Our sensibilities, prejudices and national vani- 
ties were exploited by these allies by every means in the reper- 
tory of suptle British diplomacy — by the most insistent pres- 
sure upon existing social and racial ties, the ostentatious praise 
of our President's "idealism" and our national "humanitarian- 
ism", by the foulest misrepresentation of Germany's and Aus- 
tria's position, motives and actions in the war. 

Now we know all these things and know that we were de- 
ceived and victimized! Not until February, 1919, at the Paris 
Peace Conference, during the debate on the Japanese claims to 
the German Pacific islands, were these nefai-ious secret rela- 
tions disclosed and President Wilson publicly and officially ap- 
prised of their existence, both in regard to Japan and Italy. 
(See the article by Lincoln Colcord in "The Nation", of May 
17th, 1.919.) Publication of these agreements had been made 
in November, 1917, by the Russia Revolutionary Government, 
which had found records of them in the Imperial archives; but 
being unofficial, and coming from that source, the reports were 
at first discredited. But even after their authenticity had, 
been established, no action was taken by President Wilson in 

277 



regard to them towards the Entente powers, no explanation 
demanded, no change of policy proposed! The detailed accur- 
acy of the above-related incident at Pax-is was attested by ex- 
Secretary of State Lansing - before the Senate Investigating 
Committee. It was a pleasant discovery for the American 
people, after it had brought its sacrifices and saved the Entente 
nations from defeat, to realize the kind of treatment it had 
received from them and — inferentially — to realize that all this 
chagrin was due to our own super-sentimental war enthusiasm. 

There is authentic report of a similar "acute" scene, early 
in November, 1918, at the Foreign Office in Paris, in regard to 
the repudiation of the binding power of the President's "four- 
teen points," which had been made the basis of the armistice 
negotiations by German-', and which had previously been ac- 
cepted by the Allies, in principle at least, as the basis for the 
ultimate peace to be concluded. At this meeting of the Eu- 
ropean Premiers, the fourteen points were — -one by one — 
brushed aside as having no definite meaning or binding power, 
some being l-epudiated altogether. When Col. House, who 
represented our President, then in America, was bluntly asked 
by Clemenceau "whether the President would terminate the arm- 
istice negotiations (then proceeding between himself and Ger- 
many) if the Council of Ministers should repudiate these four- 
teen points," he was momentarily put in a quandry, not being 
in possession of definite instructions from the President on such 
an abrupt challenge, — and gave an equivocal reply. This was 
immediately seized upon by the astute Clemenceau and con- 
strued to mean that the President would ^not abandon the 
peace solicitations, although they would, in that case, be car- 
ried on under a condition of "false pretenses" towards Ger- 
many. With that interpretation — Col. House sitting silent — 
he closed the argument. Premier Lloyd George, of England, 
at the same sitting emphatically "excepted" the point which 
aimed to establish "the freedom of the seas" — one of the most 
important of the f ourteen peace planks — as having any binding 
force upon England. These two far-reaching repudiations 
were not challenged, qualified or amended subsequently by 
President Wilson although they were in complete opposition 

278 



to everything he had uttered on the war and the peace to 
follow ! 

The foregoing exposition shows the spirit of the European 
powers in regard to the binding validity upon them of these 
"fourteen points" so grandly formulated by our President and 
so ignobly abandoned by him. They were entirely disregarded 
in the armistice terms and equally so in the later peace terms 
— with never a protest from our President. And as regards 
the League-of-Nations' fate in the earlier months of the Con- 
ference, the real spirit of these powers was shown by the 
fact that only the determined insistence by the President, and 
his threat to break off his further participation in the peace 
conference and to return to America forthwith, succeeded to 
put the covenant into the peace treaty as a leading and in- 
tegral part thereof. This League and its inclusion in the 
Treaty was the one thing above all others upon which the 
President had. set his heart and on which he would accept no 
compromise — and the Premiers yielded for the reasons before 
stated. But it may have been "a deal" after all, as all the 
inside facts are not yet fully clear. The President may have 
made concessions to the Allies for the acceptance and inclusion 
of his league — and some day the revelation of the actual facts 
may be made by Col. House or by President Wilson himself. 
Colonel E. M. House, of Texas, has played a secret and some- 
what mysterious part in the inception of the war (on our side) 
and in the later peace negotiations in his capacity of confiden- 
tial adviser of the President. So far, in the books on the con- 
ference which he has written or edited, he is discreetly silent on 
every point of "real enlightenment" on the war itself. But that 
is the great point. The details of the fight for "the spoils" are 
interesting .and valuable, yet secondary. These two men are 
separated now, to all appeai'ances ; and before long we shall 
receive moi'e intimate and constructive information on this and 
many other matters of war policy and peace negotation. The 
main truth for us, however, has become perfectly clear: Presi- 
dent Wilson was honored, feted, petted, "decorated" and pre- 
sented with beautiful gifts; he was publicly lauded and ac- 
claimed as few men have been, in every European country he 
visited, but at the peace table, in the practical work of diplom- 

279 



acy, he met his match — and was checkmated! Our armies won 
victories, but our high published aims for mankind were lost 
in the selfish and brutal scrimmage of the Paris peace con- 
ference ! 

The real interest of the Entente in the League has been 
given as one of false pretense for the purpose of preserving 
their "war motive" myths at the Paris conference for their own 
selfish purposes, and for their ruling power over the smaller 
nations. As to their pretended great concern over the non- 
ratification of the peace treaty by the United States, let no one 
believe that they are greatly worried over the possible failure 
of the humanitarian objects of the League but very much SO 
over the carrying of the material burdens arising from the 
suicidal peace settlement, and of which they had counted upon 
this country (through its participation in the League) to as- 
sume a large share. In the proposed "pooling scheme of war 
costs", which was incorporated in the Treaty, ,we would lose 
fully one-half of our war loans to the Allies, an item of over 
4 2 /2 billions of dollars, not a small figure even for this rich 
country. Of other burdens there was the proposition of having 
us assume the "mandate" over Turkey entirely, or at least 
over Armenia, and other similar honorary tasks involving ex- 
tensive organization and heavy financial outlay for many years 
to come, and holding the constant risk of involving us in dis- 
putes and, perhaps, hostilities. All this is our allies' very prac- 
tical interpretation of our grand war ideals of "fighting for 
human rights and freedom, universal justice, independence of 
small nations, making the world safe for democracy! They 
have taken us at our word — or at the word of our President — 
which they mistakenly thought was that of the American people. 
But can we blame them for their error in the circumstances? 
Beyond these material considerations, however, including fin- 
ancing of the enemy countries to start them on the road to 
recovery, there is good reason to believe that our late allies 
view our rejection of the League plan and retirement from 
European politics with remarkable equanimity! This country, 
having done the share of war-work which the European Allies 
had planned for it to do, may soon be dispensed with; — thank 
you, sir! In pursuance of the general situation of disillusion- 

280 



ment on our part with the final results of the war — and es- 
pecially if no early revision of the present Treaty can be 
brought about — we should try to forget our "splendid mistake" 
as speedily as possible, ignore the treaty of Versailles and es- 
cape its burdens and ignominities and make separate settle- 
ments with our enemies of the war. In this way should we 
wash our hands of the evil which has been and of that which is 
yet to come! 

The cornerstone of our changing opinion on the war is the 
realization of the joint responsibility of the original six powers 
for the war. And had we, at all times, understood that Ger- 
many was really waging a defensive war and that the Entente 
Allies were the real aggressors, our attitude in regard to the 
sea zones and the American Shipping question would have been 
different, more like that of the European neutrals, and we 
would have followed a policy of stricter neutrality in regard to 
shipping of arms and supplies to the Allies. Our whole atti- 
tude would have been different; that which under a state of 
fancied hostile provocation led us into embitterment and, 
finally, into war, would have become amenable to diplomatic 
adjustment, as, in similar relations, was the case with Holland, 
the Scandinavian countries and Spain. We see it now all very 
plainly that the Paris Peace was erected upon an error of fun- 
damental fact as to the war causes and the war guilt and that 
the monstrous terms of punishment and humiliation inflicted 
upon the Central powers were the direct outcome of this arti- 
ficial and maliciously assumed position of the Entente allies. 
It reveals the treaty of Versailles as a shocking piece of polit- 
ical fraud which not only dealt out destruction to the enemy 
but also besmirched his honor by mean slanders. These ad- 
vanced views have been hastened not a little by the publication 
of the books on the war by the leading military and diplomatic 
figures of Germany and Austria, in correct translations free 
from the intentionally garbled versions of the first American 
newspaper notices, and unfolding the war story in measured 
and dignified statements of fact. The American people cannot 
be a party to a treaty of peace of such injustice and infamy; 
they must not be! The League-of-Nations proposals, while 
dishonestly made and specially objectionable to us, are really 

281 



of secondary importance; it is the Treaty as a whole which 
must go! 

All this means for us somewhat of a disagreeable admis- 
sion, but America, as well as the rest of the world, must come 
to it! The way is not easy — and it takes time. It was ex- 
pected by many that in the heat of the campaign of last fall 
some open repudiation, some candid avowals of error would 
be made, but the open secret was kept well by both parties — 
the people were not yet considered ripe for hearing the truth — 
their enthusiasm and sacrifices were yet too recent! Instead, 
there was extra vociferous and violent denunciation, on the 
one side, of the League and the terrible things it would do to 
us, and, on the other side, equally strenuous denial and defense. 
It all looked as if we tried by our vehemence to hide our real 
thoughts and feelings on the subject! Neither side really be- 
lieved one-half of what was said. That the League and Treaty 
deserved to be beaten is sui'ely this writer's view, and must 
have been the view of the overwhelming election majority; 
but below the great outward contention there lay hidden those 
other things which we were afraid, as yet, to stir up and 
name — our hurt feelings, on account of our allies, our wounded 
pride and sense of stultification, our uneasy conscience! But 
time will bring truth and the courage to face it — as with Colom- 
bia. This people is honest enough at heart to insist that right 
shall prevail once error has been recognized! 



T'N this progi'ess towards a juster view of the war, President 
■*■ Wilson has taken no part. The total failure of his League- 
of-Nations western campaign tour, in the early fall of 1919, 
and the popularity of the Senate attitude left him untouched. 
Considering the great part he had played, it was, perhaps, 
beyond the power of human nature for him to admit any errors 
of judgment, and even partially the failure of his high en- 
deavors. He could not bring himself to give this country a 
chance to withdraw from the dangerous position into which he 
had led it, to settle down and forget the war, but continued, 
instead, to pour out his invectives against Germany and to re- 
iterate his idealistic war declarations. Like an evil genius this 

282 



man has sat upon the soul of this country — and, in fact, of the 
world — with his inflaming fanaticism and the seductive per- 
suasiveness of his pronouncements! The fire of his argument 
was almost uncanny in its sweeping self-confidence and grand 
disregard of the axioms of human knowledge, experience and 
of the voice of history. His sincerity and honesty of con- 
viction are beyond question ; but he believes himself, even to- 
day, not only right, but infallible in his position on the war; 
he combines in his character the merits of great energy, un- 
bounded enthusiasm, and the lack of practical good sense of the 
confirmed visionary. In his speeches in the aforesaid tour he 
boldly assumed that the American people had not learned any- 
thing about the war since that great peace had been made at 
Paris, and repeated his pre-war arguments unchanged, and 
displayed his intense personal bias against Germany unsoftened. 
But, in addition, he descended to a political cunning and un- 
■scrupulousness in his arguments which astonished the country 
and provoked strong disapproval. 

He began his war argument regularly with the murder of 
the Archduke in Serajevo, and from that basis developed an 
exasperating picture of the dark purposes of Austria and Ger- 
many in regard to their vengeance upon that poor, innocent 
country of Serbia, but remained entirely silent on the histori- 
cal background of the war and the motives behind the murder 
of Francis Ferdinand, silent on the sordid purposes of France 
and England! This mode of presenting the war issue left one 
part of his hearers as much in the dai'k as they had ever been, 
while that section which "had learned something'" was both 
irritated and offended by his lack of courage to tell the truth- — 
that truth which they felt he must surely know. Herein lies, 
in the writer's opinion, the crucial mistake which has cost the 
President his reputation! He failed on his return from Paris, 
himself disillusioned about the Allies and the whole war — a 
wiser and sadder man — to take this people into his confidence 
and to state the facts — gently and dicreetly but yet the facts — 
and to admit his error of judgment and our error of exhub- 
erant patriotism! He remained silent, and is silent and ob- 
durate today; but the facts have not remained silent; and the 

283 



moral strain upon the President of this irritating and depressing 
situation has boken his body and mind! 

The general tone of the President's tirades against Ger- 
many in these L. of N. campaign speeches, and his evident 
intent of inflaming anew the feeling against German-Americans 
by his taunting charges, entirely unproven, of "their lifting 
their heads again in propaganda" were exhibitions extremely 
demagogic and regrettable in a man of his intellectuality 
and position. His general characterization of the Senate op- 
position to the peace treaty and the aspersion cast upon the 
personal motives of the Senators were most lamentable utter- 
ances! It seems incomprehensible that President Wilson should 
have stooped to such raw political methods! Was this loss 
of poise and mental integrity an indication of the unfortunate 
physical collapse which was to overtake him? Was his soul 
not "torn to shreds" as between the merciless jabs of his 
assailants, his own remorseful conscience and his obstinate 
refusal to acknowledge any error? Is it not his moral nature 
which is sick and wounded much more than his physical body? 
The President must realize today that he was possessed by a 
mistaken conception of things — carried away by ideas which 
resided in his imagination and not in the real war situation in 
Europe ; that he has failed at the Paris peace conference ; that 
the League of Nations is an illusory plan and its indorsement 
by the European governments perfunctory or, at most, politic- 
ally selfish; that the most intelligent section of the American 
people have had their eyes opened and cannot be deceived any 
longer about the war and, therefore, do not approve of the 
Treaty of Versailles. What a realization for him! Can we 
wonder at the result? Even the strongest man has his limita- 
tions. His breakdown is a national calamity, a great national 
loss! What a sad difference between this broken, disappointed 
and discredited leader of today and the Woodrow Wilson who 
marched down Fifth Avenue, New York, at the head of the war 
parade, defying the whole world to say him nay! 

But scarcely had this indomitable spirit recovered some- 
what from his attack of collapse but that he rushed forth anew, 
carried away by his obsession. In his letter to Senator Hitch- 
cock, of March 9th, 1920, stating his views and probable action 

284 



on the proposed Senate reservations to Article X, we read again 
the same extravagant declarations about the victory of the 
Allies "having saved the world from dire calamities which were 
iminent from the aggression and pretensions of Germany" ! 
Just what these aggressions and pretensions of Germany were, 
the President did not say; and no one else has, as yet, set them 
forth even in general outline, not to mention in such detail as 
would, in honor, be required in a matter of such terrible pos- 
sibilities! It is one of the greatest puzzles of. the American 
war delusions that this people should have taken these wild- 
goose accusations against Germany without ever demanding 
facts or documentary evidence of these plots of aggression 
by Germany! Nothing of the kind ever appeared in print in 
any part of the world! The said letter to Senator Hitchcock 
was, in part, a deplorable attempt to galvanize the dying war 
feeling of the country to new life and to reaffirm the arti- 
ficial illusions of the war — one purpose as reprehensible as the 
other. In line with his letter was his indorsement of the Vir- 
ginia State Platform as the model for the Democratic platform 
in the 1920 election, which stated that we went into the war 
"to crush a colossal scheme of conquest" — by Germany, of 
course. This country, certainly, had worked itself into a state 
of near insanity on this subject! Further, the President at- 
tempted to make a "point" in the above letter to Senator Hitch- 
cock by representing the apprehensions of "reservation" Sen- 
ators as being unfounded, saying, in effect, "that it was a 
matter-of-course that the recommendations of the League of 
Nations Council were subject to being passed upon, — accepted 
or rejected — by the Constitutional powers of each respective 
country." But, if the President's assertion was correct and 
sincere, and the League of Nations will merely "advise and 
recommend" subject to approval — individually — by the powers 
which compose the League, what great good may be expected 
from it in the hot contentions of self-interest and ambition 
which have ever characterized European politics? Many other 
similar impassioned and hallucinatious pronouncements on the 
war and against Germany have been issued by President Wil- 
son, notably his veto messages on the reservations and the 
"separate peace" resolution. He is possessed by a strong racial 

285 



bias against Germany and is full of resentment against her for 
spoiling his world-savior ambitions; also he holds a set of politi- 
cal theories and assumptions of his own with which he plays to 
the world as upon a musical instrument, in disregard of actual 
facts and reasonable possibilities. We are afraid that no such 
arbitrary political dictums and altruistic visions will ever fit the 
case of Eui'ope! 

Judging President Wilson calmly in his gravitation from 
ostensible neutrality to open hostility towards Germany, it is 
generally acce'pted in the country today, even by his admirers, 
that he was strongly pro-British from the beginning of the war, 
in 1914. His ancestry and mental cast attest this; while he 
tried, at times, to be high-minded, just and impartial, he was 
unable to overcome his natural bias. The German Government 
slighted him twice — very imprudently; the first time by its 
utter silence in answer to his address to the Congress and the 
following declaration of war against Germany on April 6, 1917; 
the second time by its independent peace initiative, in Novem- 
ber, 1916, after having waited for seven months for the Presi- 
dent to take his own promised reciprocity and peace steps 
(which he finally did on December 18, 1916). In both in- 
stances the President's pride and egotism were deeply wounded! 
and after the complete fiasco of his peace endeavors of Decem- 
ber 18, 1916, to January 25, 1917, he threw himself into the 
arms of England without further reserve. Thenceforth he was 
the implacable enemy of Germany, as convincingly stated in 
von Bernstorff's book, and his utterances increased in vehe- 
mence with every speech he made. Colonel House had suc- 
ceeded completely in his work; while, on the one hand, duping 
Ambassador Bernstorff to believe in the President's peace pro- 
fessions, he led the latter into a fanatical frame of mind about 
"fighting for liberty, democracy, and saving civilization'-' from 
those savage Germans. All this was agitation "for a definite 
purpose — the purpose, first, to prevent Germany continuing 
her U-boat warfare at a time when it had the best chance for 
complete success, and, secondly, to deliver this nation as quickly 
as possible as a belligerent ally into the lap of England and 
France! We will conclude this subject with the following in- 
structive American estimate published in the New York papers 
of April 23, 1919: 

SEES DESPAIR OF PEACE. 
Europeans, Says C. S. Davison, Have Turned Against Wilson 

Ideals. 

"Charles Stewart Davison, chairman of the Board of Trus- 
cees of the American Defense Society, who arrived from Europe 
on Monday, said yesterday that both in England and France he 
found among pei'sons representing all social classes and occu- 

286 



pations the opinion that the situation in relation to the Peace 
Conference was unsatisfactory. 

"Some characterized it as a failure," he. said, "some as a 
farce; all denounced the failure to make peace while discussing 
theories of the future relations of the nations. The existing 
situation was attributed to the personal idiosyncrasies of Presi- 
dent Wilson. 

"Among Americans, the opinion was freely expressed that 
the President ought to return home and let Europe settle its 
own questions. All nationalities seemed to agree that the situ- 
ation was growing steadily worse throughout the world and 
would soon be intolerable. 

"All agreed that, on the President's first arrival in France, 
he was generally received as the embodiment of the salvation 
of civilization, and that now Europe was divided into three 
categories in her estimate of him — those who were puzzled, 
those who were angry, and those who despaired. 

"I did not hear the President's course of action approved 
by a single person. The people who seemed to be the most 
bitter about the situation were American army officers. Mean- 
while the general impression throughout Europe appears to be 
that, owing to the situation which has been created, the war 
will have to be fought again in twenty years. 

"The opinion appears to prevail that President Wilson and 
his policies will come to 'be execrated throughout the world. 
Whoever may be at fault it is a sad ending as it stands today, 
to high aspirations." 



America's Unbridled Language. Additional to what has 
been stated on this subject in the supplementary note "The 
Reign of Blind Hate," Article XI, and elsewhere in this book, 
and in the references to President Wilson's speeches in this 
Article XVI, we feel it necessary, as a matter of justice to the 
history of the war, to give a few more of the "pithy" pronounce- 
ments of Mr. Wilson. 

In his message to Congress, early in December of 1917, 
when he was apprised that the German Government was pre- 
paring to take the initiative for a peace move without waiting 
any longer upon his own dilatory tactics, he vented his ire by 
denouncing the German Government as one "without honor, 
conscience or qualities for entering into a peace by treaty," 
adding that "this power must be broken to the ground if not 
literally exterminated." He made an appeal to the German 
people "to get rid of their horrible masters," then would it be 
"possible to conclude a peace of "justice for all peoples." (Prob- 
ably something like the peace of Versailles.) This message 
of the President was followed by an almost equally violent 
speech by Lloyd George, English Premier, in which he called 
the Prussians "criminals and bandits" ; he had previously called 

287 



them' "savages, barbarians and huns." On January 18, 1918, 
President Wilson made his speech of "the fourteen points," 
in which he again urged the German people" to get rid of their 
masters" and erect a power of popular authority "with which 
the Entente could deal." (All this was merely political har- 
rangue to exasperate and divide the German people still more.) 

Following the desperate appeal of Lloyd George to America 
for quick help, in March, 1918, Mr. Wilson replied again: 
"Germany — without conscience, honor or understanding — 
must be crushed;" and on April 6, 1918, at Baltimore, came the 
famous: "Force, force to the utmost, force without measure 
and limit, triumphant force, to restore respect for laws and 
ti'eaties" and to "crush every form of selfish autocracy into 
the dust." To these quotations of what was uttered by the 
leader of this nation must be joined the unbridled abuse of 
Germany politically and of Germans as a race and people by 
the daily papers and periodicals of America and the innumer- 
able "addresses" made by public men and women throughout 
the country. 

Today, only two years after the signing of peace, this atti- 
tude and language appear to all rational men as incomprehen- 
sible and absolutely inexcusable! The "blind fanaticism of 
war" is patent to us now by the mere reading of these expres- 
sions of opinion and feeling. What right did these men have 
to use such language towards a country, its executive heads 
and people with whom we were at complete peace only two 
years previously and for whom we had professed great respect 
and even admiration? The "state of war" cannot excuse such 
presumptuous, dictatory and villifying language against an- 
other people! Excepting a few abusive outbursts by the Eng- 
lish Premier, the foreign statesmen, press and peoples showed 
much more self-restraint in their utterances than obtained here, 
although the war concerned them to a much more acute degree ! 



*TpHE author's views on the war have been unaffected by the 
-*- Peace Conference books, nor have they been qualified by 
the new information brought by the important war books which 
have been published in Germany and Austria during the past 
two years — the books by General Ludendorff, Admiral von 
Tirpitz, von Bethmann-Hollweg, Karl Helfferich, ex-Premier 
Czernin of Austria, ex-Ambassador von Bernstorff and others. 
We may add to these the authoritative English book by Keynes 
on the economic side of the peace treaty, the Memoires of 
Lord Haldane and many other political books and magazine 
articles aiming to explain the war. They make it clear beyond 

288 



question that an understanding, later extended to a complete 
convention, existed between France and England from the 
beginning of the Morocco difficulty, 1898-1904, which culmi- 
nated in the Algeciras conference through Germany's protest 
at being ignored by France and England in the African colon- 
ization questions. And these books make it equally clear that 
this approachment between France and England was not pro- 
voked by any unwarranted assumption of rights in the above 
questions by Germany, nor by any fears of designs of foreign 
conquest or continental domination on her part, but were solely 
inspired by jealousy of her economic rise, military power, 
growth of commercial shipping and naval strength. On the 
part of France, this feeling was augmented by the agitations 
of the irrepressible Delcasse faction for "revenge" for 1871. 

And when, as related in the respective Articles of the book, 
Russia began to realize that the Triple Alliance would compel 
Germany, through her union with Austria, to work against 
Russia's designs and hopes in her southeastern policy, she lent 
a ready ear to the advances of France to join with her and 
England in a general combine — the Triple Entente — against 
Germany and her associates. The entire background of the 
war as given by the writer is thus confirmed : The strengthening 
of the Triple Entente to crush their rival when Germany's 
near-Oriental extension policy should become fully developed; 
the diplomatic moves to alienate Italy from the "Dreibund" 
and to weaken the ties between Greece and Germany; the 
checking of Germany in her endeavor to make other alliances; 
ultimately, the creation of, or seizure, of an opportune occasion 
to bring about her humiliation and retreat under the threat 
of an overwhelming military combination against her. All this 
design was directed by the superior diplomatic skill of the Brit- 
ish against which the open and blunt, not to say clumsy, meth- 
ods of the Germans did not avail. It is also made clear that 
Germany's political form or the personality of the Kaiser had 
absolutely nothing to do with these political and economic rival- 
ries. There is nothing "new" in these views; they are the views 
of the well-educated European of every nationality. They were 
"ignored" only in America; and it is upon this ignorance that 
the Entente built to draw us into the war — on their side! 

289 



The book by General Ludendorff is very valuable in that 
it sheds much light upon the military phases of the war and 
also upon the political developments towards the end of the 
year 1918. And here, again, the author's conception of the 
events, as set forth in Article XIII, is fully sustained by addi- 
tional proofs from Ludendorff's statements. The general had 
been violently attacked in Germany for his apparently con- 
tradictory course, to wit: First, as early as August 11, 1918, 
soon after the first German reverses which followed the suc- 
cessful German drive towards Amiens and Ypres, he suddenly 
pressed for immediate peace with all his influence on the plea 
of the rapid deterioration of the army and its inability to win 
victory against the increasing favorable situation of the enemy; 
second, he issued an emphatic call for the resumption of the 
struggle and for a decision on the battlefield in answer to 
President Wilson's surrender of the aimiistice negotiations into 
the hands of France and England by his tacit consent to the 
excision of the "fourteen points" as the basis of the nego- 
tiations. What is the explanation of this apparent contradic- 
tion in Ludendorff's course? The General does not openly 
state it, but his cautious silence is "revealing" just the same, 
and is no reproach to him. The motive is too intimately con- 
nected with the change of government in Germany, still in the 
formative process, to have permitted him to speak frankly; 
but it is not difficult to put the matter together. 

The doubt entertained in Germany, and by the enemy also, 
as to the fact of the precarious position of the German army 
when Ludendorff first sounded his alarm, has since been proven 
to have been well founded. There were at the time still some 
four millions of well organized soldiers in the German armies 
in France, with ample military supplies, before the final battles 
of the fall of 1918 began. Under united military and political 
leadership they might still have won the war! These armies 
subsequently went through the windup campaigns in the West, 
center and North of the great French fighting ground ; and 
they still fought well, yet were steadily driven back because 
they were morally discouraged and disgruntled, and were, of 
course, greatly weakened in numbers by this retreat. Yet it 
was after these losses, which no one knew better than Luden- 

290 



dorff himself, that he flung out his bugle call and demanded 
resistance to the utmost, and pretended to believe in the possi- 
bility of its success! The motives are very clear now; 
thew were entirely political and such as we have partly 
given them in Article XIII : Ludendorff plainly saw the 
coming of the great political storm in Germany and the threat 
it held to the dynasty, the empire and the German people. It 
was to avert this danger, from patriotic motives and fealty to 
his sovereign and the German Constitution, that he worked for 
peace in the early fall of 1918, but for peace to be secured by 
the Kaiser and his government, by Germany as an empire, 
while these were still existent, and before they should be en- 
gulfed by the gathering forces of the revolution! 

In his estimation, an acceptable peace was at that time 
still procurable from the enemy, though it might have had to 
fall much below what had once been hoped, but would certainly 
have been greatly preferable to the debacle he saw coming. Had 
his view been able to prevail, had it been backed up by the re- 
quired diplomatic ability and the necessary spirit to sacrifice na- 
tional pride and political party ambitions for the sake of the 
rescue of the Fatherland by the offer of "sufficiently humble 
terms," then Germany, the empire and the dynasty might have 
been saved, and the revolutionary eruption, the humiliating 
armistice, the shameful peace, the like fate of Austria, Bul- 
garia and Turkey averted and the entire European and world 
chaos of today made impossible! But it was not to be. The 
political coalition which pressed for surrender, largely to attain 
its own victory and elevation — a design which received strength 
and countenance from the allied, and particularly from the 
"Wilsonian" demand for a "new government emanating from 
the people" in place of that of the Hohenzollern dynasty — did 
not want a peace that would have saved the Imperial govern- 
ment! As between that course and risking the abject sur- 
render of the country — but under their political victory — they 
chose the latter! This combination of incapacity and perfidy 
has seldom been equalled. When Ludendorff became convinced 
of this design, he quickly reversed his position and called for 
a renewal of the Struggle to save the burning ship by a last 
determined effort! But his call came too late; the ship was 

291 



already sinking; the Imperial authority was already gone — and 
Germany went down in the turbulent waves of military defeat 
and political revolution! It is the greatest tragedy the world 
has ever seen! 

The book by von Tirpitz gives us much valuable information 
on pre-war events and important junctures during the conflict, 
but is historically less valuable from its pronounced gossipy 
and vehement "personal" character. The ex-Admiral is in- 
tensely aggrieved against the Kaiser and his government 
because the policies which he recommended were not adopted; 
and he is convinced that if unrelenting U-boat warfare had 
been continued through 1916, instead of being arrested in 
deference to the protests of the United States, Germany would 
have won the war — and there is much evidence to sustain his 
opinion. Being an intensely patriotic man, and believing his 
estimate of the situation absolutely correct, the bitterness of his 
mind is easily understood and his offensive method, in some 
measure, excusable. The inroads that had been made upon 
English shipping by the U-boats up to April, 1916, were con- 
siderable and, had this continued, England would have had no 
chance whatever to prepare herself with protective measures 
against them ; she would have been starved out by the spring or 
summer of 1917 and compelled to sue for peace. This almost 
certain outcome would have made America's entry into the war 
highly improbable! 

How must the Germans feel today, in their terrible plight, 
on reading the Admiral's emphatic statements, on realizing 
"how near they were to victory" at that time, had they but 
possessed the insight and courage of one great statesman at 
home, supported by an ambassador at Washington strong enough 
to withstand the beguiling promises of Col. House about the 
President's "early steps" at London for "reciprocity"! This 
much is certain, that if Germany had even remotely believed 
at that time that America would, at the end, be drawn into the 
war, nothing in the world could have prevented the advice 
of von Tripitz being followed and prosecuted to a victorious 
finish! The whole history of the U-boat warfare, as given by 
the ex-Admiral, is also interesting as revealing — from the vacil- 

292 



lation and irregularity in its employment — that the heart of the 
German government and people was never fully in this measure 
as applied to merchantmen and passenger vessels; it was coun- 
tenanced only as "a warfare of desperation" against the English 
food blockade which was relentlessly squeezing the life out of 
the country, civil and military. 

The books by the German and Austrian statesmen, which 
we have mentioned, occupy themselves chiefly with the his- 
torical background and the political situation just prior to 
the war, and with the diplomatic "note exchanges" from the 
day of the Serajevo tragedy to the actual beginning of hos- 
tilities. Very valuable is the light thrown upon the relations 
between Germany and Austria and upon the "peace moves," 
the substance of which endeavors is embodied in preceding text 
notes. The gist of the contents of these books corroborates 
the author's conception of the war and establishes the follow- 
ing main facts beyond question : First, that the knowledge by 
Austria and Germany of "the real inner meaning" of the Sera- 
jevo murder, of the attitude of Russia and the obstinacy of 
Serbia had, from the first, not only an exasperating effect upon 
them but a depressing one also as to the possibility of pre- 
serving the peace; the whole of the events were to them a clear 
manoeuvre, pre-concocted, to "force the situation" which had 
been long preparing to bring on a tryout between the rival 
power combinations, and the real objects of which were well 
known to them; second, that in spite of this conviction the 
German Government, and the Kaiser personally, did all that 
could be done to induce Russia and Serbia to recede, to urge 
England and France to do the same, to let these powers know 
that Germany was in honor bound to stand by Austria and 
would not shrink from war even if forced to it; third, that it 
was equally clear to Germany and Austria that the failure of 
England to exert pressure upon Russia, together with her am- 
biguous attitude — holding herself threateningly in the back- 
ground while pretending to be working for peace — had no 
other meaning than that a united attempt was being made by 
the Triple Entente to coerce the Triple Alliance to a diplomatic 
backdown under the threat of war, involving a consequent re- 
traction of its political and economic aims, position and power. 

293 



As there was nothing unwarranted about the latter, this pur- 
pose of the Entente was bound to be indignantly rejected! 

From the work by Karl Helfferich, former German vice- 
Chancellor, we obtain unimpeachable and intimate testimony 
of the Kaiser's absolutely peaceable intentions and of the great 
mental agony the prospect of war caused him; likewise of the 
total absence of any schemes of conquest by Germany. How 
the policy of the Entente was wrecked by Germany's ener- 
getic repulse of its implied insinuation has been described in 
Article VIII of this book. It is now equally clear from these 
German and Austrian books that Austria's exacting terms to 
Serbia and Germany's pledge of support were not addressed 
so much to Serbia as to Russia and the other Entente powers 
to coerce them — on the part of the Triple Alliance — to back 
down and relinquish their selfish designs. Had the Entente 
yielded and Russia arrested her mobilization, Austria would 
then, no doubt, have agreed to suspend her terms to Serbia 
(another term for Russia, only). An attempt at a real con- 
ference of the powers might then have been made to prevent 
the extremity of war. Whether success would have been at- 
tained is very problematical, but the attempt would have been 
worth the making. 

The Kaiser himself has also written a book on the war — 
a book giving his personal views and aims — and intended only 
for limited private circulation. As the author has not been 
able to see a "copy" and is confined to "newspaper reports" 
as to the Kaiser's statements, he cannot speak about it with any 
real knowledge. It appears, however, that on the basis of the 
"review in the N. Y. " World," the Kaiser's explanations of the 
long-time political war causes and the course of diplomatic 
events in the month between Serajevo and August 4th, 1914, 
as well as in regard to Germany's readiness for peace at any 
time on reasonable and just terms to all, are identical in all 
principal features with those given by the author in this book. 

The "Diplomatic Memoirs of Lord Haldane", to which we 
have given some attention in a previous article, treat mainly 
of the "Berlin-Bagdad" negotiations with Germany and reveal 
the subtle English methods of diplomacy in furthering grasp- 
ing and dominating designs upon other nations by outward 

294 



candor and affability. The presentation of the same subject 
in the Vol. I of Karl Helfferich's "The World War," in which 
the negotiations are given in detail, step for step, effectually 
disposes of Lord Haldane's position and explanations. 

In addition to the deductions we have previously drawn 
from the various "books of revelation" on the Paris Peace Con- 
ference, they are all open to the charge of being written strictly 
from the position of the Allies, which is assumed to be infallibly 
correct; they do not contain one illuminating ray of truth on 
the main issue — the political and ethical causes of the war — 
and are, therefore, worthless historically except in so far 
as they record the detail incidents of the conference and re- 
flect its atmosphere and the relative positions and aims of its 
leading figures. The "conference" followed too soon upon the 
war itself to allow those who attended it — from Prime Ministers 
down to newspaper correspondents — to disembarrass them- 
selves of its sinister influence and obtain the judicial and his- 
historical viewpoint. The atmosphere of concealment and false 
accusation, which we have fully analyzed in a previous article, 
gave the keynote to everything that was said and done! 

But on one subject these several books are not only valu- 
able but also unanimous, either by direct statement or permis- 
sible inference. From all of them the extraordinary fact ap- 
pears that, with all his lofty declarations of idealistic world 
policies, the President seems to have had no definite and prac- 
tical plans as to how to attain these objects by political enact- 
ments. His energies were mainly bent upon the adoption of 
his League-of -Nations plan and its inclusion in the treaty; be- 
yond that object he seems to have allowed Messrs. Clemenceau, 
Lloyd George and Orlando to do much as they pleased with his 
ideals, the enemy and world peace! For instance, the terri- 
torial assignments made, on the President's plea for the "self- 
determination of nationalities," were so unjustly and ignorantly 
made in regard to Germany and Austria that it is impossible for 
them to stand. The crime committed against Austria and Hun- 
gary particularly under this impractical Wilsonian dictum is a 
frightful one! Hate, greed for political power, and a spirit 
of unparalleled victor's vengeance reigned at Paris — not hu- 
manitarian ideals and a genuine and intelligent desire to secure 

295 



a just and lasting world peace. Yet, President Wilson was 
present all the time and agreed to the monstrous settlement 
made! 

The book by ex-Ambassador von Bernstorff is very inter- 
esting to America in showing that through the absence of fre- 
quent and ample communication with the German government, 
he became, in a measure, isolated and out of contact with the 
true state and relation of events at home, and perhaps through 
that fell a victim to the persuasiveness of Colonel House and 
the President's promises on the subject of America's peace 
endeavors. He gauged the American trend for war correctly, 
and so informed his government, but failed to see the game of 
procrastination being played in Washington to frustrate Ger- 
many's U-boat warfare and thus gain time for Allied counter- 
preparations. He is frequently in flat contradiction with Karl 
Helfferich, but the latter's explanations of events have the 
weight of full knowledge and official evidence on their side. 
The ambassador makes an emphatic denial of his connection, 
officially or private, with the German propaganda in this 
country. 

On the economic and financial side of the Versailles peace 
we must speak again of the English book by Mr. Maynard 
Keynes because of the thoroughness and lucidity of his state- 
ments and the irresistible logic of his facts and figures, com- 
piled by an expert in statistics. His book is a scathing arraign- 
ment of the work of the Paris conference, of the incredible ig- 
norance and shortsightedness on all practical matters of pro- 
duction, commerce and finance on the part of the men into 
whose hands the fate of the world was committed! The tes- 
timony of this cool-headed author on the "pitiable littleness 
and arrogant hypocrisy" of the spirit of the Paris conference — 
its total lack of broad outlook and loftiness of conception of 
its great task — throws a vivid light upon the mockery of rea- 
son, pledges, justice and ordinary foresight which produced 
the abortive peace of Versailles. 

All the above books, and many others, leave a common void 
— to the great disappointment of the deluded public of the 
world — the void of failing to disclose the slightest evidence of 
the existence of a set design by Germany, or Germany and 

296 



Austria, to precipitate a war of conquest and domination, as has 
been represented by the war propagandas. The policy of the 
two empires is clearly revealed to have been nothing more than 
the legitimate protection of their political integrity and the 
making of such extensions of influence and economic connec- 
tions by treaties and commercial enterprises as were entirely 
justified and to the injury of no other countries. On all this, 
the war and Paris conference books coming from the Allies 
are silent; no acknowledgements, no admissions of error, no 
explanations on the basis of well-established facts; nothing but 
a stubborn adherence to their fabricated war story! And this 
void has been greatly deepened by the absolutely barren results 
of the much-heralded "disclosures" to come from the examina- 
tion of the "secret archives" of the Berlin and Vienna Foreign 
Offices. The expectations of the extreme socialists particu- 
larly, who had worked themselves into a fury of hate against 
the old order, were sadly discomfited by the emptiness of said 
archives, which held no "secrets" of any importance and fur- 
nished no additional information of moment upon the diplo- 
macy of the war. Nor did the new democratic German govern- 
ment's official investigation by a special committee of the Reichs- 
tag into the "causes of the war", with the aid of these papers 
from the archives and the personal depositions, under oath, of 
ex-Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Karl Helfferich, Von 
Jagow, Zimmermann, General Ludendorff and others who had 
held important posts in the army and navy and Imperial For- 
eign Office, bring out any evidence of nefarious designs or 
world plots, of secret terrible conspiracies against other nations 
or interests! Alas! it was all the other way; the plotting for 
suppression, conquest, gain and revenge was on the part of 
Germany's enemies; and German diplomacy was all too blunt 
and candid and lacking in finesse to be able to checkmate or 
dispel these machinations! 



TPHE political plight of the four new states carved out of the 

old Austrian empire carries less danger to peace (they all 

being too helpless and distracted) than the situation on the 

Rhine and in Upper Silesia, but it is for that so much more 



297 



pathetic and dramatic. The treatment of Hungary by the Paris 
peace, in having some of her choicest districts, overwhelmingly 
Hungarian in history and feeling, wrenched away from her 
without even a plebiscite, and arbitrarily assigned to Serbia 
and Roumania as "political rewards" is an act almost unbeliev- 
able in its brazen unscrupulousness. As to German-Austria — 
the heart of the former empire; — she has not only been crippled 
economically beyond the power of existence, her agricultural 
mainstay divided among the adjoining States, but her "natural" 
and ardent desire for economic union and political association 
with the German Republic has been denied at Paris from mo- 
tives of arrant political jealousy and in open defiance of the 
dictum of "self-determination." To let her join Germany 
would have added to the strength of both — and that would be 
entirely opposed to France's imperialistic policy! In the South, 
the contest between Jugo-Slavia and Italy over the possession 
of Fiume, etc., and the control of the Adriatic has at last been 
settled, but it is a temporary settlement, dictated by the stern 
necessity for peace and recuperation, and the issue will be re- 
opened before many years will have passed. In Czecho-Slo- 
vakia (formerly Bohemia, Moravia and the eastern part of 
Galicia of the Austrian empire) there is a reign of close rivalry 
and bitter feeling between the Slavs and the Germans, who in 
many cities and districts are almost equally matched in num- 
bers and influence, preventing the country settling down to 
peace and work. 

We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that it would be 
no surprise of history if these four States of former Austria 
should, after a few years, draw together again to a new "con- 
federation" to act as a unit in regard to economic necessities 
and external policies. There are indications even now that such 
currents are at work. This prospect arises from the very nature 
of the former Austria. The old monarchy, or rather confed- 
erate empire, was not, properly speaking, the result of con- 
quests but of a natural association of States or peoples which, 
individually, lacked the necessary physical and political quali- 
fications for independent life and were thus combined to a unit 
able to hold its own in the broilpot of European politics. Thus 
may history repeat itself! Adding to all the foregoing the 

298 



chaos in Russia and Turkey, the Shantung dispute, the total 
collapse and intense suffering of all these peoples, we have be- 
fore US the complete failure of the Versailles treaty: Nothing 
definitely settled anywhere and resolved in a statesmanlike 
manner and frankly accepted; no one satisfied, not even those 
who were assumed to have been benefitted; everywhere gaps 
and fractures and open wounds left to breed new complica- 
tions, thoughts of retaliation, resolve to force necessary cor- 
rections! The author ventures to predict that if this monu- 
ment of incapacity and cupidity — the Versailles Treaty — is not 
speedily revised by man, by man recollecting his proclaimed 
principles and promises, it will be revised by irresistible fate 
itself — the cold logic of facts and events — in a manner too 
awful to contemplate! 



'Tp HE most illuminating political denouement of the war is now 
A taking place in the Turkish dominions and Persia by the 
gradual unfolding of England's Oriental policy. Daily her scheme 
of converting Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Persia, Palestine, 
Egypt and Arabia into "a political and economic dependency" 
of Great Britain becomes more clearly apparent. This need 
not necessarily mean conquest or literal annexation but merely 
such political control as will insure the desird economic advan- 
tages for England, including the incidental protection to her 
Indian interests. It includes a continuous land-route of com- 
munication with India in addition to present and future sea 
routes from ports of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Seas. 
How familiarly all this sounds! Did we not have occasion to 
say something at several places in this book of a certain Berlin- 
Bagdad railroad and eastern-extension policy by that black- 
souled country — Germany — for the purpose of securing addi- 
tional supply sources of raw materials and new markets, and a 
land-route and sea connection to the Orient, independent of the 
unreliable sea-route through the English channel? And did we 
not say that this foolhardy plan on the part of upstart Germany 
was not much to the liking of England because of its threat of 
interference with the latter's own plans and interests and be- 

299 



cause of the challenge it offered to her "undisputed supremacy" 
in European affairs? Again, has it not seemed strange to 
large numbers of the credulous of the world that England, who 
was very hard-pressed in Europe in the war up to the last six 
months thereof, should, instead of concentrating all her forces 
in Europe, have maintained from the beginning large forces 
to challenge the Turk in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, Arabia, 
Egypt? 

The reason of this is now made plain to all: England 
wished from the very start to secure her victory in the Orient 
above all else, because it was there where her real interest in 
the world war lay! Is there anyone left, after these revela- 
tions, to believe that anything else but commercial and political 
antagonism was England's motive in the war? Does anyone 
doubt that France shared these motives of jealousy and, in ad- 
dition, had for years nursed her ambition to repay her defeat 
of 1870 and reconquer Alsace-Lorraine and inaugurate a 
policy of imperialistic annexations against Germany? Can 
there be any question that Russia's sole purpose in the war was 
to bring her rivalry with Austria and Turkey for domination 
in the Balkan States to an issue to realize her Constantinople- 
Meditei'ranean dream by any means, at any cost? There 
were other contributory but secondary causes of the war, but 
the above were and remain the principal ones! There were im- 
portant incidents — the defection of Italy, Greece and Rou- 
mania — all accidental, political and not elementary. The entry 
of America, important as it was in its results, was also merely 
an incident, in no wise connected with the "beginning-causes" 
of the war. We can thus say with full conviction that the men- 
dacious and malicious war motives advanced by the European 
and American propagandas against Germany are now disproven 
and have collapsed! And we can also say that these false war 
motives of England and the other Entente powers — advanced 
to hide their real designs — were, unfortunately, believed by 
the majority of the American people to be the genuine ones — 
a delusion which has cost us a hundred thousand lives and a 
twenty-billion war debt! 

There will be many readers who will find it difficult to 
harmonize the emphatic condemnation of the spirit of England's 

300 



war politics contained in this book with her evident disposition 
to be much more reasonable towards the Germans and other 
former enemies than the French and other Entente allies, and 

willing that they be given a revision of the peace terms — by 
enactment or interpretation — and every help and opportunity 
of rebuilding their shattered countries. To those who are de- 
ceived by these manifestations of kindliness as to their real 
nature we will say that the British character and position 
towards other nations have ever been this: Admit our mental 
and physical superiority as a race, and our consequent natural 
right to the dominating position we occupy as the first political, 
commercial and sea-power — and we will be quite glad to let 
you live alongside of us — as our contributing friends! But 
regarding France, it is quite clear that her unflinching ferocity 
towards Germany, exacting the ultra maximum possible of 
"punishment" and "restitution" at the same time, including 
annexation or control of her most valuable natural resources 
in her desire to crush her enemy to the ground forever, is born 
of the fear of Germany's inherent strength to rise again in spite 
of all and strike back! Does she realize the awful wrong she 
is committing in thus planting the seeds of a new war of re- 
venge more terrible than the last? England, equally guilty of 
the war, and even more so than France, has a different tem- 
perament: She knows neither fear nor pangs of conscience, 
and is ready to assuage the consequences of the war — now that 
she has won — no matter how — and wants to enjoy the fruits — 
by her conspicuous suavity and apparent fairness, no less agree- 
able and effective because thoroughly hypocritical! 



T EAVING the political side and turning to the moral 
*— ' and material situation of the people of Europe, we find 
them in a state of sentimental disorganization and physical suf- 
fering which defies description. In Germany, Austria and 
Hungary the extreme socialistic and democratic sections are 
possessed by a frenzy of violent hatred of the former Imperial 
governments and their rulei-s, and all and everything connected 
with them, and of the idea of the monarchy in general. AH this 
has found expression in most shocking and humiliating exhibi- 

301 



tions of revolution and indescribable acts of brutality. We 

have referred to this before. From the manifestos issued by 
these "parties," it is seen that nothing could exceed their 
fantastic conceptions of the "idea" and the merits of "people's 
rule." Not even the unreasoning opposition to "capitalism" by 
the socialists in general equals the blind hatred of these polit- 
ical extremists for the empires which have been destroyed — 
only yesterday wonderful aggregations of organization, pros- 
perity and power, and the admiration of the world! 

This new "democratic" element calls upon the German 
people particularly for "confession of their guilt," for repu- 
diation of their former political spirit of achievement and great- 
ness, for "repentance" and humble petition for reception into 
the haven of the League of Nations of their enemies! No con- 
duct more craven, abject, demoralized bas ever been shown 
before the world and exposed a great and deserving people to 
its contempt and ridicule! It is the work of men who have cast 
aside all self-respect, racial pride and patriotism, of men led 
astray by alluring political doctrines and distracted by unset- 
tling social and ethical theories — left devoid of old ideals and 
new guides alike. ALL our reasoning on these subjects, as 
given in Articles XIII, XIV and XV, has thus received a terrible 
confirmation beyond the author's worst apprehensions! One 
should have to despair utterly of Germany's right and ability 
to revive if this spirit were prevalent to a decisive extent. 
But the quiet people of Germany — those who "suffer and hide 
their faces" — are yet as stunned by their experiences; the 
whole situation is still unreal to them; daily they ask them- 
selves the question: "How did it happen, how could it ever 
happen?" Their thoughts and emotions are turned into morbid 
channels, their mental balance is upset; their sad condition 
raises the threat of psychological disorders on a national scale 
which it may take decades of normal, quiet existence to over- 
come. Similar conditions prevail in Austria and Hungary — 
complete political, social and ethical disruption and material 
collapse! 

To these mental and moral sufferings must be added the 
physical ones of hunger, cold, want of every kind — intense and 
widespread as described in a previous chapter. The evidence 

302 



of the many committees of investigation and relief and the 
report made by Mr. Henry P. Davison, Chairman of the Board 
of Governors of the League of Red Cross Societies, about a 
year ago, and other similar reports show that the conditions 
were not overdrawn in the daily press. They are only slowly 
improving now. Scarcely a family can be found on the conti- 
nent of Europe that has not suffered the loss of one or more 
sons, or of the father or both, in the war, the destruction of 
business, income and capital. The harvest of death from 
sickness and malnutrition in Germany and Austria has been 
frightful! The American people has generously opened its 
heart and purse-strings to the appeal for help, but more and 
continued assistance is needed to prevent these abnormal con- 
ditions reacting upon our own welfare, in the opinion of Mr. 
Davison, Mr. Hoover and other observers. 

Yet, all this harrowing picture has not brought the under- 
standing in America, to any great extent, that these conditions 
are not so much the result of the war itself as of the infamous - 
life-crushing Versailles peace treaty which has paralyzed all 
material agencies of existence and killed all ambition and hope 
in the former enemy countries. Nor is it, as yet, fully under- 
stood that the same cause is at the bottom of our own after- 
war conditions of inflation, profiteering, economic and finan- 
cial disorganization. The burdens laid upon the enemy are in- 
human and cry out for quick relief before it is too late! Let 
us hasten! Let us also speak the word of regret, of acknowl- 
edgement of error and of injustice done in the heat of war 
passion, and therewith rekindle in the hearts of these stricken 
people of Europe their faith in mankind, their hope, self-con- 
fidence and energy to live and work! This would be worth 
more to them than all the millions of money we could send; 
it would include all else from us and from themselves! The 
American Senate — and people — should not only protest the 
League-of-Nations plan on account of its un-American condi- 
tions but should insist on a rational and just revision of the 
Versailles Treaty on the basis argued in this book as the 
sine qua non requisite of the United States of America becom- 
ing a party to this peace settlement and assuming any of its 
burdens ! 

303 



But the preceding is not the whole after-war picture; there 
is another side to it even more alarming. There is the evidence 
that the war has been an orgie of legitimate and even more 
of illegitimate money-making, of heartless exploitation of in- 
exorable conditions of necessity, of fortunes lost by thousands 
and won by lucky or unscrupulous other thousands, involving 
a widespread shifting of social relations and scale. This hap- 
pened not only in the defeated countries, but also in those of the 
victors. And turning to these, we find that the war has left psy- 
chological scars upon them no less deep and far-reaching than 
upon the others. Due partly to this sudden acquisition of wealth 
by many, also to the general rise of earnings by labor and of 
profits by merchants but even more to the disgruntlement at the 
disappointing final results of the war, we have the reigning era 
of extravagance, gambling and fast living now running in Eng- 
land, France and America and even in the large cities of Ger- 
many and Austria! One should think that the colossal catas- 
trophe of the war upon victor and vanquished alike would have 
cast a deep gloom upon all, even the fortunate, and have 
directed their minds into serious channels. This is no doubt 
the case with the majority in the defeated countries. But even 
there, to some extent, and generally in the other countries, the 
public seems to be in a veritable riot of frivolity as if possessed 
by a sub-conscious impulse to stifle by the din and excitement 
of purely physical extravagances the recollection of the awful 
tragedy of the war and the reproach of the tormenting after- 
math; silence the unrelenting "knocking at the door of con- 
sciousness and conscience" of all those disillusions and revul- 
sions of feeling which we have endeavored to analyze in the 
preceding articles. 

No published books or magazines, as far as the writer is 
aware, have made a serious and adequate attempt to describe 
and sum up this psychological affliction. Superficial explana- 
tions, lame excuses, vain boastings, artificial reinforcing of our 
shattered self-confidence are filling the air aplenty, but of fear- 
less critical examination there is little. But the world is too 
deeply torn and stirred and too seriously sick to be thus easily 
pacified and cured! It needs the surgeon's scalpel to cut out 
all the dead ideas of the past, the accumulated errors of concep- 

304 



tion and practice which the war has brought to the full con- 
sciousness of startled and trembling mankind! The feeling of 
doubt and anxiety which permeates all men, from the statesman 
to the laborer, from the preacher to the business man, must be 
met with something tangible, something positive. Not opiates 
and plasters are wanted to ease the symptoms but a real elixir 
of new faith, hope, life! This author claims no patent in the* 
premises; there are many minds of authority, learning and in- 
fluence who know the cause to be as he has stated it — but only 
a few seem to have come forward to speak out and shake the 
fabric of our inherited delusions and their tyrannical embodi- 
ment. The war has unmistakably brought the growing skepti- 
cism of a century and a half of "free thought" to a focus; it 
has struck a stunning blow in the face of our high-flown pre- 
tensions and has exposed our littleness, wickedness, silliness, 
arrant conceit and skin-deep civilization to our own contempt! 
The amazing revelation should make us sick at heart and thor- 
oughly ashamed of ourselves! 

The author has in preceding articles set forth in main out- 
line a "philosophy of regeneration" for these conditions. It is 
a radical plan, a complete reversal of life conception and out- 
look; but he is convinced that the current propositions of "prac- 
tical" betterments, of concessions to this class and that, of the 
whole line of the present groping socialistic and political en- 
deavors will bring but superficial and temporary results, if not 
accompanied by a new system of ethics. Men and women 
everywhere are yearning and crying for the truth about them- 
selves, for a new, natural and appealing life philosophy founded 
on that truth and free from the buncomb, cant and imposition 
of past teaching! A new point of view is needed, a radical 
change of feeling and reasoning, a vital ideal in which we can 
truly believe! May the light of this new view of the world and 
of our existence here rise aggressively from this war and purge 
our effete civilization of all its ailings! Then shall we perhaps 
be able to say that the great war was not fought in vain! 



305 



TN view of the position this author has taken in regard to "Bol- 
■*■ shevism," it seems desirable to add a short word on the 
present situation in Russia. We have credited bolshevism with 
a promising framework of political and social reform, far in 
advance of merely utilitarian socialism in lucidity and com- 
prehensiveness. It represents a "fundamental" reform of so- 
*ciety in all its aspects, not merely a plan of change and adapta- 
tion within the existing ideas. It addresses itself to a radical 
reform of those material causes of discontent, surfeit, in- 
equality, injustice — and those of ethical perversion and false 
pretense — which we have pointed out. We have criticized the 
movement on the general lines of the "rationalistic life phi- 
losophy" as to its detail aims and methods. These, however, 
may in time be corrected to a more perfect and practically 
workable system of great merit. 

Has bolshevism, with its radical departure from the old 
ideas of government and society accomplished anything real, 
akin to success in Russia so far? As yet the answer must be 
uncertain; and the reasons for this are many and varied. 
While the other countries of Europe are today deep in the strug- 
gle with the disastrous after-war results, Russia has had even a 
harder road to travel. Emerging, after her important efforts 
in the war, from the blood and fire of one of the most violent 
political revolutions the world has seen, she gravitated, after 
the second stage of her revolt, in November, 1917, to her 
present form of a communistic republic, organized in "com- 
munities of common interest" — geographical and occupational 
— and based on advanced political and sociological views long 
advocated by the best thinkers of all nations on these absorb- 
ing topics. Thus Russia has, in addition to the effects of mili- 
tary defeat and revolution, gone through the upheaval and 
severities of a complete political, social and ethical transfor- 
mation such as has never before been undertaken in any 
country. 

The transformation is even greater than that attempted 
by the French revolution. It has brought a radical change 
in the Russian people's life relations, mode of work, civil ad- 
ministration, public and private ethics, property standards, etc. 
And at the same time that this tremendous work of reorganiza- 

306 



tion was proceeding, the new government had to face and 
combat internal opposition by masses and classes, counter-revo- 
lutions and the attacks of the external enemies, sent or sup- 
ported by Russia's former allies in the great war, to destroy 
this viper of Russian freedom and independence — bolshevism — 
because its principles are considered a threat to "the estab- 
lished social and moral order" — that order which produced the 
brutal war and the brutal peace — and which we have analyzed 
in this book in all its disappointing aspects! The bolshevist 
government has performed the marvelous feat of beating down 
most of its military enemies, native and foreign, and of over- 
coming much of the internal opposition to the new idea — but 
there is a force which it has not been able to overcome and 
which is working to bring about the failure of the whole 
program of bolshevist reform. That force is the ignorant 
il will of a prejudiced world clinging to its old social and ethical 
ideas although the failure of these ideas has been demonstrated 
for a half-a-century and been made glaringly apparent to all 
by the occurrence of the war and its revelation of our cup- 
idity and littleness. This force of ignorance, prejudice and 
blind hate is not content with throwing every vile epithet at 
this movement and stamping it as the work of the devil him- 
self, but has left — and continues to leave — Russia isolated, 
shunned, abandoned to herself to sink or swim as best she may, 
refusing all commercial intercourse, all supplies of materials 
for industry, all financial aid or credits! 

It was but natural that the great reformation of society 
attempted in Russia should, at the beginning, have interfered 
with normal activities and that, in consequence, production was 
curtailed and want and suffering brought on in many directions. 
It was, also, unavoidable that in the working-out of the details 
of this system many mistakes would be made. This circum- 
stance had gradually somewhat reacted on the general situa- 
tion in Russia, producing a degree of disappointment with, and 
accusations against, bolshevism as having failed to real'ze its 
expectations and promises. In combination with the external 
pressure, the total result today is a situation of want, suffering, 
business collapse and general disorganization even greater than 
that in the defeated countries. In consequence we have this 

307 



disgraceful position which the world today occupies towards 
Russia: To push her, by refusal of all material help, by re- 
fusal to fully lift the blockade of her ports, by refusal to rec- 
ognize the bolshevist government to her utter ruin — and 
then to point to "bolshevism" as the cause of it all and thus 
strike it down by indirection! It is not fought squarely on 
the value of its socialistic theories or political aims; brute force 
is the agency used in the place of argument! It is to be denied 
a chance even to demonstrate its alleged "errors" by its fail- 
ure in practical application, and is to be killed by imposing 
upon the Russian people hunger, despair, collapse, desperation! 
Daily the papers print these exulting reports: "Bolshevism 
cannot last six months; bolshevism is doomed; the industrial 
standstill of Russia is complete; bolshevism succumbs to the 
blockade," etc. And all of this shameful, cruel, cowardly dem- 
onstration is made while mankind is fully aware of the anomaly 
of its old ideas of society, morals and political form, aware of 
the fermentation among the masses, the friction among the 
classes, the sham of our "democracy", the arrogant triumph cf 
"money" over everything else, the breakdown of the old codes 
of conduct and the demand for new standards, views, methods, 
ideals! Now that this dark design of driving Russia — because 
of bolshevism — to economic collapse and starvation has suc- 
ceeded and famine has actually overtaken large sections of the 
country, these same external enemies rush in with "relief 
trains" to ameliorate the misery and failure to which they have 
so largely and designedly contributed!! 

The great difficulty in Russia with bringing the communistic 
republic to an immediate success lies largely in the fact that 
the leaders of the movement had no concrete example of a 
successful similar form of society and political State before 
them from ancient or modern times from whose record they 
might have profited and whose "constitutions" they might have 
adapted to their requirements. It is also particularly unfortu- 
nate that this form of socialism should have been first brought 
to a practical test in so vast and populous a country as Russia, 
with such limited means of communication, and under the hin- 
dering material conditions which followed the war. Reason 
and former experiments of similar character demonstrate that 
any highly advanced form of popular government, combined 
with socialistic ideas (which exact the best grade of popular 

308 



education, intelligence and personal devotion from the indi- 
vidual citizen) should first be "worked out" in a smaller coun- 
try of the size of Holland or Belgium or Bavaria and not 
exceeding twenty millions in population. Within such a modest 
compass the problems of principle and practical application of 
such a new system can be more readily tested and perfected 
and made ready for adoption in larger countries. (See the 
fuller elaboration of this thought in "National Evolution" by 
this author.) 

But Bolshevism — a simple form of democratic communistic 
society — whether the present experiment in Russia survive or 
go down — has at least successfully revealed a "new idea," a 
step forward towards freedom and salvation from present dis- 
appointments, because even its worst enemies could not deny — 
if it should succumb — that its fall came from outside opposi- 
tion m'ore than from internal weakness! The compound com- 
bination of forces against it never allowed the system a fair, 
full and peaceable chance of demonstration. The experiment 
may yet succeed ; at all events the idea will survive and return 
soon, purged of its present shortcomings, as the new star out 
of the East to show the world a new and better way to live! 




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